Tag Archives: WWII

North American P-51B Mustang

sweden flag USA (1943)
Fighter Aircraft – 3,738 Built

 

A P-51B undergoes testing at a Lockheed reassembly plant in Liverpool, UK. December 1943. [National Archives]
Initially developed to provide an export alternative to the P-40 for France and the UK, North American’s P-51 would prove to be a superb aircraft that would rank among the most decisive weapons of the Second World War. With its streamlined airframe and highly efficient cooling system, the aircraft would reach new heights when equipped with the far more advanced Packard Merlin engine. Though its early years would prove troublesome, it would solve long standing issues regarding the lack of long range bomber escorts, and achieve a level of performance beyond its Axis contemporaries.

Interwar Fighter Developments

The Merlin powered P-51’s share the distinction of being among the most successful fighter aircraft ever developed, but also having one of the convoluted development paths of any mass production fighter. While the aircraft would make its first flights in 1943, it had its roots in the late interwar period where many of the technologies it incorporated were first established.

US interwar fighter development saw rapid technical advancement, but a comparatively small build up of planes. Here an XP-40 undergoes wind tunnel testing, the design would go through a number of changes that would result in the P-40. [This day in Aviation]
The general environment of interwar fighter development for the US Army Air Corps was one of high theoretical advancement, but comparatively slow practical development. While major milestones were made in regards airframe and powerplant design, there was considerably less urgency to develop and mass produce fighters for use by the Air Corps. This was mostly a result of an isolationist foreign policy, which limited availible resources, and to a lesser degree, a desire within the Air Corps to focus on bomber procurement. While the development of new fighters was limited, the Air Corps had great freedom in procuring aircraft for testing purposes. While funding was still limited, they were allowed to procure up to 14 examples of an aircraft through their budget before they would need to petition Congress for additional funding. While a large build up of the Air Corps during this period was a financial and political impossibility, it would prove sufficient for exploring aircraft design and development. This environment would exist into the late 1930’s as the political situations in both Europe and Asia destabilized, and subsequently, the order was given to continue the development of the XP-38, XP-39, and XP-40 into new fighters for use with the Air Corps (Ethell 9).

While these aircraft were being prepared for service, vital new developments were being made in regards to airframe design. At the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) offices at Langley field, efforts had been made to produce airfoils which could achieve laminar flow. In short, this effect is characterized by minimal disruptions to the airflow of the surfaces of the wings and adjoining fuselage. In the context of fighter aircraft, this allowed for a much lower drag coefficient, which would permit better acceleration and would lessen the instability encountered at higher Mach numbers. They would achieve this by June of 1938 when an airfoil displayed laminar flow characteristics in wind tunnel tests (Ethell 10).

Europe Ablaze

The escalation to and the outbreak of hostilities in Europe would completely dispense with the interwar malaise and saw the US begin a massive arms build up. The most notable shift in policy was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s call for 50,000 aircraft in January of 1940. The resulting surge of orders would end up leaving most US aircraft manufacturers at capacity, and though they would satisfy domestic demand, the fulfillment of export orders was not a priority. This represented a serious issue facing the Allies in Europe. At the outbreak of the war, the French and British air forces were still largely in the process of expanding and modernizing. While they both possessed examples of modern fighter aircraft, such as the Dewoitine D.520 and Supermarine Spitfire Mk.I’s respectively, they also employed a large number of outdated aircraft in comparison to the better equipped German Luftwaffe. The expedient solution to this problem seemed to be to purchase aircraft abroad, and the US was by far the best source.

To this end British and French interests were served by the British Purchasing Commission. While they had decided on the ideal candidate being the Curtis-Wright P-40, they found the at-capacity firm unwilling to compromise its contracts to the US Army. They were soon negotiating with other firms for P-40’s which would be manufactured under license, and by 1940 had placed as many orders as they could. It was clear to all parties involved that any of the larger firms that were involved in US rearmament would be unable to deliver any sizable number of aircraft to the Allies. In January of 1940, Oliver Echols, in charge of Air Corps procurement, would suggest to the Purchasing Commission to approach a manufacturer that lacked any major contracts involved with US rearmament (Ethell 10).

This suggestion would see the British Purchasing commission returning to older offers from firms that they had turned down the previous year. The most important of these would be North American Aviation. North American had earlier proposed to build P-40’s under license for the Allies, though the offer was given little consideration (Ethell 10). They were likely turned down over their relative inexperience in the field of fighter aircraft, having previously built advanced trainers, like the AT-6 Texan, and the crude NA-50 and NA-68 export fighters. In spite of this, and finding few options among other US aircraft manufacturers, the British Purchasing commission would once again approach North American. This time however, North American was given the option to either produce license-built P-40’s, or instead to design a new aircraft with the aid of research data acquired from Curtiss-Wright on the XP-46 fighter prototype. NAA’s small, but enthusiastic team would choose the latter, and prepared to design a new fighter built around the Alison V-1710 engine.

Enter North American

North American’s greatest claim to fame before the Mustang was the AT-6, arguably the best advanced trainer of its day. [Wikimedia]
By the standard’s of most US industries of the time, North American Aircraft was a fledgling company, though one with great promise. It was originally formed as a holding company in 1929 to purchase stock in other aviation concerns, and was later incorporated under General Motors’ General Aviation branch. As a holding company, North American would gather a considerable amount of resources in these early years, of particular note was the firm’s acquisition of Fokker. In 1934, as a result of new regulations on air mail carriers, General Motors was required to divest itself of North American, which then became an independent firm. Thereafter, North American incorporated its parent company, General Aviation, and continued under the direction of its president James H. ‘Dutch’ Kindelberger (O’Leary 9). He would subsequently take the company west in 1936 where they would open a new facility at Mines Field, California. Prior to the war they would develop the O-47 reconnaissance and observation aircraft, which had begun under General Aviation, and the AT-6 advanced trainer, which was among the most successful designs of its type. They would also produce a set of unsuccessful export fighters which were altogether unimpressive. With this in mind it’s understandable North American was initially passed over, they were in fact, inexperienced in fighter development and their only real foray into that field was a disappointment. However, when the British Purchasing commission returned to the company in 1940, they found the firm more than ready to meet their needs. Their contract was worked out for 400 planes at a price no higher than $40,000 dollars a unit, and spare parts in the amount of 20% of the value of the aircraft.

The first step in developing the new fighter was purchasing the most recent data on fighter design from Curtiss-Wright’s XP-40 and XP-46 prototypes, and acquiring the new breakthrough aerofoil designs recently developed under NACA (Ethell 10, 11). This information was made available to the design team headed by Edgar Schmued, a German born aeronautical engineer who had previously been a GM field service manager for their Brazil branch. The work soon began on a new fighter under the designation NA-50B, later changed to NA-73, under a common and straightforward design strategy. Schmued would work to build a plane that would excel by incorporating all of the most recent developments in fighter design to produce an aircraft that was both cutting edge, yet conventional (Douglas 252). The Curtiss-Wright prototypes were a starting point that was quickly surpassed, with engineer and aerodynamicist Ed Horkey considering the prototypes too dated for use on the new project, and the data was discarded (Forsyth 13). This came as somewhat of a blow considering they were forced to pay about $50,000 for the test data. The same cannot be said for the data acquired from NACA.

Edgar Schmued would join North American through its parent company’s acquisition of Fokker. He would lead the team responsible for designing the Mustang which would be developed continuously through the Second World War. [alchetron]
Horkey would come across NACA’s research through a confidential release for American industrial use, and was convinced that it would make an excellent addition to the new fighter’s design. NAA would send a representative to collect the data from NACA at Langley Field, and they would go on to receive minor technical support. While the design did not possess true laminar flow characteristics, it did drastically reduce drag and improve the performance of the aircraft (Ethell 11). Further streamlining was achieved through the mounting of a low drag, centerline radiator which incorporated the work of British scientist, Dr. F.W. Meredith. This divergent-convergent duct was capable of using the heat ejected by the radiator to actually produce thrust and offset some of the speed loss incurred by drag incurred by the radiator’s air scoop (Douglas 252).

 

Great care was taken to build the prototype in good time. The NA-73X, would make use of a number of components from North American’s AT-6 trainer, including its landing gear, hydraulics, and electrical systems. Remarkably, the construction of the prototype was completed on the 102nd day of the project, but it would have to wait another 20 days for its Allison V-1710-39/F3R engine (Marshall & Ford 94). The supply of Allison engines at the time was constrained, and resulted in the project having to delay its deliveries to the British. Despite this, the fast pace of the program, and the fall of France would see the British order another 320 aircraft before the prototype even flew. With the program approaching testing, the British were awaiting the results and readying their own test pilots to become acquainted with the new plane. The prototype was first flown by American test pilot Vance Breese on the 20th of October, 1940. It would go on to make several more test flights before having to be repaired after an accident with test pilot Paul Balfour. The accident was a result of pilot error, who failed to switch over from an empty fuel tank, and as such the incident did not reflect poorly on the design itself (Marshall & Ford 151). As the sleek new fighter was taking shape, the British Purchasing Commission would notify NAA that the aircraft’s RAF designation was to be the ‘Mustang’ in a communique sent in December 1940 (O’Leary 24).

This prototype NA-73 was delivered to the US Air Corps for testing, though they would not place orders for Mustangs until a later date. [This day in aviation]
Among the last modifications to the NA-73 regarded its armament, fuel capacity, and reinforcement of its wings. Several proposals for its armament were considered, but for the British Mustang they installed a pair of .50 caliber guns in the nose cowling with another two .30 caliber guns in each wing. With these last additions made, the British soon received several of the new aircraft, which now bore the more familiar title of Mustang. The first, AG345, would be put through tests to find any issues from the transition from the NA-73. Several issues arose over the stiffness in the ailerons, power surges in dives, and overheating. These were subsequently addressed, though more drastic changes were needed in the case of the engine, which required installing a new carburetor scoop, and altering the scoop for the radiator (Marshall & Ford 165). The culmination of these new changes would result in the finalized Mustang Mk.I, and a second development prototype, NA-83.

While the aircraft’s development was proceeding at a rapid pace for the British, the USAAC would show very little initial interest in the Mustang. The aircraft the USAAC had dubbed the XP-51 was largely overshadowed by other developments and comparatively little effort was made to conduct exhaustive tests on the XP-51 prototypes at Wright Field to correct their faults. Their interest in the aircraft would be piqued only after the U.S. entrance into the second World War.

Mustang Mk. I

In British service the Mustang would take a different developmental path than what was proceeding in the United States. While the British were receiving their Mustang fighter aircraft, the US had been forced to develop the aircraft into a dive bomber, the A-36, as funds for fighter development had been expended for 1942. In the case of the RAF, the Mustang Mk. I went into service as soon as was practicable and saw their first squadrons, numbers 161 and 613, receive supplies of the new aircraft in April of 1942. They would first be employed as reconnaissance aircraft before later taking on more dangerous work during Operation Jubilee in which they undertook offensive recon sorties over the raid area in Dieppe, France. Beyond this they would be subsequently used to fly nuisance raids and fighter sweeps across the low countries. Its long range, high speed, and effective armament were used to great effect over these areas as they harassed rail and road communications, while also remaining quite capable against enemy fighters wherever they were encountered (Ethell 24, 25). Even by this early mark, the once uncertain contract they signed with North American had already paid off.

It was during this period that the aircraft’s faults and strengths would make themselves evident. The nose mounted guns were troublesome and complicated maintenance; they were often removed from operational planes and were eliminated from the succeeding models of the aircraft. The radiator still presented teething issues, as under certain conditions the oil could freeze over and would fail to circulate, and eventually cause the radiator to boil over. Visibility too would become an issue, as the canopy frame of the cockpit severely restricted the pilot’s view. However despite its faults, the plane was fast, possessing good acceleration and a high top speed that made it capable of outrunning all fighters in the theater at sea level (Ethell 24).

The Mustang Mk.I would prove an exceptional fighter with the RAF, if at first, a little rough around the edges. [wikimedia]
While the radiator issues would be addressed and a new bubble canopy was developed, another, more serious drawback of the design would require far more resources to address. The Allison engines that the early Mustangs were equipped with were considerably lacking when it came to high altitude performance due to their single stage, single speed superchargers. While the aircraft received good marks for its low altitude performance from pilots in the RAF, above the 15,000ft the Allison V-1710 suffered considerable power loss. Though this was by no means surprising, it represented an area where performance could be significantly improved. At higher altitudes the aircraft was outpaced by both contemporary models of the Fw 190 and Bf 109. At low altitudes, it was made somewhat redundant by the RAF’s new Hawker Typhoon, which both flew faster at low altitudes and was better armed. It wasn’t long until the idea arose to fit the Mustang with an engine possessing better high altitude performance, a combination that might well produce an exceptional fighter that was as capable at high altitude as it was down low (Douglas 253).

The first major step toward this came on April 29, 1942, when Wing Commander Ian Campbell-Orde invited one of Rolls Royce’s test pilots, Ronald W. Harker, to test the new aircraft. Harker was impressed by its performance and he believed that if the aircraft was fitted with the new Merlin 61, it would be able to outpace a similarly equipped Spitfire by a considerable margin (Marshall & Ford 215). The Merlin 61 was the obvious choice for many reasons, chief of which was its two stage, two speed supercharger which stood to offer the plane exceptional high altitude performance. To this end, a Mustang Mk.I was provided to Rolls Royce at Hucknall to undergo the necessary modifications. By the beginning of June 1942, the British had correctly projected that the Mustang’s top speed would be increased to 430mph at an altitude of 25,000ft, which was roughly twice as fast as the Allison powered Mustang at that altitude (Douglas 254). When the test aircraft was complete the results were quite impressive, as during a fly off between a Spitfire Mk. IX and a Mustang, both fitted with Merlin 61’s, the Mustang quickly outpaced the Spitfire.

Across the Atlantic, a parallel development began underway after a study of the Mustang’s combat debut with the RAF. The new United States Army Air Force, no longer constrained by funding, rushed to acquire supplies of the Mustang, and sought to re-engine the fighter to improve its high altitude performance. To this end, two P-51’s were set aside for conversion. By the early half of the Summer of 1942, both British and American Mustang experiments were underway. While the Mustang was previously seen as a side project which was never a wholly American or British effort, it was by then extremely clear that the design had tremendous potential and the development of which was of immense importance to the Allies.

Shoeing the Mustang

Orders for various Mustang types for the USAAF would begin in 1942, including this P-51 armed with four Hispano 20mm cannons. These orders were quickly overshadowed by developments to get the Packard engine into the aircraft. [Wikimedia]
Re-engining the Mustang was by no means an easy task, as the Merlin was considerably heavier than the Allison and required a larger cooling system. To achieve this, the radiator was reworked, with the oil cooler moved apart from the radiator matrix to a forward position, and the ducting of the entire scoop assembly being redesigned. Earlier aerodynamic and buffeting issues caused by the radiator intake were also resolved by moving the scoop out of the boundary layer under the fuselage. The resulting set up would also achieve the earlier described Meredith effect, which produced thrust that offset the drag caused by the scoop (Marshal & Ford 97, 219). Additionally, the carburetor’s intake duct was moved beneath the nose which also necessitated lowering the wing to accommodate the lower cowl.

In addition to higher cooling requirements, the new Merlin engine weighed 350lbs more than the Allison and would mount a larger, heavier propeller, which would represent a significant shift in weight. To compensate, 61lbs of ballast was added, the primary fuselage longerons were strengthened, and the wings were strengthened and moved lower and forward. These changes would also help to compensate for the stronger vortex generated by the propeller and the greater forces generated by the improved ailerons (Marshall & Ford 219). The new engine and the subsequent operations would also result in some yaw instability. Adding a fin ahead of the horizontal stabilizer seemed an adequate solution, but it would not be undertaken until far later.

While the testing for most of these modifications was done through a variety of converted air frames, the prototype that brought them all together was the XP-51B, which first flew on October 1, 1942. The importance placed on this aircraft was considerable, as several months prior, a large order for 1200 P-51A’s was placed by the US government on the provision that their production could be switched for P-51B’s, given advanced notice (Marshall & Ford 230).

The first of two XP-51B’s would be ready in October of 1942, however, a long and difficult development process would delay serial production until the summer of the following year.[Thisdayinaviation]
The XP-51B would prove promising but it was troubled by radiator issues which would remain with the aircraft through January of 1943. These were tracked down to a chemical reaction which was found to be degrading the coolant tubes, and was resolved by a lacquer liner. There were also air flow issues within the radiator, which were solved through moving its aftercooler core to improve airflow through the scoop. The prototype’s last major issue was the tendency for its air scoop to produce loud, and worrying, vibrations at high speed. Resolving the problem once again required them to change the geometry of the scoop (Marshall & Ford 258, 311). This was solved by the aforementioned modification that moved it out of the boundary layer below the wing, and further improved as the depth of the gutter was increased and the inlet size was reduced (Matthews 7).


Most of the issues with re-engining the P-51 involved its cooling systems and air scoop, which were revised several times. [NACA]
All of the production models of the Merlin powered P-51’s would fly with engines produced under license by Packard. It was a matter of good fortune that Packard was already engaged in the mass production of their version of the Merlin engine prior to the demand for the engine for the new Mustangs. Packard had built its first V-1650-1’s, a license built Merlin 28, in August of 1941 which were later destined for use in Canadian built Avro Lancasters, DeHavilland Mosquitos, and the updated Curtis Wright P-40F (Marshall & Ford 176). Changing production to suit the needs of the P-51B would however not be easy, and matters were made worse by a general strike at the main plant which, alongside slow development at Wright Field, made for considerable delays. Some of the supply issues would be addressed as the new Mustangs would receive the first priority in terms of supplies, superseding the P-40F and L, and denying its use on the P-38. However, beyond these were the predictable teething troubles, and combined with the less predictable hurdles, they saw widespread deployment of the P-51B delayed considerably. Packard would go on to supply North American with engines, however they would never fully be able to meet the massive demands of both the United States and Great Britain (Marshall & Ford 347).

My Kingdom for a Horse

While development on the Merlin powered P-51’s proceeded, the USAAF had formulated and launched a strategic bombing campaign dedicated to destroying industries vital to the German war effort. The theoretical foundations of this strategy had been set in the interwar era and were initially seen as a means to expand the Army Air Corps into a force with greater autonomy. Many early interwar theorists, such as Maj. Harold George, would describe a vague ‘economic web’ that could be destroyed and force an industrial and morale collapse, but in 1943 these theories were put to the test. The practical details of the campaign were laid out at the Allied conference at Casablanca. There a series of targets was decided upon, but later altered to a plan that favored targeting aircraft and submarine production, in addition to ball bearing plants (Overy 45, 305). However, the main concern for USAAF bombing operations was that thus far, all daylight strategic bombing campaigns had ended in failure after formations of unescorted bombers were shredded by fighters.

The USAAF bombing campaign against Germany began in earnest in early 1943, it was based on a number of untested theories which planners hoped would bring an early end to the war. [National Archives]
Since before the war, it was commonly believed among the Air Corps senior officers that a formation of well armed bombers was capable of defending itself from whatever threats it might face. This assertion would be disproven, as even the small raids against targets in France and the low countries sustained casualties that made consistent raids impossible. In early 1943, the next step of the campaign would be far more ambitious, moving on to targets deeper within Germany itself. The need for a long range escort fighter had already become apparent before this point, and work was underway to produce external fuel tanks for existing fighters, but the offensive would be continued without a fighter aircraft able to accompany raiders for the full duration of their missions.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1943, the USAAF would launch numerous raids against targets in Western Germany, though the bombers could only be escorted over the low countries by P-47’s and P-38’s. It wasn’t long until these range limitations were understood, and soon after, exploited by the Luftwaffe. Wherever Luftwaffe fighters were untroubled by Allied fighters, they were free to make use of their most effective anti-bomber tactics.

Generalmajor Adolf Galland’s prescribed method of attack for single engine fighters was to make head on, or oblique, attacks from slightly above the bomber formation, carried out by at least a Schwarm, or two pairs of fighters (Marshall & Ford 267). This achieved two things, it increased the closure rate to reduce the likelihood of being hit by defensive gunners, and it was from this position that both the pilot and copilot of the bomber were most vulnerable. In the absence of escort fighters, Luftwaffe pilots would be able to regroup, fly ahead of the formation, climb, and repeat the attack. The lack of escort fighters also meant the Luftwaffe was safe to employ its two engined fighters against bomber formations, which with their heavier armaments, were much better equipped to bring down bombers. Over time their tactics grew even more complex as dedicated aircraft, typically Ju 88’s, were tasked with shadowing bomber formations to pass their altitude, course, and speed to flak and fighter control services.

Many Luftwaffe aircraft would be re-equipped to take on heavy bombers, like this Bf 109G-6 with its underwing 20mm gun pods. [Bundesarchiv]
Prior to the arrival of the P-51’s, the USAAF had two suitable fighters for the purposes of escorting bombers at high altitude, the P-38 and P-47. While they had the high altitude performance, they did not have the range to reach deep into the continent. The issue would be partially resolved through the addition of external fuel tanks, which had been discussed at a conference with the Material Division at Wright Field in March of 1942 (Ethel 51). Work however, was slow and the 108 and 75 gallon drop tanks were not delivered in large numbers until the end of summer, 1943.  These tanks would allow the shorter ranged P-47 to be able to cover bombers over their flight over the low countries, and the P-38, over the Rhineland. It should also be noted that the escort range was considerably lower than the maximum combat range of the aircraft, as the planes flew in a zig-zag pattern overhead so as not to out pace the bombers. Supplies of larger volume fuel tanks which would take the fighters further into German air space would not be available until the spring of the following year. External fuel tank development and procurement had been mismanaged by Army Air Force leadership who were still largely convinced that the bomber’s defensive capabilities were adequate. Had there been a greater supply, and larger volume tanks initially available, the P-47 and P-38 could have escorted bombers over most of Germany. To make matters worse, the P-38, which by then handled the most important leg of the trip, was troubled by a number of technical issues. While the P-38 possessed good high altitude performance, an exceptional climb rate, and a heavy armament, it was handicapped by a cockpit that pilot’s rated the worst of any US fighter in service and had flying characteristics that made it difficult for pilots to aggressively pursue Luftwaffe aircraft (Dean 164). The large, twin engine Lightning also had an unmistakable appearance, such that Luftwaffe pilots would almost always spot and identify the Allied plane before Lightning pilots could do likewise. With this benefit, Luftwaffe pilots were typically the ones who dictated the engagement, and would depart when conditions were unfavorable. On the defense they would have another advantage, both the Fw 190A and the Bf 109G were capable of out maneuvering the P-38 in high speed dives. The P-38 encountered severe compressibility issues at speeds significantly lower than those encountered on the two German fighters (Marshall & Ford 441). Thus, while the P-38 was capable of performing long range escort missions, its pilots would be forced to employ more conservative tactics than those used in the P-47.

By the start Autumn of 1943, USAAF planners were hoping to accelerate their progress on Operation Pointblank. This plan would see bombers raid targets that were vital to the German aviation industry in order to achieve air supremacy over Western Europe before an invasion of the continent. While losses for these raids were still extremely high, it was hoped that dispatching a larger force capable of inflicting serious damage would make it worth it. On August the 17th, the 8th Air Force prepared for its largest raid yet, with 376 B-17’s dispatched to attack the ball bearing works, at Schweinfurt, and a Messerschmitt factory, at Regensburg. Both of these facilities were located deep within Germany and most of the journey would see the B-17’s outside the area where they could be escorted. To compensate for this, the flight over Regensburg would continue over the Alps and into Allied controlled Tunisia. It was hoped that flight over the Alps would prove easy, and in the case of the Schweinfurt force, they believed that the German fighter squadrons would still be on the ground refueling after their first attacks while the bombers made their return. Both would be met with disaster as the Luftwaffe would hit both forces after their escort fighters turned for home, and the Luftwaffe fighters had taken to the air again as the Schweinfurt raiders made the return trip.

The bombers of the USAAF flew in staggered formations in order to maximize the the defensive capabilities of the aircraft. These tactics alone proved totally inadequate to protect bomber formations from fighters and were revised several times to compensate for flak. [National Archives]
Of the 376 bombers to leave England, 60 would be shot down, 176 were damaged, and 30 remained in North Africa where they awaited repairs at the overburdened facilities in Tunisia. Losses in combat and written off airframes amounted to 31% of the dispatched force; in contrast the Germans lost only 28 fighters (Overy 340, 341). Following the disaster, the 8th Air Force would carry out raids only where there was full escort cover and the next deep incursion into German airspace would only be conducted in the spring of the following year. The winter of 1943 would spell uncertainty for the campaign, as it was clear that for all intents and purposes, much of German industry lay beyond striking range. With this limitation threatening to seriously cut back the USAAF’s campaign, they would request that Lockheed, Republic, and North American increase the internal fuel capacity of their fighters, and hoped that a suitable long range escort would materialize.

Leaving the Stable

Col. Charles McCorkle, 15th AF with pilots. The P-51B proved the solution to the problems plaguing the ailing strategic air campaign. [National Archives]
As a result of the pressure to produce new, long range fighters for the escalating campaign in Europe, the first P-51B’s were produced before the prototype had gone through its testing and modification cycles. The first plane, a P-51B-1, was completed March 31, 1943 and would include several features that would later be found unsound on prototype. As a result, these initial planes would have to be altered accordingly and would have many parts that were non-interchangeable with later models (Marshall & Ford 316). In addition to reworking the air scoop and radiator, they would also have their ailerons modified, both to improve their effectiveness and to remove a steel diaphragm which would interfere with the plane’s magnetic compass. Most importantly, the decision was made that the aircraft would incorporate an additional 85 gallon fuselage fuel tank which would provide the aircraft with phenomenal range.

With this new aircraft, the USAAF would finally possess what they had been searching for. With the addition of the new internal fuel tank, the aircraft would be capable of deep incursions into German airspace, and it would deliver on what was promised back in the spring of 1942. They were excellent fighters, especially at high altitude. The early P-51B’s would use the Packard V-1650-3 engine, a license production of the British Merlin 61, which produced 1410 hp at 29,300 ft and 1630 hp at 16,400ft at War Emergency Power (P-51 operation manual 31). This engine would later be replaced with the Packard V-1650-7 in later models of the aircraft, which was geared for better performance at medium altitude. These engines, combined with the low drag fuselage and laminar designed wings would provide the aircraft with a superb climb rate, a high top speed at altitude, and exceptional high speed maneuverability.

While the aircraft had taken a largely completed form with the P-51B-5 and P-51C-1, it would be continuously modified in the field and on the production line, throughout its service with the air force. The most notable of these changes were the additions of a fuselage tank, booster motors for its ammunition belts, a vertical fin extension, and field retrofits for a perspex canopy dubbed the Malcom Hood. However, only the 85 gallon fuel tank would be a universal addition.

The fuselage tank would enable the P-51B’s to reach much of central Europe from England, but it was not present in the first deliveries of the aircraft, as was the case with the 59 P-51B’s active in England at the end of November 1943. The installation kits were first sent out in September of 1943, and the tank was later incorporated into the production run with the first long range P-51B being accepted by the Army in December of the same year (Marshall & Ford 393, 407).

The next addition to the aircraft was intended to solve a major issue with the plane’s machine guns, which were found to be prone to jamming when the pilot pulled turns of over 1g. This issue was a result of the canted position of the guns in the wings which put stress on the ammunition belts. The ideal solution was to reposition the guns, but seeing as that would necessitate a considerable redesign, engineers would instead work in a stop gap measure in the form of boost motors for the ammunition belts. These were issued as kits like the fuel tank, though unlike those for the fuselage fuel tank, they were issued in more limited numbers and the issue persisted well into 1944 (Ethell 64).

The Mustang had long had a tendency to yaw in the opposite direction of a roll, which affected its handling since its earliest models, and this was made significantly worse when fuel was carried in the fuselage tank. Despite the problem being an evident and considerable inconvenience, its solution wouldn’t materialize until much later. Eventually, it was decided to fit the aircraft with a fin extending from its vertical stabilizer, along with adding reverse rudder boost tabs. However, these kits arrived very late, having begun production in April of 1944, and later incorporated into the design of late P-51C’s and the subsequent P-51D (Marshall & Ford 306).

The Malcom Hood provided far better visibility than the earlier ‘birdcage’, and was added to a number of P-51B’s based in Northern Europe. [National Archive]
Many long standing issues revolved around the ‘birdcage’ canopy of P-51 since the aircraft’s inception, and as was the case with the engine, an improvement was found in British service. With the RAF, many Mustangs received a new frameless bubble canopy. This canopy vastly improved visibility, especially to the rear of the aircraft, which was virtually non-existent from within the birdcage, and it could be drawn back on landing and take-off. Dubbed ‘Malcom Hoods’ after their manufacturer, a plexiglas works named Robert Malcom Ltd. they were subsequently sought after by the USAAF for use with their P-51’s in Europe.

Breaking the Stalemate

The new P-51B’s would make their first major debut with the 8th Air Force in early 1944, though the introduction was not as smooth as had been hoped. Squadrons reported a number of issues with the new aircraft, which included high altitude fuel transfer failures with external tanks, glycol reserve tanks that leaked and froze, radiator corrosion and coolant leaks, radios and spark plugs failing, and excessive oil loss (Marshall & Ford 425). However the USAAF hadn’t the time to immediately resolve these teething issues, and with these problems passed along to the manufacturer and Air Force maintenance services, the P-51’s would soon play a key role in the escalating bomber offensive.

Through the winter of 1943, both the day and night bombing campaigns were facing withering losses which spelled serious trouble for maintaining the pace of operations over Europe. With less than one thousand bombers stationed in England, the USAAF would lose 200 in September alone (Douglas 326). In the face of these losses, the Combined Bomber Offensive was failing to carry out the Pointblank directive, which aimed to cripple the Luftwaffe before an invasion of Europe was conducted. During this period the Luftwaffe had actually built up the strength of its fighter force and had reorganized and improved its defenses into a centralized command structure. To make matters worse, the head of RAF’s Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, would ignore orders to attack German industries involved in aircraft production. Instead, he would order Bomber Command to continue to carry out an ineffective area bombing campaign of Germany’s cities believing it would bring an end to the war without the need for an invasion (Overy 343, 344). It was under these bleak circumstances that the US’s Eighth and Fifteenth Airforces were tasked to cripple the Luftwaffe and establish air superiority over much of Europe before the invasion, now only a few months away. However, they would soon see a change in leadership and the delivery of new equipment that would put them on the path to controlling the skies over Europe.

Escort fighters typically flew a few thousand feet above their charges when they weren’t independently seeking the enemy. They weaved back and forth over the bombers in order to not speed past them. Here a flight of four P-51’s flies overhead at roughly 30,000 ft. This tactic declined in use when the relay system came to prominence. [National Archives]
In December of 1943, the USAAF established a joint strategic air command to consolidate their bomber forces over both the European and Mediterranean theaters, and drive them towards a unified objective. With Gen. Spaatz in command of all strategic bomber forces, and Maj. Gen. James Doolittle in command of the Eighth Airforce in England, the USAAF would now have clear strategic direction, and more aggressive leadership. Doolittle would take a pivotal role in revising the existing strategy into one which proved instrumental in undermining, and dismantling the Luftwaffe in the coming weeks. Crucially, he recognized the inadequacy in trying to undermine the Luftwaffe’s fighter strength solely through targeting the production of new aircraft. To hold to this existing, overly conservative strategy was hopeless, and the invasion of France was scheduled for five months after he took office. Targeting the factories alone wasn’t enough, and thus Doolittle would give the order for returning escort fighters to perform fighter sweeps and seek out enemy planes in the air and on the ground (Overy 361). Among the first and most important moves was to create a more effective relay system for the fighters, further increasing the time they could spend over enemy territory.

By the start of 1944, Maj. Gen. Kepner, 8th Air Force, would also play a major role in implementing this new strategy, as he officially untethered the Eighth’s fighters from the bombers and allowed them to seek out the enemy at their discretion. The P-51 would play a pivotal role, as its excellent high altitude performance and range meant it was able to take up the last position of the fighter relay, and was more than a match for whatever it found. Beyond the existing penetration, target, and withdrawal relay positions, the P-51 was also able to take up a fourth mission. These units would perform sweeps 50 to 70 miles ahead of the bomber formation and attack German fighters as they were climbing, assembling, or transiting towards the bomber formation. Their efforts were greatly aided by British signals intelligence services that provided the assembly points for the Luftwaffe’s fighter groups (Marshall & Ford 425, 425; Overy 362).

This change in tactics would have immediate and profound impacts as they began to be widely implemented in February and March of 1944. The first major achievement of the new strategy were the widespread losses inflicted on the twin engined fighter forces, which had earlier proven themselves as potent anti-bomber weapons. Against the new long range fighters, they were almost defenseless, and were withdrawn in March (Overy 366). Similar effects were felt throughout the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces, which thanks to the new P-51’s, were left without any safe haven. Whenever the bombers were over Germany, their escort fighters could make their appearance. While the new strategy often meant that the bomber formations were often less protected, this was counterbalanced in that it placed the German fighters on a defensive footing. The days of Luftwaffe fighters leisurely climbing alongside a formation before diving at it head on were over, now whenever they reached a formation they were forced to conduct hit and run attacks, or face off against the escorts.

Luftwaffe attrition escalated as airfields that were once ignored were now periodically harassed by fighters that attacked transiting and grounded aircraft. Doolittle did all he could to promote these attacks, and would allow for the destruction of aircraft on the ground to count towards a pilot’s ace status (Marshall & Ford 423). These attacks would prove costly to the USAAF, but well worth it as Luftwaffe operational losses for all aircraft increased sharply and it robbed them of the ability to train new pilots in secure airspace. This shift in strategy and subsequent success would prove instrumental to the USAAF in the following months, as their responsibilities were soon to broaden when the Allies landed in France.

When equipped with external fuel tanks, the P-51B could operate over any part of Germany. This proved disastrous for the Luftwaffe as transiting aircraft and those on the ground were now vulnerable, no matter how far they were from Allied air bases. [National Archive]
While the Eight and Fifteenth air forces were still occupied with the task of destroying the Luftwaffe in the air and on the ground, they would soon be given additional missions. The most unexpected of which came in the form of Operation Crossbow, which called upon the Eighth Air Force to disrupt Germany’s use of the new V-1 bomb from coastal bases. Then came the task long awaited, which called upon the Eighth to begin the preparations for Operation Overlord. To meet these new objectives, the Pointblank raids were accelerated, culminating in ‘Big Week’ in February of 1944.

Between the 19th and the 26th, the Eighth and Fifteenth air forces would fly roughly 6,200 sorties against 18 aircraft assembly plants and two ball bearings plants, at a loss of 247 bombers and 28 fighters. Undoubtedly steep, but sustainable in comparison to the Luftwaffe which lost roughly one third of its single engine fighters (Overy 369). The success of the raids themselves was difficult to judge, as fighter production still increased, though at a significantly reduced rate which saw a shortfall of roughly 38.5 percent (Overy 370). During these operations the P-51 would provide the USAAF deep penetration cover and perform strafing attacks against German airfields. However, there weren’t enough long range escorts for full coverage until the summer of 1944. The situation was further complicated when all P-51B’s were grounded between the 10th through the 15th of March in order to address structural issues with the aircraft’s engine mounts, wings, and tail. These were subsequently resolved by replacing the retaining bolts for the engine, reinforcing the tail empennage and ammunition doors, and installing landing gear locks to prevent their uncontrolled release at high speed (Marshall & Ford 442, 446). These issues would however not present a long term obstacle during the early months of 1944 as the tempo of operations and list of targets grew in the following months.

With the major push against the German aviation industry mostly over, the USAAF would soon set its sights on two major targets, rail communications across much of Northwestern Europe, and Germany’s oil industries. The first was an immediate necessity for the success of Operation Overlord, crippling German strategic mobility was essential for an invasion which would require considerable time after the first landings to build up a force on the continent. The formalities were worked out in March when the Transportation Plan was decided upon. It would fortunately have the support of RAF Bomber Command, as Harris’s evident failure to end the war on his terms would see him temporarily divert his force into supporting the preparations for the invasion of France. The subsequent offensive against fuel production would start far less formally. Spaatz was convinced of its necessity, but due to the months it would need to take effect, he was at first unable to convince his superiors to divert resources to it. However, in a matter of weeks, he was able to argue for its necessity under the Pointblank Directive and was then allowed to conduct attacks against Germany’s synthetic fuel industry whenever resources permitted (Overy 371).

Between the now crippling fuel shortage and marauding allied fighters, the Luftwaffe soon found themselves completely overwhelmed by the autumn of 1944. Here a P-51 lines up on an He 177 heavy bomber, as the one beside it continues to burn. [National Archives]
With these new policies in place, the Luftwaffe would be thoroughly disrupted as a result of Spaatz’s strategy, and Doolittle and Kepner’s tactics. The USAAF would end up inflicting punishing losses on the Luftwaffe in the air, disrupting the manufacturing of new aircraft, and eventually causing chronic fuel shortages that severely limited their ability to conduct large scale operations of any kind. In this, the P-51 would prove essential with its exceptional high altitude performance, and its endurance that could take it anywhere over Germany.

In many ways, the bombing of factories alone was a largely ineffective means of inflicting serious damage to the German war economy, as many industries proved to be exceedingly resilient. Fighter production proved a particularly difficult target, as apart from the later targeted aero engine industry, production and final assembly plants could be dispersed and were largely safe from raiders. When fighter production was further streamlined and resources were diverted to support it, Germany would end up vastly expanding fighter production during the period in which those industries were the most frequently raided (Zeitlin 59). This was, however, was achieved only by reducing the rate of modifications and improvements, and transferring resources away from the production of bombers. In comparison, the later targeting of fuel production and rail transportation proved key, as the inability to reliably move material by rail combined with chronic fuel shortages proved a fatal military and economic obstacle. As a result, establishing air supremacy over Western Europe before Operation Overlord was as much an achievement of long range fighter operations as it was of the bombers. The Luftwaffe could sustain itself when aircraft deliveries did not meet expectations, but it quickly found itself struggling when it lost scores of pilots and found itself hard pressed to train new ones once they had lost control of the skies over Germany.

Pre-war military theorists envisioned fleets of bombers destroying vital war industries with the near pin-point accuracy they achieved in controlled tests. The reality of the campaign revealed this as hopelessly optimistic when even the most accurate raids resulted in large amounts of collateral damage. [National Archives]
In the end it must also be said that the civilian costs of the raids were steep, and while the Eight and Fifteenth Airforces were not involved in a campaign directed against the civilian populace, as was the case with Bomber Command and the USAAF elsewhere, the technical limitations of the time meant that bombs frequently fell on civilian areas. Even under ideal circumstances, the dimensions of a bomber formation were larger than their targets and it was physically impossible to strike factories, railyards, and refineries without causing significant damage to the surrounding area. The realities of the campaign would also prove worse than predicted. Targets were frequently obscured by bad weather and smoke generators, and formations typically took heavy anti-aircraft fire on the approach. As a result, bombs were often released by the best estimate from the bomb sight or at the direction of a ground mapping radar system (Overy 347). Even outside of Germany, the civilian costs of these operations were heavy as the Allied air forces carried out the transportation plan. In France alone, between March and June of 1944, French officials placed the figure of civilians killed by Allied bombing at 25,266 (Overy 574).

The 4th Fighter Group ‘Debden Eagles’

When the US entered the Second World War, few American airmen had any combat experience, with the notable exceptions being volunteer airmen in service with foreign armies. The Debden Eagles were one such group, having volunteered to serve with the RAF and entered service in late 1940 and 1941. While they were among the few Americans fighting against Nazi Germany at the time, they had garnered a somewhat unfortunate reputation as glory-seekers and primadonnas thanks to their unique position (Bucholtz 6). Their tendency of excessive overclaiming of victories during this period would prove particularly irritating to their superiors. With the US entry into the war, the Eagle squadrons, and their Supermarine Spitfires, were subsequently integrated into the USAAF.

Capt. Donald Willis, an Eagle Squadron pilot alongside a Spitfire Mk V, late 1943. [National Archives]
The RAF’s 70th, 121, and 133 Eagle Squadrons would become the 334th, 335th, and 336th Squadrons of the 4th Fighter Group on the 12th of September 1942. These units flew Spitfire Mk IX’s and within the month were supporting the nascent bomber offensive which was targeting installations in France. The start of this effort went poorly, when only one aircraft out of a twelve plane flight returned, the rest having been lost to enemy fighters, harsh weather conditions, or having run out of fuel in the short range fighter. Thankfully for the Group, this would be their worst day of the war. Despite this setback, the unit saw its first major mission carried out on the 20th of October in the Calais area escorting B-17’s carrying out a high altitude raid. This would be the first major bomber operation carried out under escort and was met with success. Their Spitfires would prove a very capable fighter aircraft, but their short range rendered them unable to conduct escort missions far beyond the English Channel. In any case, this wouldn’t prove much of an issue, as for the rest of the year as they would mostly conduct fighter sweeps across the low countries and provide convoy cover (Bucholtz 9). However, with the changing of the year, the 4th would exchange their venerable Spitfires for new P-47’s.

The 4th FG flew their Spitfires in combat for the last time on April 1st, 1943, after which they completed the full transition to P-47C’s. This change was not viewed favorably, as most of the unit’s pilots disliked the considerably heavier Thunderbolt (Marshall & Ford 340). The changeover had little initial impact on operations, and the squadron was largely involved in the same missions as before. However, the group would later accompany bombers on deeper raids into Europe thanks to newly issued external fuel tanks for their P-47’s. They would use these new 200 gallon fuel tanks on an escort mission into Ghent on July 25th and soon after their first foray into Germany airspace over Westhoff-Emmerich. It should be noted that these fuel tanks were a rare piece of equipment at the time and the 4th only had them thanks to the efforts of Lt. Col. Cass Hough of the 8th Fighter Command’s technical section. They were, unfortunately, as troublesome as they were vital, often failing to transfer fuel above 20,000, and were later withdrawn as British made paper 108 gallon tanks became more available (Marshall & Ford 411).

Despite their complaints, the 4th FG’s veteran pilots would master their new planes and had put them to good use. In a battle defending a formation of B-17’s over the city of Utrecht, the 4th FG was credited for the destruction of nine enemy aircraft at the cost of one of their own, with the pilot having bailed out over the occupied Netherlands (Bucholtz 16). With their P-47s, the 4th would take up an important supporting role in the escalating bombing offensive, one which saw their longer ranged P-47s making more flights into the German frontier. This tempo and the 4th’s change in command under the more aggressive Lt. Col. Don Blakeslee would see the unit become among the most successful in the entire USAAF.

Col. James Matthew Blakeslee would lead the 4th FG from January to November 1944, after which he remained on the ground after several high profile pilots of the USAAF had been lost in a short period of time. He is pictured here receiving the Distinguished Service Cross from Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower. [National Archives]
Lt. Col. Blakeslee was made C.O. of the 4th with the turn of the year, and in addition to bringing new, more aggressive tactics to the table, he would work to ensure his unit was re-equipped with the new P-51. Blakelsee would meet personally with General William Kepner and argue that his squadron would be the best candidate for refamiliarization with the new plane as their experience with the similarly-engined Spitfire would make for an easier transition. Kepner was convinced, and subsequently put the 4th FG at the top of the list for P-51’s. The schedule for the transition was harsh as they continued to fly combat missions in their P-47’s while also familiarizing themselves with the new aircraft. The process was time consuming and they would not make their operational debut with their new planes until February 28, 1944 (Marshall & Ford 432). These Mustangs would nearly double the combat range of the unit, and the pilots favored them over their older P-47’s, but they experienced a variety of harsh teething issues and mechanical failures.

While the conversion was taking place, the 4th would be committed to Doolittle’s more aggressive strategy against the Luftwaffe, with the aim to achieve aerial supremacy over Western Europe before the invasion of France. As such their independent actions increased, and on January 31, 1944, they would join the 355th FG in bombing the Luftwaffe’s airfield at Gilze-Rijen (Marshall & Ford 425). In many ways this mission bore some similarity to the fighter sweeps they had conducted since they had flown with the RAF, but it would mark a first in that direct assaults on Luftwaffe airfields would then become more commonplace. Among the last major actions the unit would perform with its P-47s was its support of ‘Big Week’.

Their first combat mission in the new planes was fairly uneventful, on February 28, when flying as escorts for a formation of bombers attacking a V-1 launch site they encountered no enemy aircraft but strafed a Ju 88 on their way home. They would claim their first aerial kills two days later during a bomber withdrawal support mission near Frankfurt where they claimed two enemy fighters (Bucholtz 38). The following day the unit would help achieve a major milestone, the first fighter escort operation to Berlin and back. The operation would prove anything but easy, as deteriorating weather conditions saw most of the aircraft involved turn back. However, elements of the 3rd Bomb Division would press on, supported by the 4th, 55th, 354, and 363rd FG’s. The 4th would engage a formation of roughly 60 Fw 190’s and Bf 110’s northeast of Wittenberg in the day’s first encounter with the enemy. They claimed five victories but suffered one loss from enemy fire, and another as a result of a radio failure which made navigation across a storm in the English channel impossible. The pilot was later forced to ditch his aircraft in France after a failed attempt to reach neutral Spain (Marshall & Ford 439, Bucholtz 39).

Capt. Don Salvatore Gentile was among the leading aces in the 4th FG. He was credited with 21 aerial and 6 ground victories, though his combat service ended after a botched aerobatics stunt in front of assembled members of the press. He was grounded and went on a tour to raise war bonds, later becoming a test pilot. [National Archives]
Perhaps the most exciting encounter that day was experienced by Capt. Don Gentile and Lt. John Godfrey, both aces in the 4th. The two pilots were unable to join the rest of their flight as a result of extremely poor weather, but proceeded with their mission regardless. En route the weather would clear, and reveal a flight of roughly 50 Do 217 night fighters, pressed into service as daylight bomber destroyers, and dozens of Fw 190’s which were preparing to attack a nearby formation of USAAF bombers. The pair would decide to attack, in order to disrupt the enemy formation and prevent them from engaging the nearby bombers from an advantageous position. Gentile and Godfrey dove on the night fighters, damaging one and sending the group diving in an effort to escape. The engagement turned into utter chaos as the single-engined fighters joined in. In the confusion, the pair of aces would claim one enemy aircraft in a series of defensive fights that eventually saw them make their escape through the clouds. Flying on instruments and practically lost, they made their way back to England by their intuition, landing at RAF Hurn (Bucholtz 40).

The unit would return to Berlin on March 6 in support of a massive 8th Air Force operation. Favorable weather conditions would allow the 8th to dispatch a force of 730 bombers against a series of targets in and around the German capital, where they would meet the Luftwaffe in the largest air battle of the war up to that point. The 4th, led by Col. Blakeslee, would be tasked with escorting the bombers, which would prove a difficult undertaking, with the sheer number of opponents forcing the group to disperse into individual flights and sections to expand their coverage. The unit would be credited for the destruction of 15 enemy aircraft of the 45 claimed by P-51’s that day, in exchange for five losses. In comparison, P-47 units were credited with 37 kills for 5 losses, and P-38 units brought down three units at the cost of three of their own. It should also be noted the P-38’s comprised the minority of the fighters, while there were roughly twice as many P-47’s as there were P-51s. The USAAF would claim a total of 83 ‘confirmed’ enemy aircraft with the Luftwaffe having recorded the loss of 75 fighters (Marshall & Ford 439; Bucholtz 43, 45). The majority of these kills were twin engine and night fighters pressed into daylight service. This engagement, while not representing a distinct turning point, did demonstrate a noticeable shift in the war over Germany. Of the 672 bombers that proceeded with the mission, 69 failed to return, and 6 were written off. These were certainly heavy losses, but were a fraction of the nightmare that the Allies were facing in the summer and autumn of the previous year. Beyond that, Luftwaffe losses were mounting both in the sky and on the ground, and the use of its heavier, twin engined bomber destroyers had become untenable in the face of agile new opponents.

D-Day

During the first day of Operation Overlord, most fighter units were dedicated to countering a Luftwaffe response that never came. Several would go on to attack inland targets. [National Archives]
Over the coming weeks the 4th would continue to support the bombing campaign, but in June of 1944 they would participate in something far more decisive. The group would be among the many fighter units providing top cover for the invasion of Normandy. Throughout D-Day, each of the unit’s three squadrons would operate independently and continuously until nightfall. The day began with the 334th and 335th squadrons undertaking an offensive patrol under the command of the unit’s C.O., Col. Blakeslee, between 03:20 and 09:45 over Rouen, France. The patrol found no enemy fighters and sought out targets of opportunity, in their case a pair of locomotives that they strafed with their machine guns. Their only loss was 1st. Lt. Fraser, who had lost contact with the rest of the squadron and was subsequently downed by German fighters and taken prisoner. The 336th would sortie at 06:42 to provide cover for warships shelling the landing areas, which proved uneventful (Bucholtz 84).

At 11:20, the 334th would sortie again to Rouen with one section carrying bombs. They would attack a troop train to poor effect, though an encounter with a flight of 10 Fw-190 near their airfield at Evreux proved more successful. In the ensuing battle the 334th was credited with the destruction of four enemy fighters, with the only damaged P-51 making it back home. While this confrontation was happening, the 335th had attacked the marshaling yards at Fleury. The 336th would fly for the last time that day at 13:35 conducting a fighter bomber sweep near Evraux. They would find no targets and would lose an aircraft to ground fire, with 1st Lt. Freiderick being taken as a PoW. The last mission of the day would see the 334th and 335th conduct attacks against a radar station and a road convoy near Rouen. While successful in their mission, they incurred heavy losses when elements of the unit were attacked by around 15 fighters belonging to JG 2 and JG 26 as the US fighters attacked infantry positions.

Capt. Winslow Sobanski was a Polish infantryman at the outbreak of the war, eventually finding his way to the US where he then joined one of the Eagle Squadrons. He was among those killed in action during the group’s last sortie on D-Day. Pictured here in a P-47. [National Archives]
The day would prove exhausting, with pilots flying up to three missions from dawn to dusk. Between flights most of the 4th’s pilot’s would rest, usually either having coffee or trying to get some sleep in before their next mission. The different squadrons would also find themselves having vastly different experiences, with the 336th having spent most of the day covering the invasion force which the Luftwaffe hadn’t the strength to attack, and taking part in a fighter bomber sweep that found no worthwhile targets and saw one aircraft lost to flak. In comparison, the 334th and 335th spent the entire day conducting offensive sweeps which claimed a number of targets, but also saw them sustain higher casualties than any of the other US fighter squadrons over Normandy that day with ten fighters lost (Bucholtz 82, 83).

Shuttle Mission to VE-Day

Following the success of the landings, and subsequent breakout in Normandy, many of the USAAF fighter units would take on tactical missions in support of the armies in Western Europe, in addition to the ongoing strategic air campaign. However, some P-51 units were selected to participate in an escort mission in which the bombers would land at prepared airfields in the Soviet Union instead of returning to their home bases. A 45 aircraft detachment of fighters from the 4th would depart for the Soviet Union on June 20th. The mission would see them join a force of 1,000 bombers as they attacked targets in the Rhineland, and then on to Piryatin, Ukraine some seven hours away. 45 Mustangs of the 4th would make the trip, encountering some 25 enemy fighters over Siedlice, downing two, but losing one of their own. All but one of the remaining planes landed at their intended destination, with one 2nd Lt. Hofer being forced to land at Kiev after running low on fuel after pursuing enemy fighters (Bucholtz 88). However, unbeknownst to the assembled American aircraft, the formation had been trailed by a Ju 88. Soon after, a well coordinated attack by the Luftwaffe using its He 177 heavy bombers saw many of the US bombers hit, though their P-51’s were unscathed.

The P-51’s were subsequently dispersed and flew a variety of missions in the following weeks which brought them over Central Europe and the Mediterranean. They soon flew an escort mission against an oil refinery in Drohobycz, Poland on the 26th. The return leg of the mission took them to Lucera, Italy where they would support the bombing operations of the 15th Air Force. The largest of these missions would take them over Budapest to perform a fighter sweep ahead of the strike force. There they encountered 80 German and 18 Hungarian Bf 109G’s and a massive dogfight ensued. In the battle the 4th would claim eight Axis fighters at the cost of four of their own. This included 2nd Lt. Hofer who had died during a strafing attack against an airfield. (Bucholtz 89). The unit would be led back to England on the 3rd of July.

American and Soviet personnel during Operation Frantic. [National Archives]
Beyond Operation Frantic the 4th settled back into the ‘usual’ operations they’d had since most of the group had left for the Soviet Union. They continued to fly deep penetration and escort missions over Germany, though by the end of the summer, Luftwaffe activity in the air had been considerably reduced. The savage war of attrition over Germany had been decisively won by the USAAF, as the Luftwaffe began to feel ever more crippling shortages of experienced pilots and fuel. Ironically, the Luftwaffe’s supplies of fighter aircraft were secure, though transporting them to airfields would prove ever more troublesome through the remainder of the war. While they had the aircraft, a subsequent USAAF campaign against rail communications across Germany would make overland transportation difficult, and ever more frequent fighter sweeps made transiting by air a very dangerous prospect.

For the remainder of the war the 4th FG remained committed to supporting the strategic bombing campaign, especially as it pertained to offensive fighter sweeps and attacks against Luftwaffe airfields. Their last victory of the war was a probable destruction of an Me 262 that was damaged over the Prague/Ruzyne airfield, with the group credited for 1,058.5 total victories against enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground (Bucholtz 120). They would end the war among the most successful Fighter Groups in the USAAF, having come a long way from the overly boastful volunteers that had flown against the Luftwaffe before any other Americans.

The 99th Fighter Squadron ‘The Tuskegee Airmen’

As black aviators, the men of the Tuskegee-trained squadrons would face unique challenges, having to face prejudice from their own countrymen who sought to deny them the opportunity to fight. They were initially excluded from many of the pre-war programs that turned out many of the pilots who later joined the ranks of the USAAF and US Navy. Many who ran these programs espoused the belief that they were incapable of the judgment needed for leadership, and that they had lacked ‘the proper reflexes to make a first class fighter pilot’ in the words of General Edwin J. House (Moye 102).

Their chance came with the Civilian Pilot training program in 1939, having been excluded from the program the previous year. The program was extended to a series of predominantly black colleges and universities, with the most critical being the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. The university would build a fledgling airfield that eventually grew into an Army Air Corps training base, which proved controversial even among hopeful applicants, as in their eyes they were clearly still segregated from the rest of the Army. While the controversies flowed in the small Alabama town, the Air Corps moved to create the first black pursuit squadron, the 99th.

Col. Benjamin O. Davis would lead the 99th fighter squadron and the later 332nd Fighter group. He would go on to become a Brig. General in the newly formed United States Air Force after the war. [San Diego Air and Space Museum]
The first cadets of the 99th would graduate March 7, 1942 under the command of Capt. Benjamin O. Davis. The squadron would subsequently fly within the US before its transfer to the Mediterranean in late March 1943, equipped with new P-40L’s (Moye 99). They occupied a former Luftwaffe airfield in Morocco and were to be attached to the 33rd Fighter Group after they had gotten some experience in theater. In May, the squadron would be deemed ready for service and would move to a field in Tunisia. They would see success there, but the leader of their fighter group, Col. William Moymer was immediately hostile to their presence. He failed to return the salutes of the 99th’s officers and he placed the squadron on patrol duties over secure air space. He would then openly criticize them for being ‘unaggressive’ for failing to claim victories over territory where they were unlikely to encounter enemy aircraft (Bucholtz 18, 19; Moye 101). In spite of this, the unit pushed on and would aid in the preparations for the invasion of Sicily.

The 99th’s first combat missions were fighter sweeps against enemy positions in Southern Italy, their first target being a German airfield on the island of Pantelleria on June 2, 1943. The airbase would be the site of many more attacks, including the unit’s first encounter with enemy fighters. On June 9th, six P-40’s from the 99th Squadron accompanied A-20’s to the airfield, encountering four enemy fighters. In the ensuing fight they successfully drove off the enemy aircraft, and damaged one, taking no losses of their own. A further effort was made to intercept a flight of Ju 88’s at high altitude but were unable to, as their P-40’s had their oxygen systems removed to save weight for the low altitude mission (Bucholtz 21). The pilots of the 99th were particularly enthused that in their first encounter with the enemy, they had managed to complete their mission and all returned home safely.

While they would eventually be known for their iconic red tailed P-51’s, members of the Tuskegee fighter squadrons would fly the P-40L, P-39Q, and P-47D before they were issued Mustangs. [National Archives]
The squadron would be redeployed days later, partially a result of Moymer who sought to see the squadron reduced to coastal patrol duties. Instead, the 99th was transferred to the 79th Fighter Group, who’s commander, Col. Earl E. Bates, did his best to integrate the unit into the group. While they remained formally segregated, they enjoyed a far more open and professional environment than what they endured with the 33rd (Moye 103). Their first mission with the unit was on July 2 and saw them escort a flight of 16 B-25’s to their target, a German airfield in Castelvetrano, Italy. It would prove less than ideal when the B-25’s failed to line up with their target on the initial approach and had to repeat the attack, giving Axis fighters stationed nearby the time they needed to scramble. Two of the 99th’s pilots were lost in the first pass from the German fighters, but the remaining members soon regained control of the situation. In the ensuing confrontation with enemy Fw 190’s, Bf 109’s, and a Macchi 202, the 99th would claim one confirmed destruction, one probable, and two damaged aircraft. Though perhaps most importantly, none of the B-25’s they were escorting came to harm (Bucholtz 21, 22).

The coming weeks saw them mostly fly ground attack missions in support of the ongoing invasion of Italy, and met very few enemy aircraft for the remainder of the year. It was during this time that they also discovered that the Tuskegee training center wasn’t large enough to supply a sufficient number pilots to the squadron, while also supporting the construction of three additional squadrons. Their pilots resultantly flew an abnormally high number of missions due to being short handed (Bucholtz 25). This period also saw them defeat a great deal of the unfair criticism leveled against them and had largely cemented a favorable reputation within the Army Air Force. Among the most notable victories on that front was an article in Time, which had previously published an article based on Moymer’s alleged grievances with the squadron. Maj. Roberts of the 99th would be quoted “people assumed we were not producing because we were negroes…but now that we have produced, things have changed.” The 99th had also succeeded in convincing most of the 79th FG of their worth, and had garnered a great deal of respect as they moved into 1944. Many white pilots of the 79th disobeyed an order from the commander of the Air Force commander in the MTO, and held a desegregated dinner party to celebrate the anniversary of the 99th’s combat debut (Moye 104, 105).

Forming the 332nd Fighter Group

While 99th gained valuable experience over the Mediterranean, they began to rotate pilots out to train the next pursuit squadrons to form a segregated fighter group. These squadrons were the 100th, 301st, and 302nd, all of which would be formed at Selfridge Field, Michigan. Selfridge would prove a particularly dreadful post for these men, as it was here that they would face intense discrimination both by the local populace and base staff, while being a stone’s throw from the racial powder keg of Detroit. However, this would not remain their home for long, and they would soon depart for their operational assignments by the end of the year. They would join the 99th in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in January of 1944, being equipped with a set of used P-39s. These aircraft would prove troublesome in service due to their age and condition, and as such numerous accidental losses followed, so by the early summer of 1944, Col. Davis had managed the acquisition of new P-47Ds. However, the unit would soon transition again to the newer P-51 soon after the 99th joined the rest of the fighter group in July, something the group’s veterans would resent as they felt they had been segregated again after finding acceptance within the 79th FG.

Capt. Andrew Turner aboard a P-51. The group’s transition to this aircraft vastly expanded the range and variety of operations across the Mediterranean and Central Europe. [National Archives]
The group would fully transition to Mustangs by July of 1944, and would be reassigned to the 15th Air Force where they would support long range bombing operations. Their first mission in their new planes was on July 4th, where they took 40 aircraft to to escort two bomber wings, but they would encounter only a pair of Bf 109’s that made no attempt to attack the allied aircraft . Beyond this, their pace of escort missions rose and they would take part in supporting raids against Axis positions in Northern Italy and Southern France. Soon after, they would provide support for the amphibious invasion of Southern France. On August 12, All four of the 332nd’s squadrons were given specific targets, with the 99th striking radar stations in Montpelier and Sete, the 302nd attacking radar stations in Narbonne and Leucate, the 100th attacked the radar stations near Marseilles and Cape Couronne, and the 301st attacked four targets around Toulon. At the loss of three pilots, one captured and two killed, all of the targeted radar stations sustained considerable damage .

The remainder of the war saw the 332nd fly a considerable number of escort missions, including an earlier attack against the Ploesti oil fields in Romania on July 13th, 1944. It was during that mission that they had begun to cement their status as one of the most reliable escort units in the USAAF, after they dispersed a flight of eight German fighters that had attacked bombers of the 55th Bomb Wing. Their C.O., Col. Davis maintained an unwavering directive to his unit, on escort missions they were never to abandon their bombers. This didn’t sit well with some but it was accepted, in part because many felt that a failure to protect the bombers would come down harder on them than the other squadrons (Bucholtz 51, 105; Moye 102). As such, their record for defending bombers was exemplary, having lost only 27 bombers to enemy fighters from June of 1944 to April 1945. It should also be noted that 14 of these losses occurred during a single day when a failure in mission planning resulted in the bombers and their escorts failing to meet at the proper time. As the target that day was the Luftwaffe air base at Memmingen, Germany, losses were correspondingly high (Bucholtz 53, Haulman 2). This places the remaining 13 bomber losses among the other 178 escort missions they performed over ten months. This policy would however, result in the squadron having the lowest aircraft kill to loss ratio of any other P-51 squadron in the theater, however, they would still consistently outscore all of the veteran P-38 squadrons in the Mediterranean (Marshal & Ford 477).

Among their most impressive escort missions was in support of a bombing raid against the Daimler-Benz tank assembly plant in Berlin, on March 24, 1945. From the 332nd’s base in Ramitelli Italy, this was a 1600 mile round trip, the longest mission ever conducted by the 15th Air Force. 59 Mustangs of the 332nd would leave their base at 11:45 under the command of Col. Davis, though he would soon return after experiencing engine trouble and left the squadron in the command of Capt. Edwin Thomas. They would encounter some two dozen enemy fighters outside of the German capital, including a number of Me 262s. The jets would initially prove difficult to catch, and the aircraft, belonging to JG 7, would at first disengage from the bombers whenever the escorts drew close. However, several of the jets would later press their attack on the formation. In the ensuing battle 1st Lt. Earl R. Lane, Flt. Officer Joseph Chineworth, and 1st Lt. Roscoe Brown would each be credited with a confirmed kill on three downed Me 262s. On their return flight they engaged several targets of opportunity, including two trains. The success of this mission earned the unit one of their three Distinguished Unit Citations, and the personal thanks of Gen. Lawrence of the 5th Bomb Wing (Bucholtz 108, 109).

Beyond their role as escorts for the 15th Airforce’s bombers, the 332nd would be engaged in a number of fighter bomber missions across the Meditteranean and Central Europe. These missions were conducted whenever time permitted between bombing raids and would see the squadron engage a number of targets. These would include airfields and various transportation targets varying from trains to river barges. A raid on August 30, 1944 would mark the unit’s most successful day when the 332nd attacked poorly camouflaged aircraft at Grosswardein airfield, Romania. In the ensuing strafing attack, they would be credited with the destruction of 83 aircraft with a further 31 damaged, ranging from 30 Ju 88’s, to a pair of super heavy Me 323 transport aircraft (Bucholtz 66). They would mount similar attacks against Axis airfields from Romania to Hungary.


Pilot’s of the 332nd, Lt. Clarence ‘Lucky’ Lester on the right, leads the group with 3 credited victories, all claimed on the same day. [National Archives]
The 332nd would end their campaign at an airfield in Cattolica, Italy, and was credited for the destruction of 111 aircraft in the air, 150 on the ground, 57 locomotives, 600 rail cars, and had flown 15,533 sorties (Bucholtz 116). It was a common myth that the squadron had never lost a bomber to enemy fighters, this being a rumor circulated by the press near the end of the war. This was not the case, but even with the failure over Memmingen, their bomber losses to fighters were half of the average and they were a considerable morale booster for the bomber crews of the 15th Airforce.

Flight Characteristics and Pilot’s Remarks

 

[P-51B pilot training manual]
The P-51B would prove to be an excellent fighter, but one that could present some challenges to those unaware of its quirks. It shared most of its general flight and handling characteristics with its older Allison powered predecessors, though some alterations to the design would make themselves felt, and not always to the plane’s benefit or pilot’s wishes.

Overall, the Merlin Mustang’s would prove to be fast and highly maneuverable, but with more complex flight characteristics than the Allison powered models that came before. Under most flight conditions, the plane was positively stable and possessed controls that were light and responsive. This aspect had been improved from the previous models, as the P-51B would be equipped with improved internally sealed and balanced ailerons which kept control stick forces light. These were rated very well, though pilots would note they were still ‘mushy’ at low speeds. However, as the plane’s top speed increased, it was capable of pulling maneuvers that could prove hazardous to pilots. Above 4g turns where a pilot without a g-suit was partially blacked out, the stick reversal could be harsh, but the worst of its effects were eliminated by a 20lb bobweight that was incorporated into the control system later on (Dean 350, 349).

The plane’s stall characteristics were mixed, but mostly mild. A one g stall in a clean aircraft was characterized by a roll to the right which came on after rudder buffering and aileron snatching, and was easily recovered from. Pilots were generally positive about the stall warning and recovery characteristics. However, its accelerated stall behavior proved to be far less universally understood. Some pilots claimed an easy recovery after ample warning, and others claimed it came on suddenly and viciously. Its low drag wings would contribute partly to this, as with its lack of air flow disturbances, stalls could come on without much warning. In the event of a spin, recovery was achieved by throttling back and pulling up while directing the rudder in the opposite direction of the spin. A spin could be serious trouble as a typical recovery resulted in a loss of about 9,000 ft in altitude (Dean 351, 352; P-51B flight manual 80).

While the plane was certainly very capable in regards to its maneuverability, pilots would have to take great caution when performing maneuvers of any kind when the fuselage tank still contained fuel. When the 85 gallon tank still contained fuel, the plane’s center of gravity shifted considerably and induced severe longitudinal instability. Hard maneuvers with any considerable volume of fuel still in the tank would result in a stick reversal that would require the pilot to brace themselves against the movement of the stick. Failing to do so would result in a loss of control or a further tightening of the turn which could result in a high speed stall or even structural failure (Dean 347, 348). Both RAF and USAAF manuals would ban aerobatics with roughly forty or more gallons of fuel in the tank, and suggested caution once it had been reduced to 25 gallons (Pilot’s Training Manual 68, Pilots Notes 30). In service this issue was one that rarely affected the plane’s effectiveness in combat, as the long range tank was the first to be used on long patrols and escort missions and thus typically contained little or no fuel when contact with enemy aircraft was made.

On early and mid production P-51B’s, pilots would also have to be cautious of high speed snapping brought on by the aforementioned longitudinal instability while they were conducting rolls. Pilots caught unaware were often injured during this violent jolt, and rolls were restricted accordingly. The addition of a fin extension for the vertical stabilizer and reverse rudder boost tabs would largely solve this issue, and the restrictions were lifted on suitably modified aircraft (Dean 350).

Perhaps where the aircraft shined the brightest were its dive characteristics, which were achieved as a result of its low drag wings and fuselage. These granted it excellent acceleration and a higher critical mach number than most of its contemporaries. Due to the changes in air flow across an aircraft’s wings as a plane approaches the sound barrier, most aircraft would experience buffeting, and a loss of control along and total loss of lifting forces. This change in flight characteristics that results in this loss of control is known as compressibility, a phenomenon that occurs when an aircraft exceeds the speed of its critical mach number.

A visual explanation of compressibility from the P-51B’s pilot training manual, the disturbed airflow results in a loss of lifting forces on the wings and control surfaces. The P-51’s wings mitigated the worst of its effects until much higher speeds. [Pilot’s training manual]
Thanks to its laminar flow airfoil, the P-51 was almost unique in its ability to remain controllable at otherwise unheard of speeds. However, in a high speed dive the P-51 would eventually experience compressibility and a pilot needed to be aware of the changing characteristics of their aircraft. In the P-51 this would first be felt through a ‘nibbling’ at the controls, afterwards by the stick ‘walking’ back and forth, and lastly by the aircraft pitching up and down with motions that grew more violent as the aircraft picked up speed (Pilot’s Training Manual 74, 75). On earlier models that lacked the vertical stabilizer extension, there was also directional instability that occurred at high speed, which required rudder correction or the plane could be sent into a spin. However with the later modifications the plane was nothing less than astounding. In diving tests from 35,000ft, pilots were able to reach mach .83 while retaining control of the aircraft, and despite the violent shaking and buffeting of the aircraft, were able to recover from the dive. In more practical conditions, control characteristics would remain normal until the aircraft was between .72 and .74 mach, after which the plane would experience escalating tuck-under, or a tendency to pull downwards airspeed increased. The maximum permissible dive speed was set at 505 mph IAS below 9000 ft, and 300 mph IAS at 35,000 ft, TAS being 539 mph (Mach .81). The maximum permissible engine RPM in dives was 3300 (Dean 341, 342, 343). Overall, the P-51B proved to be phenomenal in a dive, with only the British Hawker Tempest gaining a slight lead in tests, it being another aircraft equipped with laminar flow airfoils (Ethell 62).

Its take-off procedure was fairly typical of contemporary US fighters and required a strong right rudder deflection during take off to counteract the powerful torque from its engine. Its best climb out speed was between 160 to 170 mph IAS, which was quickly achieved after its flaps and landing gear had been retracted (Dean 341). Landing was somewhat more challenging, as the 140 mph IAS glide slope offered poor forward visibility, and little was improved as the plane came in to land at about 90 mph. It was thus fairly common for combat pilots to make tail up, level landings in order to have a better view of the landing strip before touching down. Its widely spaced gear and wide tire tread otherwise made the landing fairly easy.

While the P-51B’s possessed some truly phenomenal flight characteristics, the same cannot be said for the canopy. In US Navy evaluations the ‘birdcage’ canopy was found to result in poor all-around vision, most notably fore and aft. It was also fairly restrictive and made turning to view behind the aircraft more difficult (Dean 353). The frame itself could also not be opened on take off or landing and thus proved to be of some annoyance to pilots. This would later be solved with the addition of the ‘Malcom Hood’ which provided excellent visibility and was far less confining. The rest of the cockpit was judged to be satisfactory and capable of accommodating pilots of varying stature.

The ‘birdcage’ was unpopular as it was quite restrictive in terms of visibility, and it could not be kept open on the landing approach or takeoff. [Pilot’s Training Manual]
Its armament however, was distinctly lacking and fairly unreliable. It’s armament of four .50 caliber AN/M2’s was considerably lighter than most US fighters of the time and were installed in such a way that the ammunition links were prone to deformation in high-g maneuvers. It was not uncommon for P-51B/C’s to return from their missions with several guns malfunctioning as a result of failures to feed or extract. As a gun platform, its qualities were judged as roughly the same as the P-40, and below those of the P-38 and P-47 (Dean 353).

Comparisons with American Fighter Aircraft: Early to Mid 1944

Entering service alongside the P-47 and P-38, the new P-51’s would compare very well. When it came to the P-47D, equipped with R-2800-63’s, these aircraft were in some ways complementary, and excelled in areas the other did not. Thanks to its powerful turbosupercharger, the P-47 would retain the power needed to outperform the P-51 above 25,000ft, but was significantly slower at lower altitudes. The P-47 was also less vulnerable to ground fire and thus better suited for ground attack missions. The P-51B however, outstripped the P-47D in rate of climb, linear speed, acceleration at altitudes below roughly 30,000ft, and dive performance (Ethell 70; Marshall & Ford 526). Ergonomically speaking, the P-51B was the superior aircraft, as the turbosupercharger controls of the P-47D added to the workload of the pilot.

The P-47’s Turbosupercharged R-2800 engine provided unparalleled performance above 30k feet, and it’s durability made it ideal for fighter bomber missions. It was fairly lacking in its rate of climb and acceleration at low to medium altitudes. [National Archive]
When it came to escorting bombers, the P-47D and P-51B were the most effective tools at the USAAF’s disposal. Both aircraft performed superbly at and above the altitudes the bombers typically flew at, though the P-51B would prove the more vital as it could travel significantly further. By late spring 1944, external fuel tanks had been introduced that extended the P-47’s escort radius across most of Germany, however, by this time the P-51B was capable of accompanying bombers beyond Poland (Marshal & Ford 516). While the shorter range of this aircraft was often used to excuse the high bomber losses during earlier campaigns, the fact is that had they been supplied with the proper external fuel tanks, they would have been capable of deep incursions into German airspace months before the P-51 entered service.

The P-38 experienced serious reliability and performance issues due to the extremely low temperatures encountered at high altitude over Northern Europe. Its poor high altitude dive performance was also widely known, and exploited by Luftwaffe pilots. [National Archives]
The older P-38J Lightning would not stack up quite as favorably against the new Mustang. While the P-38J possessed a better climb rate and acceleration, it was out-stripped in linear speed by the P-51B at all altitudes, and possessed a very low critical mach number which meant that virtually any opponent at high altitude could escape by diving away. To make matters worse, a number of technical and operational issues spelled trouble for these aircraft in the colder Northern European climate. These issues, compounded by the extremely poor cockpit and canopy of the P-38, saw Lightning squadrons fall behind Thunderbolt and Mustang squadrons in victory credits (Marshall & Ford 439, 516; Ethell 70).

While the P-38J would receive external fuel tanks that would allow it to travel to Berlin and back, it was held back by a number of factors that severely reduced its combat effectiveness. In the European Theater of Operations, the P-51B would present a clear and general improvement over the P-38s, which saw more success in other theaters with conditions that they were better suited to, namely the Mediterranean and Pacific.

German Fighter Comparison: Early to Mid 1944

Entering service near the end of 1943, the P-51B compared very well to the German Fw 190As and Bf 109Gs in service at that time. The typical Bf 109 encountered through the first half of 1944 was the Bf 109G-6 series, which possessed better firepower than those that preceded it, but was heavier, and initially slower for it. These planes were equipped with either the Daimler-Benz DB 605A, or the high altitude, DB 605AS engines, both of which were later equipped with MW-50 boost systems. In all cases the P-51B possessed the superior linear speed, but in the case of MW-50 equipped aircraft, the Mustang had a slightly lower climb rate at low to medium altitude (Marshall & Ford 526, 523; P-51 flight tests). Without the boost system, which came into widespread use in the summer of 1944, the Bf 109G-6 was considerably slower and had a clear disadvantage in top speed and climb rate at all altitudes. The disparity with the high altitude model was much narrower, though the P-51 still held an edge.

The Bf 109G-6 was the most common Luftwaffe fighter encountered by the P-51. Later versions boasted considerably higher engine power thanks to the MW50 boost system; they did not compare well to many western allied fighters prior to this. Here one prepares for a fighter bomber sortie. [Asisbiz]
When it came to maneuverability, both aircraft had their own advantages, with the Bf 109 having better low speed handling and the P-51 having the advantage at high speed. The dive performance of the P-51B was far superior even at lower altitudes as the Bf 109 experienced stiffening of the elevator at high speed.

Visibility the Bf 109 was more or less on the same level of the standard ‘birdcage’ P-51B, and this would largely remain the case, as both planes would be re-equipped with improved canopies that offered better visibility. However, the cockpit of the P-51 was considerably more spacious and was further improved by the Malcolm hood. The Bf 109’s greatest strength was that it was equipped with an automatic RPM governor and mixture control that took a great deal of work off the pilot.

In terms of armament, both aircraft were comparable, with an unmodified Bf 109G-6 possessing a pair of 13mm machine guns and either a 20 or 30mm cannon, which fired through the propeller hub. Of the two, the 30mm was far less common.

Overall, the Bf 109G-6 was a somewhat dated fighter, one that had its advantages, but was  generally outclassed by the new Mustang. However, upgrades like water-methanol injection, an improved vertical stabilizer, and a new canopy helped keep the aircraft competitive and staved off obsolescence. The much refined ‘Kurfurst’ series would match P-51 performance in a number of areas, but its introduction was well after the Luftwaffe had lost control of German airspace.

The P-51B would face several models of the Fw 190A, with the most up to date being the A-8. The P-51B would have considerable linear speed, climb, and high altitude dive advantages over the earlier models. The Fw 190A-8 would have the benefit of a significant boost in power to its BMW 801D-2 engine, first by means of a fuel injection system, and in the summer of 1944, they were judged robust enough to be run at higher manifold pressures and had their supercharger boost regulators overridden. These modifications allowed the engine to produce significantly more power and increased the aircraft’s top speed at all altitudes (Douglass 344). In terms of top speed, this put these two aircraft on closer footing at low altitude, and ahead of the other two American fighters. It was, however, nowhere close to offsetting the general disparities at higher altitudes. The excellent defensive characteristics of the aircraft helped to offset some of its disadvantages against the P-51, as the Fw 190A held the best roll rate in the theater, solid dive characteristics, and good rearward visibility.

The Fw 190A’s were completely outclassed at altitude by the P-51B, owing to their relatively low full throttle height. They would however, be on somewhat closer footing at lower altitudes and could hold their own against the other two American fighters. [Asisbiz]
In terms of armament it was no contest, as the earlier A-6’s and A-7’s possessed a pair of either 7.92mm or 13mm machineguns respectively, and a pair of 20mm cannons. This was increased to two pairs on the Fw 190A-8. In regards to ergonomics the Fw 190A was excellent, with good visibility, clean instrumentation, and an advanced engine control system which handled RPM, manifold pressure, and mixture through the use of a single, integrated electro-mechanical computer. Its controls too were tight and responsive, if a little heavy at speed, thanks to its push rod control system. However, as was also the case with the Bf 109, its cockpit was comparatively cramped compared to the P-51.

Subsequent models of both these aircraft, the most numerous being the Bf 109G-14 and the Fw 190D-9, would largely eliminate the performance disparity at low altitude. However, at medium to high altitudes, the P-51 would still enjoy a considerable edge in top speed, dive performance, and high speed maneuverability. Only later Bf 109G’s with enlarged superchargers and better high altitude performance were close to closing the gap, with the K-4 series finally achieving high altitude parity near the very end of the war.


The Bf 109G-14 and the Fw 190D-9 would enter service in the Autumn and Winter of 1944, though they would not entirely replace their predecessors by the end of the war. [Largescaleplanes, Asisbiz]
The Me 262 presented a much greater threat in the air for obvious reasons. The jet fighter possessed a top speed roughly 100 miles per hour faster than the P-51 and was the only Luftwaffe fighter capable of following it into a dive. It was, however, considerably lacking in acceleration, which presented itself most dangerously on take off and on the landing approach. While the high top speed of the jets meant that they could disengage safely from most confrontations, they were helpless if caught near taking off or landing. Thus the general strategy for defeating these aircraft was to catch them as they were returning to their bases, where Allied fighters would await them. This is not to say this was easy, as their airfields were well defended by some of the best flak units available to the Luftwaffe and they would eventually have their own dedicated fighter cover (Ethell 97, 98). Higher up the jet could prove a deadly opponent as when flown well, it was extremely difficult to catch and an experienced pilot had control over most engagements.

The Me 262 was a world first, and had many USAAF planners concerned. On paper it had the ability to wreak untold havoc on allied bomber formations, but its technical limitations and the general poor state of the Luftwaffe late in the war prevented it from operating in numbers large enough to make a major impact. [Asisbiz]
In any case, encounters with the new jet fighters were fairly uncommon as they were constrained by operational restrictions owing to the temperamental nature of the new turbojet engines and the lack of a dedicated trainer for the aircraft until late 1944. They would not be seen flying against the Allies in appreciable numbers until the late autumn of that year.

Building the P-51B & C

The P-51B’s and C’s were built at plants in Inglewood, California, and Dallas, Texas, respectively. The distinction exists due to the differences in manufacturing between these two facilities, but these are functionally the same aircraft. With the exception of the earliest model, the P-51B-1, which had a different aileron design, their components were interchangeable. The main production models were equipped with the Packard V-1650-7 engine. Deliveries of these models began in February of 1944 (Marshall & Ford 253)

Production of this aircraft was complicated greatly by the breakneck pace of its procurement, which saw massive orders placed before its prototype had completed testing. As such, the aircraft that left the factories differed considerably even when they were built mere weeks apart. While all WWII fighters underwent constant modification, the level and rate of changes made to the P-51B and C were extensive and rapid. In addition to minimal changes, like changing the pilot’s seat from a wooden one to a magnesium one, in a matter of weeks the P-51B would receive an additional fuselage fuel tank, an extension to its vertical stabilizer and a rudder anti-balance tab, and an elevator control system which made use of a 20lb bob weight (Dean 329). These features would constitute a considerable challenge to work into the design without compromising the pace of production for an aircraft that USAAF planners wanted in as great quantity in the shortest possible time.

The Inglewood P-51 production line. [North American Aviation]
This challenge would highlight both the greatest strengths and weaknesses in US aircraft manufacturing. Most aircraft factories in the US operated by building large batches where the design would be frozen to allow faster construction. Modifying the design meant changes to the production line, which meant slowing down or stopping. US factories operated at batch sizes of up to 1,500, compared to the British Supermarine Spitfire’s production lines which operated at or below 500. The compromise was the modification center, to which “finished” aircraft would be delivered to be fitted out to new modifications. In practice, this system was extremely inefficient and saw quality control drop significantly. It also proved to be a highly inefficient use of labor, and could represent between 25 to 50% of the total labor required to complete an aircraft. Quality control also dropped considerably as the modification center was primed to try and deliver aircraft as quickly as possible (Zeitlin 55, 59). Lastly, the centers saw a great deal of wastage of material, accumulating a much larger proportion of metal scrap from rushed fittings, and ruined parts than the production lines (O’Leary 142). The USAAF would have its Mustangs, but only at a considerable cost and of initial questionable quality.

In the end they were successful in that they delivered the P-51B in great quantities despite the rushed pace of procurement, development, and production. However, it certainly contributed to the severe teething issues experienced by the aircraft that would see it briefly grounded in March of 1944 and would trouble it for weeks later.

In all, 1,988 P-51Bs were built with the first leaving the production lines, at a very low initial rate, in the summer of 1943 with the first deliveries taking place in August, with a further 1,750 P-51C’s being built. Production of both types declined as the P-51D production began in January of 1944, with the last P-51B’s leaving Inglewood in March and P-51C production continuing for several more weeks (Dean 321).

Construction

Wings

The wing group of the P-51 was composed of each wing, bolted together at the centerline. Each wing was of a cantilever stressed skin construction and consisted of a main panel, the wingtip, the flap, and the aileron. The main panel was built up around a main forward spar and a rear spar, to which twenty one pressed ribs were attached. These spars were spliced together roughly around half their length. A self-sealing 90 gallon fuel tank was fitted at the inboard section and a bay for its .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition was found near the center. The ailerons were of a fairly heavy construction, being all metal and supported by two spars and twelve flanged ribs. They were aerodynamically balanced by a diaphragm attached to the forward edge of the aileron and sealed to the rear spar by a fabric strip. These were controlled by means of a cable, as were all of the control surfaces of this aircraft. These were equipped with trim tabs and were adjustable in flight. The flaps were all metal plain flaps that were hinged on three sealed ball bearings and were hydraulically actuated.

[Legends in their time]
The landing gear was hydraulically actuated with a fully retractable tail wheel. The main landing gear were fixed to the wings by a cast magnesium supports and were equipped with multiple disc brakes connected to the hydraulic cylinder by metal tubing. The wheels were 27 inches in diameter and possessed a fairly wide tread, which helped to give the P-51 excellent ground handling.

The wings of the P-51 were designed to achieve laminar flow and used a NAA/NACA 45-100 series airfoil. It would fall short of true laminar flow as even extremely minor surface imperfections resulted in airflow disruptions that made laminar flow impossible. However, these were among the most aerodynamically advanced wings used by any fighter during the Second World War, providing extremely low drag and excellent high altitude dive performance.

Fuselage

[Legends in their time]
The fuselage was composed of two main sections, both of which had a semi-monocoque construction. The main section was formed by four extruded longerons, around which the intermediate frames and stringers were connected. The upper longerons were extruded H-sections which extended from the sheet metal firewall and tapered into a T-section. The lower longerons, consisting of an H-section and U-channel, extended the full length of the main fuselage. This entire unit was made up of eight assemblies which were riveted and bolted together, these being the firewall, turnover, truss, upper deck, left and right side panels, radio shelf, web assembly, and the radiator air scoop.

The main fuselage section also contained the cockpit, the windshield being composed of a center pane of bullet resistant five pane laminated glass, with two Plexiglas windows to either side. The canopy was either a metal framed Plexiglas ‘bird cage’, or a Malcom Hood. The birdcage had panels that opened outward on the top and port side. The hood slid back across the rear of the canopy. Behind the pilot were lucite windows which enclosed the radio space. A relief tube was installed and stored beneath the seat, and proved quite useful considering the long flights that this aircraft commonly made.

Early P-51B instrumentation. [Legends in their own Time]
The rear section was comparatively simple, composed of two longerons, a shelf, five formers, and three solid bulkheads. The fuselage, as with the rest of the aircraft, was skinned in Alclad. This section was reinforced after structural failures during high speed rolls in early models.

Tail Section

The tail section was affixed to the rear fuselage and consisted of the horizontal stabilizer, elevators, fin, vertical stabilizer, and the rudder. The horizontal stabilizer was a one piece assembly supported by two spars, fixed to the fuselage by four bolts, and through which the vertical stabilizer was attached. The elevators consisted of a front spar with eighteen flanged ribs, and was initially fabric skinned with Alclad leading edges before it was later entirely metal skinned. These were fastened with five sealed ball bearing hinges and each had an adjustable trim tab.

The vertical stabilizer was supported by two spars along with four ribs and a detachable tip. Extensions to the vertical stabilizer by means of a fin were added to P-51B/C’s to correct for longitudinal stability issues with a full fuselage fuel tank, and to correct certain undesirable characteristics when the aircraft was put through a roll. The rudder was fitted at the rear of the stabilizer and was supported by a single spar to which twenty flanged ribs were attached. Much of the rudder was skinned with mercerized cotton, save for the reverse edge. The rudder was fitted with a trim tab and aerodynamically balanced by means of a 16.6 lb lead weight at the tip.

Engine Section

The engine section consisted of the engine mounting and external cowl components and was bolted to the firewall. The cowl consisted of a frame made of Alclad beams to which the cowl panels fastened. This frame acts as a cradle for the engine which is mounted by a bracket through anti-vibration units. The entire section is designed to facilitate easy access to the engine through panels, and the engine mount allows for the rapid removal of the Packard engine.

[Legends in their time]

Engine

The early models of the P-51B used a Packard V-1650-3, with this engine being replaced on the production line in February of 1944 with the Packard V-1650-7. These are largely the same engine, though their superchargers were geared for optimal performance at different altitudes and thus have different maximum outputs. The 1650-3 was designed specifically for high altitude use and gave the P-51B/C a full throttle height of 29,000 feet, the 1650-7 was geared to achieve a higher engine output at a FTH of 21,400 feet (Marshall & Ford 253).

These engines had a bore of 5.40 inches, a stroke of 6 inches, a displacement of 1,649 cubic inches, a compression ratio of 6.0:1, a width of 30 inches, a height of 41.6 inches, length 87.1 inches, a frontal area of 5.9 sq. ft, and a weight of 1690 lbs. They differed in that the -3 supercharger ratios of 6.391:1 and 8.095:1, and those of the -7 were 5.80:1 and 7.35:1 (Wilkinson 125, 127). They were both fitted with a four blade Hamilton-Standard 24D50-65 or -87 hydropneumatic propeller with aluminum blades of a diameter of 11 feet and 2 inches. These blades were either 6547-6, 6547A-6, or 6523A-24 types. The engine exhaust stacks were of a stainless steel construction which had a removable exhaust shroud to keep heat from the spark plugs and to reduce drag.

Packard V-1650-7 [Pilot’s training manual, Smithsonian]
Both engines used a two stage, two speed supercharger and was equipped with an aftercooler. The supercharger was automatically controlled and governed by the air pressure at the carburetor intake, which was found just below the prop spinner. The controls for the engine were conventional, requiring manual throttle and rpm adjustments.

Radiator and Cooling Systems

The engine was cooled by two separate systems, one dedicated to the engine, and the other cooled the supercharged fuel-air mixture. Both of these systems were connected through the main radiator matrix within the air scoop below the main fuselage, with the coolant flow maintained by an engine driven pump. A smaller radiator for the oil cooler was placed below and ahead of the radiator matrix for the engine and aftercooler. The radiator setup was designed to make use of the Meredith effect, which in practical terms meant that the heated air flow out of the radiator produced thrust which counteracted a large percentage of the drag incurred by the scoop. The outlet for the radiator was automatically controlled. This design was able to reduce net drag upwards of 90% and was one of the most important features which allowed the aircraft to achieve such a high top speed (Marshall & Ford 510).

[Legends in their time]
The hoses for the radiator which extended through roughly two thirds of the aircraft, and the unarmored radiator, which sat at the bottom center of the aircraft, constituted the most vulnerable part of the aircraft’s design. These made the aircraft fairly vulnerable to ground fire, as the high cooling requirements of the Packard Merlin engine meant that a failure of the cooling system wouldn’t take long to put the aircraft out of action.

Fuel System

The initial models of the P-51B possessed only two 92 gallon wing fuel tanks with an 85 gallon fuselage fuel tank being included later through modification kits and was eventually incorporated into the production line. The Mustang was also capable of carrying two external fuel tanks by means of wing mounts. Fuel was drawn only from individual fuel tanks, requiring the pilot to manage up to five individual sources of fuel throughout longer flights (Pilot’s Training Manual 26).

[Pilot’s Training Manual]
The inclusion of the 85 gallon fuselage tank would introduce new challenges, as the shift in weight caused by a full tank introduced severe longitudinal instability. For this reason this tank was the first to be consumed. The combined tankage was 269 gallons.

Armament and Armor

P-51B’s were equipped with four .50 caliber AN/M2 machine guns. Each inboard gun was supplied with up to 250 rounds, with the outboard weapons having 350 each. These guns were mounted at roughly 45 degree angles within the wing, which caused severe cycling issues when the guns were fired while the aircraft was pulling hard maneuvers. These issues were lessened with the addition of electric boost motors for the ammunition feed, but were not completely solved until the subsequent P-51D model. The guns were electrically heated to prevent them from locking up at high altitudes. These aircraft were typically equipped with the N-3B reflector gunsight, with later aircraft receiving K-14 gyroscopic gunsights.

[National Archives]
Wing pylons allowed the aircraft to carry a payload of up to 500 pounds at either side, being either external fuel tanks or bombs. These aircraft could be made to carry rockets by means of field modification kits. Armor plates were placed ahead of the radiator header tank, at the engine fire wall, and behind the pilot.

(Dean 355-376)

Conclusion

It would take a considerable effort to develop the P-51B from its Allison engined predecessors, and even greater hurdles would have to be overcome to produce them in the quantities needed. In the end, both were achieved and the P-51B would enter large-scale operation in the Spring of 1944. In spite of its harsh teething issues, it would become among the most decisive weapons of the Second World War. With its incredible range and medium and high altitude performance, the aircraft would prove instrumental in establishing air superiority over Western Europe prior to Operation Overlord, and contesting the skies over Germany itself.

P-51B production was switched over to the D model at Inglewood in March of 1944, but the aircraft would remain in service in large numbers through the end of the war. [National Archives]
Its design, while not revolutionary, was thoroughly advanced and represented a considerable leap in aerodynamics and airframe design. The P-51B would however, be only a starting point for the Packard Merlin Mustangs, as further refinements would result in the iconic, and much more widely produced P-51D.

Specifications

P-51B/C ( with Fuselage tank) Specification
Engine  Packard Merlin V-1650-3, V-1650-7
Engine Output [V-1650-7] 1630 hp [1720 hp]
Maximum Escort Fighter Weight 11,150 lbs (2x108gal external)
Gross Weight 9,681 lbs
Empty weight 6,988 lbs
Maximum Range [External Fuel] 1350 miles [2150 miles]
Combat radius [External Fuel] 375 miles [750 miles]
Maximum speed (V-1650-7) 444 mph (75″ Hg) at 20600ft
Armament  4x .50 cal M2 machine guns, 1200 rounds of ammunition
Crew Pilot
Length 32′ 2
Height (tail down) 12’8
Wingspan 37.03′
Wing Area 235.75 sq.ft

 

P-51B/C ( with Fuselage tank) Specification
Engine  Packard Merlin V-1650-3, V-1650-7
Engine Output [V-1650-7] 1630 hp [1720 hp]
Maximum Escort Fighter Weight 5058 kg (2×409 liters external)
Gross Weight 4391 kg
Empty weight 3169 kg 
Maximum Range [External Fuel] 2172 km [3460 km]
Combat radius [External Fuel] 603 km [1207 km]
Maximum speed (V-1650-7) 714 km/h (1905mm Hg) at 6279 m
Armament  4x 12.7mm M2 machine guns, 1200 rounds of ammunition
Crew Pilot
Length 9.80 m
Height (tail down) 3.86 m
Wingspan 11.29 m
Wing Area 21.9 sq.m

(Dean, Performance Tests on P-38J, P-47D and P-51B Airplanes Tested with 44-1 Fuel., Marshall & Ford)

Maximum Level Speed Speed at 67″ Hg, 3000 RPM 75″ Hg, 3000 RPM No wing racks, 75″ Hg, 3000 RPM
Sea level 364 mph 380 mph 388 mph
Critical altitude low blower 408 mph at 10400 ft 411 mph at 2300 ft 422 mph at 7400ft
Critical altitude high blower 426 mph at 23900 ft 431 mph at 20600ft 444 mph at 20600ft
Aircraft Specification Gross weight 9680lbs, P-51B-15  (V-1650-7)

*A note on fuels: The 75″ of manifold pressure figure represents the high end of performance using 150 octane fuels, these were typically only available to P-51 squadrons based in England.

Climb rate 67″, 3000 RPM 75″ Hg, 3000 RPM
Maximum at low blower 3,920 ft/min at 5600 ft 4,380 ft/min 2,300 ft
Maximum at high blower 3,170 ft/min at 19,200 ft 3,700 ft/min at 15,600 ft
Aircraft Specification Gross weight 9680lbs, P-51B-15

 

Maximum Level Speed Speed at 1701 mm Hg, 3000 RPM 1905mm Hg, 3000 RPM No wing racks, 1905mm Hg, 3000 RPM
Sea level 586 km/h 611 km/h 624 km/h
Critical altitude low blower 656 km/h at 3169 m 661 km/h at 701 m 679 km/h at 2255 m
Critical altitude high blower 685 km/h at 7284 m 693 km/h at 6278 m 714 km/h at 6278 m
Aircraft Specification Gross weight 4390 kg, P-51B-15 (V-1650-7)

 

Climb rate 1701 mm Hg, 3000 RPM 1905 Hg, 3000 RPM
Maximum at low blower 1194  meter/minute at 1707 m 1335 meter/minute 701 m
Maximum at high blower 966 meter/minute at 5852 m 1128 meter/minute at 4755 m
Aircraft Specification Gross weight 4390 kg, P-51B-15

(Performance Tests on P-38J, P-47D and P-51B Airplanes Tested with 44-1 Fuel.)

P-51 Variants through P-51D

North American USAAF RAF Engine Armament No. Built Additional Notes. First delivery
NA-73X Allison 1 Prototype. October 1940
NA-73, -83 XP-51 Mustang Mk I Allison 2x .50 cal MG, 4x .30 cal MG 622 RAF, export. August 1941
NA-91 P-51 Mustang Mk Ia Allison 4x 20mm cannons 150 ‘Plain P-51’. July 1942
NA-97 A-36A Allison 6x .50 cal MG, bombs 500 Dive Bomber. October 1942
NA-99 P-51A Mustang Mk II Allison 4x .50 cal MG 310 March 1943
NA-101 XP-51B Packard 4x .50 cal MG 2 (converted) P-51B prototype
NA-102, -104 P-51B Mustang Mk III Packard 4x .50 cal MG 1988 Inglewood production. Summer 1943
NA-101, -103 P-51C Mustang Mk IIIB Packard 4x .50 cal MG 1750 Dallas production. August 1943
NA-106 (through -124) P-51D Mustang Mk IV Packard 6x .50 Cal MG +8000 Bubble canopy. January 1944

(Dean 321)

P-51B & C Variants

P-51B & C Variants Notes Serial No.’s
P-51B-1-NA Earliest production model, steel aileron diaphragms, two point aileron attachment.  43-12093 to 12492.
P-51B-5-NA Three attachment points per aileron, non-magnetic diaphragm.  43-6313 to 6352, 43-6353 to 6752, 43-6753 to 7112.
P-51B-7-NA B-1s and 5s which received a new fuselage fuel tank carried this designation. Aircraft often carried prior designation in practice. Converted aircraft.
P-51B-10-NA Production model with fuselage tank.  43-7113 to 7202, 42-106429 to 106538, 42-106541 to 106738.
P-51B-15-NA Engine changed to Packard V-1650-7 (previous models were converted to this engine via supercharger kits).  42-106739 to 106908, 42-106909 to 106978, 43-24752 to 106738.
P-51C-1-NT Same as P-51B-5-NA.  42-102979 to 103328
P-51C-2-NT C-1s which received a new fuselage fuel tank carried this designation. Aircraft often used prior designation in practice. Converted aircraft.
P-51C-5-NT Same as P-51B-15-NA. 42-103329 to 103378, 42-103379 to 103778.
P-51-C-10-NT Production model with stabilizing fin extension. 42-10818 to 103978, 43-24902 to 25251, 44-10753 to 10782, 44-10818 to 10852, 44-10859 to 11036, 44-11123 to 11152.
P-51C-11-NT Production model. 44-10783 to 10817, 44-10853 to 10858,44-11037 to 11122.
F-6C Photoreconnaissance. Converted Aircraft.
TP-51C Dual control trainer. Converted Aircraft.

(Marshall & Ford, O’Leary)

Video

Gallery

Illustrations by Ed Jackson

XP-51B, 312093. The XP-51B’s were a pair of earlier Mustangs converted to use the Packard V-1650-3. Their cooling systems would prove the most troublesome, though the general teething issues these aircraft experienced were harsh and varied.
P-51B-7-NA 43-6913 ‘Shangri-La’. Debden, UK 1944. Debden ,UK 1944. This aircraft was flown by Capt. Don Gentile of the 4th Fighter Group, one of the unit’s leading aces.
P-51B. 325th Fighter Group. Poltava, USSR 1944. The 325th was among the units that participated in Operation Frantic, where they supported a series of USAAF raids launched from within the Soviet Union during the summer and fall of 1944.
P-51B-5-NA, 43-12214 ‘Rebel Queen’. Debden, UK 1944. This aircraft was flown by Col. Don Blakeslee, Commanding Officer of the 4th Fighter Group. This aircraft is an early production P-51B which had been equipped with a Malcolm Hood bubble canopy, this modification greatly improved visibility.
P-51C-10-NT ‘By Request’. Ramitelli, Italy 1944. This aircraft was flown by Col. Benjamin Davis, Commanding Officer of the 332nd Fighter Group. This is a late model which has been fitted with a fin fillet, extending from the vertical stabilizer. This addition greatly improved the aircraft’s stability in rolls and high speed dives.

B-17’s accompanied by a P-51B over England, March 1945.[National Archives]
A collection of P-51’s accompany a flight of B-24s of the 8th Air Force, near England. 1944. [National Archives]
The Malcom Hood bubble canopy would offer pilot’s great visibility compared to the ‘birdcage’. [National Archives]
The P-51A can be easily differentiated from its merlin powered counterpart by the tube shaped carburetor intake over the nose. [wikimedia]
Though most P-51B’s would be sent to Europe, some would serve in the China-Burma-India theater. Here a Mustang cruises alongside a C-47. [National Archives]
Ground crew pose alongside one of their planes. [National Archives]
A P-51B in the CBI theater is cleaned. This plane has had its exhaust fairing removed, a fairly common modification made in the field which some pilots believed cut down on drag. [National Archives]
A P-51B comes in to land, the wide tire tread and wheel base of these planes helped give these planes good landing and ground handling. [National Archives]
Ground crew pose with one of their planes, the tail fin extension as equipped to this plane helped alleviate some of the aircraft’s less desirable characteristics when it was rolled. [National Archives]
Among the challenges caused by segregation for the 332nd were personnel shortages. The only available training facility at Tuskegee struggled to turn out enough pilots and ground crew to support the segregated squadrons. Mechanics and armorers were among the most affected, especially when the fighter group rapidly transitioned from P-39’s, P-47’s, and P-40’s to P-51’s over the late spring and summer of 1944. [National Archive]
P-51B’s of the 325th Fighter group accompany bombers on their way to the Soviet Union during Operation Frantic. [National Archives]
The success of Operation Overlord saw the redeployment of many USAAF units to the continent. These P-51’s of the 9th AF were the first to be deployed to France. [National Archives]
The F-6C was a photo-reconnaissance variant that had a camera installed in the fuselage, the lens cover for which sits here just behind the radiator scoop. This model was credited with the last kill in the ETO, after downing a Fw 190 on May 8 1945 (Dean 339). [Wikimedia]

Credits

  • Written by Henry H.
  • Edited by  Ed Jackson & Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Ed Jackson

Sources

Primary:

  • Flight Tests On The North American P-51B-15 Airplane, AAF NO. 43-24777, 1944.
  • Preliminary Results of Performance Tests on a P-51B Airplane with 44-1 Fuel P-51B-5-NA, V-1650-7 Engine. 1944.
  • P-51B-15-NA 43-24777 (Packard Merlin V-1650-7) Performance Tests on P-38J, P-47D and P-51B Airplanes Tested with 44-1 Fuel. (GRADE 104/150). 15 May, 1944.
  • Matthews, H. F. Elimination Of Rumble From The Cooling Ducts Of A Single-Engine Pursuit Airplane. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS. 1943.
  • Messerschmitt A.G. Augsburg. (1944). Leistungen Me 109 G-14/U4 mit Db 605 Am u. Asm. 1944.
  • Pilot Training Manual for the Mustang. United States Army Air Force, 1943.
  • Pilot’s Flight Operating Instructions P-51B-1 Airplane. Evansville, Indiana: United States Army Air Force, 1943.
  • Pilot’s Notes for Mustang III Packard Merlin V-1650-3 Engine. Air Council, 1944.
  • Wilkinson, Paul. Aircraft Engines of the World. 1944.
  • The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-All Report (European War). U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1945.

Secondary:

  • Bucholtz, Chris. 332Nd Fighter Group: Tuskegee Airmen. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.
  • Bucholtz, Chris. 4Th Fighter Group “Debden Eagles”. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
  • O’Leary, Micheal. Building the P-51 Mustang the Story of Manufacturing North American’s Legendary WWII Fighter in Original Photos. Specialty Pr Pub & Wholesalers, 2011.
  • Dean, Francis H. America’s Hundred Thousand: the US Production Fighter Aircraft of World War II. Schiffer Publ., 1997.
  • Douglas, Calum E. Secret Horsepower Race: Second World War Fighter Aircraft Engine Development on the Western Front. TEMPEST, 2020.
  • Ethell, Jeffrey L. Mustang: A Documentary History of the P-51. London: Jane’s, 1981.
  • Haulman, Daniel L. Nine Myths about the Tuskegee Airmen. October 21, 2011.
  • Marshall, James William; Ford, Lowell. P-51B Mustang: The Bastard Stepchild that saved the Eighth air force. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2020. (Electronic)
  • Moye, J. Todd. Freedom Flyers: The Tuskegee Airmen of World War II. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012.
  • Overy, Richard James. The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945. London: Penguin Books, 2014.

Nakajima Ki-115 Tsurugi

 Empire of Japan (1945)
Kamikaze Aircraft – 105 Built

The Ki-115 suicide aircraft [Combat Workshop via Pinterest]

Throughout 1945, it was becoming clear to Japanese Army Officials that an Allied invasion of the Japanese mainland was growing ever more likely. Seeing as their navy and airforce had been mostly destroyed, they needed new weapons to fight off a probable Allied attack on Japan. Among these new weapons were Kamikaze aircraft, with many older designs having already been used in this role. However, some Kamikaze aircraft were to be specially designed for such a role, being cheap and able to be built quickly and in great numbers. One such aircraft was the Ki-115 Tsurugi (Sabre) which was built in small numbers, and never used operationally.

History

Rear view of Ki-115 suicide aircraft [ijaafphotos.com]
Following the extensive loss of men, materiel, and territory during the fighting in the Pacific, the Japanese Army and Navy were in a precarious situation, especially as there was a great possibility of an Allied invasion of their homeland. Unfortunately for them, the Japanese fighting forces on the ground, in the air, and on the sea were mostly mere shadows of their former selves, unable to prevent the rapid Allied advance across the Pacific. This was especially noticeable after the costly Japanese naval defeat during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 and later Battle of Okinawa which ended in July 1945.. The desperation, or better said fanatical refusal to accept that the war was lost, led to the development and use of Kamikaze (divine wind) tactics. This name was taken from Japanese history, the term arose from the two typhoons that completely destroyed the Mongol invasion fleets.

Essentially, the Kamikaze were Japanese pilots that used their own explosive-laden aircraft as weapons, and sought to crash into important targets, such as Allied warships. This term also entered widespread use to designate all Japanese suicide craft used in this way. During the war, these tactics managed to sink over 30 Allied ships and damage many more.

Allied anti-aircraft fire was often concentrated in order to prevent Kamikaze attacks. But, despite this, Japanese aircraft would often get through. [Wiki]
The suicide attacks were mostly carried out using any existing aircraft that was operational, including older trainers and obsolete aircraft. Kamikaze are a subject with a great deal of nuance and can be difficult to understand through a conventional lens. However, supplies of these aircraft would inevitably become limited and their previous usage meant fewer would be serviceable compared to newer, more expensive models. Thus, the Japanese Army wanted a specially designed Kamikaze aircraft that could be produced in great numbers. These aircraft needed to have a simple construction and use as little of dwindling material stockpiles as possible.

On 20th January 1945, the Japanese Army contacted the Nakajima aircraft manufacturer with instructions to design and build such an aircraft. The basic requirements included a bomb load up to 800 kg (1,760 lbs). It had to be able to be powered by any available radial engine in the range of 800 hp to 1,300 hp. The maximum speed desired was 515 km/h (320 mph). Construction and design had to be as simple as possible. They also wished to speed up the whole development and production process and also to reduce the need for skilled labor. It was especially emphasized that the undercarriage had to be jettisonable, not retractable. It was not expected for the aircraft to fly back, so a retractable landing gear was not needed and this would make the production and design process somewhat quicker.

First Prototype

The job of designing this aircraft was given to Engineer Aori Kunihiro. He was supported by engineers from Ota Manufacturing and the Mitaka Research Institute. While Nakajima received the contract in January 1945, it only took two months to complete the first prototype. In March 1945, this prototype was presented to the Japanese Army and then put through a series of tests. Almost immediately, a series of faults with the design were noted. This was not surprising given that the whole design process lasted only two months. During running on the ground, the fixed and crude undercarriage was difficult to control. The pilot’s poor frontal visibility further complicated matters. This was unacceptable even for skilled pilots, while less experienced pilots would have had great difficulty in successfully operating it on the ground. The Army rejected the prototype and requested a number of modifications to be done.

The Ki-115 first prototype. [ijaafphotos.com]
The Ki-115 cockpit was positioned in the middle of the fuselage and offered the pilot limited forward vision when on the ground. [Wiki]

Technical Specifications

The Ki-115 was designed as a low-wing mixed construction suicide attack aicraft. The front fuselage, containing the engine compartment, and the central part were built using steel panels. The engine compartment was held in place by four bolts and was specially designed to house several different potential engines. Eventually, the Japanese chose the 1,130 hp Nakijama Ha-35 14 cylinder radial piston engine. It had a fixed-pitch three blade propeller. In order to help reach its target quicker, two small auxiliary rocket engines were placed under each wing.

The wings were built using all-metal construction with stressed skin. The rear tail unit was built using wood and was covered by fabric. The cockpit was placed in the upper centre of the fuselage. It was semi-open, with a front windshield.

As requested, the Ki-115 prototype had a fixed and jettisonable undercarriage. It had a very simple design, using simple metal tubes with no shock absorbers. While two wheels were used in the front, a tailskid was used at the rear. The fixed undercarriage tested on the prototype proved to be highly ineffective. All later produced aircraft were instead equipped with a simple and easy to build shock absorber.

Ki-115 side view [ijaafphotos.com]
The armament consisted of a bomb load of up to 800 kg (1,760 lbs). This included using either a single 250 kg (550 lb), 500 kg (1.100 lb) or 800 kg (1.760) bomb. The bomb was not to be dropped on the enemy, but instead be detonated once the aircraft hit its target. Beside the bomb, no other armament was to be provided on the Ki-115.

The Ki-115 was initially meant to be supplied with a fixed undercarriage, which proved to be problematic. Production aircraft were instead provided with simple shock absorbers. [ijaafphotos.com]

The Fate of the Project

Once the prototype was back in Mitaka Kenkyujo (where the prototype was built), the engineers began working on improving its performance. The redesigned undercarriage, which incorporated a simple shock absorber, was completed by June 1945, by which time a series of test flights were done. By August 1945, some 104 Ki-115 aircraft were ready. Two Ki-115s were given to Hikoki K.K., where the Japanese Navy Air Force was developing its own suicide attack aircraft. By the war’s end, none of the Ki-115s built would be used in combat.

Surviving Aircraft

The Ki-115 planes were later captured by the Allies, and nearly all were scrapped. Surprisingly, two Ki-115s have survived to this day. One can be seen at the Pima Air & Space Museum. This aircraft is actually on loan from the National Air and Space Museum. The second aircraft is currently located in Japan. Not wanting to potentially damaged tis aircrafts on the side of caution no restoration attempts are planned for the near future.

The surviving Ki-115 at the Pima Air & Space Museum. [Wiki]
A picture of the second surviving aircraft taken during the 1980’s in Japan. [hikokikumo.net]

The Ki-115b Proposal

In order to further improve the aircraft’s performance and reduce cost, the Ki-115b version was proposed. This included replacing the all-metal wings with ones built of wood. These new wings were larger and had to be equipped with flaps. To provide the pilot with a better view, his cockpit was moved to the front. Due to the end of the war, nothing came from this proposal.

Production and Modifications

The Ki-125 was built in small numbers only, with some 104 production planes plus the prototype. These were built by the two Nakajima production centres at Iwate (22 aircraft) and Ota (82 aircrafts). The production lasted from March to August 1945.

  • Ki-115 prototype – Tested during early 1945.
  • Ki-115 – In total, 104 aircraft were built, but none were used operationally.
  • Ki-115b – Proposed version with larger wooden wings, none built.
Only 105 Ki-115 aircraft, including the prototype, were ever built. [ijaafphotos.com]

Conclusion

Luckily for the Japanese pilots, the Ki-115 was never used operationally. It was a simple and crude design which was born out of desperation. If the Ki-115 was ever used in combat, it would have likely presented an easy target for enemy fighters and suffered from poor reliability due to its cheap construction.

Ki-115 Specifications
Wingspan 28 ft 2 in / 8.6 m
Length 28 ft 1 in / 8.5 m
Height 10 ft 10 in / 3.3 m
Wing Area 133.5 ft² / 12.4 m²
Engine One 1,130 hp Nakijama Ha-35 14 cylinder radial piston engine
Empty Weight 3,616 lbs / 1,640 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 6,440 lbs / 2,880 kg
Maximum Speed 340 mph / 550 km/h
Cruising speed 186 mph / 300 km/h
Range 745 miles / 1,200 km
Crew Pilot
Armament
  • Bomb load up to 1,760 lbs (800 kg)

Gallery

Illustrations by Ed Jackson

Another Ki-115 Tsurugi in Natural Metal with 500kg Type 92 Bomb
Ki-115 Tsurugi in Green with 500kg Type 92 Bomb
Ki-115 Tsurugi in Natural Metal with 500kg Type 92 Bomb

Credits

  • Written by: Marko P.
  • Edited by: Stan L. & Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Ed Jackson

Sources

  • R. J. Francillon (1970) Japanese aircraft of the Pacific war, Putham and Company
  • D. Nešić (2007) Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata Japan, Tampoprint
  • D.Mondey (2006) Guide To Axis Aircraft Of World War II, Aerospace Publishing

 

 

 

Northrop P-61 Black Widow

sweden flag USA (1943)
Night Fighter – 706 Built

A P-61A of the 422nd NFS. (San Diego Air and Space Museum)

The Northrop P-61 was a night fighter designed to fulfill a largely overlooked gap in America’s air defenses in the years prior to its entry into the Second World War. Ambitious and groundbreaking, the P-61 would be the first fighter aircraft designed to carry a radar and was to be equipped with a state of the art remotely operated turret. However, the aircraft suffered numerous technical problems which led to many delays in its development. Despite its quirks, the plane proved to be popular with its pilots, effective in service, and far more capable in its mission than preceding American night fighters, while also proving itself effective in roles not envisioned at the time of its design.

Nascent Developments

The US Army’s night air defense services during the interwar years were perhaps their most neglected and least developed. This was in part due to the meager capabilities of the aircraft and detection systems of the time, but also general disinterest from senior leadership and, resultantly, poor funding. Despite advances in night flying instrumentation and training aids, most notably Edward Link’s ground trainer, efforts during the period to detect and intercept aircraft at night were largely futile. Success in testing was almost entirely based on the weather, as the search lights they coordinated with relied on acoustic detection, and their ability to find the enemy was largely based on luck whenever the skies were not clear. Attempts were even made to detect enemy aircraft by the weak electromagnetic waves emitted by their spark plugs, but these were met with predictably poor results. What methods they did develop were subsequently made useless by advancements in bomber design, as the new Martin B-10 was faster than most contemporary fighters, and the B-17, still in development at the time, showed even greater promise (McFarland 3, 4).

Andrew Link’s ground trainer allowed pilots to train for blind flying without actually taking to the air [American Society of Mechanical Engineers]
Night fighters would prove a largely unworkable concept during the interwar years due to the crude instruments employed to find the bombers, which themselves also stood a good chance of outrunning their pursuers, however, this would soon change. The development of radar and more capable fighters would prove to be the decisive factor that would transform the practice of intercepting aircraft at night from a clumsy mission dependent more on luck than anything else, to an essential service that would grow ever more precise in its ability to detect and bring down enemy aircraft.

 

Lessons Abroad

The night raids during the Blitz both proved the necessity of night fighter forces and would provide the first lessons needed to found the service [Encyclopedia Britannica]
Virtually all major new developments of the Air Corps’ night fighting capabilities in the years prior to the US entry into the Second World War were a result of two factors, new developments in radar and reports from observers sent to take note of the lessons the RAF were learning during the fall of France and the Blitz.

As the clouds of war drew over Europe during 1938 and 1939, it was clear that airpower would be a decisive component of any potential conflict. It was for this reason that president Franklin Delano Roosevelt massively built-up US military forces for the goal of defending both the mainland United States and its overseas military installations in 1939 and 1940. This build up had broad aims, but perhaps most importantly it saw the vast expansion of the US Army’s air power. This was to prove instrumental for those officers who wished the service to take on a much larger role in the US Armed Forces, and to finally cement their position in it, as the department had been reorganized several times during the interwar period.

They would soon see a massive leap in responsibilities as the Air Corps took up the bulk of air defense duties with the founding of the Air Defense Command in February of 1940. However, despite their eagerness to play such a major role, they also recognized their lack of experience and sought to understand the fundamentals of the modern air war in order to better fulfill this task. With the war waging in Europe, General Henry “Hap” Arnold was able to argue for the presence of US Air Corps observers overseas. In the spring of 1940, four officers were sent to London, Paris, and Berlin (Harrison&Pape 26). While these early postings were important for shaping foreign policy and building ties that would facilitate easier coordination with the RAF later in the war, they would soon become an essential source of information for Air Corps planners following the fall of France and throughout the Blitz.

It was during the Blitz that perhaps the largest gaps in US air cover would become evident, with various solutions being presented to help bridge them. Thankfully for the Air Corps observers, the Blitz would demonstrate exactly what they would need to develop to face any threat from the air. They recognized that they needed a modern air force, which could cooperate with sophisticated detection and communication networks to form a comprehensive air defense system that would leave any attacker badly mauled, day or night.

Brig. General Tooey Spaatz was the primary observer for RAF night fighting operations, and it was no coincidence that he later became Chief of the Air Corps Material Division at Wright Field. While the British night fighter services were still extremely crude at this point in the war, they presented a much better starting point for US planners than the virtually useless interwar experiments. Spaatz’s efforts largely shaped the requirements for the Air Corps’ night fighter, these being relayed to Northrop’s Chief of research, Vladimir Pavlecka, while he was at Wright Field working on another project. Alongside a set of specifications, he was told the plane would need to be a two-engined aircraft with a crew of two, a pilot and a radar operator, though the specifics of radar were not disclosed. At this time, Northrop was a new company and made for an obvious choice, as they had previously worked on an unbuilt night fighter design for the British, and were one of the only firms that were not at capacity at the time.

Soon, this new aircraft, designated the ‘Air Corps Night Interceptor Pursuit Airplane’, began to take shape. It would be powered by a pair of Whitney Double Wasp engines carried in nacelles that would be connected by a twin boom tail, and joined to the fuselage through the wings. It would carry a crew of three, a pilot, a gunner, and a radio operator who also doubled as a rear gunner. It would mount two turrets carrying four .50 caliber guns each and would be a large aircraft with a height of 13 feet and two inches (4.013 m), a length of 45 feet and six inches (13.87 m), a wingspan of 66 feet (20.12 m), it would weigh 22,654 pounds (10276 kg), and feature the new Zaparka flaps.  While this proposal bore many similarities to the later XP-61 prototype, much would change as the design was revised.

While the design was promising, work was slow, and though Northrop had a prototype designed in January of 1941, it would be many months until it was ready to fly, and years before it was ready for service (Harrison&Pape 30). As a result, the aircraft would not be ready for the war to come, leaving most of the night fighting duties to stop gap designs, such as the converted A-20 bomber designated the P-70, and the British supplied Bristol Beaufort.

Clean slate, Dull chisel: A history of early American night fighting

With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the night fighter force found itself entering the war with the lessons learned from the RAF, but without adequate training programs or equipment. Compared to what existed in England, the communications and detection infrastructure was very poor, as it relied on high frequency radio sets which proved troublesome, lacked sufficient identify-friend-or-foe capability, with early warning radar set up in poor positions, and worst of all, they lacked a dedicated night fighter force.

With the help of RAF advisors, they set out to correct these faults, with the Air Defense Operational Training unit being activated March 26th, 1942. The 81st Fighter Squadron (special) was chosen on May 28th, 1942 as the first official night fighter training unit and was staffed with officers who were enthusiastic about the promise of this new mission. This unit was later placed under the new Night Fighter Department, which itself was reorganized as the Night Fighter Division and made subordinate to the Fighter Department . Their curriculum was composed on July 4th, 1942, as pilots were to be trained to a high level of proficiency in instrument flying, blind take offs and landings, night formation flying, night gunnery, pilot-radar operator interception teamwork, Ground Control Intercept (GCI), and general air defense procedures.

While this unit was extremely useful in testing and building confidence in new equipment, like the SCR 540 radar, it was hit by numerous hurdles which prevented it from turning out the number of pilots needed. This was mostly the result of a shortage of aircraft, as the relatively small number of P-70’s, DB-7’s, AT-11’s, T-50’s, and B-80’s would prove a serious bottleneck, as would the delays in getting Airborne Intercept ground trainers. This problem remained late into 1941, as the 81st was deactivated and its personnel used to form the 348th and 349th Night Fighter squadrons in October of 1941. These two squadrons would be used to train new night fighter personnel with the hope that they could build 15 squadrons by 1943. However, this training schedule was overly ambitious and hampered by insufficient supplies of equipment. Sadly, in line with much of the troubled program, night fighter pilots graduated with no fanfare or any formal ceremony. They simply signed on a line and received their wings.

Night Fighter Squadron building would continue slowly until James Doolitle would push for its accelerated development in late 1942. Doolittle, after being so impressed by RAF night fighters over North Africa, called for four new night fighter squadrons to be formed, these being the 414th, 415th, 416th, and 417th. It was not until July of 1943 that real Night Fighter Squadron development began in earnest, as more aircraft and training material became available, and the new 481st Night Fighter Operational Training Group was formed under the command of Lt.Col. Winston Kratz (Harrison&Pape 104).

Trial by Fire: Pacific

The P-70 was the USAAF’s first true night fighter. Unfortunately, in practice, the plane proved to be totally inadequate for the task. [SDASM Archives]
The first night fighter deployments were to Panama and Hawaii, with the first P-70s becoming available in January of 1942. These planes were first used in improvised night fighting squadrons, like the 6th Night Fighter Squadron initially based out of Hawaii. They were, however, badly constrained by their inadequate support infrastructure and, as pilots would soon find out, the performance of their aircraft. Problems soon arose over the personnel shortages which required volunteers from signal corps officers and the enlisted maintenance crews to serve as radar operators. Problems improved very little following their move to Guadalcanal in February of 1943, where conditions were brutal.

Their objective was to try and stop the nightly raids by Japanese bombers which came over the islands to conduct nuisance raids. The P-70s were vectored onto these aircraft using the ground-based SCR 270 early warning radar without success, as the radar could provide only the azimuth to the target but not its altitude. Neither the radar crews nor pilots had much experience with GCI procedures and, combined with the meager capabilities of the P-70, the night fighters brought down few Japanese aircraft. While the night fighter crew’s living conditions improved thanks to new prefabricated shelters, their operational success did not. Their challenges were made far more difficult as the Japanese adapted to their tactics and their bombers began to fly above the P-70’s service ceiling, and went so far as to imitate American GCI operators in attempts to give faulty information to pilots (Harrison&Pape 68). P-70 crews did all they could to improve the speed and operational ceiling of the aircraft through serious modification which included installing propellers from B-17F’s and P-38 fuel pumps, though to no success.

Conditions at airfields across the Solomons were extremely poor, and made worse by occasional bombing raids [National Archives]
Frustration with the P-70 even managed to motivate the squadron to modify some of the P-38s they had been supplied with in an effort to replace the P-70. This would prove difficult, as the aircraft were not equipped with radar as they were to be used in conjunction with searchlights to find their targets. Two P-38Gs were modified by Lt. Melvin Richardson and a squadron radar mechanic by adding a second seat behind the pilot and building an avionics pod for the SCR-540 out of an external fuel tank. These modified planes were much faster than the P-70s and were capable of reaching high flying Japanese bombers, however, they could not convert enough fighters. Both would receive the Legion of Merit for their ingenuity, but apart from this small victory, the 6th would lack the means to conduct their missions.

Overall, the night fighter squadron’s experiences in the South Pacific proved dismal, having neither the properly trained personnel, support elements, or even aircraft needed to effectively complete their mission. In the end, what success they did have was a result of their ingenuity and perseverance rather than specialized training or the equipment they had been issued. Each victory over the Japanese bombers was a hard-won achievement equally celebrated by the aircrews and the Marines the enemy harassed on a nightly basis.

Trial by Fire: Mediterranean

While the 6th NFS was still deployed to Guadalcanal, the 414th and the 415th left for England in March of 1943, where they would soon be retraining on Bristol Beaufighters. The switch from the P-70 was a difficult one, as between its tendency for ground looping and engine fires resulting from landing gear failure, the Beaufighter proved an intimidating plane for the US pilots. While the Beaufighter proved to be significantly faster and more agile than their old P-70s, many pilots felt uneasy flying it, and even their RAF instructors would readily admit the aircraft was among the most difficult in British service. Unlearning the habits from the P-70 was difficult, but thanks to a comprehensive program from the RAF, the challenge was soon overcome. Now proficient, the 414th and 415th left for North Africa and went into action in July of 1943 (Harrison&Pape 80).

The Bristol Beaufighter would prove an effective weapon against the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica, though its handling characteristics left much to be desired [National Archives]
Unlike their counterparts in the Pacific, the Mediterranean squadrons were largely successful thanks to their far superior Bristol Beaufighters, comprehensive training programs, and good technical support. Not only were they directed by far superior ground based radar systems, but these squadrons would later be the first to use the British AI Mk VIII centimetric radar sets, which, unlike the previous SCR-540, could operate at low altitudes. This radar was particularly useful, as it meant German bombers could no longer fly low to reduce the effective range of the aircraft’s radar. In November of 1943, the campaign proceeded and the two NFS’ would cover Allied convoys against the attacks of German bombers during the advance into Italy. The Germans would use a very different set of tactics compared to the Japanese, and made use of far more sophisticated equipment. As opposed to the single Japanese aircraft that often came in at around 30,000 ft (9144 m), the Germans tended to stay roughly between 10,000 and 15,000 ft (3048, 4572 m) in formations of various sizes. As opposed to the nuisance raids designed to keep the Marines from getting any rest, the Germans often sought to hit strategic targets, like harbor facilities and shipping vessels en masse.  The Germans would also later employ chaff, which cluttered up radar scopes, and tail warning radar on their bombers to warn them of the approach of night fighters.

The efforts of early American night fighter squadrons in the Mediterranean would thankfully prove to be the rule rather than the exception for the air crews still to come. In the future, they would expect well trained, specialized personnel, and effective ground control radar support. However, there were still strict limitations imposed by the equipment afforded to the night fighter squadrons, in particular their aircraft which, despite their greater speed, were anything but easy to fly.

XP-61 & YP-61: trouble, frustration, and promise

The XP-61 would prove to be a promising, but troubled design that would require a lengthy redesign [This Day in Aviation]
While American night fighter pilots had their first experiences in combat during 1942 and 1943, work on the new XP-61 continued. The program truly began in early 1942, after several contracts were issued. It was decided in February of 1942 that 410 aircraft would be procured with $7,136,689.56 being charged to the Defense Aide and $55,656,178.67 to Air Corps Appropriations. This contract stipulated the delivery of the first twelve to take place in April of 1943, with the final aircraft being handed over in January of 1944. However, contract negotiations saw the number of aircraft requested rise and fall significantly in the following months. In addition to deliveries to the USAAF, 50 P-61s were to be set aside for Lend Lease, though this was later dropped due to a lack of RAF interest in the aircraft (Harrison&Pape 89).

The XP-61 first flew on May 26th, 1943, but only after a long and troubled process that saw the prototype fly with different propellers than what were originally called for, a dummy turret, and without a radar. Despite these shortcomings, the prototype was initially quite promising, with the aircraft performing satisfactorily during its short preliminary flight, and its test pilot, Vance Breese, telling Jack Northrop “Jack, you’ve got a damn fine airplane!” (Harrison&Pape 89). The succeeding flights would, however, prove more troublesome ,as they soon revealed stability problems and reliability issues with the engines. These issues were tracked to the horizontal stabilizer and elevator assemblies, the short span Zap flaps, and the buildup of oil and gas in the engine crankcase. Engine failures and violent longitudinal instability soon grounded the XP-61. The stability problems were particularly troublesome, as they required redesigning much of the tail assembly of the aircraft and the addition of full span flaps in place of the Zap flaps.

Issues also arose with the use of the spoileron system on the second XP-61, which was designed to be used in conjunction with short ailerons as part of its lateral control system. The spoilers themselves were thin circular arcs that sat in grooves in the wings. These would deploy and allow the pilot remarkably good control at high speed, but their development would prove to be rather difficult. At first, they proved unstable as a result of their hinge movements, which was solved by reducing the size of the scoop. Later, serious vibration issues were found to destroy the spoilers within their wing slots. This, in turn, was found to be the result of high-speed airflow moving through the slot, and was remedied by installing plates to seal it off (Harrison&Pape 94).

In an effort to improve engine reliability, the initial Pratt & Whitney R-2800-25S engines were replaced with R-2800-10s, though this would fail to solve the problem. Despite the swap, engine failures were common in testing and it was found that cutting oil consumption resulted in oil starvation in the master cylinder, resulting in it freezing. With the rest of the articulating rods still going, the engine would work itself apart. After diagnosing the problem, the engineers at Pratt & Whitney soon resolved it with the installation of additional oil jets (Harrison&Pape 95).

These faults would see a major redesign of the XP-61, with the new model being designated the YP-61, which would act as both a prototype and pre-production model. This would incorporate a number of design modifications, including switching the tail boom’s construction from welded magnesium to aluminum alloy, the Zap Flaps being replaced by a full span trailing edge arrangement, and they would go on to incorporate the fix for the spoilerons (Dean 383). However, this would not represent an end to trouble, as the much-needed improvements in stability meant it could now be used for more demanding tests which would, in turn, uncover new faults.

As testing grew more strenuous, new problems began to arise, most notably with the fuselage. It was soon found that there were several structural weaknesses in the fuselage, with the vulnerable sections being subsequently strengthened, particularly around the canopy. The nose gear door also proved to be fairly fragile, which necessitated strengthening and having the aircraft’s 20 mm guns fitted with blast tubes to prevent the muzzle report from damaging it. It was also found that, at high speeds, the dome at the rear of the radar operator’s compartment could implode as a result of pressure difference. While this component was improved in prototyping, the problem would resurface in production models of the aircraft (Harrison&Pape 114).

At the nose of the aircraft, a new problem was found after a stopover in Arizona. In the sweltering 110-degree weather of the desert, it was found that the Plexiglas radome would deform and collapse once the aircraft was in the air, with the resulting shift in air flow causing the Lucite dome at the rear of the aircraft to blow out. While a new fiberglass dome was designed, it would not be ready well into serial production of the P-61A (Harrison&Pape 115).

The remote-controlled turret was also found to have several faults. The most immediate and concerning of these was that, while the guns were forward, the aircraft remained aerodynamically clean, but there would be intense buffeting as the turret traversed beyond 30 degrees in either direction. Following a redesign, the buffeting was mostly gone save for a far lighter effect that occurred when the turret was fully deflected to either side. In firing tests, it was found that use of the turret resulted in severe structural damage, with a similar problem being encountered with the aircraft’s 20 mm armament. In both cases, it was necessary to strengthen nearby structural elements with steel fittings, though owing to the complexity and size of the remote-controlled turret, a major redesign of the aircraft’s upper structure was required (Harrison&Pape 117, 118).

In spite of its many teething issues, the general flying characteristics earned the aircraft good marks from test pilots, exceeding Northrop’s guaranteed performance by one mile during speed tests, and was remarked upon by production project engineer Capt. Fred Jenks as follows: “The P-61 is an honest airplane. It has no mean tricks. In acrobatics such as loops, spins, Immelmanns, and fast turns, it behaves as a pursuit plane should. Its stalling gestures are near perfect.” (Harrison&Pape 121)

The YP-61, later redesignated P-61, would solve most of the issues of the troubled XP-61 and ease the transition for production models [NACA]

Britain and America on the same wavelength: Cooperation in developing the SCR-720

The Tizzard Mission

The P-61’s highly advanced air search radar was a device many years in the making, being a product of the interwar Tizard Mission, which sought to bring together US and British technical expertise for radar and radio development. It would officially become known as the British Technical and Scientific Mission, and it was not long into the war that approval was granted for the scientific material transfer to the US, which the British hoped would be reciprocated in kind by technical assistance and access to America’s electronics industries. The mission arrived in the US in September of 1940 with two gifts, a cavity magnetron, a device which allowed for the development of more advanced centimeter band radars, and an ASV Mark II surface search radar. Their audience was composed mostly of three groups, the Signal Corps, who had been struggling with the practical employment of radars for nearly a decade, microwave researchers, who were well versed on the technology but had yet to produce practical radar examples, and the US Army Air Corps, who were uninformed on technical matters but saw the promise of the technology (Brown 159, 160).

The mission got off to a good start, with the American audience suitably impressed. On the British side, they gained a great deal of information on the use of microwave techniques, and more importantly, access to larger electronics manufacturing industries and procedures. The US, on the other hand, gained access to the existing British radars and the cavity magnetron. While these advancements would have taken place eventually, the collaboration through the Tizard mission allowed rapid advancements in radar development and production in both countries. It was, of course, not without its negative consequences. Some trust in the American service-labs was lost when they gained the undeserved reputation of producing inferior equipment among the Armed Services when their interwar work was judged against the British (Brown 165, 166).

In the US, work on centimetric radar was mostly carried out through the MIT Radiation Lab, with their first goal being to produce an airborne centimeter band set (Brown 168). The benefits of a centimeter band radar over a meter band were considerable, as they would not require the use of drag inducing aerial antennas. The narrower band also meant less reflection from the ground, and while it was not yet known, they were less susceptible to jamming. In short, they represented a massive leap in capabilities over older radar sets (Brown 145).

The rooftop radar experiments above the Rad Lab were a major step in the development of practical centimetric radar [MIT Physics Department]
The Rad Lab’s first centimetric radar was a 10 cm band set operated from a roof in January of 1941, with an intensive development program to follow. It was hoped that, by February, it would be mounted in a B-18 for testing, and a month following that, they hoped to have it aboard an A-20. However, many issues plagued the rooftop experiment and it was not until March that the device was transferred over to the B-18. Work would continue, and after further collaboration with the British, a new series of technology transfers would benefit both programs, with the British gaining access to a better transmitter, and the US a better receiver. Soon, the lab would produce America’s first practical centimetric Aerial intercept radar, the SCR-520. Western Electric built a few of these sets but work soon transitioned to making a lighter version for the P-61, the SCR-720 (Brown 168, 169).

SCR 720

The SCR-720/AI Mk X was comprised of a number of components, some of which were encased within pressurized canisters [Mossie.org, thisdayinaviation]
The SCR-720 series was an advanced aerial intercept radar built by Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories (Harrison&Pape 113). The radar operated on a wavelength of 9.1 centimeters at 3,300 megacycles, with a peak pulse power of approximately 70 kW. It had a maximum range of about 6 miles (9.65 km), which was later extended beyond 10 miles, at all azimuths between a search angle of 75 degrees to either port or starboard, with a minimum range of 300 feet (91 m). The system used a helical scan method and, in addition to the previously stated horizontal search angle, covered a total elevation of –30 degrees to +50 degrees. The device lacked provisions for IFF gear but could be used in conjunction with the SCR-729 transmitter, which was compatible with Mk III and Mk IIIG IFF sets along with beam approach beacons.

SCR-720 Radar operator’s display and controls [SCR 720 manual]
The display set up was composed of two indicator boxes, a two screen display to be used by the operator, and a far simpler one screen display which was for use by the pilot. The pilot’s indicator typically went unused, as it was less precise than the rear set and was generally redundant, as the pilot would be talked onto the target by the RO. The RO’s scope consisted of a range tube on the right, and an azimuth and elevation tube on the left. The display on the azimuth scope was dependent on the settings of the range scope, as only targets within certain set ranges would appear on the scope. This range was indicated by a marker line on the range scope and could be adjusted by the RO (Survey 28). The settings of these scopes were adjusted through the control box and synchronizer in the RO’s compartment.

In service, the SCR 720 offered many benefits over previous Allied centimeter band aerial intercept radars, in particular the slightly older British AI Mk VIII. A post war survey found that, while using the SCR-720, it was harder to lose maneuvering targets on the scopes thanks to the range/azimuth display which allowed the operator to follow the target’s course. The wide coverage meant it was unlikely a rapidly descending target would be lost, the range scope made course adjustment estimates to the target easier, and the range/azimuth display made intercepts across the flight path of the night fighter easier. Overall, the SCR-720 would prove to be the most precise and advanced AI radar set of the war and would see widespread use aboard the P-61 and DeHavilland Mosquito, which carried a British production of the device designated the AI Mk X (Survey 30).

However, while the radar was the best set in its day, it was also the most complex and was said to require the knowledge and experience on the level of a masters of electrical engineering just to make one’s way around the black boxes that made up the system (Harrison&Pape 113). In service, it would prove even harder to maintain where personnel and spare parts for the system would be sparse, and many of its components would prove vulnerable to the elements. This would generally prove an issue with P-61 squadrons, as they typically lacked personnel able to fix the boxes should problems arise, and often would not have enough spares to replace faulty components. Maintenance notwithstanding, the SCR 720 was a generation ahead of the previous SCR-540 and exceeded it in every capacity except ease of repair.

SCR 720 display diagrams [Radar Survey]

Enter the Black Widow: P-61A&B

An early production P-61A [National Archives]
The first P-61A rolled off the line in October of 1943 at Northrop’s plant in Hawthorne, California, with a public reveal later occurring at an Army-Navy show in Los Angeles in January of 1944. These aircraft were mostly unchanged from the last P-61 pre production aircraft, though this plane and the next 36 P-61As would be the only examples of the A model to be equipped with the remotely operated turret. The turret would be absent from the remaining 200 As and many of the succeeding B model, only to be reintroduced after a redesign (Pape 120,121).

Despite the revised model which would arrive much later in 1944, the P-61’s performance was roughly the same for its entire wartime service, with no major overall increases in horsepower or any major modifications to the airframe, apart from those to allow it to carry additional fuel and bombs and rockets for intruder and ground attack missions. Both the A and B models were powered by the Pratt and Whitney R-2800, with many early P-61As using the R-2800-10 and all aircraft beyond the P-61A-15 using the R-2800-65. Both engines produced 2000 hp, with the only major differences being their magnetos and ignition systems (Pilot’s training manual 11). Revisions to the design were gradual and often very minor between subtypes. As the P-61A matured, many new additions were made, including a new fuel system, underwing racks for bombs and fuel tanks, a water injection system, and additional oil capacity. The water injection system would boost the engine’s power about 15%, but only for brief periods and unsuitable for a lengthy climb or long-distance pursuit (P-61 training manual 12).

The P-61B would go on to extend the nose, revise the trim and hydraulic systems, alter certain instruments and displays in the cockpit, revise the heating system, alter the landing gear doors, and restore the turret (Dean 383). Much more work was done with regards the P-61C, which made use of significantly more powerful turbo-charged engines, though this aircraft did not see wartime use.

While the aircraft would mostly resemble the early prototypes, there had been more than a few major reworks of the airframe, most notably, the dropping of the ‘Zap Flaps’ for near full span types with an added lateral control system which made use of spoilerons. While these did prove troublesome in testing, the faults had been ironed out and the system worked to the satisfaction of pilots. The final configuration made use of slot covers and seals for the spoileron slots that solved the vibration problems and allowed for great lateral control for such a large aircraft while requiring little force on the part of the pilot. While this system was unconventional, pilots rapidly adapted to its use and were immediately appreciative of it, as it allowed for easily applied control at both very high and low speeds. It was particularly useful during landings, where they allowed for precise control on approach thanks to the automatic adjustment of the lateral control system with the flaps (Ashkenas 13, 14). This system was a major factor in making this fighter among the most maneuverable in the USAAF inventory, in spite of it also being the largest and heaviest.

Tough most of the aircraft’s worst issues were remedied in the prototypes, a few made it into the production models. The most glaring of these would be the plastic radome fitted to the nose of the aircraft, and the lucite tail cone at the rear, both of which would constitute fairly significant structural weaknesses. The plastic nose fitted to many of the early P-61As was weather sensitive and was prone to warping in the hot, tropical weather of the Pacific, or simply if left uncovered during a sunny and particularly hot day. The solution was painting the nose of the aircraft in a bright, reflective white paint, which raised obvious disadvantages when the aircraft was trying to stealthily pursue its targets in the dark. The lucite cone would prove more persistent and more dangerous (Harrison&Pape 115). On several occasions, these cones imploded during dives and high-speed maneuvers. While this presented little danger to the overall aircraft, the sound of rushing air through the radar operator’s position made communication between him and the pilot virtually impossible. This would be resolved later by the addition of metal reinforcement bands, though many older P-61’s would continue to fly without them.

While this was the first purpose built night fighter, in many ways, the aircraft fell short of the high hopes placed upon it, but would prove adequate for the purpose it was given. Responses to the P-61 were mixed though generally favorable, but complaints over speed and the difficulty of maintaining the SCR 720 radar persisted for all wartime models of the aircraft. Perhaps most unfortunate was that the top turret, which vastly complicated the aircraft’s design and added considerably to the aircraft’s frontal area and weight, was found to be completely unnecessary. The most immediate requests for improvement were for more powerful engines with better high-altitude performance, and for units to be supplied with more maintenance and test equipment for the SCR-720 radar, which the inadequately prepared ground crews struggled to keep in working order. While they were trained in basic maintenance and installation of the device, few had the technical skills necessary to actually repair faulty components. Neither of these would be provided in time to be of use during the war.

ETO: The 422nd and 425th Night Fighter Squadrons

French workers repair a runway at an airfield operated by the 9th AF [National Archive]
The first P-61 to leave the United States was a P-61A to be evaluated by the RAF in March of 1944. This aircraft was later returned in February of 1945, as the RAF were not particularly impressed with its performance and found its maximum range to be far too low. They needed night fighters for deep penetrations into German airspace in support of the ongoing strategic bombing campaign, and the P-61 simply did not fit the requirements. While the aircraft was by all metrics a poor fit for the RAF, the language and tone surrounding the growing competition between the P-61 and DeHavilland Mosquito would become increasingly petty and hostile within certain sectors of the US War Department and the Night Fighter division.

Beyond this evaluation aircraft, three Night Fighter squadrons would be deployed to England in anticipation of Operation Overlord. These were the 422nd, which departed on March 10th, the 423rd on April 1st, and the 425th which departed May 1st. During this period, only the 425th had P-61As slated to be shipped out with them amidst general concerns regarding the availability of the aircraft. The 422nd and 423rd were still equipped with the inadequate P-70 at the time of their departures (Overlord Build Up). Supplies would thankfully become more available, with the 422nd getting their first P-61As in late May and the 423rd becoming a photographic reconnaissance squadron and would not require the aircraft (Dean 285). Both squadrons would possess a small number of aircraft, with the 425th shipping out with only nineteen aircraft, and throughout their service in the European Theater it remained the case that replacement aircraft were in short supply.

None of these P-61As were equipped with the dorsal turret, and with copious time on their hands and the feeling that a second pair of eyes looking forward would be helpful, several crews in the 425th NFS had the bright idea to move the radar operator’s position up into the now vacant gunner’s seat. Along with technical representatives from Northrop, the chief radar and engineering officers, and a Capt. Russell Glasser, who possessed a graduate’s degree in mechanical engineering, they set out to modify the aircraft. The results were spectacular, with the pilot and R/O now able to communicate in the event of intercom failure, and the resulting shift in weight changing the slightly nose up to a nose down at cruise, increasing the cruising speed between 15 and 20 mph. This change was subsequently authorized for 9th Air Force’s P-61s (Harrison&Pape 205, 206).

Ground crews prepare a P-61 for action [National Archives]
It was not until July of 1944 that the European P-61s actually flew their first combat sorties, with the several months prior to this being taken up by training, including joint exercises with the RAF, and a race between the P-61A and a DeHavilland Mosquito NF Mk XVII. The latter was precipitated by a rumor that the USAAF was planning to replace the P-61 with the Mosquito.

In June, Lt. Col. Oris B. Johnson arranged for joint training with an RAF Halifax bomber squadron based at Croft, during which the Night Fighters would practice intercepting the bombers, who would in turn practice evasive maneuvers and other defensive tactics. The night fighters would be given an area to defend and would be vectored onto bombers by GCI. When they were in place to claim a ‘kill’, they flashed their navigation lights (Harrison&Pape 206). While this exercise was undoubtedly easier than what they would later be asked to do over France, it was important in building up the crew’s confidence in their abilities and equipment.

The ‘race-off’ was an event long in the making, with its roots in the War Department’s desire to purchase DeHavilland Mosquitoes for use as reconnaissance aircraft and night fighters. There were those in the department who wished to equip the Night Fighter Squadrons in the Mediterranean with Mosquitos, with the ensuing politics eventually driving a rumor that the War Department was planning to scrap the production of the P-61 in favor of the Mosquito, which were to be supplied by the UK and Canada. In any case, these proposals were impractical, as the British were extremely protective when it came to these aircraft. However, rumors soon filtered to the squadrons who were upset enough to propose a fly-off between the types. A demonstration was arranged on July 5th, 1944 at RAF station Hurn. The contenders were a P-61A and a Mosquito NF Mk XVII, with the results being that the P-61 out climbed and out turned the Mosquito between 5,000 and 20,000 feet.

The race was anything but clear cut, and it is extremely unlikely that it was just a fair competition that both sides took part in earnestly. Simply put, the RAF did not want to give the USAAF any more Mosquitoes than they absolutely had to, and were extremely motivated to throw the race. They had a great desire to ensure they were better supplied with the only night fighter in Allied service at the time that could fly long range missions into Germany. The results of the race are extremely suspicious given just how clear the P-61A’s win seemed to be in comparison to the years of evaluations which virtually always claimed that the Mosquito NF had the superior climb rate, and the P-61 had superior maneuverability. Members of the 481st NFTG who had flown planes came to the same conclusion, as did the AAF board, and even Col. Winston Kratz, director of night fighter training and a major proponent of the P-61 (Harrison&Pape 153, 156, 203). His words perhaps best sum up the event, “I’m absolutely sure the British were lying like troopers. I honestly believe the P-61 was not as fast as the Mosquito, which the British needed because by that time it was the one airplane that could get into Berlin and back without getting shot down. But come what may, the ‘61 was a good night fighter. In the combat game you’ve got to be pretty realistic about these things. (Harrison&Pape 209)”

The first real test of the P-61 in Europe came in July of 1944, when they were pressed into service against a new threat, the Fiesler 103 flying bomb or ‘buzz bomb’. The fast, unmanned weapon required the P-61 to enter a slight dive to catch them and, while they flew straight and level, they still proved a dangerous and challenging opponent. The bomb presented a small target but its massive warhead was capable of damaging a pursuer, something Capt. Tadas J. Spelis and F/O Eleutherios ‘Lefty’ Eleftherion would learn on the night of July 20th. Drawing in at 450 ft, Spelis detonated the bomb’s payload. which violently shook his plane and caused serious damage to the plane’s control surfaces and left much of the fuselage dented and perforated (Harrison&Pape 205).

Over the Channel: Autumn through Winter

P-61 crews grab lunch. Conditions for the crews of the 422nd and 425th grew basic as they operated from hastily prepared airstrips in the Autumn of 1944 [National Archives]
At the end of July, the 422nd and 425th would make the trip across the channel to provide afterhours protection for the US First and Third Armies, respectively. There, both squadrons would defend the Normandy beachhead as the Allies pushed forward into France. This period would largely inform the kind of fighting they would be doing for much of the campaign, intercepting lone German bombers and the occasional night fighter acting as an intruder, while also taking on alternate support missions. Shortly after the 422nd was deployed to the Cherbourg peninsula, they intercepted several Ju 88s, Do 217s, and Ju 188s as they attempted to harass Allied forces in the area, but kills were difficult to confirm owing to the contested areas these aircraft went down in.

This period also saw the P-61’s first encounter with a German night fighter when Lt. Paul Smith and Lt. Robert Tirney intercepted a Bf 110G-4 on August 7th, 1944. While Smith and Tirney approached the enemy, they were soon spotted and found themselves in a turn fight. While the maneuverability of the P-61 allowed them to keep up with the enemy, the two planes would end up colliding. Despite the impact, both planes would end up returning home, each carrying paint from their opponent. Records show elements of the German night fighter squadrons NJG 5 and 4 had been conducting ground attack operations that night without losses (Harrison&Pape 203; Part 4 Boiten 29).

This period also saw the first use of the P-61 in the ground attack role when the 425th NFS was called to assist an attack on German forces that had broken out of Lorient. Despite their early model P-61As lacking hard points for bombs, they were able to carry out the mission thanks to the powerful cannon armament of the P-61A. They conducted strafing runs on gun positions, truck convoys, and an artillery ammunition dump at the cost of one aircraft which struck a telephone pole in a low-level attack (Harrison&Pape 204).

Following the breakout in Normandy, there was a considerable lull in interceptions of enemy aircraft and the trickle of supplies to the unit meant much of the autumn of 1944 was characterized by inactivity. From September to November, GCI directed the 422nd’s P-61s into a total of 461 chases, resulting in 282 airborne radar contacts, 174 sightings, 20 of which were positively identified as enemy aircraft, and only 7 were shot down (McFarland 28). The use of Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) appeared to be limited, resulting in a high number of interceptions of friendly aircraft, and occasional friendly fire. Air crews in the 422nd NFS believed they had been fired on several times by RAF Mosquitos, and one Mosquito of the 305 Squadron, piloted by WO. Reg Everson, had been shot down by a P-61, with his aircraft being claimed as a ‘Ju 88’ (Harrison&Pape 302, peoples war).

As the Night Fighter Squadrons moved away from the beachhead and into airfields previously held by the enemy, their supply lines grew tighter and the enemy began to develop better tactics. A scarcity of fuel even threatened to keep the 442nd on the ground, but the crisis was avoided thanks to a little ingenuity. As fuel laden B-24’s came in for their deliveries in Florennes, Belgium, they would occasionally overrun the airstrip, whereupon the aviation gasoline would be siphoned out, and then stolen by the 422nd (Harrison&Pape 267).

A P-61B is prepared to sortie, Italy 1944. [National Archives]
While the Luftwaffe was less active at night during this period, their tactics had largely improved. Their typical after hours raiders became flights of bomb laden Fw 190s in the place of the lone medium bomber. The common types, the Ju 88, Do 217, Ju 87, and Ju 188, were still encountered, but were eclipsed by the more numerous 190s flying low altitude raids against Allied positions near the front line. The 190s would prove more difficult targets, as their small size made them hard to identify in the dark, and their speed and maneuverability meant they had a much better chance of slipping away from the larger night fighters. While they were harder to shoot down, the P-61 was still more than capable of breaking up their attacks and forcing them to return to base (Harrison&Pape 262).

With their superior speed and maneuverability, Fw 190 fighter bombers would prove a greater challenge for the P-61 than the usual medium bombers [Rod’s Warplanes]
The lull in Luftwaffe nightly activity in the autumn and winter of 1944 meant that both British and American night fighter squadrons could shift to offensive operations, and thanks to newer models of the P-61A and B mounting additional hardpoints for fuel and bombs, they would have an exceptional tool for this task. Both the 422nd and the 425th NFS would provide a vital service to the beleaguered 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium, where they were able to provide air cover and ground attack support, day or night, in weather that kept most planes on the ground. The nightly air battles over the Ardennes took a similar, but intensified form as the Luftwaffe mounted a desperate offensive, sortieing aircraft to attack Allied positions, drop supplies, and mounted a score of night fighter intruder missions. These intruder missions had aircraft loiter around enemy airfields and attack any aircraft attempting to take off or land.

It was during this time that one of the greatest drawbacks of the P-61 made itself well known. It was a high maintenance aircraft and replacement parts and planes were scarce. During the Battle of the Bulge, only four of the 422nd NFS’s sixteen P-61s were operational, and keeping these four planes serviceable was a round the clock effort of the highest importance. Apart from the just as limited number of A-20s, the P-61s were the only aircraft capable of flying in the terrible weather conditions of the battle. Supplies had to be found outside of the regular channels, and crews were rotated out of these aircraft that each flew up to four missions per night. Combined, the 422nd and 425th NFS claimed a total of 115 trucks, 3 locomotives, 16 rail cars, sixteen aircraft, and had disrupted Luftwaffe activities in the area (McFarland 32, 33). The actions of the 422nd would go on to earn them another Distinguished Unit citation, and a commendation from the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne at Bastogne (Harrison&Pape 293).

However, this period was also considerably more dangerous as Luftwaffe’s night fighter squadrons were also performing similar missions in the same area. While they used comparatively obsolete radars, they could still present a threat. Of the scarce P-61’s active during the Battle of the Bulge, three were lost to unconfirmed causes (Dean 286).

Spring to VE-Day

The Battle of the Bulge would mark the apex of the NFS’ activity in the European Theater. The remainder of the European campaign would consist almost entirely of ground attack and intruder missions, as fuel shortages left most of the Luftwaffe grounded. Both the 422nd and 425th would commit themselves to ‘ground work’ against the usual targets; truck convoys and rail lines, as Tactical Air Command ordered a cessation of defensive air patrols, instead focusing on general offensive operations. In this role, the P-61 proved exceptional despite the design never being intended for such use, with the initial models not even possessing bomb racks.

Most ground attack missions would be conducted the same way, though some new tactics would be introduced to take advantage of the bomb racks added to the newer models of the P-61. During the beginning of 1945, P-61s would often carry napalm to both destroy targets, and for illumination. Using the fires for illumination, they carried out attacks with a combination of bombs, and in the case of the 425th’s modified P-61s, HVAR rockets. Rail yards, locomotives, and truck convoys were favored targets, as their drivers often felt it was safe to keep their lights on. While this may seem a ridiculous use of what were among the most expensive aircraft employed during the war, the 422nd was credited with damaging or destroying 448 trucks, 50 locomotives, and 476 rail cars for the duration of their service. Perhaps more impressive were the astoundingly low loss rates suffered on these intruder missions. From October of 1944 to May of 1945, the 425th NFS flew 1,162 intruder missions with the loss of only six aircraft. Despite the inherent dangers of flying at night, these missions actually proved to be far safer than daylight sorties (McFarland 29).

VE-Day [National Archives]

Luftwaffe Opponents

The typical encounters with the Luftwaffe were with its bomber, night attack, reconnaissance, transport, and occasionally night fighter forces. Their targets ranged from frontline positions, rolling stock, to airfields, and were typically attacked by lone aircraft or small formations of light attack aircraft, such as the Fw 190F&G or obsolescent Ju 87. P-61 crews would encounter virtually all medium bomber types in service with the Luftwaffe, including the dated He 111 and Ju 88A-4. Of all the aircraft encountered, only the Me 410 proved a serious challenge to intercept. They were employed as reconnaissance aircraft and their high speed meant they were only vulnerable to the P-61 when at a disadvantage. On roughly equal footing, the Me 410 could pull away (Harrison & Pape 275).

Encounters with enemy night fighters were fairly rare, as their squadrons generally only flew ground attack missions in August against the Normandy beachhead, and much later in December, in support of the Ardennes counteroffensive. They flew Bf 110G-4s, a few of the older Ju 88Cs, and the newest German night fighter at the time, the Ju 88G. While these aircraft flew with radar that had a much more limited range than the SCR 720 and were nearly useless at low altitude, their pilots were capable of putting up a much greater fight than those of the bomber and night attack squadrons. The first encounter between a P-61 and a Bf 110G-4 resulted in the latter being able to slip away after a collision, despite holding clear disadvantages in speed and maneuverability. While most of the new pilots the Luftwaffe were supplied with at the time possessed questionable proficiency at their tasks, most green crews remained on the ground as a result of chronic fuel shortages (Part 4,Boiten 33).

On the night of December 17th, several Luftwaffe night fighter squadrons would be committed to large scale ground attack operations in support of Von Rundstedt’s offensive. These missions were conducted by several dozen aircraft at a time that searched highways, rail lines, and known Allied positions for targets. These operations achieved a level of mixed success but at an extremely high cost, as the pilots were insufficiently trained for the mission and typically encountered accurately directed anti-aircraft fire (1944 Part 5, Boiten 68). The P-61s of the 422nd and 425th would find these night fighters significantly more challenging opponents than the medium bombers and transport aircraft they usually encountered. On several occasions, the German fighters slipped away from their pursuers and claimed two, later disproven, victories against P-61s, with the war diarist of Stab NJG6 commenting the “Black Widow inferior to Ju 88 and Bf 110 in dog fighting (Part 5, Boitens 77).” However, this confidence is likely due more to survivor bias than any major technical difference between these aircraft, as several German night fighters would be lost to P-61s. In all likelihood, it was the German night fighter pilot’s confidence in undertaking aggressive maneuvers in the dark that was the most probable reason for this assessment, as the P-61 was superbly maneuverable for its size.

Over the course of this offensive, the 425th would encounter a number of German night fighters and down several of them. Between the 25th and the 29th of December, three confirmed and two probable German night fighter losses can be attributed to this squadron’s P-61s, these being Bf 110 2Z+DH of NJG 6, Ju 88G-1s of NJG4 3C+RK and 3C+ZK, and two very likely Bf 110s, 2Z+DL and 2Z+CV (1944 part 5, Boitens 79, 84, 85). Given the short period and how few P-61s were serviceable, it is safe to say that the P-61 was certainly capable of taking on these opponents. However, it should also be noted that night fighters comprised a relatively small number of kills during this time, with many more being medium bombers and Ju 52 transport aircraft.

The 422nd NFS would later rebase in Langensalza, Germany. This posting allowed P-61 crews the opportunity to get a close look at the enemy’s standard night fighter, the Ju 88G. [National Archives]

CBI: The 426th and 427th

The 426th Night Fighter Squadron was called upon by General Henry H. Arnold for the defense of the B-29s based in Chengdu, China, as per the request of the Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay (Harrison&Pape 222). They would also be joined by the 427th NFS following the end of Operation FRANTIC and the cancelation of any further deployments of USAAF bombers in the Soviet Union. While they were sent to defend the B-29 bases, they were soon found to be almost totally unnecessary, as there were little to no Japanese aircraft active after dark in the China-Burma-India Theater. Not long after their arrival in October, 1944, they would pivot almost entirely to an offensive role, and were mostly relieved of their defensive task to search for trains and truck convoys across the theater. Several aircraft were later modified to mount 4.5 inch rockets, as was the case for their counterparts in Europe (Harrison&Pape 215). They would be met with success, as the Japanese Army was reliant on a single network of roads that ran north to south, a single major rail line, and the Irrawaddy River to move men and material across the theater. Despite the massive patrol area, they could expect to find targets at these strategic bottlenecks (McFarland 40).

A pair of P-61s look for targets by daylight over Northern Burma. Note that the tail cone has been reinforced. [National Archives]
The challenges of operating in this theater largely mirrored those of the squadrons based in the Pacific, as supply lines were tight, the terrain proved difficult to construct airbases in, and the mountainous geography hampered the use of early warning radar. Fuel was particularly scarce and had to be shared with the B-29 squadrons based with them, which typically meant offensive operations were periodically called off when supplies of fuel ran out, as was a case for the 427th NFS’ detachment in China for the month of April 1945 (Harrison&Pape 236). The squadrons operated mostly dispersed across the theater as detachments, with the peak number of P-61s in the CBI being 53 in July of 1945. The number typically sat around 35 aircraft until June (Dean 386).

PTO: the 421st NFS

Many airfields across the PTO were built over coral beds which were difficult to clear and highly visible at night [National Archives]
The P-61 was a godsend to the Pacific night fighter squadrons who had long been forced to rely on the inadequate P-70, and with the exception of a few field modified aircraft, radar-less P-38s. Starting from early 1944, the various night fighter squadrons in the PTO would begin receiving P-61s and phasing out their long obsolete P-70s. Unlike Europe or the Mediterranean, the operations in the Pacific would not proceed at the pace of a gradual frontline that needed to be supported but rather saw the NFS deployed to newly constructed airstrips in support of larger amphibious operations which were targeted by raiders. Conditions were poor and extremely hard on airmen and planes alike, which brought unique challenges unknown to those in the ETO. In the words of S/Sgt. Harold Cobb of the 421st NFS: “Night fighting is not glamorous, but it is specialized in every degree, especially in the seven-league-boots, island-hopping war in the Pacific. Pilots must be able to take off and land without strip lights and on fields which are so new that construction is still in progress and the Seabees are still working (Kolln 51).”

The 421st got its hands on the P-61 in April of 1944, while it was based in Wakde, New Guinea, the planes having originally been shipped to Brisbane, Australia. The impact of receiving the new planes would prove considerable, both boosting the morale of the unit and giving it a long-needed replacement for its P-70s. The overall mission of the 421st was largely the same as it was for the 6th Night Fighter squadron in Guadalcanal two years earlier, to defend against nightly nuisance raids from Japanese bombers. The Japanese had also largely improved from their earlier campaigns, as they began to seek targets of greater strategic importance which they attacked with a far greater frequency. The men of the 421st were among them and their bases at Wakde and Owi were attacked regularly, often causing casualties and destroying aircraft. These airfields being built on lightly colored ancient coral beds made them both extremely visible at night and made it extremely difficult to dig shelters (Kolln 48). The effects of high explosives were also magnified, as they propelled sharp fragments of coral through the air with every bombardment.

The squadron also faced the same challenges posed by tropical environments, often with little improvement over the conditions almost two years ago. The prepared airfields were often built under difficult circumstances and challenging geography. The Seabees often had to work with coral beds, wetlands, and jungles that proved time consuming to develop into usable airstrips, often leaving little time and resources for improving the living conditions at these airfields.

Wakde Island before it had been captured by the US. The bright coral beds that were the foundations for the airstrip made an excellent aiming point for Japanese raiders [National Archives]
These conditions were also felt by the sensitive radar systems of the aircraft, especially the pressurized canisters which contained many of the system’s vital components. They had a tendency to depressurize, which resulted in electrical arcing at altitude, disabling the entire system. The 419th NFS had developed an improvised system where the electronics tanks were kept pressurized by engine-driven vacuum pumps, but it is unknown if this modification was ever taken up by any other squadrons (Harrison&Pape 149). Early models of the P-61A, which still had the plastic radome, also encountered trouble in the tropical heat and sun, as the nose of the aircraft would often soften and deform, which would impact the movement of the SCR 720’s scanner. In addition to the reflective white paint added to the nose, crews would fasten ‘sun shields’ while grounded to protect the radome in the tropical heat. As was the case with the European squadrons, supplies of replacement parts and aircraft were scarce, and in a unique twist in the Pacific, the improper packing of engines resulted in the loss of 400 R-2800s to corrosion. Combat readiness suffered as a result. The 421st considered it a ‘good day’ should six of their aircraft be operational during their operations from their later airbase at Tacloban (Harrison&Pape 241).

Conditions for the air and ground crews of the 421st were scarcely better. Harsh tropical weather, limited access to drinkable water, and disease were common in the South Pacific, with conditions only improving after redeployment to the Philippines. At Owi and Wakde, personnel had to overcome an outbreak of Typhus which claimed two, heatstroke which claimed one, and even Silicosis of the lungs which resulted in a single fatality. However, the base at Owi became perhaps the most livable thanks to the discovery of an artesian well near the unit’s bivouac area (Kolln 47,48).

In the PTO, P-61s often operated from small, busy airfields where accidents were not uncommon. This P-61 went off course on a blind landing through fog at Iwo Jima and crashed into another aircraft [National Archives]
Operations over New Guinea largely proceeded the same way as they had earlier, but with far greater success thanks to their new P-61s, which meant interceptions were comparatively easy, though new Japanese tactics would periodically disrupt their success. Perhaps the most surprising of these was the deployment of radar reflecting chaff from bombers as they made their way to and from their targets. The chaff were aluminum strips that reflected radar and presented on radar scopes as a single large ‘cloud’ that could obscure the positions of aircraft. In practice, the SCR 720 did not prove very vulnerable to chaff if the pilot had already been guided toward the target, as the air search radar proved powerful enough to burn through the interference. Far off ground-based radar stations would prove more vulnerable to it, especially older models (Kolln 55). The Japanese air force would also employ new tactics against the defenders. On August 5th, the Japanese sortied several fighters along with the typical high-altitude bombers. These aircraft were picked up on radar later than the bombers to which the night fighters had already been sent against. The Japanese fighters were, however, unable to inflict much damage and their tactics were soon understood by the defenders (Kolln 50). While the 421st NFS’ P-61s were largely part of the waning war in the South Pacific, their subsequent redeployment to the Philippines would place them in one of their most active theaters of the entire war.

Tacloban

The airfield at Tacloban was muddy, overcrowded, and under constant attack during the first weeks of the US Army’s return to the Philippines [National Archives]
The 421st was deployed to the airfield at Tacloban on October 31st, 1944 to provide nightly air cover for the amphibious operations in the Southern Philippines. The conditions were largely a repeat of those of the prior camps at Wakde and Owi, but the raids were far worse. What were once frequent occurrences became a daily fixture of the stay at Tacloban (Kolln 61). The airfield itself would also prove to be an extremely hazardous and ineffectual location to operate from, as would be the positions chosen for the GCI radars. Tacloban was extremely underdeveloped during the height of operations. It was without runway lights for fear they would attract Japanese bombers and the short, muddy airstrip was difficult for the heavy P-61 to operate from, with most landing attempts having to be repeated (Harrison&Pape 240). From their airfield, they were given a number of tasks which would include providing nightly air cover to invasion forces, escorting PT boats, convoy protection, and even conducting daylight patrols.

The Philippines would present a greater set of challenges to the 421st than New Guinea. For one, the aircraft and tactics used by the Japanese air forces were of a different nature entirely. While they previously worked mostly against occasional, small formations of bombers coming in at high altitudes, they now also fought against large numbers of fighters which flew continuous attacks, typically conducted at low altitudes. Coupled with poor GCI coverage of the area, the Ki-43s and A6Ms employed by the Japanese would prove an extremely difficult enemy to counter. The nightly attacks continued and many of the invasion planners became frustrated with the squadron’s inability to stop them entirely, eventually leading General Kenny to send much of the 421st to Peleliu, while the 541st Marine Air Squadron, equipped with the 565-5N, took their place at Tacloban. In the end, the 421st achieved seven kills during this time at Tacloban, and while this was a fairly significant level of success for the PTO, it was deemed unacceptable by the invasion planners (McFarland 37).

The reasons for this swap have long been debated, with claims ranging from the P-61 having insufficient range and loiter time, to the SCR-720 being unable to track more the more maneuverable Japanese fighters. In the end, however, the greatest problems faced by the squadron were its poor GCI support, its low number of serviceable aircraft which resulted from supply shortages, and the vulnerable, poorly suited airfield they had at Tacloban. The Marine night fighters who replaced them were credited with 23 kills, though most of these were during dawn or dusk missions. It does not appear that any technical failings of the P-61 were responsible for a perceived lack of performance, but rather, exceedingly poor operational conditions and biases held by the higher headquarters that placed the expectations of daylight fighters on the NFS 421st while not understanding how they would best be deployed or utilized (Kolln 72). Though most of the squadron had departed Tacloban, several planes and their associated personnel remained to ensure a smooth transition for the Marine aviators and to carry out their previous duties, though to a lesser degree.

The 421st would return at full strength to Tacloban in early January of 1945, after five weeks, and largely resumed the work they had been doing before they left. Most notably, this included the joint patrols with motor torpedo boats, especially the 7th PT boat squadron, which they had developed a good working relationship with. The P-61s would provide cover for the boats as they patrolled Surigao strait and the Ormac Bay area, with a squadron representative aboard to ensure smooth operation between the boats and their air cover (Kolln 75). Enemy air activity in the area had decreased significantly and once again took the form of periodic raids by bombers flying alone or in small formations.

The airfield the 421st returned to was vastly different from the one they had left just a few weeks prior. [National Archives]
The squadron would end the war at Ie Shima, Okinawa, in July of 1945. By this point, the Japanese armed forces were in a state of exhaustion but they were still capable of launching nuisance raids against front line positions and airfields, though the frequency of these raids was low and there were two other P-61 squadrons stationed in the area. This would also mark the beginning of the replacement period of the squadron’s P-61s for P-38Ms. The 421st would spend this time performing intruder missions against targets in Kyushu, Japan, with airfields tending to be the primary targets. In this role, they developed a bombing technique with their search radars, which would be used to measure the relative distance to the target, and in conjunction with the airspeed and altitude of the aircraft, a bomb release window could be worked out. Some pilots would even add marks on their windscreens as visual aids for the technique (Kolln 89). They were, however, unable to account for its effectiveness. There was little resistance to these raids as Japan had a comparatively underdeveloped night fighter service and their night fire control for their anti-aircraft artillery was little better.

With Japan facing famine and industrial breakdowns from the blockade, the prospect of a third atom bomb with more to follow, and their last hope for conditional surrender evaporating as the Soviet Union overran their mainland colonies, the war ended and the P-61’s wartime service came to an end.

Japanese Opponents

Despite being significantly less experienced with the use of ground based and airborne radars than the Germans, Japanese aviators and mission planners consistently demonstrated the ability to develop effective countermeasures and tactics to American night fighters. Japanese signals intelligence services would prove extremely effective and were able to determine the presence of enemy night fighters in areas without radar coverage by monitoring radio transmissions, and were even able to track the position of P-61s by their IFFs (Harrison&Pape 220, 319). They would also successfully employ chaff on a number of occasions, though to decreasing effect, as the US Army began to employ more advanced centimetric search radars that were less vulnerable to it. On Iwo Jima, for instance, raiders would typically use chaff roughly thirty miles out from the island and when they departed, which had the effect of blocking the older meter band SCR-270 and reducing the range of the centimetric SCR-527 (McFarland 39). In addition to this, they would also employ seaplanes to get the attention of night fighters, and once they had drawn them away from the raider’s target, they would land on the water’s surface or return home at low altitude (Thompson 71). This tactic appeared to have been used against the P-61s of the 421st while they were at Tacloban and to good effect, as the loiter time of the P-61 was rather low and they were often forced to return home after several of these non-encounters (Harrison&Pape 234).

Variants of the Mitsubishi G4M were among the most common raiders encountered by P-61s in the Pacific [Rod’s Warbirds]
In the Pacific, P-61s faced mostly medium and light bombers, though would face considerably more fighter aircraft as the war drew to a close. These aircraft employed a wider variety of tactics than those of the Luftwaffe, often to considerable success. However, they would still employ earlier tactics such as lone bomber, high altitude raids which were far less effective, as the P-61 did not have the difficulty the P-70 had in reaching high altitudes.

What they wanted but never got: The P-61C

The P-61C would be developed largely to fulfill the requests of most of the pilots who had flown P-61As and Bs. The design sought to add two major features, more powerful turbocharged engines to provide better high-altitude performance and a higher climb rate, and a set of air brakes. The air brakes would be designed by the AAF’s Wright Field staff in conjunction with Northrop. The design was first incorporated on a P-61A test aircraft, which was nearly lost after a portion of the air brake was sheared off the aircraft and nearly sent it out of control. The final design proved satisfactory and took the form of a two-part slotted panel with halves above and below either wing. These brakes also incorporated a novel system to reduce the asymmetric forces acting on the brakes. This worked by having the deployment of the lower set of brakes assisted by the raising of the top. The brake system exerted a counter force of roughly 1G when the aircraft was at high speed (Harrison&Pape 278, 281).

The engines would go through a considerably longer development period and were to be mounted on a new airframe. Initially, there was some debate on whether the engine should use either a two stage two speed supercharger, as the previous production models of the P-61 used, or a turbo supercharger. It was a new study under John M. Wild at Northrop that made the case for choosing the turbo charger, with his finding being agreed on by Wright Field’s Fighter Project Office. A CH5 turbo-supercharger was subsequently fitted to a P-61A for testing, the aircraft being redesignated the XP-61C. The XP-61C’s conversion was handled by Goodyear Aircraft out of Akron, Ohio, a firm that provided parts for Northrop. The aircraft was initially to be powered by the R-2800-77, though a production run could not be secured and a temporary installation of the R-2800-14’s were used in their place until the R-2800-73 was chosen for the production model. A parallel development that would later be designated the XP-61D made use of the R-2800-77. Cooling issues would bring an end to its development, with the P-61D being canceled as the P-61C entered production. The P-61C proved to be quite promising and a massive step above the previous models, with the aircraft’s service ceiling being raised to 41,000 ft (12497 m) and its maximum speed rising to 430 mph (692 km/h) (Harrison&Pape 279, 280). The P-61C would be the aircraft the test pilots had wanted from the outset, but would fail to make it into service fast enough to see combat.

Project Thunderstorm

Several Project Thunderstorm P-61Cs and an F-15A [NOAA]
While the P-61C arrived too late to take part in the Second World War, it would go on to make major contributions to meteorological research and aeronautical safety in the post-war Thunderstorm Project. The project began with the passing of the H.R. 164 bill in January of 1945, which authorized and directed the Weather Bureau to conduct a study on the causes and characteristics of thunderstorms for aviation safety. The bill would also authorize the appropriations needed for such a study and authorized the cooperation of other departments for assistance.

The finalized research plan called for a vertical stack of five aircraft to make passes through thunderstorms as they drifted over a network of meteorological recording stations in order to document the conditions within the storm. The Army Air Force would provide several P-61Cs and its derivative, the F-15A, for this purpose, as they were designed to withstand strong maneuvering loads and were judged strong enough to quite literally ‘weather the storm’ (Roscoe 26). These aircraft would be modified for the purpose, with wartime equipment being removed and meteorological research equipment installed in its place. The aircraft were prepared at NACA’s Langley Field with the equipment necessary to monitor turbulence and vertical air currents.

The Flight Plan [Roscoe]
For the tests, the planes entered thunderstorms at altitude differences of five thousand feet, with the highest aircraft being at 25,000 ft (7620 m). No storms were avoided, no matter how violent. The project first began around Orlando, Florida in 1946, before later moving to Wilmington, Ohio the following year. These locations were chosen on the basis of the frequency of thunderstorms and the nearby Air Force installations which had the radars needed to support the project. The project would see the P-61s fly through 76 storms for 1362 fly-throughs, during which they collected vital data which would help pave the way for safer air travel during the post war civil aviation boom and were used to build a foundational study for thunderstorm research (Roscoe).

The hail damaged radome of a P-61C [NOAA]

Pilot’s Remarks

Lt. Herman E. Ernst, an ace of the 422nd NFS, behind the controls of a P-61A. Note that the pilot’s radar indicator has been replaced by a compass below the gunsight [National Archives]
Exhaustive tests were performed on the P-61 to determine its flight characteristics, and they were largely found to be in line with the earlier prototypes. Pilots were highly appreciative of its easy handling on takeoff and landing, along with its favorable stall characteristics. Its controls were effective up until stall condition, which itself only occurred after ample warning. Stalls themselves were relatively predictable and virtually always resulted in the nose dropping, with no tendency for either wing to drop, and no corrections being needed to prevent a roll (Dean 391).

In addition to its great stall characteristics, the P-61 would prove to be exceptionally maneuverable for a plane of its size and weight. However, given its size and with two heavy engines on the wings, its roll rate was rather poor. Tests found the aircraft could be put through all hard maneuvers save for outside loops, continuous inverted flight, spins, snap rolls, and vertical reversements. Pilot’s praise was given mostly for its extremely light controls even at high speeds, which was largely thanks to its unorthodox spoileron based lateral control system. Even at speeds of 400 mph IAS, fast aileron and spoileron movement could be affected with one finger on the control wheel, though controls were found to be ‘sloppier’ around 100 mph IAS. One pilot was so confident in the P-61’s maneuverability that he felt he could turn with the best of fighters and, in the case of the F6F, he would “be on his tail so fast it was incredible.” In addition to its maneuverability, its trimming characteristics were also very good, such that it was possible to trim the aircraft out for cruising on a single engine at 130 mph IAS. It should, however, be noted that despite this praise, pilots rated its maneuverability fair to poor, as it was compared to far lighter single engine fighters. Overall, the plane was rated very stable on all axes with good rudder and elevator effectiveness (Dean 388, 390).

Despite its size, the P-61 was capable of pulling off some very impressive aerobatics. However, regulations stipulated that acrobatics were restricted under most combat conditions. [Pilot’s manual]
The P-61 also boasted excellent dive and recovery characteristics, with the book limits being set around 430 mph IAS depending on the arrangement of the aircraft, or around Mach .70. Beyond these limits, buffeting and tuck-under would occur, but the aircraft also demonstrated the ability to exceed these limits by a fair margin. One pilot would claim that he had no problems at speeds of 450 to 475 mph IAS at around 10,000 to 15,000 ft. In this case, he had achieved a true airspeed of 599 mph at Mach .83 and returned within the specified limit envelope at 512 mph TAS, Mach .70, as he reached 10,000 ft. Typically, if buffeting did occur, it was advised to exit the dive by means of a gradual pullout and with high caution should external loads be carried. Another pilot would claim that buffeting would occur far in excess of the recommended dive speed limits. The P-61 would be rated good in respects to its dive acceleration, control forces, recovery characteristics, and be ranked 8 out of 11 US fighter types in the category best stability and control in a dive (Dean 389, 390). The engine limits within dives were 30 seconds at 3090 rpm.

The P-61 was, however, not without its faults, and the most criticized and frequently voiced issues were concerning its acceleration and climb rate. These sentiments were echoed in many tests, and were most notable in rating the aircraft for takeoff, where pilots soon found themselves climbing at a disappointing rate after reducing power. Even at combat-power, the aircraft could at most manage 2500 ft/m at an altitude of 5000 ft (Dean 381). In the concluding remarks to exhaustive tests, it was the most frequently voiced complaint. While it was true many test pilots judged the aircraft somewhat unfairly against lighter single engine fighters, even its most enthusiastic testimonies were typically accompanied with remarks regarding its acceleration and climb performance (Dean 393).

The cockpit drew mixed reactions, with the general feeling being that the layout was adequate but not ideal. While most felt the layout was fair, eight of twenty-one pilots felt the arrangement was “cluttered”, with another ten remarking that they felt the pilot was seated too far from the instrument panel. This group was so displeased with the arrangement that they ended up rating P-61’s cockpit 3rd in the category “worst cockpit”. While the layout of the cockpit remained divisive, virtually all of them were displeased by the restricted visibility caused by the canopy frame (Dean 392).

The P-61B and several As would make use of the night binocular gunsight. These slid behind the pilot when not in use [P-61 Pilot’s training manual]
In terms of its weaponry and its stability as a firing platform, the P-61 was well rated. Equipped with four 20 mm AN/M2 cannons and up to four .50 cal AN/M2 machine guns, the P-61 was very well armed. Despite the lack of the turret on most P-61s, the aircraft’s armament was more or less equal to its contemporaries, the Mosquito NF and Ju 88G, which both carried an armament of four 20 mm cannons. Firing stability was also good, with only one out of fourteen test pilots finding it objectionable. However, problems with the turret would impact its usefulness, as early aircraft would experience intense buffeting on the tail surfaces when the guns were set to certain positions. This problem would later be solved and the turret reintroduced to the aircraft when it was redesigned and supply bottlenecks with the B-29 were resolved (Dean 393).

Overall, the P-61 would present an aircraft with mixed, but favorable characteristics. The aircraft would be superbly maneuverable and responsive for its size and presented excellent flight characteristics at high and low speeds. In contrast, pilots were not enthused over what they judged was a poor rate of climb and cockpit layout. The 481st Night Fighter Training Group would also go on to lodge complaints about poor cockpit visibility and short combat radius (Harrison&Pape 156). While the cockpit went unchanged, the relatively limited range, of only about 1000 miles, would be later brought above 1,800 miles with the use of external fuel tanks (Dean 382).

Construction of the P-61A and B

The wings of the P-61, except for the tips, used a fully cantilever riveted, stressed skin construction with two main spars. Each wing assembly was composed of an inner panel, an outer panel, and the wingtip. The inner panel contained the engine nacelle, two fuel tanks, and a section of the flaps. This portion was the largest wing section and was fitted to the crew nacelle by means of bathtub and lug type fittings at the end of the main spars. The front section also provided one of the main air intakes for the aircraft and an outboard for the oil tank. It was constructed in two parts, forward and aft sections.

A P-61 undergoing maintenance. Its outer wing panel has been detached from the nacelle group [National Archives]
The aft section was also built in two parts and it contained the wing flaps, spoilers, and ailerons. The section also contained an oil cooler and its associated exit shutter. There were six hydraulically actuated slotted flaps with a full deflection of 60 degrees. Relatively small ailerons were installed outboard of the flaps, which extended to the wing tips. To boost lateral control along with the ailerons, a series of spoilers were used and were found in trailing sections, ahead of the outer wing flaps. These were curved metal panels that extended from slots in the wings and were mechanically driven by the pilot’s control column along with the ailerons. Initially, there were also aileron and booster tabs fitted to the inboard end of the left ailerons, but these were removed on later models. The combined fuel capacity of the wing fuel tanks was 646 gallons (2445 liters).

The center fuselage was a semi-monocoque structure composed of transverse bulkheads and channel section frames, longerons at the upper and lower quarters, longitudinal bulb angle stringers, and stressed skin. It was attached to the wings by means of heavy forged fittings on both sides of the fuselage. This section contained the stations for the aircraft’s pilot, gunner, radio operator, the aircraft’s SCR-720 radar, fixed quadruple 20 mm armament, and the mechanically operated turret. The enclosures for the pilot and gunner positions were made from molded Lucite sheets and extruded metal framing, with forward sections protected by bullet resistant glass blocks. The radar nose cone was made of plexiglass on early models, before a switch to a less heat sensitive resin-impregnated fiberglass on later aircraft. The radio operator’s position was enclosed by a framework of Lucite in extruded metal frames, with a rear tail cone that was formed from two sheets of Lucite that had been cemented together and bolted to the rest of the framework. All positions had a seat with a metal pan, padded backs, safety belts, relief tubes, and hand fire extinguishers. The center fuselage was also fitted with armor plates to protect the crew and ammunition boxes. These were located behind the nose, ahead of the gunner, in front of the turret ammo boxes, and behind the radio operator. The standard crew layout on this aircraft was poor compared to contemporary night fighters. A failure of the intercom system left the aircraft combat ineffective, as each crewmember was isolated, the radar operator particularly so.

The P-61’s fuel system [Pilot’s notes]
The tail booms were of a monocoque structure and connected the nacelle group to the tail group. They also housed components for communication, identification equipment, the flight control cables to the rudders, elevators, and tabs. They were connected to the nacelle groups, which were composed of a semi-monocoque structure. These carried the engine mounts, main landing gear, and fuel tanks. The engines were mounted from a built-up welded steel tube frame that was bolted to this nacelle through vibration isolators and the engine cowling panels. The cowling sections were removable in large sections and were attached to the engine by quickly-detachable fasteners to facilitate easier access to the engines. The adjustable flap segments were controlled from the cockpit and were hydro-mechanically actuated.

The tail section consisted of the horizontal stabilizer, the elevator, and two vertical stabilizers and was connected to the tail booms. The two tail sections were supported by two spanwise spars that ran through the horizontal stabilizer and had the vertical stabilizers at either end. The rudder and elevators were fabric skinned and had trim and booster tabs built into their trailing edges.

The aircraft had a tricycle landing gear arrangement, with its nose wheel housed in the center fuselage and the main gear in the nacelle group. Each main gear was supported by two steel castings which were bolted to either side of the inside of the nacelle. Landing gear loads would be handled by a shock strut which was connected to these castings by a pair of trunnions. When the gear was retracted, it was hinged on these trunnions at the castings by lockbolts which would be held in either the extended or retracted position by a mechanical latching mechanism.

Engines

The mid production P-61A and the P-61B were powered by a pair of 2000 hp class of the R-2800 Double Wasp engines. This was an air cooled, two row, eighteen-cylinder radial engine with a 5.57 inch bore and a 6-inch stroke. These engines had a maximum RPM of 2700 and a compression ratio of 6.7:1. The early A models used the R-2800-10, with the remainder of the series and the B models using the R-2800-65, both of which produced a maximum output of 2000 hp. The later R-2800-65W boosted this to 2250 using water injection, and the C used the R-2800-73 which produced 2800 hp. The A and B models were equipped with two-stage, two-speed superchargers, but the C used turbosuperchargers.

T/Sgt. M. Stetson at work on a 9th AF P-61, 1944. [National Archives]
The exhaust system was a stainless-steel arrangement with the exhaust stacks distributed around the edges of the nacelle, making use of a flame dampening system used to reduce the visibility of the exhaust at night. The B model and the late A series aircraft were equipped with a water injection system. The first aircraft with this system carried 26 gallons (98 liters), good for 15 minutes, with later aircraft carrying 34 gallons (128 liters), which was enough for 20 minutes of use, though some aircraft would carry as much as 74 gallons (280 liters). Use of this system could boost engine power by up to 250 hp per engine, though only in short increments, with the suggested limit being five minutes at a time (Pilot’s manual 12). Engines with water injection were designated R-2800-65W.

The engines drove a pair of Curtiss Electric four blade constant speed, selective pitch, full-feathering propellers. The hubs were a pair of C642S with a set of 12-foot 2-inch diameter, 714-7C2-12 blades. Engine speeds between 1800 and 2300 RPM were restricted as a result of propeller vibration in that range. The props were capped by large metal spinners which enclosed the hubs and inboard prop sections.

Avionics

In addition to the SCR-720 search radar, the P-61 carried a well-developed electronics suite. This included an SCR 729 radio navigation system, an SCR 695 IFF, and an RC-36 intercom system. The P-61A and early B models were equipped with the SCR 718 radio altimeter, which was later replaced with the AN/AP1. Early models used a pair of SCR-522 radio sets which was simplified in later models by a single AN/ARC 3. In later aircraft, an AN/APS-13 tail warning radar set was also included. The navigation systems were also supplemented by a MN-26C radio compass with a MC-1206A range receiver.

The P-61’s SCR-720 air search radar was composed of six main units which were installed in a number of boxes throughout the aircraft. These were the modulator, the transmitter, the receiver, an indicator unit, the mixer, and the power supply unit. The modulator was a rotary spark gap, pressured type which produced a 4 kV pulse. The transmitter was magnetron regulated and installed in a pressurized unit. The mixer was a crystal mixer type with a soft rhumbatron switch valve. The receiver used a reflector klystron oscillator with automatic frequency control. The indicating unit used a two-tube range and azimuth elevation display set. The entire system was powered by a 1,200 watt, 115 volt, 1,600 cycle engine driven alternator (Survey 27).

Heaters

In addition to navigation, communication, and detection equipment, there were also considerable heating, cooling, and ventilation systems. On the P-61A, a series of fuel-air mixture heaters were used to provide heating for the cannons and to the crew through three ventilators. The B model decreased the number of heaters from four to just two heaters that were placed fore and aft.

Armament

Gunnery Equipment and Armament Cutaway Diagram [Pilot’s notes]
The standard armament of most P-61s was a set of four fixed 20 mm Hispano AN/M2 cannons that were set in a compartment at the bottom of the central fuselage. 200 rounds of ammunition could be carried for each gun. Sighting for the gun consisted of the L-1 type gunsight on the P-61A and the LY-3N on the P-61B, with both being a reflector type lit by a sight lamp. From the B model onward, the aircraft would also carry a set of night binoculars which were a specialized gunsight for use in low light conditions.

While this aircraft is often known for its remotely controlled, quadruple .50 caliber turret, only about half of P-61s actually carried one. The turret’s machine guns were each supplied with 560 rounds, were fired simultaneously at a rate of about 800 rounds per minute, had a 360-degree traverse, and a maximum elevation of 90 degree upward from the horizontal. While the guns could be fired from any of the aircraft’s three positions, only the gunner and radio operator could direct the turret. For the pilot’s use, the guns would be locked forward by latching the turret and flipping the switch labeled “pilot” from either of the other two positions, though in the B model, the turret would automatically return to the guns forward position when not in use. The .50 caliber guns were typically fitted with flash concealing tubes in the field after pilots found it could interfere with their vision adjusted for low visibility flight. In service, the turret was almost always used by the pilot and very sparingly by the gunner against targets ahead of the aircraft. Pilots often found it unnerving to see the turret firing forward without warning from the gunner, as it could both ruin their low light vision and sometimes they misidentified the gunfire as coming from an enemy behind their aircraft. As a defensive armament, it was of little practical use, as the radar operator’s illuminated instruments screens degraded his low light vision. The turret was directed by a sighting arm which sat atop a rotating column with firing controls in the grips and fitted with an N-6 reflector sight.

The aiming system for the remotely operated turret [P-61 Pilot flight operating instructions]
Several models included wing racks which were capable of carrying additional fuel tanks or bombs with a maximum weight of 1600 pounds (725.75 kg). Field modifications on some aircraft allowed for the use of rockets. (Dean 393-404)

Several P-61s of the 425th NFS were modified to carry rockets, in this case, HVARs. [Wikimedia]

Conclusion 

The P-61 was a somewhat troublesome, yet effective night fighter that proved to be a capable replacement for the useless P-70 and obsolescent Bristol Beaufighter. Most of its faults, apart from the poor layout of crew, were to be expected for such a sophisticated plane still in its ‘teething period’ and supported by a modest supply chain. In the space of roughly a year, which constituted its entire combat service, most of its faults were corrected or lessened.

The aircraft served admirably across the European, Mediterranean, China-Burma-India, and Pacific theaters. P-61 pilots would encounter a variety of opponents among the Japanese and German air forces, utilizing a variety of tactics and equipment. They would prove effective against all but a handful of these combinations. Surprisingly, despite never being designed with such a use in mind, the P-61 would prove exceptional in the ground attack role. It was among the few aircraft at the time capable of carrying out attacks at night, or in poor weather. In service its greatest danger was its limited material support. This scarcity of replacement aircraft and parts would hobble operations, but the resourcefulness of ground crews often kept their squadrons from being entirely grounded. In the end, the aircraft provided effective service during their somewhat short combat tour across much of the world, in the face of inadequate material support and, at times, extremely poor conditions.

While the P-61C would never see combat, it would perform a vital role in a foundational meteorological study. Despite never being used for its intended purpose, this variant’s legacy proved to be no less important.

Specifications and Production Numbers

Type Number Built First Delivery Description
XP-61 2 May-42 First prototype series
YP-61/P-61 13 Aug-43 Second prototype series, pre production
P-61A-1 45 Oct-43 Power turrets installed in first 37 planes, first production model
P-61A-5 35 Turret removed, R-2800-10 engine changed to R-2800-65
P-61A-10 100 Water injection system added
P-61A-11 20 Two underwing racks
P-61B-1,2,5,6,11 155 Jul-44 Extended nose, wing racks on 2,6, and 11
P-61B-10 45 Four underwing racks
P-61B-15,16,20,25 250 Turret revised and reintroduced with two and four gun versions, wing racks (two on the -16), radar gun laying on -25 with seven built
P-61C-1,5,10 41 Jul-45 Turbosupercharged R-2800-73 engines, air brakes
XP-61D 2 converted airframes Nov-44 Prototype, turbosupercharged R-2800-77’s, wing racks
XP-61E 2 converted airframes Apr-45 Prototype daylight fighter, 2 crew, bubble canopy, turret removed, increased fuel capacity, no radar, four nose mounted .50 caliber guns, developed from P-61B.
XP-61G 16 converted airframes 1945 P-61B-20 modified for weather recon, unarmed

All airframes were built at Northrop’s plant in Hawthorne, California

Specifications P-61A P-61B P-61C
Engine  R-2800-10, R-2800-65, R-2800-65W R-2800-65W  R-2800-73
Maximum Engine Output [boosted]  2000 hp [2250 hp]  2000 hp [2250 hp]  2800 hp
Maximum Weight  29249 lbs  39056 lbs 41138 lbs
Standard Fighter Weight  28202 lbs   29876 lbs  30068 lbs
Empty Weight  23158 lbs  24413 lbs  26418 lbs 
Range [maximum external fuel]  ~1000 miles [+1800 miles]  ~1000 miles [+1800 miles] 
Maximum Speed  366 mph at 20,000 ft 366 mph at 20,000 ft 430 mph at 30,000ft
Armament [turret]  4×20 mm AN/M2 [4x .50 cal AN/M2]  4×20 mm AN/M2 [4x or 2x .50 cal AN/M2]  4×20 mm AN/M2 [4x .50 cal AN/M2] 
Crew  Pilot, gunner, radar operator  Pilot, gunner, radar operator  Pilot, gunner, radar operator 
Length  48′ 11″ 49’7″ 49’7″
Wingspan  66′  66′  66′ 
Wing Area  664ft² 664ft²  664ft² 

 

Specification  P-61A P-61B P-61C
Engine {P-61}  R-2800-10, R-2800-65, R-2800-65W R-2800-65W R-2800-73
Maximum Engine Output [boosted]  2000hp [2250 hp]  2000hp [2250 hp]  2800 hp
Maximum weight  13267 kg   17715 kg 18660 kg
Standard fighter weight  12792 kg 13552 kg 13639 kg
Empty Weight  10504 kg  11074 kg 11983 kg
Range [maximum external fuel]  ~1609 km [~2897 km]  ~1609 km [~2897 km]
Maximum speed  590 km/h at 6 km 590 km/h at 6 km  692 km/h at 9144 m
Armament [turret]  4x20mm AN/M2 [4x or 2x 12.7mm AN/M2]  4x20mm AN/M2 [4x or 2x 12.7mm AN/M2]  4x20mm AN/M2 [4x 12.7mm AN/M2] 
Crew  Pilot, gunner, radar operator  Pilot, gunner, radar operator  Pilot, gunner, radar operator 
Length  14.91 m  15.11 m 15.11 m
Wingspan  20.12 m 20.12 m 20.12 m
Wing Area  61.69 m² 61.69 m² 61.69 m² 

Cruising Speeds for the P-61A&B at 28,500lbs (12927 kg)

Altitude Speed
9000ft : 2743m 253mph : 408 kph
16000ft : 4876m 256 mph : 412 kph

Video

Gallery

Illustrations by Ed Jackson

P-61A ‘25507’, a very early A model. Only the first 37 aircraft would carry turrets before it was removed in order to correct buffeting issues and as to not compete with the B-29 program for certain components.
P-61A-5 ‘Lady Gen’ 9th AF, 422nd NFS, Florennes, Belgium. 1st Lt. Paul A. Smith (Pilot) & 1st Lt. Robert E. Tierney. This particular P-61A was among the first to travel to the ETO and was flown by the first US night aces. P-61’s would eventually switch to a gloss black livery, which would eventually replace this particular plane’s olive drab and invasion stripes.
P-61B ‘Midnite Madness II’, 548th Night Fighter Squadron, Iwo Jima. Stationed on Iwo Jima, aircraft of this squadron defended the recently taken island from nightly visits by Japanese raiders and reconnaissance aircraft.
P-61B ‘23968’ 414th NFS, 12th Air Force, Italy with a detachment to the 422nd NFS.
While two of the four MTO night fighter units were re-equipped with P-61’s and British built Mosquito’s, the other two continued to use their old Beaufighters until the end of the war.
P-61C, Thunderstorm Project, USA. With their guns traded for meteorological equipment, a select number of P-61C’s would embark on a foundational meteorological and aviation safety project. While never designed for such use, the P-61 would provide data for a groundbreaking study that would reveal the effects of thunderstorms on aircraft and the behavior of the convection cells within storms, among other major scientific findings.

The R-2800-10 and R-2800-65 differed in regards to their magnetos and ignition systems. War Emergency Power with the R-2900-65W was rated for 2250 hp at 60 inches of Manifold pressure, 2700 RPM [Pilot’s operating instructions for the P-61A]
Pilot’s Instrument Panel. The Pilot’s radar indicator position below the gunsight is empty [P-61 training manual]
The AN/CPS-1 was a microwave early warning radar system used to great effect by the USAAF across Europe, and later the Pacific, providing P-61 crews with accurate target information. The set here was deployed in Luxembourg, where it provided support during the Battle of Bulge [National Air and Space Museum]
P-61Bs patrol over the Marianas [National Archives]
The addition of underwing racks would largely solve the P-61’s range issues and allow it to carry a considerable bomb load [National Archives]
Members of an aviation engineering battalion add extensions to an airstrip in order to accommodate the P-61 [National Archives]
A P-61 landing at Luzon, 1945 [National Archives]
The radar operator worked from an isolated position at the rear of the aircraft. This would prove a major drawback of the design, as the pilot would be without radar guidance should the intercom system fail, the R/O accidentally pull the IC cable out, or if the tail cone imploded in a dive. [National Archives]
Reinforcement kits were used to keep the tail cones of these aircraft from imploding in dives or high speed maneuvers [Wikimedia]
A very early production P-61A of the 6th NFS in the Marianas, 1944. [National Archives]
Brig. General Earl W. Barnes flew a P-61 modified for his personal use with an extra fuel tank installed in the place of its turret. Pictured here at the opening of an airfield at Middleburg Island, New Guinea. [National Archives]
At -35F (-37C), engine heaters were needed to start this P-61 stationed in Alaska, 1944. [National Archives]
The P-61 gave squadrons who formerly relied on the P-70 a massive boost in performance and confidence. Here, Major V. Mahr of the 6th NFS climbs into his P-61 in Saipan, July 1944. [National Archives]
The XP-61E was a prototype escort fighter based on the P-61B, two aircraft were converted, but further development was canceled after the war. [Wikimedia]
P-61s of the 548th NFS wait for their shift to start, Iwo Jima. [Wikimedia]
A P-61 sits at Clark Field, Philippines, in August of 1945. By this point, the P-61 was being phased out by the P-38M in several squadrons. It would continue to see some use in the post war years. [National Archives]
The F-15A reporter was a photo reconnaissance aircraft developed from the P-61 that went into production after the war. These aircraft would participate in the Thunderstorm Project and serve in the Korean war. [Murph’s Models]

Credits

  • Written by Henry H.
  • Edited by Stan L. and Ed J.
  • Illustrations by Ed Jackson

Primary Sources:

  • Ashkenas, I L. The Development of a Lateral Control System for Use with Large Span Flaps. No. 1015. NACA, 1946.
  • Pilot’s Flight Operating Instructions Army Model P-61A Airplane. (T. O. NO. 01-15FB-1). Commanding General, Army Air forces. January 15, 1944.
  • Pilot Training Manual for the Black Widow P-61. Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Training. 1944
  • Handbook of Operating Instructions for Radio Set SCR-720-A and Radio Set SCR-720-B. AN 08-10-181. Joint authority of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General, Army Service Force. (1943).
  • Northrop P61 Black Widow Pilot’s Flight Operating instructions. T.O No. AN 02-35VC-3. USAF, July 1945
  • Introduction Survey of Radar Part II. Air Publication 1093D Volume 1 First Edition. Air Ministry, June 1946.

Secondary Sources:

  • Boiten, Theo. Nachtjagd Combat Archive 1944 Part Four. Surrey: Red Kite, 2021.
  • Boiten, Theo. Nachtjagd Combat Archive 1944 Part Five. Surrey: Red Kite, 2021.
  • Braham, Roscoe R. “Thunderstorms and the Thunderstorm Project”
  • Brown, Louis. Technical and Military Imperatives: a Radar History of World War II. Taylor & Francis, 1999.
  • Dean, Francis H. America’s Hundred Thousand: the US Production Fighter Aircraft of World War II. Schiffer Publ., 1997.
  • Kolln, Jeff. The 421st Night Fighter Squadron in World War II. Schiffer Pub., 2001.
  • McFarland, Stephen Lee. The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II: Conquering the Night: Army Air Forces Night Fighters at War. Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998.
  • Pape, Garry R., and Ronald C. Harrison. Queen of the Midnight Skies: the Story of America’s Air Force Night Fighters. Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1992.
  • Price, Alfred. Instruments of Darkness: the History of Electronic Warfare. Greenhill, 2005.
  • Thompson, Warren E. P-61 Black Widow Units of World War 2. Osprey, 1998.
  • “WW2 People’s War – Reg EVERSON’S STORY.” BBC. BBC. Accessed August 1, 2021. https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/26/a3130426.shtml.

 

 

 

Macchi M.C. 200 Saetta

italian flag Italy (1939 – 1945)
Fighter – 1,153 built

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 272ª Squadriglia of the 153° Gruppo Autonomo ‘Asso di Bastoni’. This aircraft was part of the middle production run of the SAI Ambrosini plant. Soure: pinterest.com

The Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’ (Lightning) was a fighter aircraft developed by Aeronautica Macchi (AerMacchi) of Italy around the mid-1930s, resulting in one of the most produced and used aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force) during the Second World War. It yielded good results on all fronts where the Italian forces operated, from the hot and dusty desert of North Africa, to the cold and snowy Russian steppes.

After 8th September 1943, both the Luftwaffe and Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana (Eng: Italian National Air Force) on the Axis side, and the Aeronautica Cobaelligerante Italiana (Eng: Italian Co-belligerent Air Force) on the Allied side used the surviving aircraft.
After the war, the Aeronautica Militare (Eng: Italian Military Air Force) used the few Macchi 200 that were still functioning for another two years, until 1947, for training tasks.

Development

Before the Macchi 200, the Regia Aeronautica was equipped with fighter biplanes, such as the FIAT C.R. 30 and C.R. 32, which were considered among the best biplanes produced in Europe at the time.

During the early 1930s the Regia Aeronautica had in service some of the best biplanes of the world, not for nothing it was considered one of the best air forces in the world, with records in both civilian and military spheres.

In the mid-30s it became clear to the Italians that the biplane configuration was more than outdated and they needed new, state-of-the-art, low-wing, all-metal monoplane aircraft, and, only one year after the biplane FIAT C.R. 32 appeared in 1935, the leaders of the Royal Air Force issued a request for a new aircraft.

On 10th February 1936, the Direzione Generale Costruzioni Aeronautiche or DGCA ( General Directorate of Aeronautical Construction) requested the development of a low-wing monoplane ground interceptor fighter with retractable landing gear. The maximum speed was to be 500 km/h (310 mph), with a range of 2 hours, and a climb rate of 6,000 meters (19,685 ft) in 5 minutes. The requested armament was to be composed of one or two 12.7 mm (.50 in) machine guns, the engine had to be the FIAT A.74 radial with an entirely metal fuselage.

The largest aeronautical companies in Italy responded to this order. Aeronautica Macchi presented the Macchi M.C. 200, FIAT Aeronautica, a subsidiary of FIAT, had the FIAT G.50, Aeronautica Umbra S.A. (AUSA) had the AUSA AUT 18, Caproni the Caproni Vizzola F.5 and Industrie Meccaniche Aeronautiche Meridionali (IMAM) had the IMAM Ro. 51.

In 1938, Officine Meccaniche Reggiane also responded to the request by presenting the Reggiane Re. 2000 which did not see great success, however it was used to develop the more powerful Re. 2001 and Re. 2002.

The FIAT G. 50 prototype. Photo taken prior to its first test flight. Source: warfly.ru

Two winning projects were chosen. The Macchi M.C. 200 was found to have excellent flying characteristics, meeting most requirements that were stipulated in the original request. The FIAT G.50 was not as highly praised, but still accepted into service. The prototypes of both aircraft first flew in 1937, and both would enter service in 1939.

The Macchi MC 200 was designed by a team of engineers led by Mario Castoldi (1888-1968), a successful designer who had already worked on the Macchi M. 39 and M.C. 72, the latter still holding the speed record for a seaplane powered by a non-standard engine.
The initials M.C. stood for Macchi-Castoldi to emphasize the prestige that the company gave to its chief engineer.

Prototypes

Hastily produced, the prototype, with serial number MM. 336 (Matricola Militare; Military Serial Number), flew for the first time on 24th December 1937 from the Lonate Pozzolo runway, piloted by test pilot Giuseppe Burei that I judge the driving of the aircraft positively. Due to Burei’s untimely death during a flight test of the seaplane Macchi M.C.94, the subsequent test flights of the first prototype were conducted by Ambrogio Colombo.

First prototype during assembly in the Varese plant. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

On March 1st, 1938, Colombo was asked to impress the ministerial commission composed of General Ferdinando Raffaelli, Lieutenant Colonel Torre and Major Lippi. The reason for this request was simple. Macchi was late with developing the aircraft. FIAT and IMAM had already completed test flights months before, and there was a risk that the Macchi fighter would not be taken into consideration by the Regia Aeronautica.

During the exhibition flight for the commission, Ambrogio Colombo performed 38 exercises with the prototype fully loaded and at an altitude of 3,300 meters (10,827 ft).

There were no major differences between the first and second prototypes apart from a few small details, such as a one-piece rear canopy, anti-rollover structure and shorter exhaust pipes.

The second prototype, serial number MM. 337, during its first flight test. Note the full size landing gear gear cover. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

On 11th June 1938, during the test flights at the Guidonia runway with the 1° Centro Sperimentale Aviazione (1st Experimental Aviation Center), the body responsible for evaluating aircraft for the Regia Aeronautica, it was found that the aircraft tended to flipping if turns were too tight, with consequent loss of control (in 1940, two pilots of the 1st Wing, Lieutenant Tinti and Sergeant Major De Bernardinis, were killed during training on 1st March and in May due to this problem).

Mario Castoldi immediately began to design new wings to solve the problem (which was common to all the monoplanes presented for the competition), a solution that would take an excessive amount of time to design and implement.

Engineer Sergio Stefanutti of the Società Aeronautica Italiana Ambrosini (another Italian aeronautical company), was commissioned by the Experimental Aviation Center to find the cause of the Macchi’s control problems, solved the problem more simply, by gluing layers of balsa wood on the center and ends of the wings. Castoldi did not waste time, and the new wings were then mounted on the successor of the ‘Saetta’, the Macchi M.C. 202.

Around 1941, some Seattas of the 1st Fighter Wing, belonging to the first production series, were withdrawn from first line service due to the problems with the defective wing profile.

Engineer Mario Castoldi with MM. 337 piloted by Giuseppe Burei. Photo taken during the first test flight of the second prototype: Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

With this problem corrected, the Macchi M.C. 200 proved to be a reliable, manageable aircraft. Despite the radial engine, it still had enough speed to compete with the Hawker Hurricane, which it bested in combat maneuverability, but was outmatched in firepower. As the war went on, the Saetta’s maneuverability, sturdy construction, and the reliability of the radial engine were the fighter’s only remaining strengths.. Primarily thanks to the experience of the pilots did the type manage to obtain some aerial victories.

The prototype serial number MM 336 remained in the Breda factory for a period of time, and was then returned to Macchi on 23rd August 1940, where it was left in disrepair. Due to the lack of engines caused by the war, at an unknown date, the MM 336’s engine was disassembled and mounted on the Macchi M.C. 200 serial number MM 8836. The prototype, without the engine, returned to Varese in September 1942 and from there, nothing more is known about it.

The second prototype was used for camouflage tests after the conclusion of flight tests, before being overhauled and sent to Rimini.

Structure

The structure of the MC 200 was entirely metal, a big step forward for the Italian aircraft industry at the time. The only other Italian aircraft with an all-metal structure before the MC 200 was the Breda Ba. 27, of which only 14 units were produced and otherwise remained at the prototype stage, along with the competing FIAT G. 50.

Structure of the Macchi MC 200’s fuselage. Source: cmpr.it

The new fuselage turned out to be quite robust, but was heavier, and let to longer production times It was made of molded duralumin and was covered with super avional plates (a special duralumin alloy) riveted with countersunk-head rivets, reducing aerodynamic drag.

Structure of the Macchi MC 200 seen from inside. Source: cmpr.it

Like the fuselage, the wings, mounted on the lower part of the fuselage, were also a single structure consisting of two spars with ailerons and ventral flaps. The whole wing structure was made of duralumin, apart from the ailerons, which retained the doped and painted canvas.

The prototype Macchi prototypes were equipped with a constant airfoil that increased the speed by a few kilometers per hour but caused autorotation problems which risked making the aircraft impossible to maneuver with the risk that the pilot could not even parachute out. On the production models, this was replaced by a variable airfoil.

The wing structure. Source: cmpr.it

Cockpit

The Macchi M.C. 200 cockpit. Source: cmpr.it

The cockpit had a single hand-control column. On the left side was the throttle, along with the controls for take-off and the flaps controls. The instrument panel had a gyroscope, speedometer, altimeter and other basic instruments for flight and an onboard ammunition gauge that ran up to 650 rounds per weapon. In the center of the instrument panel was the compass with a San Giorgio collimator located just above, for aiming the onboard armament.

On the first series of the Macchi MC 200, the windshield was a 5 centimeter (1.96 in) thick piece of glass, and the steel pilot’s seat had a thickness of about 3 centimeters (1.18 in) to protect the pilot. Behind the seat were oxygen cylinders, and those of the fire extinguishing system. The ARC 1 radio system and its batteries were located in front of the cockpit.

From the 26th Macchi MC 200 produced onward, a new tubular roll bar was introduced behind the armored seat. This was meant to protect the pilot if the plane landed inverted. It is not clear whether this was introduced after an accident or as a precaution. However, from the 3rd Series onward, this feature was again eliminated, the cockpit was open and unpressurized, and the rear canopy, no longer made of glass, was reinforced to act as the anti-roll structure.

The semi enclosed cockpit was introduced in August 1941, starting from the 12th aircraft of the 5th production series of Macchi and starting from the 65th aircraft of the 1st production series of Breda.

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 2nd Series. The anti-roll structure behind the pilot and the retractable tail wheel are visible. This aircraft was part of the 371ª Squadriglia of the 22º Gruppo Autonomo Caccia Terrestre during the Greek Campaign. Source: Macchi MC 200 Saetta

In the late production versions, an antenna fixed to the back of the canopy was added. This reduced the reception problems of the onboard radio.

Landing Gear

The landing gear with the third type of wheel covers. Source: cmpr.it

There were several types of landing gear covers used on the Macchi MC 200. On the first prototypes, the landing gear door completely covered the strut and the wheel. During landing, the lowest part was raised to avoid hitting the ground. This version was very complex to manage, and in case of malfunction the landing gear would break. Often the planes were forced to take off on makeshift runways on lawns, in case of malfunction the cover, due to the speed, would be stuck in the ground causing the breakage of the strut or worse, that the plane would fall on one side leading to the total destruction of the fuselage and wings.

The outer landing gear cover of the prototype. The lowest part is raised in the photo. Source: Macchi MC 200 Saetta

The models of the first series adopted a different type of outer landing gear doors, with a small inner gear door at the wing attachment points.

The 1st series Macchi MC 200 with the 2nd type of running gear cover. Source: Source: pinterest.com
The standard Macchi M.C. 200 outer running gear cover with the 372ª Squadriglia. Source: pinterest.com

The rear wheel on the first 146 examples was retractable, which slightly increased top speed but slowed production. In addition, during firefights, enemy fire could damage the mechanism that lowered and raised the wheel, leading to the risk that it would not come out during landing.

The rear retractable wheel of the landing gear of the Macchi M.C. 200. Source: cmpr.it

The tires were of the FAST type, produced by Pirelli of Milan. The dimensions of the front ones were 236 x 85 x 79 inches, while the rear wheel model had the Spiga type, also made by Pirelli, which was 82 x 31 inches.

Engine

The M.C.200 engine was the radial two-row FIAT Aeronautica 74 RC 38 ‘Ciclone’ ( Cyclone). It had 14 cylinders and was air-cooled, with a displacement of 31.25 liters (1,907 in³).
It had been developed by Engineer Tranquillo Zerbi and Professor Antonio Fessia based on the American Pratt & Whitney R-1535. The 600 kg (1,322 lbs) engine delivered a take-off power of 870 hp at 2,500 rpm, 840 hp at 2,400 rpm at an altitude of 3,800 meters (12,467 ft), and a maximum power of 960 hp at 3,000 rpm, which could only be maintained for short periods.

Photo of the FIAT A.74 RC 38 ‘Ciclone’. Source: Centro Storico FIAT

This engine guaranteed a maximum speed of 503 km/h (313 m/h) at 4,500 meters (14,763 ft). Its low fuel consumption also guaranteed a range of 570 km (354 miles) with two fuel tanks, one in the wings and the other under the cockpit, and a third auxiliary tank behind the pilot’s seat. In total, there were 313 liters (82.6 US gallons) of fuel. This could be extended to 870 km (540 miles) with an external tank of 450 liters (118 US gallon), at an average speed of 465 km/h (288 m/h) at an average height of 6,000 meters (16,685 ft) . Its climb rate was 6,000 meters in 7 minutes and 33 seconds.

FIAT A.74 RC 38 schematic. Source: svppbellum.blogspot.com

This engine, despite being outdated in performance and power compared to the most contemporary modern in-line engines of the war, was appreciated by pilots and technicians for its simplicity, ease of maintenance and ease of operation. This was true even in unsuitable climates, such as the deserts of North Africa and the freezing Russian steppes. However, there were problems with the carburetors that had quality issues in addition to not being suitable for such extreme climates.

A FIAT A.74 Engine mounted on a FIAT C.R. 42 biplane during maintenance. Source: stormomagazine.com

The engine cowling featured “bubbles” that protected the rocker arms of the cylinders.
This allowed a decrease of the diameter of the cowling, increasing visibility compared to the G. 50, which was equipped with the same engine.

In June 1940, all Fiat A.74 engines, produced under license by Reggiane, were replaced due to failures that brought oil temperatures to dangerous levels after an inspection by a captain of the Aeronautical Engineers and an engineer of the company.

In the first series, the cockpit was equipped with a fully enclosed canopy, which was prone to several problems. Over time, the glass became opaque which affected visibility, and it was also difficult to open above a certain airspeed, so it was opted to go for an open cockpit with only frontal protection.

The new fighters were required to have variable pitch propellers. On the two prototypes, and on the first 25 specimens produced, the propeller was the three-blade FIAT-Hamilton 34D-1. The first 25 production planes were equipped with an aerodynamic spinner to protect the propeller hub but. From the 26th plane onwards, the Piaggio P. 1001 propeller, designed by Castoldi himself, was mounted with the spinner removed. In both cases, the propellers had a diameter of 3.05 meters.

One of the first 25 planes produced with the FIAT-Hamilton 34D-1 propeller with a cap. pinterest.com

Armament

The machine guns are visible through the open inspection doors. Source: cmpr.it
The Breda-SAFAT machine guns without flash hiders. Source: cmpr.it

The armament consisted of two 12.7 mm (.50 in) Breda-SAFAT machine guns positioned on the engine cowling and synchronized with the propeller. They weighed 29 kg (64 lbs) each and were fed with two 370-round 12.7 x 81 mm SR Breda belts. This ammunition developed from British Vickers .5 V/565 Semi-Rimmed round.

There were various types of bullets produced by the Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche and by the Società Anonima Fabbrica Armi Torino (SAFAT). In addition to the classic full metal jacket bullet, the weapon could fire ammunition produced in Italy of the following types: tracer, perforating, explosive-incendiary, and explosive-incendiary-tracer (or multi-effect).

On average, these bullets weighed 34 grams each, for a total of 25.160 kilograms (55.46 lbs) of ammunition. The machine-gun firing rate was 700 rpm, but this was decreased to 574 rpm when synchronized with the propeller.

Ammunition resupply of a Macchi MC 200 of the 160ª Squadriglia of the Regia Aeronautica. Source: kitshow.net

Although quite powerful, these machine guns proved insufficient to deal with enemy threats as the war continued. Another big problem encountered was the small number of rounds on board. Only 740 rounds guaranteed just over a minute of continuous fire.

After the 25th plane, the machine guns were equipped with a flash hider so as to not blind the pilot when firing. The ammunition reserve was also increased to 740 rounds, as it consisted of only 600 rounds in total on the first planes. The spent cartridges, after being shot, were not ejected from the plane but stored onboard, so that they could be reused.

In 1937, engineer Castoldi proposed the adoption of two 7.7 mm (.303 in) Breda-SAFAT machine guns in the wings to the Regia Aeronautica. This required a consequent strengthening of the wing structure, and subsequent loss of speed, but the proposal was ignored.

On the Macchi MC 200CB, or Cacciabombardiere (fighter-bomber), version, the aircraft was equipped with two 3 kg (1.86 lbs) underwing pylons, capable of carrying bombs weighing up to 160 kg (353 lbs) each.

The bombs were used for infantry support missions. Although the maximum load was 320 kg (705 lbs), four 15 kg bombs (33 lbs) per pylon were commonly carried .

The aircraft could also carry two bombs up to a maximum of 160 kg (353 lbs) each or two 150-liter (40 US gallons) auxiliary tanks, increasing the range. The two 150-liter tanks could also be equipped together with the 450-liter centerline tank, effectively doubling the aircraft’s maximum range.

Schematic representation of the Italian aeronautical bombs used during the Second World War. The 50, 100 and 160 kg ones were the used on the Macchi MC 200CB. Source: talpo.it

In Italy

The first M.C. 200s were ready in the spring of 1939 and were delivered to the Regia Aeronautica during the same year. As of September 1st, 1939, 29 Macchi M.C. 200s had been delivered, of which 25 were allocated to front-line units, with the others given to flight training schools. In comparison, the Regia Aeronautica had 19 FIAT G. 50s and 143 FIAT C.R. 42s.

At the time of the Kingdom of Italy’s entry into the war on the 10th of June 1940, the number of M.C.200s in the Regia Aeronautica was 156. Of these, only 103 were in the front-line units and not all were combat ready. Similarly, there was in increase in other fighters on hand with 118 FIAT G. 50s and 300 FIAT CR 42s.

A Macchi M.C. 200 of the 81ª Squadriglia, 6º Gruppo of the 1º Stormo in Sicily. This aircraft belonged to the 1st SAI Ambrosini series. It had a fixed rear landing wheel but an enclosed cockpit. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

These 156 aircraft were split between different units, such as the 16º Gruppo Autonomo da Caccia Terrestre (16th Autonomous Land Fighter Group) of the XVI° Gruppo (16th Group) and the 181ª Squadriglia (181st Squadron) of the 6° Gruppo Caccia (6th Fighter Group) of the 1º Stormo Caccia Terrestre (1st Ground Fighter Wing), based at an unknown airport in Sicily.

7 Saetta had gone to the 369ª Squadriglia, 6 to the 370ª Squadriglia and 6 to the 371ª Squadriglia of the 152º Gruppo commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Melotti, based at Vergiate airport in Lombardy. Another 7 Macchi MC 200 were in service with the 372ª Squadriglia, 6 with the 373ª Squadriglia and 6 with the 374ª Squadriglia of the 153º Gruppo of Captain Alberto Benefonti at the Caselle airport. The 152º Gruppo and 153º Gruppo were under the command of the 54º Stormo of Colonel Enrico Guglielmotti, with headquarters in Airasca.

The very first Macchi aircraft were delivered to the 91ª Squadriglia of the 10º Gruppo of the 4º Stormo, which was considered an elite unit. The 4th Wing received the MC 200 shortly before entering the war, but preferred to go to battle in Libya with the old FIAT CR 42 biplanes in late June 1940.

The reason for this downgrade was that the pilots of the 4° Stormo were all veterans of the Spanish Civil War, or possessed years of experience in aerobatic performances around the world, and were far more accustomed to their FIAT C.R. 32 and C.R. 42 biplanes. While they received the latest generation monoplane fighters, they did not have enough time to properly train on them, and subsequently turned down the opportunity to fly the Macchi M.C. 200.

It should also be emphasized that the pilots of the 4th Wing were the only ones not to appreciate the Macchi initially. On October 23rd, 1939, a few weeks after delivery, General Velardi, commander of another air unit, wrote to the General Staff of the Italian Royal Army that his pilots were more than satisfied with the new plane, and that within a few weeks of training they could use the new Macchi for aerobatic performances.

A Macchi M.C. 200 of the 54° Stormo with Italian pilots finishing a pre-mission briefing. Source: pinterest.com

The first victim of the new Macchi MC 200 was a British Short S.25 Sunderland four-engined seaplane on a reconnaissance mission on 1st November 1940, near Augusta in Sicily.

In the last weeks of December 1940, the pilots of the 181st Squadron of the 6th Fighter Group of the 1st Ground Fighter Wing had the task of escorting the Junkers Ju 87 ‘Stuka’ dive bombers of the I/StG.1 and II/StG.2 of the X Fliegerkorps. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 of 7./JG 26, which were supposed to escort the Stukas on their missions to Malta, had not yet arrived in Sicily.

During this mission, the Saettas proved effective and without any particular defects in dogfighting against the Hawker Hurricane. They were able to outclass the old Gloster Gladiator biplanes without much difficulty.

A Macchi M.C. 200AS produced by SAI Ambrosini takes off from a runway in Sicily. Source: pinterest.com

In Sicily, two Saettas of the 70th Squadron of the 23rd Autonomous Fighter Group based at Boccadifalco airport were used for night missions. Lieutenant Colonel Tito Falconi, commander of the group and Captain Claudio Solaro, commander of the squadron, were, according to documents, the only ones to fly the two Macchi at night.

According to the documents, between September and December 1941, these two fighters flew dozens of missions over Palermo, also participating in several engagements against British aircraft, but without managing to shoot any down. By the end of the year, the 23rd Group was sent back to the Turin Mirafiori airport to be reorganized.

After the North African Campaign, in July 1943, Allied troops invaded Sicily. At that time, the Regia Aeronautica had 81 Macchi M.C. 200, 41 with the 2nd Wing, 3 in the 22nd Group, 13 in the 157th Group, 4 in the 161st Group and 20 aircraft in the 82nd and 392nd Squadrons.

A Macchi M.C. 200 produced by Macchi with the 73ª Squadriglia in Sicily. Source: pinterest.com

One of the last battles occurred a few days before the Armistice of Cassibile in September 1943. On 2nd September 1943, while on patrol around the naval base at the port of La Spezia, Lieutenant Petrosellini of the 92nd Squadron of the 8th Group intercepted a group of 24 American Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses that were approaching to bomb the port facilities and industrial areas of the city. Petrosellini carried out two attacks on the behemoth US bombers alone, managing to shoot down one and damage a second. He then performed an emergency landing on Sarzana airport due to damage sustained from heavy defensive fire.

As of the 8th of September 1943, 33 Macchi M.C. 200 were in the ranks of the Regia Aeronautica.
Until September 1943, the ‘Saetta’ was the most widely used Italian fighter on all fronts. The first examples of its successor, the Macchi M.C. 202, entered front-line service in late September 1941, with the first examples of Macchi M.C. 205V appearing in February 1943.

Malta

Malta, or “L’Isola Maledetta” (The Damned Island), a British stronghold in the Mediterranean, was the setting for dozens of air battles in which the Macchi M.C. 200 took part.

Just above the Island of Malta, the first loss of an M.C. 200, a casualty of the Royal Air Force, was recorded on 23rd June, 1940. Nine Macchi M.C. 200s of the 79th Squadron, eight of the 88th Squadron, and one of the 81st Squadron, all belonging to the 6th Group, escorted ten Savoia Marchetti SM.79s of the 11th Bomber Wing to the island.

Immediately, the British launched two Gloster Gladiators to intercept them. Sergeant Major Molinelli of the 71st Squadron attacked one of the two British planes that were, in turn, attacking a bomber off Sliema. The ‘Saetta’ was hit and fell into the sea. It is not clear whether Major Molinelli survived.

Franco Lucchini, an Italian ace of the 90th Squadron of the 10th Fighter Group of the 4th Wing with 26 kills, took off on 27th June 1941 from Trapani Airport in Sicily. He was on an attack mission during which he shot down a Hawker Hurricane. Afterward, he shared many other victories with his companions of the 4th Wing.

Another loss recorded occurred on the morning of 25th July 1941, when about 40 Macchi M.C. 200s of the 54th Wing and were tasked with escorting a CANT Z.1007bis of the 30th Wing for photographic reconnaissance on Valletta. The mission was meant to photograph an English naval convoy that had been attacked the day before by torpedo bombers.

Above the island, about 30 Hurricanes descended upon the formation, causing the CANT Z. 1007 bis to fall into flames. The Saetta of second Lieutenant Liberti was shot down, with the loss of the pilot, as was that of Lieutenant De Giorgi, whose fate is unknown. The Italian fighter pilots declared the downing of four Hurricanes, two by Sergeant Major Magnaghi, one by Captain Gostini and one by Sergeant Omiccioli of the 98th Squadron.

On 27th of October 1940, Carlo Poggio Suasa of the 81st Squadron, 6th Group, assigned to the 1st Terrestrial Fighter Wing stationed at Catania-Fontanarossa airport, shot down a Hawker Hurricane over Malta.

On July 11th, 1941, during an attack on the Maltese airbase of Micabba, three Italian Aces, belonging to the 10th Group of the 4th Wing were engaged by seven or eight enemy Hurricanes. They were Leonardo Ferrulli (with 21 kills between the war), Carlo Romagnoli (11 kills and 6 probable) and Franco Lucchini (22 kills). After a grueling dog fight, the three MC 200s managed to disengage and were pursued for 40 km before the British gave up the chase and, with their aircraft damaged but still able to fly, they were able to return to Sicily safely.

On June 27th, 1941, the same units of the 10th Group, 4th Wing, commanded by Ace Carlo Romagnoli, took off from Catania-Fontanarossa airport in Sicily to escort a Savoia-Marchetti S.M. 79 on a reconnaissance mission.
Arriving at Malta, they were immediately intercepted by a group of Hawker Hurricane Mark I of RAF No. 46 Squadron that forced them to abort the mission and return to Sicily.

On September 4th, Romagnoli led a reconnaissance mission over Malta with a formation of 17 M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’. Their goal was to confirm the sinking of a merchant ship that had been hit that night by a Junkers Ju.87B Picchiatello of the 101st Autonomous Dive Bombardment Group piloted by Sergeant Major Valentino Zagnoli, in the vicinity of Kalafrana.

Once in Valletta, the Macchi carried out a reconnaissance of the port at 6,000 meters and, having found nothing, returned to Sicily. At this point, 21 Hawker Hurricane Mark II fighters of No.126 and No.185 Squadrons were waiting for them (thanks to Maltese radars) at about 7,500 meters. After the furious battle that followed, Second Lieutenant Andrea Della Pasqua of the 91st Squadron was missing after being seen bailing out with a parachute. He was never found.

The 76th Squadron of the 7th Group of the 5th Terrestrial Fighter Wing took part in the Battle of Pantelleria between 12th and 15th June 1942. There, the Axis forces, with 92 aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica and 48 of the Luftwaffe, destroyed two, and damaged four merchant ships at the cost of 29 lost aircraft and 12 dead pilots.

Due to the three-engined reconnaissance aircraft flying over Malta being easy targets, some mechanics modified about ten Macchi MC 200 with an Avia RB 20/75/30 camera positioned behind the pilot’s seat. This strategy decreased the fighter’s maximum speed, but made the reconnaissance aircraft unrecognizable to the enemy, as well as being far more agile and faster than the three-engined aircraft they replaced.

Greece

For air combat during the Greek Campaign, which started on October 28th, 1940, the 54th Wing was employed. Its 372nd Squadron had 12 Macchi MC 200, based at the Brindisi-Casale Airport in southern Italy.

Between November and December, the 373rd Squadron, with 11 MC 200s, also arrived at the Bari-Palese Airport, the 374th Squadron with 12 MC 200s at the Taranto-Grottaglie Airport and the 370th, with 8 MC 200, at Foggia Airport, all in Southern Italy.

These squadrons mainly carried out escort missions for Italian FIAT B.R. 20 and Savoia-Marchetti S.M. 79 bombers used against Greek strategic targets.

Sergeant Luigi Gorrini of the 85th Squadron of the 18th Fighter Group of the 3rd Ground Fighter Wing, an Italian ace with 19 confirmed and 9 presumed kills, took training courses to learn how to fly the Macchi M.C. 200 and FIAT G. 50 held at Caselle Torinese and Torino Mirafiori airports between August 29th and December 10th, 1940. After this, he and his squadron were transferred to Araxos airport in Greece, where he flew escort flights for naval convoys and aircraft from Italy to Greece and vice versa.
On December 17th, 1940 during a patrol over the island of Cephalonia, Gorrini spotted two Bristol Blenheims, hitting one of them (which he considered probably shot down) and damaging the second.

In March 1941, the 22nd Autonomous Land Fighter Group was sent to Greece. Its 371st Squadron went to Vlora, while the rest of the group, with 36 Macchi MC 200s and an unknown number of FIAT CR42s, moved to the airport of Tirana, both cities of occupied Albania. During their first fights, they went up against the Hawker Hurricanes and Gloster Gladiators of the RAF.

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 372ª Squadriglia. These planes were produced by Breda. The 153° Gruppo coat of arms is visible. Source: asisbiz.com

Thanks to reinforcements that arrived in Albania in April, the 18th Group was sent back to Italy to train on the Macchi MC 200CB. The training lasted until mid-July, by which time the Greek Campaign was over. The Group was subsequently transferred to North Africa.

During the Greek campaign, which lasted until April 1941, Royal Italian Air Force fighters claimed to have shot down 77 Hellenic Air Force (HAF) aircraft (plus another 24 presumed), of which 52 were shot down and 25 destroyed on the ground, at a loss of 64 Italian aircraft. During engagements against the RAF, the British claimed to have destroyed 93 Italian aircraft (and another 26 probable) for just 10 aircraft lost. However, at the end of the campaign, the British losses amounted to 150 pilots (dead or prisoners) and 209 aircraft lost, 72 shot down by Italian fighters, 55 destroyed on the ground and 82 destroyed or abandoned during the evacuation.

Yugoslavia

At the outbreak of hostilities against Yugoslavia, the only air units assigned to the sector were the 4th Wing, equipped with 96 Macchi MC 200, the 7th Group in Treviso, and the 16th Group in Ravenna, which had 22 each, the 9th Group in Gorizia and the 10th Group in Altura di Pola, which had 23 each, and, finally, 6 that were in service with the 256th Squadron in Bari.
At dawn on April 6th, 1941, before the Declaration of War, four M.C.200s of the 73rd Squadron took off without an exact mission, flew over the port of Pula and then arrived at the island of Cres, attacking a tanker and setting it on fire.

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 73ª Squadriglia after a landing accident. The pilot, Sub Lieutenant Albano Carraro, came out unscathed. The plane was repaired and put back into service. Source: asso4stormo.it

There were no noteworthy actions for the rest of the brief Yugoslavian campaign. The Macchi of the 4th Wing flew against Yugoslavia for the last time on April 14th, when 20 Saetta of the 10th Group patrolled the airspace 100 km south of Karlovac, but without encountering enemy aircraft.

In March 1941, in order to counter the new British Hawker Hurricanes, the Regia Aeronautica was forced to withdraw the FIAT CR 42 of the 150th Group from Albania, replacing them with 36 Macchi MC 200s of the 22nd Group based at Tirana airport and the 371st Squadron, which moved from the Rome-Ciampino Airport to Valona.
Despite its lower top speed compared to the Hurricane, in the hands of experienced Italian pilots who were well trained in aerobatic flight, the Macchi MC 200 proved to be a tough adversary for the British pilots.
Ground operations on the Yugoslav front ended on April 17th. According to the official report of the 4th Wing, in eleven days there were no losses, 4 enemy aircraft were shot down and 45 Yugoslav aircraft were destroyed on the ground, damaging another ten.
Other victories were achieved by destroying an oil tanker, a tanker truck and an unspecified number of mechanized vehicles, as well as destroying airport facilities.
Another 5 Yugoslav aircraft, Dornier Do 17Ks, were destroyed on the ground at a Greek airport where they had taken refuge during an Italian attack.

North Africa

The North African desert was the most important theater of operations for the Italian pilots and their Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’.
At the end of the operations in Yugoslavia, the 153rd Group returned to Italy. It was based at Grottaglie airport, in southern Italy, with the task of defending the Port of Taranto against RAF attacks.
One of its squadrons, however, was ordered to go to North Africa to support Rommel’s offensive in Cyrenaica.
The first eleven M.C.200s of the 374th Squadron, under Captain Andrea Favini (later to become Wing Chief), arrived on April 19th, 1941 at Castel Benito airfield, 35 km south of Tripoli. Until the end of June 9th, the Macchi aircraft remained under Favini’s command. During the period of activity, the squadron never reached more than 7 operable Macchi at the same time.
An interesting fact is that Captain Andrea Favini was still using a pre-production Macchi MC 200 with a FIAT-Hamilton 34D-1 spinner and propellers. This is very strange, as all the pre-production aircraft and the very first production series should have been modified by that point.
Given the continuation of operations, on July 2nd, 1941, Macchi M.C. 200 of the 372nd Squadron of the famous 153º Gruppo ‘Asso di Bastoni’ (Eng: 153rd Group ‘Ace of Wands’) arrived in North Africa. Later, the 373rd Squadron from Greece, together with the 157th Group, also arrived.
The 76th Squadron of the 7° Gruppo Autonomo Caccia Terrestre, commanded by Major Marcello Fossetta, also arrived with 22 Macchi M.C. 200. However, they lost almost all of their fighters during a British air attack on the Benina base 19 km east of Benghazi, where the unit was stationed.
The data of both Italian and British units report some skirmishes between Macchi and British aircraft.
On December 8th, 1941, a Macchi MC.200 of the 153rd Group clashed with Hawker Hurricanes of the British 974th Squadron. During a fight, a Macchi engaged a Hurricane. After a succession of very tight turns, the Macchi struck the Hawker’s cockpit, which then flipped over and plummeted in a dive, killing New Zealand RAF Flight Lieutenant Owen Vincent Tracey, who had 6 kills credited to his name.
The 153rd Group, in its July-December report, claimed to have flown 359 missions for a total of 4,686 flight hours by its pilots, and 19 enemy aircraft destroyed in flight, plus 12 probable, in addition to 35 aircraft destroyed on the ground.
In December 1941, the Macchi M.C. 200 began to be accompanied by Macchi M.C. 202 of the 8th and 150th Groups based at El-Nofilia airport.
In the early months of 1942, the 8th, 13th and 150th Groups were mainly used on escort missions for FIAT CR 42s in the ground attack configuration.
On July 20th, 1942 the 18th Group of the 3rd Wing arrived in Tripoli with the 83rd, 85th and 95th squadrons, with a total of about 40 MC 200s, of which 21 in the M.C. 200CB configuration. These new arrivals, which were positioned at the Abu-Aggag airbase, 370 km from Cairo, meaning that the Macchi 200 was still the most numerous Italian fighter in North Africa, with 76 units (of which about three quarters were operational), 37 of which were in the 2nd Wing.
The Macchi M.C. 200CB of the 18th Group carried out dozens of ground attack missions. One of the most famous was stopping the British attempt to recapture Tobruk by sea in July 1942, sinking the destroyer Zulu and seriously damaging two troop carrier ships.
On April 18th 1942, between 1725 hrs and 1830 hrs, five Macchi M.C. 200CBs attacked a column of tanks of the 1st Armored Division of the British 8th Army at Sidi Bou Ali, in the governorate of Susa, in Tunisia. 22 M.C. 202s of the 54th Wing escorting the ‘Saetta’ clashed with a formation of P-40s and Spitfires that had arrived to support the armored units. Captain Sergio Maurer, Lieutenant Giuseppe Robetto and Sergeant Mauri each shot down a Spitfire, while Sergeant Rodoz brought down a P-40.

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 373ª Squadriglia of the 153º Gruppo ‘Asso di Bastoni’ (with the playing card symbol on the frame) on an airstrip in North Africa. Source: pinterest.com

Despite the Regia Aeronautica’s gradual transition to the Macchi MC 202, the ‘Saetta’ remained the most widely used fighter aircraft. It was widely used as a secondary fighter by pilots when their MC 202s were undergoing repairs.
The 364th Squadron of the 150th Fighter Group, 52nd Wing, equipped with the Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’, operating from the airports of El Agheila, Benghazi and Martuba, participated intensively in intercept operations, surveillance flights, strafing ground targets, and escorting bombers.
The Macchi MC 200s were also able to successfully deal with Allied four-engined aircraft, despite their armament. On 14th August, Lieutenant Vallauri of the 2nd Wing intercepted four Consolidated B-24 Liberators during a reconnaissance mission in the skies above Tobruk. Instead of waiting for support from other fighters, he attacked them alone, managing to shoot down one of them.
A few days later, on 23rd August 1942, three M.C.200s intercepted and attacked a group of B-24 Liberators en route to Tobruk. Sergeant Zanarini and Second Lieutenant Zuccarini shot down one Liberator while the third pilot damaged another. The entirety of the 2nd Wing was 198 aircraft in August 1942 (including Macchi M.C. 200 and M.C. 202,) which flew an unspecified number of missions that lasted a total of 394 hours of missions over Tobruk and 1,482 hours escorting 77 Axis convoys from Southern Italy to the North African coast.
The Allied air superiority was becoming more and more overwhelming. Unfortunately, precise data for the actions of the following months is not available. In October, ten Macchi 200 were lost by the 2nd Wing.

Macchi M.C. 200 of the 372ª Squadriglia while refueling before take-off. The pilots discuss the mission. Source: pinterest.com

At the beginning of November 1942, there were only 15 ‘Saetta’ on the front line in the 2nd and 3rd Wings (there is no data on the losses of the 54th Wing during the period). This was a very limited number. In July, there had been 76, meaning an average loss rate of about 12 aircraft per month.
The M.C. 200s were now outclassed in speed and armament by the latest versions of the Hawker Hurricane, Curtiss P-40s, and the more powerful Supermarine Spitfires. Despite this, the Macchi still managed to score a few victories.
In November, Lieutenant Savoia and Sergeant Major Baldi shot down two Bristol Beaufighters, while Sergeant Turchetti managed to shoot down two aircraft.
During the same month, some replacements arrived but they were not enough. On the 1st of December, the 2nd Wing had only 42 ‘Saetta’, of which 19 were in flying condition, while the others were under repair.

A Macchi abandoned on the side of a runway after a botched landing. Source: pinterest.com

After the Battle of El Alamein, the Macchi were used to cover the retreat of the Italian-German troops. However, the lack of spare parts, fuel and the overwhelming technological and numerical Allied superiority meant that many aircraft were lost.
In October 1942, the 18th Group received the Macchi MC 202 of the 4th Wing, which, after months of actions, had been repatriated for reorganization.
On 11 January 1943, units of the 3rd Wing were used in the attack against some British airbases in the Wadi Tamet area.
The Macchi MC 202 escorted the Macchi MC 200CB fighter-bombers in bombing operations. Luigi Gorrini managed to shoot down the Spitfire Mark V of Flying Officer Neville Duke of the 92nd Squadron, as reported by the British pilot himself in one of his books.
In January 1943, all non-operational units were repatriated, with very few Macchi MC 200s remaining in North Africa as part of the 384th Squadron in Tunis and the 13th and 18th Groups in El Hamma.
The last group to be equipped with MC 200s was the 18th Group of Major Mario Becich, which fought with the ‘Saetta’ until the end of the campaign. The last major air battle of the Macchi MC 200 in North Africa was on 29th March 1943. Then, in the Gabès sector, 15 M.C.200s of various units intercepted an unknown number of P-40s and Spitfires, shooting down 4 enemy aircraft at the cost of one damaged aircraft forced to land on the way back.

The remains of three Macchi M.C. 200 and a FIAT C.R. 42 abandoned at the Castel Benito airport in late 1942. Source: pinterest.com

Soviet Union

A contingent of Macchi M.C. 200s was sent to the front in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that they had an open cockpit.
The Comando Aviazione del Corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Aviation Command of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) was officially constituted on July 29th, 1941 at the Tudora airport. Major Giovanni Borzoni Group landed at this airport on 12th August with the 359th Squadron of Captain Vittorio Minguzzi, which had 11 other pilots, including Captain Carlo Miani and Lieutenant Giovanni Bonet. The 362nd Squadron of Captain Germano La Ferla also arrived with 11 other pilots. The 369th Squadron, commanded by Captain Giorgio Jannicelli, which had 13 pilots, and, finally, the 371st Squadron of Captain Enrico Meille, which had 11 pilots, completed the setup, all belonging to the 22nd Autonomous Land Fighter Group.
On August 16th, the 61st Aerial Observation Group arrived with 32 Caproni Ca.311 (34th, 119th, and 128th Squadrons) and a Savoia-Marchetti S.M.82 for support.

Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’ of the 22º Gruppo Autonomo Caccia Terrestre, 359ª Squadriglia in Krivoi Rog, Soviet Union, 1941. Note the tarpaulins covering the cockpits to prevent rain or dirt intrusion. Source: asisbiz.com

The 22nd Autonomous Land Fighter Group had a total of 51 MC 200s, two Savoia Marchetti S.M. 81 and three Caproni Ca. 133s. It was sent to the Eastern front from the Tirana Airport ( where they were located after March 1941). For its first missions, starting from August 27th, 1941, it was stationed at the Krivoi Rog airport.

On the same day, some aircraft of the 22nd Autonomous Group and some others of the 6th Group assigned to the 1st Ground Fighter Wing arrived in the Soviet Union. In total, eight Soviet aircraft, two Poliakov I-16s and six Tupolev SB-2s. were shot down.

Carlo Poggio Suasa, of the 81st Squadron of the 6th Group, shot down two Poliakov I-16s in a single day.

Due to the lightning advance of Axis troops in the Soviet Union, at the end of August, the unit had to move to the Kryvyi Rih airport and to Zaporižžja by the end of September. On 9th November, the 371st Squadron moved to the Donetsk sector, breaking away from the rest of the group.

Between August and the beginning of December, the 22nd Autonomous Fighter Group shot down another 8 Soviet fighters and bombers, apparently without suffering any losses. 4 more Soviets were downed in December.

Macchi M.C.200 of the 53° Stormo, 22° Gruppo Autonomo Caccia Terrestri, 362ª Squadriglia near a Bf 109 in Novo Orlovka, Soviet Union, 1941. Source: pinterest.com

During the Soviet Christmas ground offensive against Italian troops at Novo Orlovka, Italian pilots attacked Soviet troops in the Burlova sector. During these actions, they also shot down five Soviet fighters without any losses.

During one of these missions on December 28th, the ‘Saetta’ of the 359th Squadron shot down nine Soviet aircraft in the Timofeyevka and Polskaya areas, including six Polikarpov I-16 fighters and three bombers, without suffering losses.

On December 29th, 1941 the 369th Squadron lost its commander, Captain Giorgio Jannicelli. During a solo reconnaissance mission, he was intercepted by more than ten I-16 and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 fighters and, after a grueling air battle, he was shot down. For his bravery, he was awarded the posthumous Gold Medal.

The Italian Macchis in the Soviet Union were unable to carry out any missions throughout January, and the first few days of February 1942 due to bad weather. On February 4th and 5th, the Regia Aeronautica launched an operation to destroy Soviet air bases. The first was at Kranyi Liman, where the MC 200 destroyed 21 Soviet aircraft on the ground and another 5 fighters were shot down during dogfights over the airport.

Between March and April, the airports of Luskotova and Leninsklij Bomdardir were also attacked.

By the end of March 1942, the 22nd Gruppo Autonomo Caccia Terrestre had scored a further 21 aerial victories against the Soviet Air Force.

On May 4th, 1942, the 22nd Autonomous Land Fighter Group, which still had a few operational aircraft, was replaced by the 21st Autonomous Land Fighter Group, consisting of the 356th, 382nd, 361st and 386th Squadrons. The 21st Group, commanded by Major Ettore Foschini, brought with it 12 new Macchi M.C. 202 fighters and 18 new Macchi M.C. 200s, probably the fighter-bomber version.

During the second battle of Kharkov, fought between May 12th to 30th 1942, Italian pilots carried out escort missions for German scouts and bombers. They earned the admiration of the commander of the German 17th Army, in particular for their daring and effective attacks in the Slavyansk area on Soviet fighters trying to shoot down German bombers.

In the summer of 1942, following the German advance, the 21st Group moved first to the Makeyevka airfield, and, later, to those of Tazinskaya, Voroshilovgrad and Oblivskaya.
The group shoots down 5 enemy aircraft in May, 5 in June and 11 in July.

Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’ of the 369ª Squadriglia, Soviet Union, 1942. Source: ww2aircraft.net

Increasingly, Italian pilots were asked to escort German planes, but the Macchi aircraft wore out very quickly because of the lack of spare parts. On July 25th and 26th, five M.C.200s were shot down during aerial combat with the Soviets.

In the summer, 17 Macchi 202 ‘Folgore’ arrived from Italy to reinforce the line-up of ‘Saette’, by then worn out by incessant use. At the beginning of December, the Macchi MC 200s still on the line numbered 32 plus 11 Macchi MC 202s. The losses suffered became more and more consistent due to the technological advancement of the Soviet aircraft.

On 6th August 1942, some MC 200CBs carried out a bombing mission east of the Don, hitting Soviet artillery and infantry with their 50 kg bombs.

In December, only 32 Macchi M.C. 200s and 11 Macchi M.C. 202s were available. The Soviet Air Force, which was starting to become better combat trained, as well as the increasing prevalence of anti-aircraft fire also caused additional losses. In fact, over half of the missions that the Macchi were requested to carry out were ground attacks against Soviet tanks and infantry.

The last Italian action that employed a large number of aircraft was on 17th January 1943, when 25 Macchi MC 200 and MC 202 machine-gunned troops on the ground in the Millerovo sector.

Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’ of the 21 Gruppo. Pilot Elis Bartoli shows the damage that resulted from Soviet anti-aircraft fire. Source: asisbiz.com

On January 18th, 1943, commander Ettore Foschini received the order to withdraw, first to the airport of Stalino in Donetsk, and from there to Zaporižžja. On February 20th, 1943, the Group was at Odessa airbase, waiting to return to Italy. On 15th April, the Group left Odessa and, after four stops, arrived at the Florentine airport of Peretola at the end of the month.

Thirty Macchi M.C. 200s and nine M.C. 202s returned to Italy, while 15 damaged aircraft were dismantled and used for spare parts, abandoning them at airfields during the retreat.
A total of 66 Italian fighter planes had been lost on the Eastern Front for various reasons, but they managed to shoot down 88 enemy aircraft during 17 months of operation in the theater of war.

In a postwar document written in Italy, it is stated that, in 17 months, the fighters of the Regia Aeronautica on the Eastern Front carried out 3,759 actions against the Soviets, 511 in support of the infantry by dropping bombs, 1,310 machine-gun attacks on ground targets, 1,938 escorts to bombers or scouts. 88 enemy planes were destroyed at the expense of the loss of 15 Macchi M.C. 200 lost in combat. The best Italian unit in the Soviet Union was Captain Germano La Ferla’s 362nd Squadron, which destroyed 13 Soviet aircraft on the ground and shot down 30 fighters and bombers in air engagements.

Luftwaffe

After the armistice of September 8th, 1943, the German Army managed to recover a small number of Macchi M.C. 200s from Italian airports and put them in service with the Luftwaffe, mostly as training aircraft.

As far as known, these never took part in actions against Allied targets.

A destroyed Macchi M.C. 200 which was in service with the Luftwaffe. Source: british-eevee.tumblr.com

Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana

After the Armistice of 1943, of the 33 Macchi MC 200s operational at the time, 10 remained in the German-occupied territories. Not much is known about these 10 units, but it can be assumed that almost all of them were confiscated by the Luftwaffe.

Several Macchi M.C. 200s remained in service with the Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana (Eng: National Republican Air Force) for training purposes. Some of these vehicles had probably been recovered from depots or hangars and returned to service after an overhaul period.

Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana

Macchi M.C. 200AS with sand filters and Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana coats of arms and the Savoia cross on the vertical stabilizer. The registration number looks like MM 4337. Source: pinterest.com

As many as 23 Macchi MC 200s managed to reach the south of Italy after the Armistice of September 8th, 1943. Almost all of these belonged to the 8th Group, which had escorted the Regia Marina fleet (Eng: Italian Royal Navy) from La Spezia to Malta. In the summer of 1944, the 23 Macchi were assigned to the Fighter School of Leverano, where they were used for training until they could no longer be maintained.

Two Macchi M.C. 200 of the Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana in South Italy. The one in the foreground was equipped with wing pylons and a sand filter. The registration number was removed. Source: pinterest.com

Aeronautica Militare

Unfortunately, not much is known about the Macchi M.C. 200 in service with the Aeronautica Militare (Italian Air Force) after the war. A number of these, probably the surviving aircraft from the 23 Saettas used by the Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana, were kept in service using spare parts found all over the Italian peninsula, some with new parts that were produced after the war. They were used until 1947.

Being obsolete by the war’s end, the Macchi MC 200s were used in the 2ª Squadriglia of the Scuola Caccia (Fighter School) of Lecce for the training of a new generation of Italian fighter pilots.

Others

The MM337 prototype was presented at the Yugoslavian Belgrade Air Show in June 1938 and immediately attracted worldwide interest.

The MM. 337 exhibited at the Belgrade Air Show in June 1938. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

Spain, Finland, Sweden and Romania asked to evaluate the aircraft but, due to political problems and the Italian government’s ban on exports, these negotiations did not move forward.
Only the request of the Royal Danish Navy for 12 Macchi M.C. 200 to replace their old Hawker Nimrods was accepted. However, when Germany invaded Denmark in 1940, the delivery was canceled and the aircraft remained in Italy.

Switzerland also requested 36 examples. Italy responded by offering the first batch of 24 and the second one of 12. All examples would have been without radios and would have cost 58,000 USD (equivalent to about 1.1 million USD today) each without ammunition. Due to the imminent entry into the war, the General Staff of the Royal Army blocked the negotiations before Switzerland allocated the funds.

The USAAF 86th Fighter Squadron of the 79th Fighter Group of the 9th Air Force Division came into possession of a Macchi MC 200 at Grottaglie. This one had belonged to the 357th Squadron, from where it was later transferred to Gerbini in Sicily. It was piloted by Captain Jack H. Kauffman, who used it to train his fellow soldiers to fight against Italian aircraft.

The Macchi M.C. 200 of the 357ª Squadriglia used by USAAF pilots. Source: pinterest.com

British Evaluation on the Macchi M.C. 200

Former Squadron Leader D. H. Clarke wrote in 1955 in one of his books that, in Sorman, North Africa, he came into possession of a Macchi M.C. 200, serial no. MM 5285. After three days of overhaul, the British officer boarded the Macchi and took it to their base at El Assa.

Clarke stated that the Macchi had excellent visibility, a spacious cockpit with an open cabin (which he regarded very positively), was rustic but simple and had comfortable controls. The engine was quiet and easy to maintain and the vehicle was very maneuverable.

During simulated combat against a Hawker Hurricane II, a Curtiss P-40 and a Spitfire V, it could outturn all three. The downsides that Clarke pointed out were the poor armament (although he considered the ammunition reserve adequate) and the flipping problem.

The RAF captured more aircraft during the war. Another one was captured in North Africa and was shipped to the USA, while other aircraft were captured intact in Sicily and used for training British pilots, to familiarize them with enemy aircraft.

A Macchi MC 200AS captured by British troops with RAF coats of arms at an airport in Sicily. The identification number was MM. 5815. Behind it is a Savoia Marchetti SM 79. Source: pinterest.com

Camouflages and Coat of Arms

Being one of the most long-lived and most produced aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica during the Second World War, it is easy to understand that the Macchi M.C. 200 had many camouflage schemes during its operational life on the various fronts on which it operated.

The prototypes, at the time of their test flights and their presentation to the Army Staff in Guidonia, had no camouflage or paint applied, with the natural aluminum being exposed. On the rudder, there was the Italian Tricolour with the Savoia symbol in the middle. This was the flag of the Kingdom of Italy until 1947. On the side of the cockpit, there was the Fascio Littorio painted inside a round frame with a blue background.

The Fascio Littorio was the symbol of the Partito Fascista Italiano (Eng: Italian Fascist Party) which, after Benito Mussolini’s rise to power, became the symbol of the dictatorship, like the swastika for Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party.

On both sides of the wings, there were also the “Fasci Littori Alari” (Eng: Wing Fasci Littori), circular rosettes 96 cm in diameter with a black outline and white background inside which were painted 3 stylized Fasci Littori. As the war progressed, the Fasci Littori Alari were slightly modified. The ones on the underside were painted white, with a black background.

Various italian coat of arms, 1 is the Fasci Littori Alari, 2 the Fascio Littorio painted on the fuselage, 3 the Croce di Savoia and 4 the Cockade of the Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana. Source: wikipedia.it and author collage

The first examples produced by Macchi and then used in Italy and those used in the Soviet Union were painted in dark green (Verde Mimetico 2; Eng: Green Camouflage 2) with dark brown spots (Bruno Mimetico; Eng: Brown Camouflage) with yellow outlines (Giallo Mimetico 4; Eng: Yellow Camouflage 4).

Some variations existed.. For example, the brown spots could be covered by small yellow mottling or, as in the case of the 79th Squadron of the 6th Group of the 1st Wing, the dark green background was covered with yellow spots and brown spots.

Starting from June 1940, the planes of the Regia Aeronautica received a new feature. In order to avoid incidents of friendly fire, the Italian Tricolor, which could be confused with the tricolor of French planes, was replaced by the Croce di Savoia (the Italian Savoia royal family symbol), a white cross by ministerial order.

However, the dispatch did not specify the exact dimensions of the cross and the units painted different types before a standard model of the Croce di Savoia was chosen.

Also, the Macchi, Breda and, later, SIA Ambrosini production plants painted the crosses differently. Macchi painted a cross with longer vertical arms, while Breda painted a Greek cross (all arms of equal length) and SIA Ambrosini painted the cross on the whole height of the rudder.
The white band on the fuselage was introduced at the beginning of 1941 with the same purpose.

The Croce di Savoia of different origins, the 1st is from Macchi, the 2nd from Breda, the 3rd is from SAI Ambrosini and finally, the 4th is an example made by a unit. Source: Macchi MC 200 Saetta and author collage

Between the spring and summer of 1941, a rule issued by the Ministry of War ordered that all Regia Aeronautica fighters be painted with a yellow nose to avoid incidents of friendly fire.
The order lasted only a few months, but many pictures show Italian aircraft with a characteristic yellow nose.

Also, in this case, the dispatch was misunderstood and some units (especially in the Soviet Union) painted the fuselage line and the wingtips in yellow.

The two planes of the 70th Squadron of the 23rd Autonomous Group were repainted by the unit completely in pitch black. They also covered all the markings.

SIA Ambrosini painted its M.C. 200 in dark green (Verde Oliva 2; Eng: Olive Green 2) and only in rare cases did the units repaint them. In North Africa, there were many camouflages, all on a khaki base (Nocciola Chiaro 4; Eng: Light Hazelnut 4 or Giallo Mimetico 4; Eng: Yellow Camouflage 4) with dark green spots (Verde Mimetico 2; Eng: Camouflage Green 2).

Three examples of camouflage used in North Africa. The first is a Macchi M.C. 200AS produced by SAI Ambrosini. It belonged to the Brigadier General, aircraft number 9 of the 373ª Squadriglia of the 153° Gruppo Autonomo. The second was a Macchi M.C. 200AS produced by Macchi. The third Macchi M.C. 200AS was the 2nd aircraft of the 363ª Squadriglia of the 150° Gruppo of the 53° Stormo Caccia Terrestre produced by Breda. Source: pinterest.com with author’s collage

After the fall of Fascism in Italy, on July 25th, 1943, pilots were ordered to obscure the Fascio Littorio, which were covered with the paint the units had available.

After the Armistice of 8th September, a number of Macchi MC 200s remained in the hands of Italian pilots who fought for the Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana. They were ordered to cover the tricolor coat of arms on the wings and on the fuselage, and to obscure all previous insignia, such as the white band on the fuselage, the coat of arms of the unit and the Croce di Savoia (although some were retained). The Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana used Macchi MC 200 with both dark green monochrome camouflage and that used in North Africa, khaki with dark green irregular spots.

After the war, the few surviving examples were used in aluminum color with tricolor cockades on the fuselage and wings.

The specimens captured by the British and the Americans had Allied coat of arms to cover the Italian ones. For example, the US specimen retained squadron identification numbers, but all other symbols were obscured or covered with US symbols.
The upper right wing and lower left wing beams were covered with paint while the upper left and lower right wing were covered with the United States Army Air Forces insignia.
The fuselage fascia was repainted yellow and received another USAAF insignia and the tail received a British tricolor.

Production

A Macchi M.C. 200, serial number MM. 5192, at the Bresso plant of the Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche. Source: pinterest.com

In total, 1,153 examples of Macchi M.C. 200 ‘Saetta’ were produced between May 1939 and October 1942 ,including the two prototypes and 12 different production series.

It is difficult to classify the production of MC 200 fighters based on “series” because the plane was produced by 3 different companies. Different “series” have to be defined per company.

With the slow rate of production, some updates were initiated by one company in one production series, and by another company in another production series. Some series had substantial differences, others only small changes to speed up production or to try to keep the aircraft up to date with the most modern Allied fighters.

The companies that produced them were Aeronautica Macchi, which produced 395 planes plus the two prototypes starting from May 1939 in the Varese plant, the Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche, which produced 556 planes, and the Società Aeronautica Italiana Ambrosini, which produced a total of 200 planes.

In late 1939, it was proposed thay FIAT should produce the Macchi M.C. 200 in their factories in Turin. Needless to say, FIAT refused, criticizing the Macchi as too complex to produce.

Production line of Macchi M.C. 200 at the Bresso Plant of Breda. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200

In 1939, 62 Macchi 200 were produced, 10 between May and July, 26 between August and October and another 26 between November and December. An interesting fact is that these aircraft were ‘produced’ but not ‘tested’ or ‘delivered’ to the Regia Aeronautica.

In fact, as in many other cases with the Italian war industry of that period, small components were missing that forced the aircraft to be kept in depots for weeks. There were also problems with a lack of test pilots or, even worse, a lack of air force pilots to deliver the new aircraft.

Finished Macchi M.C. 200 at the Bresso Plant of Breda, ready for the delivery to the units. Source: Aer.Macchi C. 200


Variants

  • Macchi M.C. 200 prototype – With fully retractable landing gear and closed cabin, 2 planes were produced by Macchi. Their first flight was on 24th December 1937.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 Pre-series – Serial numbers MM. 4495 to MM. 4520. Like the prototypes, it had retractable landing gear and a closed cabin, solved the overturning problems, and had a FIAT-Hamilton 34D-1 propeller with a hub cap.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 – Serial numbers MM. 4520 to MM. 4641. After the 146th model, the rear wheel of the landing gear was fixed.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 – Serial numbers from MM. 4641 to MM. 4736. After the 241st model, the cabin was left open.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 A2 – Equipped with wings and retractable landing gear taken from the successor, Macchi M.C. 202. The wings, redesigned by Mario Castoldi, no longer needed to be ballasted and solved the problem of overturning.
    Standardized in 1942 to speed up production at Breda and SIAI, which were producing the Macchi M.C. 202 simultaneously. It also simplified the logistic line of front-line units.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 B2 – This version received only the wing attachment of the M.C. 202, the rest of the wing was of the Macchi MC 200. Like the A2 version, it was produced to speed up production and simplify the logistic line.
  • Macchi M.C. 200 AS – AS stands for Africa Settentrionale (Eng: North Africa). It was equipped with a sand filter for the carburetor.
  • Macchi M.C. 200CB – CacciaBombardiere or CB (Eng: Fighter-Bomber). With two wing pilons for bombs up to 160 kg or 150-liter auxiliary tanks.

Proposal

  • Better armed Macchi M.C. 200 – Proposal by engineer Castoldi to equip the M.C. 200 with two 7.7 mm Breda-SAFAT machine guns in the wings.
    The idea was not approved by the Regia Aeronautica.

Macchi M.C. 200 Bis

Designation of a prototype produced by Breda (MM. 8191) with a 14-cylinder Piaggio P. XIX engine delivering a maximum power of 1,175 hp. It was derived from the Gnome-Rhône 14K Mistral Major and used on the Reggiane Re. 2002. It was tested during April-May 1942 by test pilot Acerbi. Castoldi was very annoyed because he did not approve the project.

The Macchi M.C. 200 Bis. Source: pinterest.com

Macchi M.C. 201

Two prototypes were built, with serial numbers MM 437 and MM 438. Given the availability of other, more powerful engines, Castoldi and Macchi spent very few resources on this project.

It was planned to equip the aircraft with the 1,000 hp FIAT A.76 RC.40 14-cylinder radial engine and some aerodynamic improvements, such as a more streamlined fuselage and a pressurized cabin.

Since the engine was not yet available, the prototypes were equipped with the 840 hp FIAT A.74 RC.38. The first prototype was flown for the first time on August 25th, 1941, by test pilot Guido Carestiato. It reached a speed of 512 km/h, while the second prototype was flown in September of the same year.

The two homologated vehicles, MM 8616 and MM 8617, were flown to Guidonia by Marshal Gori and Sergeant Staube on June 28th, 1942. The aircraft was not pursued because the expected engine was not available until 1943, by which time Italy had already started producing German inline engines under license for more than a year.

The Macchi M.C. 201. Source: wikipedia.com

Surviving Macchi M.C. 200

Given the large production numbers, there are still three MC 200s exhibited in museums.

A destroyed fuselage and radial engine are exhibited at the Museo dell’Aeronautica Gianni Caproni in Trento, North-East Italy. Serial number unknown.

An example is exhibited at the Museo Storico dell’Aeronautica Militare in Vigna di Valle near Rome. Original serial number MM.8307, serial number exhibited MM.7707.

The last surviving example is on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Riverside, Ohio. This aircraft belonged to the 372ª Squadriglia of the Regia Aeronautica. In order to replace losses, the plane was transferred in November 1942 to the 165ª Squadriglia in North Africa.

Due to the Battle of El Alamein and the hasty retreat from the Benghazi airport, the plane was abandoned with the coat of arms of the 372nd Squadron and did not receive the 165th Squadron coat of arms. It was captured by British troops and was subsequently shipped to the United States, where it was displayed around the country to sell war bonds.

It was later sold to the New England Air Museum, where it remained on display until 1989, when it was purchased by a private owner who had it restored in Italy by a team from Aermacchi (the new name of the company) and then sold to the US museum. Fortunately, the aircraft is displayed with the original coat of arms of the 372nd Squadron of the Regia Aeronautica and MM. 8146 serial number.

Conclusion

The Macchi M.C. 200 was one of the most produced fighters in Italy during the Second World War. It proved to be a reliable fighter, easy to produce and fly, with adequate power and speed and served on all fronts where the Regia Aeronautica was employed.

As the war progressed, it became increasingly obsolete against newer, more powerful types, but still saw service until the end of the war and even after.

Macchi M.C. 200 Specifications

Wingspan: 10,580 m
Length: 8,196 m
Height: 3,510 m
Wing Area: 16,800 m²
Engine: Fiat A.74 RC.38 radial engine, 14-cylinders, 870 hp, 31,250 cm³
Empty Weight: 1,910 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 2,340 kg
Fuel Capacity: 313 liters
Maximum Speed: 503 km/h at 4,500 m
Range: 570 km
Maximum Service Ceiling: 10,700 meters
Climb speed: Climb to 6,000 m in 7 minutes and 33 seconds
Crew: One pilot
Armament: 2 Breda-SAFAT 12,7 mm with 370 rounds each

Gallery

Illustrations by Carpaticus

Macchi M.C. 200 Serial Number M.M. 336, December 24, 1937
Macci M.C. 200 1st Series 91st Squadron, 10th Squadron. Gorizia 1939
Macchi M.C. 200 1st Series of the 88th Squadron, 6th Group. Catania, winter 1940
Macchi M.C. 200 23th Series of the 362th Squadron, 22th Autonomus group. August 1941, Krigoriov, Soviet Union
Macchi M.C. 200AS of the 373th Squadron, 153th Autonomus Group, North Africa, Summer 1941
Macchi M.C. 200 of the first series produced by Breda in Milan before its delivery to units
Macchi MC 200AS captured by British troops in Sicily, September 1943
Macchi M.C. 200AS of the 93th Squadron, 8th Autonomus Group piloted by Marshal Bruno Batazzi of the Aeronautica Cobelligerante Italiana in Gerbini, October 1, 1943
Macchi M.C. 200 of the Italian Air Force of the 2nd Fighter Squadron of the Fighter School in Lecce, 1946

Credits

  • Written by Arturo Giusti
  • Edited by Ed J. & Stan L.
  • Illustrations by Carpaticus
  • Aermacchi C.200 – La Bancarella Aeronautica Torino, Gianni Cattaneo
  • Macchi MC 200 Saetta – Maurizio Di Terlizzi
  • Macchi MC. 200/FIAT CR. 32 – Italo De Marchi and Pietro Tonizzo
  • Macchi MC 200 Saetta, pt. 1 (Aviolibri Special 5) – Maurizio Di Terlizzi
  • Macchi MC 200 Saetta, pt. 2 (Aviolibri Special 9) – Maurizio Di Terlizzi
  • Aermacchi, Bagliori di guerra (Macchi MC.200 – MC.202 – MC.205/V) – Nicola Malizia
  • The Macchi-Castoldi Series, Famous Fighters of the Second World War-2 – William Green
  • I brutti Anatroccoli della Regia – Daniele Lembo
  • The Macchi MC.200 (Aircraft in Profile number 64) – Gianni Cattaneo

Arsenal de l’Aéronautique VG.33

French flag France (1936-1940)
Fighter – 25 Built & ~200 Incomplete [Destroyed]

The VG.33 on an airfield. Colorized by Amazing Ace

Arsenal de l’Aéronautique was one of the more peculiar plane manufacturers of interwar France, though it is also one of the somewhat more obscure ones. Arsenal was a state company which was created towards the end of 1934. Its goal at the time was to provide a way to train aviation engineers employed by the French state, and to help them evaluate design proposals. It would also be tasked with studying aircraft designs without the profitability constraints of a private company, meaning Arsenal de l’Aéronautique would typically be used to study experimental projects not necessarily meant to see mass-production. Following the mass nationalization of France’s aircraft industry ,which began in August 1936 under the Popular Front’s government, Arsenal was given eight hangars built by Bréguet in Villacoublay, near Paris, to install its design bureau and production facilities.

Roots in Tandem-Engine Fighter Designs

The timeline of the VG 33’s predecessors tends to be somewhat unclear. It is generally considered that the fighters hold their roots in tandem-engine designs, which were being studied at the request of the French state in the mid to late 1930s. The VB10, which would be manufactured postwar, was one result of these studies. However, orders to design such tandem designs appear to date from 1937 according to some sources, while a mockup of the VG 33’s direct predecessor, the VG 30, appeared in November of 1936.

The Arsenal VG.30 mockup, the beginning of the VG.3X series of fighters, at the Paris air show of November 1936. [arsenalvg33.free.fr ]
In any case, the engineers of Arsenal, led by lead engineer Michel Vernisse, presented their new plane at the 15th Paris Air Show in November 1936. The design they had worked on appears to date from early 1936, and was an attempt to compete with contemporary fighter designs, such as the MS.405 or LN 161 . This aircraft would be designated the Arsenal de L’aéronautique VG.30.

The VG.30: An Impressive First Draft

The VG.30 mockup which was first presented at the Paris air show was a low cantilever-wing monoplane powered ,originally, by the Potez 12dc 610 hp in-line engine. The plane was to use an almost exclusively wooden construction, which would save on cost and strategic resources (though this would prove less so the case than expected when it was found France lacked the spruce wood reserves to build the aircraft and had to purchase large quantities abroad to compensate for this issue). It had a capable armament of one 20 mm HS-404 firing through the propelled hub, and four wing-mounted 7.5 mm MAC 34 machine-guns. The wings had a surface of 14 m². When first unveiled, the VG.30 had a very modern appearance and drew considerable interest from France’s air ministry. So much so that, in early 1937, the Air Ministry set requirements for a competition, the “A.23”, for French aircraft designers to offer light fighter aircraft designs. This opened up some competition to the VG.30, which would materialize in several prototypes, such as the (Bloch MB.700, SNCAO CAO.200, Roussel R.30).one design, Caudron’s C.714, would enter production (Caudron’s very light C.714)

Arsenal worked on adapting their VG.30 to these requirements and then manufactured a prototype. Manufacturing of the prototype started during the summer of 1937, and faced some considerable delays. Notably, the Potez engine could not be delivered, which pushed the Arsenal designers to switch to another engine, Hispano-Suiza’s 12Xcrs, which would provide a considerable power increase up to 690 hp. This change would start the association between Arsenal’s VG.3X series fighters and Hispano-Suiza in-line engines.

A small but nonetheless rare view of the VG.30 prototype during flight. [Internet Movie Plane Database]
The first prototype of the VG.30 had its first flight on the 15th of October 1938. It would still have to wait several months for official state trials, in which some subsequent modifications were made to the aircraft. in July of 1939 were the state trials undertaken. The VG.30 proved to have decent performance for a light fighter with a Hispano-Suiza powerplant that was not the most powerful of these available; up to 485 km/h in level flight. In a dive, the VG.30 was found to reach 805 km/h.

The VG.30 prototype on the ground during trials. [arsenalvg33.free.fr ]

Improving Upon the VG.30

The VG.30 had been found to be a rather capable design, but it had room for improvement. This was done by designing the VG.31. An issue with the VG.30 was that the radiator was fairly far forward. Being further in front than the cockpit, it was found not to be ideal for the plane’s aerodynamic profile. The VG.31 had its radiator moved back by two meters, and also had the wing surface reduced by two square meters. A more powerful engine was fitted in the form of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 860 hp, which did not however feature a 20 mm gun firing through the propeller hub. Two of the wing machine-guns were also removed, with only two 7.5 mm MAC 34s remaining as armament.

The VG.31 was never flown. It appears a fuselage was built, but was then converted to a VG.33 which was also never flown, but used as a model to base production upon.

The VG.33: First Production Model

Wind tunnel trials of the VG.31 showed that its reduced wingspan resulted in aerodynamic instability. Its reduced armament was also a major issue. However, its radiator, pushed back to the rear, appeared to be a good design choice in order to reduce drag and improve the aerodynamic profile of the series.

In designing a more advanced version, the best parts of the VG.30 and VG.31 were combined. The new fighter, the VG.33, would combine the wingspan and armament of the VG.30, with the fuselage and engine of the VG.31 – modified to mount a 20 mm HS-404 firing through the propeller hub.

Production of the VG.33 prototype started in 1938, and the prototype took flight for the first time on the 25th of April 1939. The official trials would last from July of 1939 to March of 1940, and were generally very positive.

Design: The Structure of the VG.33

A photo of the first VG.33 prototype during production in late 1938, showing the wooden structure of the aircraft before the plywood cover was applied. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
Schematics of the wing structure of the VG.33, which was mostly made using spruce. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
The VG.33 was designed using a largely wooden construction, made mostly of spruce. Almost all of the plane’s internal structure was wooden, and then given a plywood skin. The VG.33 used a semi-monocoque fuselage and a one-piece wing structure. The plane had a wingspan of 10.80 m, with each wing having a surface of 14 m². The plane was 8.55 m long, and 3.35 m high. Empty, it would weigh around 2,050 kg. When loaded, it would be between 2,450 and 2,896 kg (the second prototype would be weighed at 2,680 kg in seemingly standard configuration, with guns, fuel and pilot). The VG.33’s landing gear deployed outward.

The mounting of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 engine onto a VG.33. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
The VG.33 used a Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31. This was a V12 engine producing 860 hp maximum at a critical altitude of 3,320 m, and at 2,400 rpm. This engine was fitted with a three-bladed Chauvière variable pitch propeller with a diameter of 2.95 m. This propeller would rotate at up 1,600 rpm. The water radiator was located below the cockpit,and was recessed into the fuselage as a way to reduce drag as much as possible. Upon take-off, a VG.33 would weigh 2,680 kg.

Firing through the propeller hub was the plane’s heaviest armament: a 20 mm HS-404 autocannon. Found on most French fighters of the era, this cannon fired 250 grams projectiles at a muzzle velocity of 880 m/s. It was fed by a 60-round drum magazine, which would typically be expended quite quickly considering the weapon typically fired at 570 to 700 rpm. Additionally, two MAC34M39 machine-guns were located in each wing. The M39 was the belt-fed version of the original MAC34 aircraft machine-gun, which initially used drum magazines. The 9 gram 7.5 mm projectiles were fired at 830 m/s, and 1,200 to 1,450 rpm. With a larger ammunition provision of 850 rounds per gun, the machine-guns could be kept firing much longer than the cannon.

The VG.33 featured the standard radio of the French air force at the time, the RI 537.

Performance

The VG.33 on an airfield, giving a good angle on the plane’s sleek profile and radiator. [Pinterest]
The trials undertaken from July of 1939 to March of 1940 gave a very good impression of the Arsenal VG.33, which could reasonably be considered the best French single-engine fighter of the era.

At its optimal altitude of 5,200 m, the VG.33 could reach a maximum speed of 558 km/h. This was faster than the newest French fighter of the time, the D.520, by about 20 km/h. The take-off speed would be of about 135 km/h, with a take-off distance of about 550 m. The landing speed was 125 km/h. The plane’s climb-rate was also a strength of the design. It would reach 1,000 m in 1.17 minutes, 2,000 in 2.34, 5,000 in 6.26 and 8,000 in 13.26. The plane had an operational ceiling of roughly 9,500 m.

The VG.33 had a maximum range of 1,060 km with its full fuel load of 400 litres. At an altitude of 5,000 m, it had an endurance of two hours and forty minutes There were trials for additional fuel tanks on the VG.30, which could perhaps have been applied to the VG.33 as well. The plane would then have a fuel load of 600 litres, and it was expected a VG.33 could cross up to 1,560 km, or fly for four hours and twenty minutes.

A view of the instrument board in the VG.33’s cockpit. [Pinterest]
Posessing superb performance, forgiving flight characteristics, and good maneuverability, the VG.33 was a great fighter for its day . The first report made by the CEMA, the French Air Force’s evaluation service, in September in 1939, found the plane had excellent and well-balanced control surfaces which were effective at all speeds. Even at low speed, the plane remained very controllable all the way down to the stall speed, which made it easy to perform landings with. Furthermore, there was no particular imbalance and no risk of the plane losing control and nosing over. Taking-off was also not hard on the VG.33. The plane had no issues keeping a straight trajectory on the runway,and was considered very controllable even on the ground. The landing gear was found to be reliable and safe. The only somewhat lacking element was found to be the plane’s brakes, which were perhaps not as powerful as would be appreciated.

In comparison to the D.520 – which was already a decent fighter – the VG.33 compared favorably in pretty much all areas. This was even more of an achievement when taking into account the weights and powerplants of the two planes. The D.520’s weight was about equal to the VG.33 (2,050 kg empty, 2,740 kg fully loaded), however, it used a more powerful version of the same series of Hispano-Suiza 12Y engine, the 12Y-49. In comparison to the VG.33’s 12Y-31, the 12Y-49 producded 90 hp more, with a maximum output of 950 hp. This did not prevent the VG.33 from being faster than the D.520, climbing at a higher rate, and being more manoeuvrable, while featuring the exact same armament. In other words, the VG.33 would be, by the standards of 1939 and1940, a stellar fighter, very much able to compete with the newest designs from Germany or Great-Britain, the likes of the Bf109E and Spitfire. The plane would also have enough evolutionary potential to birth a series of fighters lasting potentially well into the war

A view of the uncovered 12Y-31 engine of a likely unfinished VG.33, the photo likely being of German origin. The 12Y-31 was not the most powerful version of the 12Y engine available by 1940, yet it was sufficient for the VG.33 to outclass fighters such as the D.520 powered by more powerful models of the same engine family. [hisaviation.com]

Production Orders and Setting Up the VG.33’s production

The outbreak of the Second World War in September of 1939 led to Arsenal’s fighter,which had been undertaking trials for several months at this point, being ordered into production. A first order was placed on the 12th of September, for 220 VG.33s.

Arsenal de L’Aéronautique lacked any facilities suited for mass-production. As such, production of the VG.33 would be undertaken by the SNCAN factory of Sartrouville, South-West of Paris. Five days after the first order, an additional 200 VG.33s were ordered, with the fighter being thought of as a good potential replacement for the aging Morane-Saulnier MS.406.

In the following months, orders and scheduled production of the VG.33 would evolve considerably, with the type quickly being seen as a future mainstay fighter for the French air force. By late September 1939, it was planned that the first 10 serial-production VG.33s were to be delivered in April of 1940, with production gradually rising to 150 planes a month by the autumn. The schedule was revised in November, with the 10 examples then being scheduled for February, and production to be set at 50 planes a month from April onward at the SCAN factory. It was already understood that a second assembly line would be required at this point. It was planned to open an assembly line in Michelin’s factories of Clermont-Ferrand, in the region of Auvergne in Southern France. This facility would not produce the VG.33, but one of its derivatives, the VG.32, of which the first were to be completed in December of 1940. There were also plans to set up a VG.33 production chain in Vendée, Western France.

VG.33 fuselages (top) and wing structures (bottom) during production. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
The flap of a VG.33 during production in a workshop. [arsenalvg33.free.fr ]
Production of the VG.33 required a large number of small producers. The aircraft’s largely wooden construction meant that a lot of parts could be supplied by cottage industry sources. Nonetheless, the production of the plane was quite consuming in terms of resources. To produce a single VG.33, 1,166 kg of spruce, 110 kg of plywood, 880 kg of steel, 436 kg of aluminum and duralumin and 125 kg of magnesium was required. Even if mostly wooden, a large quantity of steel was still consumed in the aircraft’s production. The most significant efforts in providing the materials needed to produce the VG.33 were not spent in acquiring any of the steel though, but rather the spruce wood. The French Air Force only had a reserve of 750 tonnes, and the wood was also used to manufacture some reconnaissance or training aircraft, meaning this available reserve would only be sufficient to provide for about 500 VG.33s. France had to start a scramble to acquire spruce from foreign sources. In November, the acquisition of 500 m3 of spruce from Great-Britain was negotiated. In the meantime, France also bought spruce not only from its traditional suppliers, the USA and Canada, but also from an additional source, Romania. Romanian spruce was soon found to be lacking in comparison to the North American-sourced material. However, it would still be sufficient for less strategically important reconnaissance or training aircraft, freeing up better quality spruce for the VG.33, which had become an absolute priority of the French air ministry by the spring of 1940. In terms of cost, the airframe of the VG.33, without engine or armament, cost 630,000 French francs to produce. This was less than the D.520 (700,000) or MB.152 (800,000), and the VG.33 could be considered to be a fairly economical fighter – though not as much as the much lighter, and less capable, Caudron C.714, born from the same specifications .

Too Little, Too Late

The first production schedule for the VG.33 evolved considerably over the months.At the outbreak of the war, it was expected that the first VG.33s would be delivered in April 1940. In November 1939, the date for the first expected deliveries was changed to February 1940. In January of 1940, it appeared obvious this schedule would not be met and the new set date for the first VG.33 deliveries was March. Finally, in March, the first VG.33 were not yet completed, and the schedule was moved again to April of 1940, where it originally was at the start of the war. Finally, the first production aircraft would take flight on the 21st of April 1940. The next two production aircraft followed in early May. Eventually, 7 production aircraft would be taken into the French Air Force’s registry. The aircraft’s production and service was cut short by the German invasion of the Low Countries and France, with the production facilities at Sartrouville being occupied by German troops around the 14-15th of June 1940.

Side view of a VG.33. Taken in Toulouse, Southern France, in 1942, this photo shows one of the few production aircraft which could be evacuated to Southern France in time. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
The first squadron the VG.33 was supposed to enter service with was the GC ½, which previously operated the MS.406, far outclassed by the D.520 or Bf.109E. This squadron was allocated its two first aircraft, the 2nd and 4th production VG.33s, on the 10th of June 1940. The squadron, already engaged in the campaign, could not allocate any pilots to recover the aircraft. In the end, pilots of a reconnaissance group, GR 1/55, took them and relocated them from the under threat airport of Villacoublay, near Paris, to the far-away Toulouse-Francazal, deep in Southern France. Production planes n°1 and n°7 were moved to Clermont-Ferrant, where they were supposed to serve as models for the future VG.32 assembly chain. A fifth aircraft was moved to Southern France, n°7, in uncertain conditions.

Two VG.33s were reportedly part of an ad-hoc defensive squadron created in Bordeaux in June, GC I/55 active from the 17th to the 24th. According to some scaint claims, they may have been engaged in a few combat missions in the last days of the campaign of France. Two VG.33s are known to have been captured by German forces on Mérignac airfield, in Gironde, the same region as Bordeaux. These may have been the same aircraft.

Two production VG.33s captured intact by the Germans in Mérignac, Gironde. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
Outside of these 7 aircraft taken in by the French air force, production at SCAN’s facilities in Sartrouville had been starting to pick up steam, and a number of aircraft were at various stages of production. It appears a total of 19 fighters had been completed. 20 more lacked only their landing gear and were near completion. Seemingly, at least 120 more fuselages were at various stages of production. The vast majority of these were sabotaged in extremis to prevent advancing German troops from capturing them. Notably, the completed fighters, that had yet to be taken in by the French air force were destroyed by the crew of a Potez 540 reconnaissance bomber on the 14th of June using sledgehammers, mere hours before German troops would seize the facilities. This did not prevent the Germans from getting their hands on a few VG.33s. Two VG.33s were seemingly captured in Mérignac airfield. Located near Bordeaux, these two planes may have been those part of an ad-hoc defensive squadron. At least one aircraft would be repainted in German colors and tested extensively, likely at Rechlin airfield, Germany, and given the registration number “3+5”. According to some sources, the Germans would capture a total of five serial production VG 33s as well as the original prototype.

An uncompleted VG.33, likely photographed by the picture services of Germany’s armed forces in Sartrouville. [Le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
The VG.33 which would be tested by German pilots at the Rechlin airfield. [Armedconflicts.com]
Another photograph of the VG.33 which was captured by the Germans [Armedconflicts.com]

A Series of Derivatives, France’s Potentially Mainstay World War Two fighter

Though the VG.33 was already a very potent fighter by 1940, there were already plans to improve upon it, generally by improving its powerplant. A variety of prototypes, mostly based on VG.33 airframes and given alternative designations as VG.33 prototypes, were flown in the Spring of 1940 and would have given Arsenal’s new series of fighters a more promising fate, were it not for the German occupation of France.

The VG.32, developed before the VG 33, but never flown, replaced the 12Y-31 engine with an American-sourced Allison V-1710-C15 1,150 hp engine. A model from the same series of engines would be fitted into the American P-40 Warhawk fighter. While also being more powerful than the Hispano-Suiza 12Y, the most significant advantage of the Allison engine was that it would relieve France’s strained engine industry. By producing the relatively easy to build VG.33 airframe and giving it an engine which would not strain the local industry, France would have a fighter that would require comparatively few work hours. The fifth VG.33 prototype airframe, VG.33-05, was supposed to receive the Allison engine and be the VG.32 prototype. However, the engine was not delivered before the armistice and, as such, the prototype was never flown. Nonetheless, the VG.32 had been ordered for serial production. Production was to be set-up in Michelin’s facilities of Clermont-Ferrant. It was hoped the first dozen would be delivered in December of 1940, with 25 to be manufactured in January of 1941, 40 in February, 70 in March, 100 in April, and 150 monthly from May 1941 onward. This obviously never materialized. As it was never flown, there is no good way to estimate the VG.32’s performance. The Allison engine reportedly required lengthening the engine cover by 42 cm and may have made the plane somewhat heavier, but its significantly higher power output may still have resulted in the VG.32 being at least comparable, if not somewhat superior to the VG.33.

A rear view of the first VG.33 derivative to take flight, the VG.34, parked aside a LeO 451 bomber on a French airfield. [Aviafrance]
The first VG.33 derivative to take flight would be the VG.34. Built using the second VG.33 prototype airframe (VG.33-02), the VG.34 mounted a more powerful version of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y engine, the 12Y-45. Producing 960 hp, this was enough to give the VG.34 a maximum speed of 576 km/h at 6,000 m, and likely improve upon its climb rate as well. The VG.34 had its first flight on the 20th of January 1940. It appears to have been at an airfield near Toulouse by the armistice, with its further fate unknown.

The VG.35, made from VG.33-04, received a Hispano-Suiza 12Y-51 engine producing 1,000 hp. Sadly, it is a lot more elusive than the VG.34. Its recorded performances do not appear to be known, nor do any photo survive, despite the VG.35 having its first flight on the 25th of February 1940. The plane was known to be in Orléans by the point German forces captured the city. Its further fate is unknown.

A front view of the fairly impressive-looking VG.36 prototype. [Old Machine Press]
The VG.36 could be said to be a more mature version of the VG.35. Using the same 12Y-51 engine, the VG.36 was not built from a converted VG.33 airframe, but instead had a new one, incorporating a number of changes. Its radiator was wider but presented a smaller profile, and was more integrated into the fuselage in an effort to reduce drag. Taking its first flight on the 14th of May 1940, the VG.39 could reach 590 km/h at 7,000 m. Very satisfying in terms of its performance, it appears to have been scheduled to replace the VG.33 on the production lines at some point. As for the prototype, it was reportedly withdrawn to an airfield in La-Roche-Sur-Yon during the campaign, before being destroyed to avoid capture.

The VG.37 was never built; a further development of the VG.36, it was to feature a supercharger and be modified for long-range operations. The VG.38 was never built either, and was to feature an improved version of the 12Y engine – the exact model being unknown.

The sleek and impressive looking VG.39, often considered to be the most brilliant example of the future of French fighter design to have reached prototype stage by 1940, parked in front of a LeO 451 bomber. [ww2.sas1946.com]
The VG.39 was the most advanced model which took flight. Its main improvement was in terms of its powerplant. It received the advanced Hispano-Suiza 12Y-89 ter, with an output of 1,200 hp. It appears this engine did not allow for a cannon firing through the propeller hub in this version. To somewhat compensate for this, the wings were redesigned, keeping the same surface area but having a vastly modified structure which enabled for the mounting of one additional MAC34 machine-gun in each wing. Taking its first flight on the 3rd of May 1940, it could reach an impressive 625 km/h at 5,750 m. A very well performing plane for the time, the VG.39 was, as the VG.36, intended to enter production. This would, however, likely have been in the form of an improved version still on the drawing board by 1940. Designated as the VG.39bis, this improved VG.39 would feature an even more powerful Hispano-Suiza 12Z-17 engine producing 1,600 hp and allow for a 20 mm HS-404 to fire through the propeller hub, with the 6 wing machine-guns being retained. The VG.39bis would also incorporate a lower and widened radiator design similar to the one found in the VG.36. It would likely have been a very high performing aircraft, but it stayed on the drawing board due to the German occupation of France. As for the VG.39 prototype, its eventual fate is unknown.

The Undying Shadow of a Promising Fighter: Vichy Regime Studies

As can be seen, the VG.33 was an aircraft with promising performance, and an already well-developed series of variants which would have guaranteed the aircraft good evolutionary potential. Had France not been knocked out of the war by 1940, it is likely the Arsenal VG.3X series would have become for France what the Spitfire was to Britain or the Bf.109 to Germany: a mainstay able to continue to evolve and remain relevant for pretty much the entirety of the conflict.

This promising future was cut short by German wings, tracks and feet occupying France in 1940. Nonetheless, the armistice regime known as Vichy continued some studies upon the base of the VG.33. A few of the fighters, seemingly five production models as well as the original prototype, were indeed re-located in the unoccupied part of France at the end of the 1940 campaign. Though they were not put into service, they appear to have been taken as a basis to continue working on future fighters.

A series of profile views of Arsenal’s series of fighters. There is little in common to be found between the original VG.30 or VG.33 and the later VG.50 or VG.70 projects undertaken by the Vichy regime. [le Fana de l’Aviation n°199]
Under the Vichy regime, studies would continue, leading to the VG.40, 50 and then VG.60. The definitive aircraft designed by 1942 would have featured larger 16.25 m² wings, and a completely redesigned fuselage which had little to do with the old VG.33. It would feature a new version of the Hispano-Suiza 12Z engine. Studies stopped after the occupation of the unoccupied part of France in November of 1942, but would resume after the liberation of France, with a VG.60 fitted with a German Jumo 213E 1,750 hp engine being considered. This would have been a fighter vastly different from the original VG.33. Armed with eight wing-mounted M2 Browning 12.7 mm machine-guns and a cannon of unknown model firing through the propeller hub, it would have weighed up to around five tons and was expected to reach over 700 km/h. This would never materialize, as Arsenal would end up manufacturing a version of a pre-war project in the form of the tandem engine VB.10. The design bureau would also design some jet fighters in the form of the VG.70 and VG.90, though these would not result in any Arsenal aircraft being adopted by France before the bureau was absorbed into the larger SNCAN in December of 1954.

A Fighter Mystified and Fantasized-About, Cut Short by France’s Defeat

The Arsenal VG.33 was a particularly interesting French piece of equipment. Having its roots in a venture by Arsenal de L’Aéronautique to design the VG. 30 light fighter, the type would evolve into a solid fighter by 1939-1940. Having both promising performance and evolutionary potential, the VG.33’s future was cut short by the German invasion which happened right as the very first production aircraft were taking their first flights. Even more so than the D.520, often described by this sentence, the VG.33 arrived too few and too late, and couldn’t provide the French air force an aircraft able to compete with Germany’s Bf.109 . It has since become a fairly mystified piece of French engineering. An elegant fighter with a sleek design, it has become a sort of ambassador for the large variety of advanced military equipment which France was to field by 1940, but never got the chance. In this fashion, it is not too different from the Somua S40 and B1 Ter tanks or MAS 40 rifle in the psyche of French military enthusiasts.

Two production VG.33s on a French airfield. The majestic and sleek fighter design that is the VG.33 has attracted the eyes of many French military enthusiasts for decades. Though the reality is somewhat more complex, it is certain the VG.33 would have provided the French air force with a better performing asset than the MS.406, MB.152, and even D.520 and H.75. [Old Machine Press]

Replica Construction

This heavily mystified status of the VG.33 likely played a role in the creation of a project to produce a replica of the French fighter aircraft. An association, Arsenal Sud Restoration, was created with the goal of building a replica. With the original plans unavailable, the team had to recreate them using new tools. As of November 2020, while far from complete, the shape of the replica’s fuselage is starting to take shape, while the rudder has been painted and given its markings.

A view of the state of the project in October of 2020 [Facebook]

Variants

VG.30: Original light fighter prototype

VG.31: Planned modified variant of the VG.30, with Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 860 hp engine, radiator moved to the back, and only two 7.5mm machine-guns. Never flown, a fuselage built and converted to a VG.33 prototype

VG.32: Planned variant fitted with Allison V-1710-C15 1,150 hp engine. A VG.33 prototype fuselage was set aside to receive the engine and serve as the VG.32 prototype, but it had not yet been mounted in June of 1940. Production was scheduled to begin in December 1940.

VG.33: Main production variant, using the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 860 hp engine and armed with one 20mm HS-404 autocannon and four 7.5mm MAC 34 machine-guns.

VG.34: Prototype converted from the second VG.33 prototype airframe, using the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-45 engine producing 960hp.

VG.35: Prototype converted from the fourth VG.33 prototype airframe, fitted with the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-51 1,000hp engine.

VG.36: Prototype, an improved iteration of the VG.30 series with the 12Y-51 engine in a modified airframe, with a radiator designed to reduce drag and significant other changes. Was to replace the VG.33 on the production lines at some point

VG.37:Planned variant of the VG.36 fitted with a supercharger and optimized for longer-range operations, never built

VG.38: Fighter design with an unknown iteration of the 12Y family of engines, never built.

VG.39: Prototype using the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-89 ter, producing 1,200hp but not fitted with an engine cannon, and instead using six 7.5mm machine-guns instead of four.

VG.39bis: Further evolution of the VG.39, powered by the Hispano-Suiza 12Z-17 1,600hp engine which would allow for a 20mm firing through the engine, while retaining six 7.5mm machine-guns. Never built

VG.40: First variant studied under the Vichy regime, using a Roll-Royces Merlin III 1,030hp engine on an airframe based on the VG.39bis. Never built

VG.50: Variant studied under the Vichy regime, using the Allison V-1710-39 engine. Never built

VG.60: Variant studied under the Vichy regime, with a new version of the Hispano-Suiza 12Z series of engines. Never built.

Arsenal VG.33 Specifications

Wingspan 10.8 m / 35 ft 6 in
Length 8.55 m / 28 ft 1 in
Height 3.55 m / 11 ft 8 in
Wing Area 14 m² / 46 ft² (One Wing)
28 m² / 92 ft² (Total)
Engine Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31
Engine Output Take Off – 760 hp
Optimal Altitude – 860 hp at 5,200 m / 17,000 ftMax RPM –  ~1,850 Standard
Propeller Three-bladed Chauvière Variable Pitch Propeller (2.95 m diameter) 
Empty Weight 2,050 kg / 4,519 lb
Takeoff Weight 2,450 to 2,896 kg (2,680 kg standard)
5,400 to 6,385 lb (5,908 lb standard)
Wing Loading 95.7 kg/m²  /  19.6 lb/ft² (at standard 2,680 kg weight)
Fuel Capacity 400 liters / 105 US gallons           
600 liters / 158 US gallons with proposed additional non-droppable fuel tanks
Maximum Speed  558 km/h / 347 mph
Cruising Speed 385 km/h / 239 mph
Cruising Range 1,060 km / 620 mi with Standard 400 liter fuel load

1,560 km / 970 mi with Extended 600 liter fuel load

Endurance 2h40 at 5,000m with 400 liter fuel load

4h20 at 5,000m with 600 liter fuel load

Maximum Service Ceiling 9,500 m / 31,000 ft
Time to Altitude 1.17 minutes to 1,000 m

2.34 minutes to 2,000 m

3.51 minutes to 3,000 m

5.07 minutes to 4,000 m

6.26 minutes to 5,000 m

8.02 minutes to 6,000 m

10.11 minutes to 7,000 m

13.26 minutes to 8,000 m

Crew One Pilot
Armament
  • 20 mm HS-404 firing through the propeller hub center with 60 rounds
  • 4x MAC34M39 machine-guns with 850 rounds per gun in the wings
Production
  • 1 prototype + 4 completed derivative prototype
  • Around 20 production aircraft fully completed of which 7 were taken in by the French Air Force
  • 40 airframes very close to completion
  • About 200 aircraft in various stages of production in total by June of 1940 

Gallery

Arsenal VG.30 Prototype
Arsenal VG.33 Prototype
Arsenal VG.33 in Standard Camouflage for 1940
German Captured VG.33 – Depicted as seen in testing at Rechlin

Sources

  • Written by Marisa Belhote
  • Edited by Stan and Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Ed Jackson
  • Le Fana de l’Aviation, Jean Cuny & Raymond Danel, 1986:
  • N°197 : “Les Chasseurs Arsenal VG 30 à VG 70” (I)
  • N°198 : “Les Chasseurs Arsenal VG 30 à VG 70” (II)
  • N°199 : “Les Chasseurs Arsenal VG 30 à VG 70” (III)
  • L’Aviation Française, chasse, bombardement, reconnaissance et observation 1939-1942, Dominique Breffort, Histoire & Collection Editions, 2011
  • L’Arsenal de L’Aéronautique, Gérard Hartmann for hydroretro.net, February 2007
  • William Pearce for old.machinepress.com: https://oldmachinepress.com/2019/03/05/arsenal-vg-30-series-vg-33-fighter-aircraft/
  • https://www.facebook.com/ArsenalVG33/

Blohm und Voss Bv 141

Nazi flag Nazi Germany (1938)
Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft – 13-18 Built

The Second Bv 141 Prototype (V1) – Colorized by Michael Jucan

During the Second World War, the Germans would design and build a number of unusual aircraft (the Me 163 or the He 111 Zwilling, for example), but none was so unorthodox and strange as the Bv 141. In order to provide good visibility for its reconnaissance role, the crew gondola was completely separated from the aircraft’s fuselage. While small numbers were built, during testing it was shown to have decent flying characteristics for its completely unconventional design.

History 

In 1937, the German Ministry of Aviation (Reichsluftfahrtministerium RLM) issued a request to all German aircraft manufacturers for a new single-engine reconnaissance aircraft with provision for three crew members. Great attention was to be dedicated to having a good all-around visibility. In addition, the aircraft would also have to be able to act as a light attack, and smokescreen laying aircraft. Three aircraft manufacturers responded to this request, Arado, Focke Wulf, and Blohm und Voss. Of these, Blohm & Voss would submit the most distinctive design to say at least. 

While at first glance, the Ha 141 (as it was known at the start of the project, with the ‘Ha’ designation stands for Hamburger Flugzeugbau) appears to be created by someone with no experience whatsoever in aircraft design. This was not actually the case. In reality, the Ha 141 was designed by Dr. Ing. Richard Vogt, who was Chief Designer at Blohm und Voss for the new reconnaissance aircraft. The Ha 141 was to have an unusual design, as the crew was put into a well-glazed gondola, with the fuselage with and engine to the left. During his initial calculations, Dr. Vogt predicted, successfully, that the large crew gondola would act as a counterbalance to the long left-side engine fuselage.  

When Dr. Ing. Richard Vogt presented his plans to the Ministry of Aviation, the officials were quite uninterested in such an unorthodox design, and the story of the Ha 141 would have ended there. Not willing to give up on his idea so easily, the Blohm und Voss company financed the construction of the first prototype with its own funding. The prototype was completed early in 1938  and the name was changed to Bv 141. It made its maiden flight on the 25th of February that year. The flight went well, without any major problems. The only issue was a slight oscillation of the landing gear. When it was presented to the Luftwaffe officials, they were surprised by its performance and ordered a production run of three more prototypes. Interestingly, after some negotiations with Blohm & Voss, their prototype was included in this order and two more aircraft were actually built. The first prototype was marked as V0 and would be later rebuilt into the Bv 141 V2 prototype and tested with the BMW 139F engine.  The Luftwaffe officials only requested that the crew gondola be completely redesigned, internally and externally, to incorporate a larger working space, and to be almost completely glazed, quite similar in design to the Fw 189. Bv 141 V1, actually the second produced aircraft, was used to test the aircraft’s general flight performance. The V3 made its first test flight on 5th October 1938 and was used mainly to test the BMW 132N engine. 

After the first prototype was shown to the Luftwaffe officials order few more to be built for future testing [luftwaffephotos.com]
By 1939, an additional two more aircraft were built. The V4, that was to be sent to the Erprobungstelle Testing Center at Rechlin, had an accident during landing. After the repairs were made, it was finally flight tested at Rechlin. It performed well and it was liked by the pilots that had the chance to fly it. It also underwent a number of different weapon tests. Once all these tests were completed, the V4 prototype was chosen for modification into the first A-series. After that, a small series of the A version, five aircraft in total, were built and used mostly for testing and development of new improvements at Rechlin. Some were stationed at Aufklärungsschule 1 (Training School 1) at Großenhain. While the A-2 would be rebuilt into a training airframe in May 1942, the fate of the remaining aircraft of this series is unknown. Likely, all were scrapped. Depending on the sources the A-series aircraft were powered by a 1,000 hp BMW Bramo 323 radial engine.

A rear view of the Bv 141 V4 prototype. [luftwaffephotos.com]
Following these tests, the Bv 141 received positive reports about its overall performance. There were also discussions about its mass production. Despite this, the whole project was officially canceled on 4th April 1940. The main reason was the Luftwaffe high officials’ distrust of the design. The official reason for rejection of the Bv 141 was noted as ‘underpowered,’ despite its good performance.

Technical Characteristics

The Bv 141 was a uniquely designed single-engine all-metal aircraft. It did not have a standard fuselage, with the engine in the front and the crew behind it.  The crew gondola and the fuselage with the engine were completely separate from each other. Both were located slightly off the center of the wings. The crew gondola was placed on the right, with the engine to the left.

The glazed crew gondola is quite visible here [luftwaffephotos.com]
The first A-series aircraft had a wingspan of 15 m (49 ft 3 in). The Bv 141 was initially powered by a 865 hp BMW 132N 9-cylinder radial engine. It used a constant speed propeller. Behind the engine, the 490 l fuel tank was placed. 

Close up view of the initially used 865 km/h BMW 132N engine. While weaker than the later engine used, its performance was much better and offered a much more pleasant flight. [luftwaffephotos.com]
The tail design was changed during the Bv 141’s development. Initially, a standard tail design was used. This would later be replaced with a forward leaning, asymmetric tailplane, offset to port side. The unusual shape of the new tailplane had the intent of providing the rear gunner with the best available firing arc. It only had one elevator, which had a larger surface area than the previous model. Surprisingly, the aircraft’s good performance was left unchanged after the introduction of the asymmetric tailplane. 

The landing gear was more or less standard for its time. The front landing gear consisted of two large wheels that retracted outwards into the leading edges of the wings. To the rear, there was a small landing wheel that retracted to the back and slightly protruded out of the fuselage.

The landing gear on the Bv 141 were standard type at the time, consisting of two forward landing wheels and one smaller to the rear [luftwaffephotos.com]
The first crew gondola had fewer glazed surfaces than the later used models. In general, it provided the crew with excellent front, rear, and right-side views of the surroundings. The left view was partly obscured because of the engine.

The Bv 141 pilot front gondola interior [luftwaffephotos.com]
The armament consisted of four 7.92 mm machine guns. Two MG 17 forward firing fixed machine guns were placed in the forward nacelle. These were operated by the pilot, who used a Revi aim sight. To the rear, one defensive MG 15 was placed in a small circular cupola atop of the Bv 141. The last MG 15 was positioned to the rear of the aircraft. The Bv 141 could also carry four 50 kg (110 lb) bombs. 

The pilot was positioned on the left side of the englazed nose of the gondola.  Next to him  was the position of the observer, who also acted as bombardier in case the Bv 141 was used for ground attack. The observer also had the job of operating the radio and the machine gun placed in the small circular cupola. Interestingly, because he performed different tasks, his seat was connected to two tracks which enabled him to move freely inside the gondola without getting up. The third crew member operated the rear defensive machine gun. 

The Bv 141 pilot had a large glazed gondola where the crew was positioned. It offered a good all round view (except to the right side where the engine was). [luftwaffephotos.com]
The front view of the first Bv 141 prototype built by Blohm und Voss. [luftwaffephotos.com]

Last Hope for Production

With the cancelation of the Bv 141A series due to allegedly poor engine performance, Dr. Ing. Richard Vogt immediately began working on an improved version. In order to address the concerns made  by the Luftwaffe regarding its engine, the Blohm & Voss designers decided to use the stronger 1,560 hp BMW 801A 14-cylinder two-row engine. Unbeknownst to them, this decision would actually doom the whole project. 

With the new engine, other changes to the overall design had to be made. The wings had to be reinforced and their span increased to 17.46 m (57 ft 3 in). In addition, the leading and trailing edges had to be redesigned. The rear part of the fuselage’s design was also changed. The landing gear was also improved by adding much stronger landing gear wheels. The armament appears to have been reduced to three machine guns (the sources are not clear here), while the bomb load remained the same.

The top view of one of few built Bv 141B series. While intended to improve the Bv 141A series performance, it was never achieved successfully. [luftwaffephotos]
All these changes would lead to the development of the Bv 141B series. The first mock-up was completed in February 1940. The first test flight was made on the 9th January 1941. This time, the Luftwaffe officials showed interest in it, especially after installing the much stronger engine. While Blohm & Voss received permission to build five aircraft of the B-series, the order was increased by five more. Initial calculations showed that it could reach speeds up to 480 km/h (300 mph), at least in theory. Almost immediately, the Bv 141B aircraft proved to be plagued with many problems. The controls were difficult to use and the plane was prone to mechanical faults, especially regarding the landing gear and the hydraulic systems. A huge issue was also created by the strong vibrations that occurred during the test flights. In addition, during firing trials, it was noted that cordite fumes would accumulate in the cockpit from the guns.

The Luftwaffe’s initial enthusiasm for this unusual aircraft quickly faded away. While the tests on the Bv 141 would go on for a few more years, the Fw 189 would be chosen instead. Despite this setback, Dr. Vogt would continue on working on similar and improved designs during the war. Due to urgent requests for more ‘normal’ planes, he was ultimately forced to abandon his work and, besides some proposals, he never got a chance to build another such aircraft during the war. The last mention of the Bv 141 B-10 was in May of 1944, when it was used to tow another unusual design from Blohm and Voss, the experimental Bv 40 armed glider. 

A group of three Bv 141 aircraft during one of many test flights [luftwaffephotos]

Operational Use

The Blohm und Voss Bv 141 [luftwaffephotos.com]
The second BV 141B prototype was allocated to Aufklärungsschule 1 (Reconnaissance Training Unit) in 1941, stationed at Grossenhain. It appears that its performance was deemed satisfactory, as more aircraft were requested in order to form at least one operational test unit for use on the Eastern Front. This was never implemented, mostly due to two reasons. The Blohm und Voss factories were redirected to higher priority projects, and since the  Fw 189 was accepted for service, there was no real need for another reconnaissance aircraft.

Some sources, like the book Aircraft of World War II by C. Chant, mention that it was used in test flights over the UK and the Soviet Union during its short operational service.

Use After the War

The fate of the small number of Bv 141s produced is not known. While the majority were scrapped, some managed to survive until war’s end. One Bv 141 was actually captured by the Soviet Forces near the end of the war. This aircraft would be flight tested by the British pilot Captain Eric Brown. He was the chief test pilot of the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. He was involved in a British project tasked with taking over German war research installations and interrogating technical personnel after the war. 

The single Bv 141 was relocated to an auxiliary airfield near the town of Meissen. When Captain Brown arrived, Soviet soldiers were already taking anything that was of use from the airfield and destroying everything else. After making a request to the Soviets to see if the aircraft could be flown, the Soviets approved. He was instructed to conduct a short flight around the airfield, and to beware of possible engine malfunctions due to the general poor state of the aircraft.  

Captain Eric Brown described the flight with the Bv 141 as follows. “With the flaps set to start, there was surprisingly little take-off swing, although I had expected rather a lot. The run was short, but I found the undercarriage took a long time to retract, although I suspected the hydraulics were sluggish after a long period of disuse.

The climb was mediocre at a speed of 189 km/h (112 mph) and, remembering my Russian instructions, I did not go above about 915 m (3,000 ft). Cruising speed at that height was 325 km/h (202 mph). It was at this speed that I decided to try out the theory behind the asymmetric layout of the 141, namely that in the event of attack, the aircraft could be stood on its wing tip and held there in straight flight, thus giving the gunner in the cone of the nacelles a tremendous field of fire. 

Frankly, I was sceptical of this claim of edge-on straight flight, but it proved to be, as near as damn it, true. I then stepped up the power, increasing the speed to 360 km/h (224 mph), but just as I rolled the aircraft on to its port side, the engine suddenly backfired heavily and oil pressure began to drop. This terminated any short handling session, as I considered discretion better than providing the Russians with their eagerly awaited spectacle. 

I therefore turned straight into the landing pattern with the engine throttled well back, and lowered the undercarriage immediately at about 610 m (2,000 ft) to give it time to lower in case it got temperamental. I had both flaps and the undercarriage lowered by about 305 m (1,000 ft), across wind of the final approach, turning on to finals at 150 m (490 ft) at 145 km/h (90 mph) and easing the speed off to 130 km/h (80 mph) over the airfield boundary. 

I stopped the engine at the end of the landing run, as it was obviously very sick. …. In retrospect, I am really glad to have had the unique opportunity of even a short flight in the Bv 141B, because it left me with the realisation that it was not as bad an aircraft as its development history seemed to suggest. It had good, effective controls, although it had poor lateral stability, which would have made it unpleasant to fly in turbulence at low level. Maybe this and the fact that its competitor, the Fw 189, had excellent flying characteristics, were the real reasons for its demise before reaching operational production.  “

Allegedly, according to some internet sources, at least one Bv 141 was captured by the British forces. It was then shipped to England for evaluation, but its fate is unknown. 

Production

How many Bv 141s were produced is not clear in the sources. The number ranges from 13 to 18 aircraft being built. This includes at least three prototypes, five of the slightly improved A series and some 10 B series aircraft. The last Bv 141B was delivered in mid-May 1943.

  • Ha 141 Prototype – The first prototype was built as a Blohm & Voss private venture.
  • BV 141A –  Slightly improved version.
  • BV 141B – Powered by a much stronger engine and with many other modifications, especially to the wing design.  

Operators

  • Germany – A few aircraft were used experimentally by the Luftwaffe.
  • Soviet Union – After the War, the Soviets managed to capture one Bv 141B, but its fate is unknown.
  • United Kingdom – Possibly captured one, which was allegedly shipped to England for evaluation.

Conclusion

The BV 141 initially demonstrated generally good flight characteristics, despite its unusual and radical design. The desire to further improve the flight performance, and distrust by the Luftwaffe eventually killed the project. The extensive redesign of the Bv 141B series simply had too many problems that were never completely resolved. The Luftwaffe was also reluctant to invest more time in it, especially as the more orthodox Fw 189 was being introduced into service. In the end, while it was not put into production, the BV 141 was nevertheless an interesting design and certainly deserves a spot in aviation history.

Bv 141B Specifications

Wingspans 57  ft 3  in / 17.56  m
Length 45  ft 9 in / 13.9 m
Height 11 ft 9 in  / 3.6  m
Wing Area 570 ft² / 52.9 m²
Engine One BMW 801 A-0 1.560 HP 14 cylinder radial engine
Empty Weight 10,360  lbs / 4,700 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 13,450 lbs / 6,100 kg
Fuel Capacity 470 l
Climb Rate to 6 km In 8 minute 48 second
Maximum Speed at 5.000 m 272 mph / 438 km/h
Cruising speed 250 mph  / 400km/h
Range 745  miles / 1,200 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 32,810 ft / 10,000 m
Crew Pilot, observer and the rear gunner. 
Armament
  • Two forward fixed 0.3 in (7.92 mm) machine guns and one same caliber machine gun placed to the rear.
  • Up to four 110 lb (50 kg) bombs

Gallery

Illustrations by Ed Jackson

Bv 141 V2 – The 1st Prototype
Bv 141B – The first B Series Prototype
Bv 141B V-11
Bv 141B V-18 with 50kg Bomb Mounted
Bv 141B Overhead View

Credits

  • D. Nešić (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata Nemačka Beograd
  • B.Eric (1977/2010) Wings Of The Luftwaffe Flying The Captured German Aircraft of World War II, Hikoki Publications.
  • C. Chant (2007) Pocket Guide Aircraft Of World War II, Grange Books. 
  • M. Griehl (2012) X-Planes German Luftwaffe Prototypes 1930-1945, Frontline Book.
  • Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage Aircraft Of The Luftwaffe 1935-1945, McFarland and Company.
  • D. Donald (1994) Warplanes Of The Luftwaffe, Barnes and Noble. 

Fizir Prelazni FP-2

Yugoslavia flag Yugoslavia (1933-1947)
Training aircraft – 81 Built

Front view of the FP-2. [vazduhoplovnetradicijesrbije.rs]
The FP-2 was designed as an advanced two seater biplane trainer for the Yugoslav Royal Air Force in late 30s. It would be used to equip pilot training schools for some years before WW2. During World War II, it would be used by the Axis powers, which managed to capture a number of them, for limited ground attack operations. The FP-2 would survive the war in smaller numbers and remain in use up to 1947.

History

As the Yugoslav Royal Air Force began to develop and acquire more modern types of aircraft, the need for advanced training aircraft became apparent. Due to the obsolescence of older trainers, the Yugoslav Royal Air Force Command issued orders to begin developing a new series of advanced trainers in 1933. One of the designs submitted was the Fizir FP-1 biplane made by Zmaj. Despite its disappointing overall performance, a new design was desperately needed. At the same time, a design team composed of Rudolf Fizir and Dušan Stankov began working on a new model named FP-2. In a later address to Zmaj management in May of 1940, Dušan Stankov wrote that he was responsible for the design of the FP-2, with little to no input from Rudolf Fizir. While the Royal Air Force command was more in favor of a monoplane design, the FP-2 nevertheless received a green light.

Name

The capital letters in the name FP-2 are an abbreviation for “Fizir Prelazni 2” (Физир Прелазни ФП-2). Depending on the source, it is also sometimes identified as F.P.2. During its operational service in the Yugoslav Royal Air Force, it was also known as F.P.2-K7 after its engine name, or Fizir-Stankov F.P.2 after its designers. This article will use the FP-2 designation, as it is best known today.

What is interesting is that the FP-2 name may suggest that it was an improved version of the earlier FP-1. In reality, these two projects had nothing in common. This name was done mainly for administrative reasons, in order to obtain the funds allocated for FP-1.

Work on the Prototype

Work on the first prototype began in early 1933. At this time, the Yugoslav Royal Air Force officials were negotiating with the French for licenced production of several Gnome-Rhone engine designs, including the K-7, K-9 and K-14. For this reason, it was decided to test the performance of these engines by installing them into several prototype aircraft. This decision included the FP-2 ,which was to be powered by a French Gnome-Rhone K-7, making 420 hp.

The first prototype was officially completed by the end of 1933. It was flight tested by Zmaj test pilot Pavle Bauer. The pilot performed a series of test flights without any problems. As the first flights were successful, the FP-2 was given to the Yugoslav Royal Air Force for further testing in early 1934. For the testing of the FP-2, a commission of seven members was tasked with determining its exact flight performance. The test flight series began on the 19th of February, and after only four days a preliminary report was submitted to the Yugoslav Royal Air Force Command. The report gave mostly positive remarks on the FP-2 performance, with a few changes requested, such as increasing of the fuel load, a better position for the instruments inside the cockpit, modifications of the seats etc. The K-7 engine performance was deemed sufficient, and it was also noted that the testing of the FP-2 with any other engines at the moment was not required. This commission also urged for the FP-2 to be put into production as soon as possible. 

The FP-2 design team expected that a production order was to be given shortly by the Yugoslav Royal Air Force Command. But this was not the case for several reasons. The main problem was the inability of the Rakovica factory to locally produce the K-7 engine by 1936.  Due to high prices, the Yugoslav Royal Air Force could not buy these engines directly from France. Another issue was the adoption of the new Rogožarski ‘PVT’ high-wing training aircraft which used the same engine and offered better performance than the FP-2.

In order to solve this problem, the Zmaj engineers decided to replace the K-7 with the nine-cylinder Valter Pollux II (320 hp) engine. The ensuing flight tests carried out showed that the new engine only worsened the flight performance of the FP-2, due to lower power output. Thus, Zmaj was forced to replace it with the original K-7.

From the end of October to the first half of November 1934, more tests were carried out on the FP-2 with the K-7 by a second commission. This new commission had six members and was tasked with FP-2’s overall performance more thoroughly. These tests also included the testing of a few different types of propellers. The results showed that the metal type propellers gave better performance. In addition, the operational radius was evaluated and the results showed that, at the speed of 100 mph (161 km/h), the FP-2 could stay operational for three hours. Several pilots flight tested the FP-2 and, in general, positive remarks were given about its performance. The changes in the cockpit instrument arrangement was also rated as an improvement. After the tests were completed, this commission gave positive reviews for the FP-2 and suggested that it should be adopted for production as a basic trainer, but not as a fighter trainer due to the lack of performance for this role.

Technical Characteristics

The FP-2 was designed as a single-engine, two-seater basic trainer biplane. The FP-2 was made using wood as its main construction material and then covered with canvas. Its wooden elements were connected using metal pleats and rivets. The fuselage consisted of 16 oval shaped frames that were all connected with four long wooden spars. The wing’s construction was made of wood and then covered with fabric. Rear tail unit was made using a combination of metal and wood, which was then covered in  fabric. The landing gear was a fixed design with two wheels equipped with shock absorbers. There was no rear tail wheel and instead used a small skid which also was provided with a shock absorber. In winter, the front wheels could be replaced with skis.

It was powered by the French K-7 Gnome-Rhone 313 kW (420 hp) engine. The engine itself was placed on a ring shaped housing made of metal and duralumin construction. The maximum speed achieved with this engine was 148 mph (238 km/h). Being designed as a trainer aircraft, its crew consisted of a pilot/instructor and the student.

In Service Before War

For its service in the Yugoslav Royal Air Force, the first prototype was purchased for 577,000 Dinars in 1934. Next year, the contract for the construction of the first batch of 20 aircraft was signed. These were to be produced and given to basic training schools by 1936. All 20 aircraft were completed on time and were given to the First and Second basic training Schools. A few were temporarily given to the Fighter plane school until the more advanced PVT could be built. Once the PVT was adopted for service, the fighter school FP-2s were given to the basic training schools.

The FP-2 was mainly used to replace older training aircraft models that were in service. In its intended role, the FP-2 proved to have satisfactory performance and generally fulfilled the role of a basic trainer successfully. Only one accident was reported in 1938, when, due to a pilot error, control of the plane was lost and it crashed to the ground. The pilot managed to jump out of the plane and safely landed.

The FP-2 was considered a successful basic trainer by the Royal Air Force before the war. [airwar.ru]
During the production run, there were only minor modifications between the different planes. The FP-2 which were built in 1939 were modified with improved control panels with more updated instrumentation. Zmaj also proposed a modified FP-2H powered by the K-9 engine for use by the navy, but it was not adopted. 

By March 1941, around 9 FP-2 aircraft were reportedly awaiting repairs at the Zmaj factory. The fifth batch of 15 FP-2 were to be built by mid-1941. The materials and engine were assembled but, due to the outbreak of the war, none were delivered to the Yugoslav Air Force. Production of the FP-2 was carried out until the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. 

During the April War

At the time of the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, all FP-2 were still assigned to the two basic training schools. The First pilot school was transferred near Sarajevo shortly before the outbreak of the war, along with 10 FP-2. The school was operational until the German capture of Sarajevo. The commander of this school, Colonel Adalbert Rogulja, ordered the entire unit to surrender to the Germans without attempting to sabotage its aircraft. 

The Second pilot school, located at the Kapino polje near Nikšić, had 15 FP-2. As the area was not  attacked by Axis forces, this school was operational until the end of war. The remaining FP-2s were stationed in smaller numbers across Yugoslavia. One was destroyed by the Germans in Novi Sad, and a few more in Niš and Pančevo. By the war’s end, both the Germans and Italians managed to capture an unknown number of FP-2s.

In German Service

The Germans managed to capture the Zmaj factory and an unknown number (possibly more than 15) of FP-2 across Yugoslavia. But they were more interested in the factory itself than the FP-2, and for this reason did not use the aircraft that were captured.

In Italian Service

The Italians managed to capture around 13 fully operational FP-2. One was transported to Italy to be flight tested with other captured Yugoslav aircraft (Do-17K and Hurricane) in early June 1941. The remaining 12 FP-2s were stationed at Tirana, but then repositioned in May 1941 to Shkodër to join the 5° Gruppo, which was part of the 39ª Squadriglia. This unit was equipped with older IMAM Ro-37 aircraft. As these were prone to malfunction, the Italians simply reused the FP-2 and pressed them into service. They were mainly used for liaison missions between Tirana and Shkodër. But Partisan activity began to increase in the area and faced with a lack of any other aircraft, the Italians began to arm the FP-2s. The FP-2s were armed with machine guns taken from the Ro-37 aircraft.

The 39ª Squadriglia would be operational until June 1943 in the Shkodër region. It was then returned to Italy and, while it is not clear, there is a chance that at least three FP-2 were still operational with this unit. The final fate of the FP-2s in Italian service is unfortunately not known.

In NDH Service 

After the April War ended, the Germans captured all surviving aircraft production factories, including Zmaj, in Yugoslavia. They restarted production for their own needs. The newly formed NDH (Independent State of Croatia) puppet state asked the Germans for a number of aircraft for their newly formed air force. This included any available Yugoslavian aircraft that survived the war. The Germans supplied the NDH with FP-2s captured in Sarajevo during the war.

In the case of the FP-2s at the Zmaj factory, there were engines and parts for the incomplete fifth production series that could potentially be built. The Germans delayed any decision whether to allow the NDH to take these aircraft. In 1943, an arrangement was reached between the NDH Aviation Force officials and the representatives of Zmaj for the delivery of the 15 FP-2 aircraft. The production process was slow due to the lack of a qualified workforce and constant sabotage by resistance movements. By 1944, only eight FP-2s were completed for the NDH. The remaining seven would remain in Zmaj factory hangars until they were captured by the victorious Communist Partisan forces in October 1944. 

During the war, the NDH Air Force used the FP-2 in its original role of a training aircraft. As the Partisan activity began to rise, some FP-2s were modified by adding bomb racks for six 12 kg (27 lb) bombs. These were then used to fight the Partisans, but as neither the pilot nor the observer were supplied with parachutes, these operations were dangerous.

FP-2 in Croatian service during the Second World War. [histaviation.com]
By 1944, it was obvious that the Axis were on the losing side and, for this reason, many NDH pilots tried to escape to the Partisan side whenever it was possible. One of them was Mitar Оbućanin. While flying an FP-2 (6822) in late August 1944, he escaped to the Partisan held island of Vis. This plane would be used by the Partisans for reconnaissance and liaison. Another attempt was made in October by pilot Drago Markotić and assistant Milan Aćimović. The escape failed and the plane was shot down by German AA ground fire. The pilot was captured and executed but his assistant managed to escape.

This FP-2 (6822) is the plane in which Croatian pilot Mitar Оbućanin defected to the Partisan side. It was then put into service by the Partisans from the isle of Vis. The FP-2 received a large Red Star painted on its side.[vazduhoplovnetradicijesrbije.rs]
The NDH had around 23 FP-2s in their Air Force. The aircraft supplied by the Germans received serial numbers 6801 to 6815 and the ones acquired from Zmaj were 6816 to 6823.

After War Service

With the liberation of Zemun, where the Zmaj factory was located, seven incomplete FP-2s were found abandoned. By late April 1945, two FP-2s were completed and put to use by the new Communist Yugoslav Air Force. The last five were completed by mid 1945. In total, around 13 were operated by the Yugoslav Air Force after the war. They would not remain long in service due to a lack of spare parts. They were mostly used as a target tug to haul flying targets for ground AA crew training.

The parts of one FP-2 can now be seen at the Belgrade Aviation Museum near the Nikola Tesla Airport.

Side view of the FP-2. [airwar.ru]
One of the 13 FP-2s operated by the new Communist Yugoslav Air Force after the war. [vazduhoplovnetradicijesrbije.rs]
 

Production

The FP-2 was produced in several batches from 1934 to 1940. The first batch consisted of 20 aircraft, followed by a second one with 15 planes in 1937, another 15 planes in 1939, and the final batch of 15 in 1940. An additional 15 planes were to be built in 1941, but due to the outbreak of the war, this was never completed. 

Before the war, the total production number of FP-2s made by Zmaj was 65 aircraft, plus the prototype. During the war and, in small numbers, after the war, an additional 15 were built. In total, 81 FP-2 were built.

Modifications

  • FP-2 – Main production version
  • FP-2H – A proposed naval version powered by the K-9 engine, but not adopted for service.

Operators

  • Kingdom of Yugoslavia – Used some 66 planes for pilot training.
  • SFR Yugoslavia – After the war used seven aircraft of this type. They were all captured at the Zmaj factory. These planes were designed for the NDH but never delivered on time.
  • NDH – A dozen aircraft of this type were delivered to the Air Force of the NDH in 1941 by the Germans. In 1944, another eight aircraft were delivered from the Zmaj factory in Zemun.
  • Italy – Used 13 captured planes from May 1941 to June 1943 against the rebels in Montenegro and Albania.
  • Germany – Captured smaller numbers of FP-2s but did not use them.
FP-2 Specifications
Wingspan 35 ft 5 in / 10.8 m
Length 25 ft  11 in /  7.9 m
Height 9 ft 6 in / 2.9 m
Wing Area 310 sq ft / 28.8 m²
Engine One Gnome-Rhone 7K, 7-cylinder radial, 313kW (420 hp) engine
Empty Weight 1.630  lbs / 740 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 3.170 lbs / 1,450 kg
Maximum Speed 148 mph / 238 km/h 
Cruise speed:  124 mph / 200 km/h
Effective range 360 mi / 580 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 22,300 ft / 6,800 m 
Crew Two (Instructor and student)
Armament None

Gallery

Illustrations by Carpaticus

FP-2 in Croatian service during the Second World War
FP-2 in Italian Service – 39ª Squadriglia

Credits

  • Article by Marko P.
  • Edited by Stan L. and Ed J.
  • Illustrations by Carpaticus
  • Č. Janić i O. petrović (2011) Kratka Istorija Vazduhoplovstva U Srbiji, AEROKOMUNIKACIJE Beograd.
  • D.Babac (2008), Elitni Vidovi Jugoslovenske Vojske U Aprilskom Ratu, Publish.
  • Vojislav V. Mikić (2000) Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945, Vojno  istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije
  • Vojislav V. Mikić (1998) Italijanska Avijacija u Jugoslaviji 1941-1943, Vojno  istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije
  • B. Nadoveza and N. Đokić (2014), Odbrambena Privreda Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Metafizika Beograd.
  • T. Lisko and D. Čanak (1998), The Croatian Air Force In The WWII, Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, Zagreb
  • F. Vrtulek (2004) Ludbrežanin Inženjer Rudolf Fizir, Podravski Zbornik.  
  • http://www.vazduhoplovnetradicijesrbije.rs/index.php/istorija/229-fizir-fp-2

Heinkel He 114

Nazi flag Nazi Germany (1936)
Shipborne and coastal reconnaissance aircraft – 98~118 Built

The He 114 Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com

In the mid-thirties, the German Ministry of Aviation (Reichsluftfahrtministerium – RLM) tasked the Heinkel company with developing a replacement for the He 60 shipborne and reconnaissance aircraft. While Heinkel fulfilled the request by building the He 114, its overall performance was deemed insufficient for German standards.

History

During the early thirties, the He 60 was adopted for service as the main German shipborne and coastal reconnaissance aircraft. As it was considered outdated, in 1935, the RLM issued to Heinkel a request for a new shipborne and coastal reconnaissance aircraft that was to replace the He 60. The next year, two prototypes were completed. While it was originally planned to test these aircraft with the BMW 132 engine, due to lack of availability, this was not possible. The first prototype (with D-UBAM marking) made its maiden flight in September 1936. It was powered by a Daimler Benz DB-600A which gave out 900 hp. The test results of the first flight were disappointing, as it proved difficult to control on the water but also in the air. The second prototype, V2 (D-UGAT), powered by a 740 hp Jumo 210 E, made its first flight in December 1936. It was used to test the catapult launching capabilities of this aircraft. It had some modifications in comparison to the first prototype, like having a larger tail and redesigned floats. Despite some improvements, the catapult launch testings from the Gneisenau showed that the He 114 was not suited for this role.

Despite not having a promising start, further prototypes were ordered. The V3 (D-IDEG) prototype was powered by an 880 hp BMW 132 K (or D, depending on the source) engine. The floats were once again redesigned and the pilot had a better-glazed shield. This aircraft was tested in April 1937 with similar performance as previous versions.

V4 (D-IHDG) made its maiden test flight in August 1937. It had many modifications in order to improve its performance. The wing’s edges were redesigned, new floats were used and it was also fitted with machine gun armament. V5 (D-IQRS) had new improved floats which enabled it to take-off even from ice. While most sources mention only five prototypes, some note that there were two more. The V6 and V7 prototypes were tested with similar equipment and were armed with two machine guns, one firing through the propeller and the second mounted to the rear. Additional armament tested consisted of two 50 kg (110 lb) bombs.

A side view of the V4 prototype, during a test flight. Source www.warbirdphotographs.com

Technical characteristics

The He 114 was designed as a single-engine, all-metal, twin crew biplane aircraft. It had a monocoque oval-shaped fuselage design. It was powered by one BMW 132K 960 hp nine-cylinder radial engine. The fuel load consisted of 640 l.

The He 114 BMW 132K 960 hp nine-cylinder radial engine. Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com

Somewhat unusual for biplanes of the era, the lower wings were much smaller than the upper ones. They had a half-elliptical design and were thicker than the upper wings. The upper wing was connected to the fuselage by two ‘N’ shaped struts. There were also two ‘Y’ struts connecting the lower and the upper wings. The upper wing was constructed using three parts with two ailerons. The upper wing could, if needed, be folded to the rear. The landing gear consisted of two floats which could also act as auxiliary fuel storage tanks with 470 l each.

On later models, the floaters were used as auxiliary fuel tanks. Source www.warbirdphotographs.com

The crew consisted of the pilot and the rear positioned machine gunner/observer. The armament consisted of one MG 15 7.92 mm (0.31 in) machine gun placed to the rear. The ammunition load for this machine gun was 600 rounds. Additionally, there was an option to externally mount two 50 kg (110 lb) bombs.

Close up view of The He 114 pilot control table. Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com/luftwaffephotos

Further development

Despite being shown to have poor performance, a small production run was made by Heinkel. Some 10 (or 6 depending on the source) aircraft of the A-0 series, together with 33 of the A-1 series would be built. The only difference was the use of a larger rear tail design on the He 114A-1 series. The small number of He 114 built were given to various test units and flight schools, where its performance was often criticized by all. During its introduction to service, the much more promising Ar-196 was under development, but it would need some time until production was possible. As a temporary solution, the Luftwaffe officials decided not to retire the He 60 from service yet. Heinkel was informed that, due to the He 114’s overall poor performance, it would not be accepted for service and that it would be offered for export if anyone was interested. For this reason, Heinkel developed the He 114A-2 series. The He 114A-2 had a reinforced fuselage, floats that could be used as fuel storage tanks, and, additionally, it was modified to have catapult attach points. The He 114A-2, while tested, was not operated by the Luftwaffe, and it was used for the export market.

The following B-series (including B-1 and B-2) were actually just A-2 planes with some slight improvements, meant primarily for export. The history of the C-series is somewhat unclear, as it appears to be specially developed for Romania. It was much better armed, with either two 20 mm (0.78 in ) MG 151 cannons, two 13 mm (0.51 in) MG 131 heavy machine guns, or even two MG 17 7.92 mm (0.31 in) (the sources are not clear) placed inside the lower wings. Some sources also mention that additional machine guns were installed inside the engine compartment and could be fired through the propeller. Additionally, it appears that its fuselage was modified to be able to carry two additional 50 kg (110 lb) bombs. The rear positioned MG 15 was unchanged. This version also had a new Junkers type 3.5 m diameter propeller. The floaters were also slightly redesigned and it received smoke screen trovers. Additionally, to provide better stability while positioned near shore, a small anchor could be realized.

Operational use

Despite not being accepted by the Luftwaffe, due to the Kriegsmarine’s (German war navy) lack of sufficient seaplanes, some He 114 had to be used for this purpose. The distribution of the He 114 began in 1938 when the 1./Küstenfliegergruppe 506 was equipped with this aircraft. In 1939, it was 43equipped with the older He 60, as these proved to be better aircraft. Some German ships, like the Atlantis, Widder, and Pinguin, received these aircraft. During their use, the He 114 floater units proved to be prone to malfunctions. These were reported to be too fragile and could easily be broken down during take-off from the sea during bad weather.

While designed to be able to take-off from German ships, the He 114 construction was not strong enough and was prone to breakdowns with many aircraft being lost this way. Source /www.warbirdphotographs.com/luftwaffephotos
Despite intended as a replacement of the He 60 this was never implemented due to He 114 poor performance. Source www.warbirdphotographs.com/luftwaffephotos

A group of 12 He 114 C-1 aircraft that were to be sold to Romania were temporarily allocated to the 2nd Squadron of the 125th Reconnaissance Group (2/125 Aufkl.Sta.). These units operated in the area of Finland’s shore. When the Bv 138 became available in sufficient numbers, the He 114 C-1 was finally given to Romania.

Foreign use

While the He 114 failed to get any large production orders in Germany, it did see some export success. These included Denmark, Spain, Romania and Sweden. The B-series was sold, which was more or less a copy of the A-2 series.

In Danish service

The Danish use of the He 114 is not clear. Depending on the source, there are two versions. In the first, Denmark managed to buy 4 He 114 aircraft and even ordered more, but the German occupation stopped any further orders. In the second, while Denmark wanted to buy some He 114, nothing came of it, once again due to German occupation.

In Spanish service

During 1942, Spain obtained some 4 He 114s from the Germans. In Spanish service, these were known as HR-4. Despite their obsolescence and lack of spare parts, these would remain in use up to 1953.

Small numbers of He 114 were supplied to Spanish State during 1942. Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com

In Romanian service

Romania received a group of 12 He 114 in 1939. During the war, the number would be increased to 29 in total. These would be extensively used to patrol the Black Sea. At the end of the war, these were captured by the Soviets, who confiscated them. Some would be returned to Romania in 1947, which would continue to use them up to 1960, when they were scrapped.

The He 114 in Romanian Service.Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com/luftwaffephotos

In Swedish service

Sweden bought some 12 He 114 in March 1941. In Swedish service, these would be renamed to S-12. Despite being an unimpressive design and prone to malfunction, the Swedish used them extensively during the period of 1941 to 1942, with over 2054 flight missions. They would remain in service up to 1945, with six aircraft being lost in accidents.

One S-12 (as it was known in Sweden) of 12 in total was sold to Sweden. Source: www.warbirdphotographs.com/luftwaffephotos

Production

Despite its poor performance, Heinkel undertook a small production of the He 114. The number of produced aircraft ranges from 98 to 118 depending on the source.

  • He 114 Prototypes – Between 5 to 7 prototypes were built
  • He 114 A – Limited production series
  • He 114 B – Export version of the A-series
  • He 114 C – Slightly improved version with stronger armament

Operators

  • Germany – Small numbers of these aircraft were operated by the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, but their use was limited
  • Denmark – Possibly operated four He 114 before the German occupation
  • Spain – Bought four He 114, and operated them up to 1953
  • Sweden – Bought 12 He 114 in March 1941, which remained in use until 1945
  • Romania – Operated 29 He 114, with the last aircraft being scrapped in 1960

Surviving aircraft

While there are no complete surviving He 114s various parts and wrecks have been found over the years. Parts of one wreck were found in lake Siutghiol near Mamaia, on the Romanian Black Sea coast, in 2012. There is a possibility that the wreck of another lays in a lake near Alexeni as well.

Conclusion

The He 114 was an unsuccessful design that failed to gain any larger production orders in Germany. It had difficult controls both in the air and on the water. While it would see some limited service with the Luftwaffe, most would be sold abroad, where some were used up to the ’60s.

Specifications –  He 114A
Wingspan 44 ft 7 in / 13.6 m
Length 38 ft 2 in / 11.65 m
Height 17 ft 2 in / 5.23 m
Wing Area 455 ft² / 42.27 m²
Engine One BMW 132K 960 hp nine-cylinder radial engine
Empty Weight 5.070 lb / 2.300 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 8.090 lb / 3.760 kg
Fuel Capacity 640 liters
Climb Rate to 1 km In 4 minute 20 second
Maximum Speed 208 mph / 335 km/h
Range 572 mi / 920 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 16,075 ft / 4,900 m
Crew One pilot and one rear gunner
Armament
  • One rear-mounted 0.31 in (7.92 mm) machine gun
  • Two 110 lb (50 kg) bombs

Gallery

Illustrations by Ed Jackson

He 114C-1 1./SAGr.125 -Baltic Area 1941
He 114A-2 1.-KuFlGr-506 Devenow 1938
He 114A 1./SAGr.125 Baltic Area 1941
He 114B in Romanian Service Circa 1943

Sources

  • D. Nešić (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata Nemačka Beograd
  • M. Griehl (2012) X-Planes German Luftwaffe Prototypes 1930-1945, Frontline Book.
  • S. Lonescu and C. Craciunoi, He 114, Editura Modelism
  • Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage Aircraft Of The Luftwaffe 1935-1945, McFarland and Company.
  • Ferenc A. and P. Dancey (1998) German Aircraft Industry And Production 1933-1945. Airlife England.
    https://www.cugetliber.ro/stiri-eveniment-hidroavion-din-al-doilea-razboi-mondial-descoperit-in-lacul-tasaul-201060

Re.2000 “Héja”

Hungarian Flag Kingdom of Hungary (1939)
Fighter aircraft – Number used: 70 brought and 185 to 203 built under license

The Italian Re.2000 was known in Hungary as the Héja (Hawk). Source: -: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/273562-reggiane-re2000-falco-and-h%C3%A9ja-ii-hungarian-version/

Despite not being adopted by the Italian Air Force, the Re.2000 would see some export success. Hungary bought a production license and 70 new aircraft for its Air Force. These would be supplemented by locally produced planes, both of which would see action during the Second World War. In Hungarian service, the Re.2000 would be known under the ‘Héja’ (Hawk) nickname.

Hungarian-Italian cooperation

During 1939, Hungarian Air Force (Magyar Királyi Honvéd Légierő) military officials were concerned with the need of acquiring more modern aircraft designs. As, during the 1930s, Hungary was a regular customer of Italian aviation equipment and planes (like the Fiat CR.32, for example), it was logical for the Hungarian Air Force military officials to turn to Italy for the acquisition of new aircraft.

By the end of 1939, Hungary sent a military delegation to purchase 70 fighter and 70 bomber planes. The Italians presented a number of different designs to this delegation, which included the Re.2000, Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79, and Ca.135bis. After a demonstration, the Hungarians were satisfied with the Re.2000’s performance. On 27th December 1939, a contract for the purchase of 70 new aircraft of this type was signed. This contract also included weapons, spare parts, onboard equipment, and a small number of airframes. Radios were not bought, as the Hungarians planned to equip them with domestically built R-13 ones. In addition, a license for domestic production was also obtained. The domestic production of the Re.2000 was to be carried out by MAVAG (Magyar Állami Vas, Acél és Gépgyárak/ Hungarian State Iron and Steel Works). The Re.2000s built-in Hungary were to be powered by domestically produced W.M. (Weiss Manfred) K-14 engines. The Italians were to deliver the first specimens by 15th January 1940.

As there were delays with the shipment of the first planes, the Hungarian Air Force sent a new delegation in April 1940 to Italy to determine what the problem was. To their astonishment, only one Re.2000 had been completed by this time. The Reggiane factory could not produce more planes due to a constant lack of raw materials. This single plane was flown to Hungary in May 1940. In Hungarian service, the first Héja received the serial number V-401 or V.401 (the V stands for Vadász/fighter). The remaining Héjas supplied by the Italians received the serial numbers V-402 to 470.

By the end of 1940, only 7 Héjas had been delivered to Hungary. The slow delivery rate was due to the shortage of materials, but also due to the fact that the Italian Air Force confiscated 9 planes for their own use. These would later be replaced by 9 newly built aircraft. The sources are not clear when the last aircraft arrived in Hungary. According to Gianni C., this happened at the end of 1941, but according to George P., this was on 29th May 1943!

The name

As already mentioned, the Re.2000 was known in Hungary under the Héja nickname. The origin of this name can be traced back to the Italian name given to this plane, “Falco”. In some sources, possibly in order to distinguish between the Italian and Hungarian built planes, the first were marked as Héja I and those built-in Hungary as Héja II. This article will use these two designations (when the precise model is noted by sources) but, for the sake of simplicity, the Héja I will be simply called Héja.

In Hungary

As the first Italian built Héja planes began to arrive in Hungary, they were intended to be given to different pilot training schools. Immediately after the arrival of the Héjas, the Hungarians noted a number of technical or structural problems with these planes. A great issue was the poor state and design of the throttles. These faulty throttles caused a number of accidents, with one Héja being lost in a fire during a landing accident. This issue with the throttles, despite efforts from Hungarian engineers, could not be solved until the end of 1941. Other issues with the Héjas were the poor state of the machine guns, which often jammed during firing or were misaligned, the instability of the canopy panels, and the lower quality of the wing skin. All this caused the Hungarians to make many modifications to the Héja in order to put them into service.

The Hungarian Héja II

With the contract to purchase 70 new fighters, the Hungarians also bought a license for production. The production of new planes was to be done by MAVAG. In order to avoid being dependent on Italian engines and to lower the overall price of the Re.2000, the Hungarians decided to upgrade this fighter with a domestically built engine. The initially planned new engine was a radial 14-cylinder air-cooled WMK-14 giving out 950 hp (or 930 hp, depending on the source). This engine was, in fact, a license-built version of the Gnome-Rhône Mistral Major K 14. One WMK-14 engine was sent to Reggiane to be installed in a Re.2000 in order to see if this modification was possible, but also to test its performance. The Italians, on the other hand, were never interested in this idea and preferred to sell the Re.2000 with its original engine. Due to the low interest and slow production rate of the Re.2000, nothing came from the Hungarian proposal. For this reason, the Hungarians decided that MAVAG should make these modifications.

Side view of the Hungarian Héja II. Source: https://www.sas1946.com/main/index.php?topic=28944.0

In order to improve the potential flight performance of the plane, the Hungarian Ministry of Defence decided to use the stronger WMK-14B 1085 hp engine. For this reason, the manufacturer, Weiss Manfred, was to produce 329 new WMK-14B engines, of which 247 were to be used on Héja’s and the other 82 as spare engines.

The first plane to be powered with this engine was the Héja (V-401) supplied by the Italians. It was modified by MAVAG and then tested. The tests were successful and the order for 100 Héja II was given. The production was to be divided into two batches, a first one of 25 planes and a second with 75 planes after the first one was completed.

The Italians sent the needed documents for the production of the Re.2000 to Hungary in October 1940, which caused some delays for the Héja II production run. The first operational Héja II was built in June 1941 and was successfully tested the same month. By this time, the Hungarians also obtained a license production for the German Me-109 fighter. This plane was much better than the Héja II, but it was estimated that the production of Me-109s in any larger numbers could not be achieved until 1943. For this reason, it was decided to continue Héja II production as a temporary solution.

The preparations for the production of the first 25 Héja IIs began in November 1941. Despite the extra spare parts and airframes supplied by the Italians, the start of production could take place immediately. The reason for this was the lack of proper machine tools and production capacities of MAVAG, but also due to various testing and modifications. The second Héja (V-402) was reequipped with the stronger engine for testing purposes. It was flight tested at the Experimental Institute near Csepel. After a series of test flights, some modifications were required, like improving throttle controls and modifying the rear tailwheel.

Production of the Héja II began only in July 1942. Immediately at the start of production, problems with the Reggiane fuel tank seal were noted. The Hungarian engineers simply replaced it with 22 smaller 20-25 l fuel tanks. To their surprise, this modification actually improved the Héja II’s stability during flight, as it reduced fuel sloshing in the tank. The production of the first 25 planes (with the modified fuel tanks) was completed by October 1942. Before the start of the second series of 75 aircraft, an order for 100 additional Héja IIs was placed. The last Héja II would be built in early March 1944. Officially, the Héja II was accepted for service in late September 1942 by the Hungarian Air Force.

A Héja II (V-495) from the first batch was tested by test pilot Tibor T. in March of 1943. The production of the later series was slowed down due to difficulties with obtaining necessary parts from abroad (due to the Italian capitulation and the desperate state of the German economy). In addition, the WM factory was bombed in early April 1944. The factory was almost completely destroyed, with the loss of nearly all equipment and spare parts. For this reason, the Hungarians were forced to stop the production of the WMK-14 engine. WM was finally destroyed in another bombing raid in July 1944. For this reason, the production of a group of nearly 30 new Héja IIs could not be completed.

Technical characteristics

The Héja I was a regular Re 2000, the characteristics of which will not be repeated.
The Héja II was a low wing, metal construction, single-seat fighter plane. The fuselage consisted of a round frame covered with metal sheets held in place by using flush-riveting. The Héja II wings had a semi-elliptical design, with five spars covered with stress skin. The original Re.2000 fuel tanks, placed in the central part of the wing, were replaced with 22 smaller 20-25 l fuel tanks. The wings were equipped with fabric-covered Frise type ailerons. The rear tail had a metal construction with the controls covered with fabric.

The landing gear system was unusual. When it retracted backward, it rotated 90° before it fell into the wheel bays. For better landing, the landing gear was provided with hydraulic shock absorbers and pneumatic brakes. The smaller rear wheel was also retractable and could be steered if needed.
The Héja II was powered by one WMK-14B 1085 hp engine. With the stronger engine, the Héja II could achieve a maximum speed of 323 mph (520 km/h). A larger 10.5 ft (3.2 m) Weiss Manfred three-bladed and hydraulically controlled variable pitch propeller were used. Due to the installation of the new engine, the front fuselage design had to be changed and extended by 1.3 ft (40 cm). As the new engine had a somewhat smaller diameter, the pilot front field of view was increased. In addition, the engine cowling design was changed.

The pilot cockpit canopy opened to the rear and gave a good overall view of the surroundings. The Hungarian Héja II was not originally provided with the 0.3 in (8 mm) thick armor plate placed behind the pilot seat. The Hungarians tested domestically built ones, but the results of these tests are not clear. Most interior equipment, except the radio, was provided by the Italians.

The two 0.5 in (12.7 mm) Breda-SAFAT heavy machine guns were replaced with Hungarian Gebauer MGs of the same caliber. The Gebauer gun had a firing rate of 1000 rounds per minute. The ammunition for each machine gun was 300 rounds stored in a box magazine. With the installation of these machine guns, the upper part of the front fuselage had to be redesigned.

During the war

With the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Hungary, together with other Axis allies, joined this offensive. For the attack on the Soviet Union in early August 1941, the Hungarians dispatched the Independent Fighter Group, which consisted of two fighter squadrons equipped with CR.42 planes. The first Héja fighter squadron with seven (or six, depending on the source) planes was formed on 7th August 1941. It was stationed at Sutyska airfield near Vinnytsia, in Ukraine. A few days later, it was moved to Pervomayks and was put in a fighter escort role for Hungarian bombers. The first operational mission was to escort a group of Ca.135 bombers in attacking Nikolayev on the 11th of August. The first air victories were achieved in late August when three Héja fighters engaged a group of five Soviet I-16 fighters near Dniepropetrovsk. The Hungarian fighters managed to shoot down three I-16s with no losses. By the end of August, the Héja fighters had made in 151 sorties with five achieved victories. The Héja would see action on the Eastern front up to late October 1941, when they were recalled to Hungary. One aircraft was lost during the flight back to Hungary when it crashed somewhere over the Carpathian mountains. During its first year of service, the Héja’s were mostly used in bomber escort and occasional ground attack missions. As most of the Soviet Air Force was destroyed early on, there were few air encounters with enemy planes. In total, three Héja were lost, with one additional being damaged.

A side view of a column of three Héja II somewhere in Hungary. Source: https://www.sas1946.com/main/index.php?topic=28944.0
This Héja (V-409) was sent to the Eastern Front in the second half of 1941. Source: http://themodelingunderdog.blogspot.com/2011/04/training-hawk-mavag-heja-ii-in-service.html

In preparation for the new German campaign on the Eastern Front in 1942, the Hungarian Air Force formed the 1st Fighter Group. This Fighter Group had a Squadron equipped with 12 Héja fighter planes commanded by Colonel K Csukas. This Squadron was combat-ready by 5th July 1942. As there were cases of Germans mistaking the Héja for Soviets planes, one Héja and also a CR.42 were sent to several German airfields in order to familiarize German pilots with these planes. Initially, the Germans gave the Hungarian fighters the task of patrolling and escorting reconnaissance and bomber planes near the front. On 13th July, the Héjas were tasked with defending the ground forces concentrating for the attack on Soviet positions.
By the end of July 1942, a second unit equipped with 11 Héja was deployed to the front. Both Héja units were moved to Ilosvoskoye in early August. The first squadron was tasked with a bomber escort mission, while the second with a reconnaissance escort mission. The 1st Fighter Group was in really bad shape due to maintenance problems, with only four Héja being operational by the 8th of August. This forced the Hungarians to ask the Germans for fighter cover for their troops.

In early August 1942, the Héja fighters were hard-pressed to stop the increasing number of Soviet bombing raids into Axis lines. On 7th August, a Soviet IL-2 managed to shoot down a Héja fighter which crashed into the ground. On the same date, Héja fighters intercepted a group of three German He-111 bombers which were accidentally bombing Hungarian lines and managed to shoot down one.

On 20th August, while making a take-off from an airfield near Ilosvoskoye, István Horthy (son of Miklós Horthy) lost his life in an accident. Author Maurizio D. T. notes that the accident was possibly caused due to the installation of a 0.98 in (25 mm) thick armor plate behind the pilot seat. There are also claims that the plane was sabotaged by the Germans due the Miklós Horthy allegedly showing sympathy for the English people, but this is improbable. The Germans were in no position to sacrifice trained fighter pilots or planes. Horthy probably simply crashed due to a pilot error or miscalculation.

This is the plane piloted by István Horthy (the son of Miklós Horthy). It is easily distinguished by the small star and two revolver insignia painted on the front part of the fuselage. István Horthy was killed in an accident during take-off in late August 1942. Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/273562-reggiane-re2000-falco-and-h%C3%A9ja-ii-hungarian-version/

By late August, the 1st Fighter Group lost four planes either due to enemy action or accidents and six more were damaged but in a state that could be repaired. By the end of August, Héja pilots managed to shoot down five enemy aircraft, with three more in September. By October 1942, most Héja pilots were recalled to Hungary to begin training on the new Me-109 planes. The remaining 13 Héjas were used on the Eastern Front up to late December, with only six still being operational.

During the Soviet attack on Axis positions around Stalingrad, the Hungarians sent all available planes, including the few working Héja fighters, to stop these attacks. The following days, a pair of Héja fighters sent to escort German bombers were attacked by Soviet fighters but managed to escape. By 15th January, the Héja performed mostly escort missions. The surviving Héjas met their fate when they were destroyed by their crew in order to avoid being captured, as they could not make an escape due to the harsh Russian winter.

No improved Héja IIs were used on the Eastern Front, as these were kept in reserve. As a shipment of more advanced Me-109G arrived in Hungary from Germany in late 1943, the Héja was mostly used for training. But, due to the increase of Allied bombing runs, they were put into action for the defense of Hungary skies.

By March 1944, Germans sent forces to occupy Hungary, as there was information that Hungarian politicians were negotiating with the Soviets for an armistice. During this occupation, the Germans prevented any further work or training on the Héja II. In April, the Allies made major bombing raids against Hungarian factories. This affected the supply of new spare parts, but, despite this, a group of 30 newly built Héja II was tested in April.

This Héja II (serial number V-479) was used mostly for training, as it was obsolete by 1944 war standards. Source: http://themodelingunderdog.blogspot.com/2011/04/training-hawk-mavag-heja-ii-in-service.html

During the Allied Bombing raid by the 15th Air Force on Budapest (13th April 1944), the P-38 escort fighters were attacked by a group of Héja II fighters. During this engagement, one Héja II was damaged. Another group of 8 Héja II was sent to support the defense of Budapest. Four of these attacked Allied bombers but, due to heavy defensive fire, the attack had to be aborted. Two Héja II fighters were damaged and one had to make an emergency landing. The second group of four fighters failed to reach the bombers but ran into a group of P-47s. After a short engagement, one Héja II was shot down and one was damaged.

This was one of the Héja II (piloted by Ferenc Kass) which engaged Allied P-47s during the defense of Budapest in April 1944. Despite being hit several times, the pilot managed to escape and land it without any problems. Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/273562-reggiane-re2000-falco-and-h%C3%A9ja-ii-hungarian-version/
Rearview of Ferenc Kass’ Héja II fighter plane. The damaged rear tail is evident here. Source: http://themodelingunderdog.blogspot.com/2011/04/training-hawk-mavag-heja-ii-in-service.html

Due to the lack of spare parts, some 30 Héja II fighters could not be completed. The Hungarians tried to salvage any parts from damaged aircraft, but this was insufficient. In December 1944, there were six operational planes with the training unit ‘Puma’ Fighter Wing. The last Héja II was lost in early 1945 in an accident.

Héja wartime improvements and modifications

Based on the front line experience, in order to provide the pilots with better protection, the Hungarians asked the Italians for the design blueprints of the Re.2000 and Re.2001 0.3 in (8 mm) armored plates. The Re.2001 version was preferred, as it was much lighter at 110 lbs (50 kg), while the Re.2000 one was heavier, at 200 lbs (90 kg). The Italians, for some reason, did not agree to give these blueprints, so the Hungarians were forced to develop their own design. Author Maurizio D. T. mentions that a 0.98 in (25 mm) armor plate was added behind the pilot seat, which affected plane performance.
An additional fuel tank with 100 l was added into the fuselage in order to increase the operational range. It was equipped with a self-sealing coating in order to avoid any fuel leaks which could lead to a fire accident.

In the late part of the war, two planes were modified and equipped with dive brakes and bomb racks for 550 lbs (250 kg) or 1100 lbs (500 kg), in order to be tested for use as dive bombers. For further testing, one additional Héja II was modified for this. The tests appear to have been unsuccessful, as no production order followed for this modification.

By the end of 1942, there were plans to form a Night Fighter Squadron equipped with German radio equipment. As the promised equipment never arrived, no such unit was ever formed.

Production

The production of the first Héja II began in July 1942, with the first 25 completed by October 1942. Before the start of the second series of 75 aircraft, an order for 100 additional Héja IIs was placed. The last Héja II would be built in early March 1944. Depending on the sources used, the production numbers are different. The numbers go from 185, 192 to 203 planes. The difference in number may be caused by the fact that some sources include also the last 30 unfinished airframes.

  • Héja I – 70 planes were purchased from the Italians
  • Héja II – Hungarian built version
  • Prototypes
  • Héja II dive bomber – Three Héja IIs were modified for the role of dive bombers but were not accepted for service
  • Héja II night fighter – There were plans to use the Héja II as a night fighter but due to the lack of necessary equipment no plane was ever used in this role.

Conclusion

The Héja provided the Hungarians with a much needed modern fighter plane. While it did see service, it was never used in any larger numbers due to problems with the delivery of new planes from Italy. Even when the improved Héja II was produced in Hungary, it was also plagued with slow production and distribution to combat units. By the time the Héja II was built in larger numbers, it was already outdated by late-war standards.

Héja II Specifications

Wingspans 36 ft 1 in / 11 m
Length 26 ft 6 in / 8.4 m
Height 10 ft 4 in / 3.15 m
Wing Area 220 ft² / 20.4 m²
Engine One WMK-14B 1085 hp engine
Empty Weight 4560 lbs / 2.070 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 5550 lbs / 2,520 kg
Fuel Capacity 500 + 100 l
Climb to 6 km (19,700 ft) 6 minutes 10 seconds
Maximum Speed 323 mph / 520 km/h
Cruising speed 255 mph / 410 km/h
Range 560 mile / 900 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 25.700 ft / 8.140 m
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • Two 0.5 in (12.7 mm) heavy machine guns

Gallery

Heja, Illustration by Pavel Alexe

Heja II, Illustration by Pavel Alexe

Source

  • Nešić, D. (2008). Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Italija. Beograd
  • David M. (2006). The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
  • Maurizio D.T. (2002). Reggiane RE 2000 Falco, Heja, J.20, Instituto Bibliografico Napoleone
  • G. Punka (1994), Hungarian Air Force, Signal Publications
  • George P. Reggiane Fighters In Action. Signal Publication
  • Jonathan T. (1963) Italian Civil And Military Aircraft 1930-1945, Aero Publisher
  • Gianni C. (1966) The Reggiane Re.2000, Profile Publication Ltd.
  • John F.B. (1972) Caproni Reggiane Re 2001 Falco II, Re 2002 Ariete and Re 2005 Sagittario, Profile Publications
  • https://www.valka.cz/HUN-MAVAG-Heja-II-t6986

Re.2005 “Sagittario”

Kingdom of Italy flag Kingdom of Italy (1941)
Fighter Aircraft – 32 ~ 48 Built

The Re.2005 was one of the better and more modern Italian WWII fighter designs. It was developed by Reggiane in 1941. Due to the lack of DB.605 engines, the development and production process of the aircraft was too slow and, by the time of the Italian surrender to the Allies, less than 50 had been built.

Re. 2005 Source: Pinterest

History

Officine Meccaniche Reggiane SA (hailing from Reggio Emilia in Northern Italy) was a WWI era aircraft manufacturer. However, following the First World War, it was not involved in any large aircraft production or design work. Rather as a company, it focused primarily on the Rail and Agriculture sectors primarily building locomotives and agricultural equipment. Its production efforts only returned to aircraft during the thirties when Reggiane became a subsidiary of the much larger Caproni aircraft manufacturer, which was led by the well-known Engineer Gianni Caproni. Thanks to this, Reggiane was aided by Caproni with a larger and more qualified aircraft design department. Reggiane and Caproni were involved with several experimental pre-war designs, like the Ca.405 Procellaria and P.32bis version, in addition to their license production of the S.M.79.

By 1941, the Italian Air Force was in a very desperate state, as it lacked an effective fighter design that could engage the increasing Allied bombing actions against Italian cities. The only modern design, the Macchi C.202, could not be produced in sufficient numbers to make a difference. For this reason, the Italian Air Force initiated the development of the so-called Serie 5 fighter designs that would eventually lead to the Fiat G.55, Macchi C.205, and the Reggiane Re.2005.

One of the greatest problems that the Italian aircraft designers and manufacturers had was the lack of sufficiently strong engines. In 1938, the development of a 1200 hp Fiat A.38 engine began, but many problems appeared and the engine could not be produced in time nor in any great numbers. For this reason, the license for the production of the German DB.601 was obtained. The problem was that Alfa Romeo’s, the manufacturer of this licensed engine, production output of this engine was only around 50 to 60 per month. Due to the lack of an adequate engine, Italian General Francesco Pricolo proposed creating new designs using the German 1475 hp DB.605 engine, which was to be produced by Fiat from 1942 on. The first planes chosen to be equipped with this engine were the Re.2001 and C.202. On 23rd July 1941, a decision was made to save the entire production of the DB.601 engine for the C.202. In addition, around 1000 new DB.605 engines were ordered to be produced by Fiat. Reggiane officials, seeing a new business opportunity, devoted all their available resources in the development of the new Re.2005 model.

The name

In various sources, this plane is marked by different but similar designations. These include RE 2005, Re 2005, or Re.2005. This article has and will use the Re.2005 designation. In early January 1943, the Re.2005 received its ‘Sagittario’ (name of the Constellation Archer) nickname, which is very well known today.

Re.2005 beginnings

In order to design the future Re.2005, a team was chosen under the leadership of Giuseppe Maraschini. His team decided that, instead of simply improving earlier models, they would design and build a brand new aircraft prototype. Carryovers from previous vehicles included the wings, which were similar to previous models but were made of a single piece. The armament was increased to two 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine-guns and one 0.78 in (20 mm) cannon firing through the propeller hub, with two additional 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine guns to be placed in the wings. A new outward retracting landing gear was to be installed. The radiators were placed under the fuselage. The building of the wooden fuselage mock-up was completed by the end of October 1941. The wings were completed by early November 1941. Preparation for the construction of two working prototypes (MM.494 and 495) began soon after.

However, there were delays due to the lack of promised DB.605 engines, that were not ready for license production yet. There was also a possibility that all future produced DB.605 engines would be delivered to Fiat and Macchi designs only. Despite these setbacks, the work on an operational prototype continued and, in February 1942, the factory was visited by the High Technical-Military Inspectorate commission. This commission gave good remarks for the Re.2005 design but asked to move the wing-mounted machine guns into the fuselage. As this would cause many technical problems and delays, nothing was done on this matter and the machine guns remained in the wings. By this time, the required shipments containing the armament (Mauser 0.78 in/20 mm MG 151 cannons), canopies, and windscreens (same as on the MC.205) were yet to arrive, as there were constant delays.

Once completed, the first test flight of the MM.494 prototype was made on 9th (or 7th, depending on the source) May 1942. For the main test, pilot Major Tullio De Pranto was hired by Reggiane, for the payment of 140.000 lire. This flight lasted around 5 minutes and was without problems. The following day, Major De Pranto made another flight with the MM.494 prototype. At first, it was fine but then the landing gear mechanism on the right leg broke down, which forced the pilot to make an emergency landing. The prototype was damaged but repaired and the flight tests continued during June and July 1942. By this time, over 6 hours of flight were achieved. In late July, the plane was transported to the Guidonia test center for further testing. There, during dive testing, a maximum speed of some 560 mph (900 km/h) was achieved. But there were again problems with the landing gear and also with the cockpit design and, for these reasons, it was returned to Reggiane for modifications. During August, modifications on the cockpit were made, mostly on the design of glass surfaces and the length of the windscreen, which was considered to be too long for the pilot. In September, the flight tests continued, but there were some issues with the engine malfunctioning and the MM.494 pilot was forced to make an emergency landing. By late September, many pilots had the opportunity to fly on the Re.2005 prototype.

The first prototype, MM.494, in preparation for a series of test flights. Source: Pinterest

At the start of October 1942, the second prototype was moved to the Guidonia test center for testing. There, the problem with the landing gear persisted, in addition to problems with fuselage vibrations that were also noted. By the end of October, the Re.2005 was used in a mock fight with the Fiat G.55. During the firing of its 0.78 in (20 mm) cannons, there were ammunition feed problems. For these reasons, in combination with the previous notes, the MM.495 prototype was returned to Reggiane for further modifications. In late December 1942, an Air Force Commission was formed to examine the Re.2005 prototype overall flying performance, armament, production speed, etc. The Re.2005 was noted to be inferior to the MC.205 but better than the Fiat G.55. While the final decision was not clear, the development of the Re.2005 continued on.

 

The second MM.495 prototype stationed at Reggio Emilia. Source: http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/vvsregiaavions/regiaindex.html

The next step in Re.2005 testing was the addition of bomb loads. During these tests, no major problem was recorded, but the take-off run was increased by some 657 ft (200 m) due to the extra weight. While piloted by Captain Enzo Sant’andrea, instead of releasing the 1410 lb (640 kg) bomb, the release harness mechanism failed and the bomb remained stuck to the plane. He was forced to land with the bomb, but luckily it did not explode and the landing was successful. Various tests were carried out with the original German engine and equipment from April to June 1943.

The Re.2005 prototype was used to supplement a mixed unit in the defense of Rome on 27th May 1943. During this flight, the Re.2005 was piloted by Lieutenant Giorgio Berolaso. While no enemy aircraft were detected, he managed to test the main armament. He later wrote, “ … It was a terrific experience! Such was the recoil that I had the impression that the entire aircraft slowed down…”.

Reggiane fights for production orders

In January 1942. Italian Air Force Officials decided to adopt the Macchi C.202, C.205, and the Fiat G.55 for mass production. The fate of the Re.2005 was, for some time, uncertain. Only in August 1942 did Reggiane receive orders to prepare machine tooling for the possible production of the Re.2005. In October, Reggiane petitioned for the production of 16 Series-0 Re.2005 aircraft. This petition was accepted by Italian Air Force officials and an order for 16 Series-0 (MM.092343-092358) planes was placed in November. Engineer Roberto Longhi was tasked with the construction of the first Series-0 aircraft. As numerous modifications were required, he immediately began working to improve the Re.2005’s performance. The fuselage skin was reinforced, along with the wing spar caps, skins, and internal structure.

As Engineer Roberto Longhi was working to improve the Re.2005, a special Air Force committee rejected it for serial production. Instead, the Re.2005’s improved wings were to be applied to the Re.2002 to serve either as an advanced fighter or as a fighter-bomber. It was also proposed to reequip the Re.2005 with the weaker DB.601 due to a lack of DB.605 engines. For some time, there were fierce discussions between Reggiane officials and the Italian Air Force about the Re.2005. The Reggiane officials even managed to involve Benito Mussolini in this discussion. Eventually, Reggiane managed to obtain a production order for 100 Re.2005 in January 1943, with an additional 18 of the Series-0. In late January 1943, it was increased to 600 aircraft with a monthly production of 70. In order to achieve such high production orders, other manufacturers were to be included in Re.2005 production, like Breda, Caproni, and Aerfer. Eventually, an order for 1000 aircraft was sent with Reggiane, but these numbers were never achieved due to a lack of engines and the war ending for the Italians.

When the production began in early March 1943, it was decided that, from the 24th produced plane onward, bomb racks would be added and the planes were to be used solely as fighter-bomber aircraft.

Technical characteristics

The Re.2005 was designed as a single-engined, low wing, all-metal fighter plane. The fuselage was made using a reinforced sheet metal construction covered with an aluminum alloy skin. The fuselage around the cockpit was additionally strengthened in case of a crash landing.

The landing gear had a simpler design than previous Reggiane designs. It consisted of two outward retracting wheels which were operated hydraulically. The rear tail wheel retracted into the fuselage and was enclosed by two small metal doors. The rear tail wheel could also be steered by the pilot if needed.

To speed up and ease production, the wings were made of one semi-elliptical piece. The wings were made using light alloy materials. They consisted of three double ‘T’ shape spars connected with sheet metal ribs. The split flaps made of metal were extended to under the fuselage. The ailerons (Frise type) were made using a combination of fabric and light alloy materials.

The cockpit had a canopy that could be opened to the right side. For better pilot protection, his seat was made using an 8 mm steel plate. The cockpit was provided with standard Italian equipment, like an Allocchio-Bacchini 30 radio, San Giorgio reflector collimator, Patin telecompass, etc.

Close lock of the Re.2005 cockpit interior. Source: http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/vvsregiaavions/regiaindex.html

The engine used was the German Daimler Benz DB.605A-1 1.475 hp that was being produced under license in Italy as the R.A.1050 RC.58 Tifone (Typhoon). A Piaggio P.2001 three-bladed, mechanically controlled metal propeller was used. The engine was placed in a specially designed mount that was connected to the rest of the fuselage. The Re.2005 oil radiators and coolant were placed on the sides.

The total fuel load was 580 l (or 536 l, depending on the source) stored in four fuel tanks placed in the wings. Access to the fuel tanks was done by removing metal plate panels held in place by screws. Three additional external fuel tanks could be added if needed, one larger with 240 l under the fuselage and two 100 l tanks under the wings.

For Italian standards, the Re.2005 was heavily armed with German supplied cannons. Its armament consisted of one 0.78 in (20 mm) MG 151 cannon firing through the propeller center and two 0.45 in (12.7 mm) Breda SAFAT machine-guns were placed in the front fuselage. Depending on the availability, two 0.45 in or two 0.78 in cannons could be placed in the wings. The total ammunition load was 550-600 (for all three) rounds for the cannon and 700 rounds for the two machine guns. Different bomb load combinations were tested, with a maximum load under the fuselage of 1410 lb (640 kg) and 350 lb (160 kg) under each wing.

 

The center of the propeller has an opening for the internal 0.78 in (20 mm) MG 151 cannon. Source: http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/vvsregiaavions/regiaindex.html

In Operational service

Due to the small number built, the Re.2005 saw only a limited number of actions with the Italian Air Force. All surviving Re.2005 were captured by the Germans, who put them to use. The last operator was the Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana, which had only a few Re.2005, but if any were ever used operationally is not known. There were attempts to sell the Re.2005 to Sweden, but nothing came from this.

In Italian Service

The delivery of the Re.2005 to operational units was slow, maximally up to four planes per month. The first unit to be supplied with this aircraft was the 362° Squadriglia which was part of the XXII Gruppo Caccia commanded by Captain Germano La Ferla. The first prototype, MM.494, was given to this unit in early 1943. At the start of April 1943, a group of 20 Italian fighters attacked an Allied B-24 bomber formation and managed to shoot down two bombers. One kill was credited to Re.2005. On 10th April, another attack on an Allied bomber formation was made and the Re.2005 again managed to shoot down one bomber. The next day, two more B-24 were shot down at the cost of one Re.2005. The pilot managed to survive using a parachute. On 28th April, another attack was made by a group of four Re.2005, eleven Macchi C.202 and one French captured D.520. In this action, the Re.2005 pilots shot down two more bombers. By this time, it was apparent to the pilots that the Re.2005 was far superior to the C.200 and C.202. The greatest strength of the Re.2005 was its strong firepower of up to three 0.78 in (20 mm) cannons. From May to June, there were several more flights but without any success.

A group of four Re.2005 belonging to the 362° Squadriglia. Source: http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/vvsregiaavions/regiaindex.html

The 362° Squadriglia was moved to Latina in June 1943. By this time, the 362° Squadriglia had only 8 Re.2005 with 7 operational. On 25th June, this position was attacked by Allied aircraft and four fighters were damaged.

In early July 1943, the 362° Squadriglia, with around 8 Re.2005, was relocated to Sicily in an attempt to stop the Allied advance. In the following days, the Re.2005 managed to shoot down several British Spitfires with the loss of a few aircraft. With the inevitable Axis defeat in Sicily, the Re.2005 crews were moved to Italy. The last two operational Re.2005 were lost in an air raid on the positions of the 371° Squadriglia to which they were temporarily attached.

This Re.2005 (MM.092352) was part of the 362° Squadriglia defending Rome in June 1943. Source: Pinterest

In mid-July, the 362° Squadriglia was operated from Naples with newly supplied Re.2005. By 20th July, this unit had only six Re.2005 but, in the following days two, were lost during bad landings, including the second prototype. Other units were also supplied with the Re.2005 but, in most cases, they were supplied in very limited numbers, for example to 369° Squadriglia. Through August, there were several unsuccessful flight attempts against Allied aircraft. A number of Re.2005 were lost either to Allied action or to other circumstances. By early September, due to the Italian surrender, all available Re.2005 stationed in Naples were destroyed by their crews.

The maximum number of Re.2005 ever operated by 363° Squadriglia was around 9 operational planes. By the time of the Italian surrender, in total, 19 Re.2005 were supplied for operational use to front line pilots. During the period in which XXII Gruppo Caccia was equipped with the Re.2005, it claimed to have shot down some 24 enemy aircraft, with 17 more labeled as possible. In addition, 8 to 13 aircraft were reported to be damaged by this unit. The total losses of Re.2005 amounted to 12 planes, with the deaths of 3 pilots and 4 wounded. While in service, the Re.2005 landing gear proved to be problematic and thus the ground repair crews made several field modifications in order to solve this problem.

The Re.2005 had the best firepower of nearly all Italian fighter designs. With its three 0.78 in (20 mm) cannons, its pilots managed to shoot down many Allied planes during its short operational life. Source. Wiki

In German hands

After the Italian defeat, the Germans rushed to capture any available military equipment and factories they could find. This included the Reggiane factory, along with all surviving Re.2005 in September 1943. Once in German hands, 8 Re.2005 that were under construction were completed. The Germans seemed to be satisfied with its performance and allocated them to the Luftwaffe Luftdienst Kommando Italien in October 1943. At the start of 1944, two additional Re.2005 were completed and given to the Luftwaffe.

The Germans were impressed with the Re.2005’s performance and put to use any surviving aircraft they could find. Source: http://xoomer.virgilio.it/f5avipatches/re2005%20page.html

The use of the Re.2005 by Germans is somewhat confusing, as some authors suggest that they were used in defense of Berlin up to the war’s end ( like D. Mondey). Author M. Di Terlizzi mentions that the MM.495 prototype along with MM.096105 were sent to Germany for evaluation, but what their fate was is not known. Author G. Punka even writes that the second prototype was used in defense of Bucharest. Both cases seem highly unlikely if we take into account the cost of transport, lack of spare parts which would force it to operate close to the Reggiane factory, and the small numbers of captured planes. Even if the Re.2005 were repositioned to defend Berlin, they would have made no difference due to the small number built.
In an Allied bombing raid in March 1944, three Re.2005 were lost. From March to June 1944, three more were damaged, mostly due to accidents, and were returned to Reggiane for repair. By the end of July, five Re.2005 were still operational and used by the Fliger Ziel Staffel 20. This unit was active from June to December 1944. The final fate of the German-operated Re.2005 is not clear but, by the end of 1944, all were probably lost.

Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana

The Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana had two operational Re.2005 captured at Castiglione del Lago in October 1943. It is highly unlikely that they ever saw any operational service.

Offer to Sweden

In 1942, the Chief of the Caproni commercial company (Compagnia Commerciale) made an attempt to sell the license and 50 incomplete airframes to Sweden. His offer was based on the fact that Italy had sold older Re.2000 and that Sweden had obtained a license for the production of the German DB.605 engine. By the time the Air Ministry and Mussolini allowed this arrangement, in June 1943, it was too late and the whole deal was never achieved.

Proposals and modifications

During the Re.2005’s development process, there were few attempts to overcome the problem of the lack of an adequate engine. Other different modifications were also tested, but with little to no success.

Re.2005 SF/R

In late November 1942, there were proposals to mount an additional jet engine on the Re.2005 which could help it reach a speed up to 466 mph (750 km/h), at least in theory. Due to the extra weight of some 1000 lb (310 kg) and complications with the installation, no Re.2005 was ever fitted with this engine. This proposal is often marked by Re.2005 SF, after the names of the main proponents of this project, Marcello Sarracino and Antonio Ferri. It is also marked simply as Re.2005 R, Reazione (Reaction), by some sources.

Re.2005 wooden version

Luigi Nardi made a proposal to build the Re.2005 aircraft using mostly wood. This would make the production of Re.2005 cheaper. Nardi was involved in building the first wooden wings in March, following with a fuselage in June 1943. Reggiane officials hired Nardi in late 1942 ( officially in early 1943) and gave him a team of 39 men to complete a wooden model. Little to no progress was made by 1943 and, in the end, it appears that no working prototype was ever built.

Twin fuselage Re.2005 version

There was a paper proposal in late 1942 to build a twin-fuselage heavy fighter version of the Re.2005. It was to be powered by two DB.605 engines and the pilot was to be positioned in the left fuselage. This project remains on paper only and no mock-up or working model was ever built. In 1943, Nardi proposed a similar all-wood project, but nothing came of this. If these two projects were related, it is not known. It is unknown if this version received any official designation.

Re.2005 aircraft carrier version

Due to Reggiane’s experience with shipboard aircraft designs, the Re.2005 was chosen to be used for the Aquila aircraft carrier. No progress was ever made for this version and, in the end, nothing came from it.

Re.2004

Due to the lack of DB.605 engines and the priority given to the G.55 and C.205 aircraft, Italian Air Force officials proposed in late 1941 that Reggiane adopt another solution. This included the use of the new Isotta Fraschini Zeta 1.250 hp engine still in development. This new aircraft project was named Re.2004. The development process of the Re.2004 was slow and, by late June 1943, only two prototypes were ordered to be built. The main engine was never successfully completed nor used due to huge problems with the cooling system. It is likely that only wooden mock-ups were ever built of the Re.2004. Some authors, like John F.B, note that the Re.2004 was actually based on the Reggiane Re.2001 fighter design.

Re.2006

In March 1943, the Italians managed to obtain a number of German 1750 hp DB.603 engines. Immediately, there were plans to equip the existing fighter designs with this engine, including the Re.2005. In May 1943, the Italian Air Force ordered Reggiane to construct two new prototypes (MM.540-541) using this engine. By the time of the Italian surrender, only one incomplete (or complete, depending on the source) prototype was built. After the Germans captured the Reggiane factory, they continued work on the Re.2006 by using some components taken from the Re.2005 (the fuselage). The work on it was never finished by the Germans. It was captured by the Allies, who showed no interest in it, and the incomplete Re.2006 was scrapped in April 1946.

Production

Despite promising performance and an official production order for more than 740 aircraft, only small numbers were actually ever built. The number of production aircraft depends on the sources: According to author Christ C. 37 were built, while D. Mondey and Nešić, D claim 48 being built.
Author John F.B. gives information that 2 prototypes, 16 Series-0 and 18 pre-production aircraft were built, in total 36. Author Gregory A. notes that, by September 1943, 32 Re.2005 were built. These include 2 prototypes, 29 Series-0 and a single Series-I aircraft. He also notes that an additional one was under construction but never finished.

  • Re.2005 Prototype – two prototypes (MM.494 and 495) built
  • Re.2005 Series-0 – 16 to 29 were built and used for testing and in combat.
  • Re.2005 Series-I – 1 to 18 built with some structural modifications.

Proposals and modifications

  • Re.2005 SF – Proposed version equipped with an extra jet engine, none built.
  • Re.2005 wooden version – Proposed version to be built using wood, only limited progress made.
  • Twin fuselage Re.2005 – Paper project only.
  • Re.2005 carrier version – Proposed version to be used on the Aquila aircraft carrier, no prototype was ever built.
  • Re.2004 – Experimental fighter project equipped with the Isotta Fraschini Zeta 1.250 hp engine, possibly only a mock-up built.
  • Re.2006 – Proposed fighter plane powered with Daimler Benz DB 603 and to be built using Re.2005 components, only one incomplete model built.

Operators
Italian Regia Aeronautica – Operated less than 22 aircraft during the war.
Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana – Operated two Re.2005.
Germany – Rebuild 10 Re.2005 which were used by the Luftwaffe.
Sweden – There were proposals to negotiate a deal with Sweden for license production. Nothing came from this.

Surviving Re.2005

One Re.2005 captured in Sicily was allegedly put on display in the American National Aircraft Show in November 1946. There is little to no evidence that proves that this ever happened. Today, only a part of a Re.2005 is the rear fuselage and tail of  MM.092352362-2,  restored by GAVS Milan. It can be seen at the Gianni Caproni Museum of Aeronautics near Milan.

Conclusion

While the Re.2005 had the potential to be a good fighter design, its development process was plagued by the lack of engines, problems with vibrations, and the indifference of the Italian Air Force officials. While it was used in combat, it was built in small numbers and too late to have any influence on the war.

Re.2005 Specifications

Wingspans 36 ft 1 in / 11 m
Length 28 ft 7 in / 8,7 m
Height 10 ft 4 in / 3.15 m
Wing Area 220 ft² / 20.4 m²
Engine One Fiat R.A.1050 RC.58 12-cylinder 1475 hp engine
Empty Weight 5732 lbs / 2.600 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight 7.960 lbs / 3.610 kg
Fuel Capacity 580 + 440 l
Climb to 8 km (19,700 ft) 7 minutes 50 seconds
Maximum Speed 390 mph / 630 km/h
Cruising speed 319 mph / 515 km/h
Range 776 mile / 1.250 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 39.370 ft / 12,000 m
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • Three 0.78 in (20 mm) cannons and two 0.5 in (12.7 mm) heavy machine guns
  • One 1,410 lb (630 kg) bomb, and two 252 lb (160 kg)

Gallery

Re. 2005, Illustration by Pavel Alexe

Source:

  • D. Nešić. (2008). Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Italija. Beograd.
  • D. Mondey (2006). The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books.
  • G. Punka, Reggiane Fighters In Action. Signal Publication.
  • J. W. Thomson (1963) Italian Civil And Military Aircraft 1930-1945, Aero Publisher
  • G. Alegi. (2001) Reggiane RE 2005, SATE Zingonia.
  • M. Di Terlizzi (2001) Reggiane RE 2005 Sagittario, IBN Editore
  • John F.B. (1972) Caproni Reggiane Re 2001 Falco II, Re 2002 Ariete and Re 2005
  • Sagittario, Profile Publications
  • N. Sgarlato (1979) Italian Aircraft OF World War II, Squadron Signal Publication.
  • C. Dunning (1998) Courage Alone The Italian Air Force 1940-1943, Hikoki Publication