The Sopwith Salamander was a dedicated ground attack aircraft, at this point known as a trench fighter, designed for use by the Royal Air Force in the First World War. The Salamander was based off of the Sopwith Snipe fighter and reused many components, but was much more armed and armored. Only a few Salamanders would be assigned to squadrons for testing during the war and none would see frontline combat. After the war, the Salamander was in service with squadrons in British territory until at least 1922. The aircraft was interesting as, in addition to its other modifications, it would be one of the first aircraft to be officially painted by the RAF in camouflage, most likely being the first in RAF aircraft to do so.
The Trench Fighter: Birth of the Ground Attacker
Late into the First World War, the British Royal Air Force began using single-engine fighters to deliberately attack enemy trenches. This was seen at the Battle of Ypres and Cambrai in 1917. Oftentimes, the types used for this role could not perform well enough to dogfight or had some other glaring issue that prevented them from seeing widespread service. Although not their original purpose, these “Trench Fighters” were the first evolutionary step to creating what is now known as dedicated ground attack and close air support aircraft. The Sopwith Aviation Company began experimenting with dedicated, purpose-built trench fighters in 1918. The first of these was a derivative design based on their famous Sopwith Camel fighter. The T.F.1 Camel, TF standing for Trench Fighter, was a modified Sopwith F.1 Camel that had additional armor and was to be used to strafe trenches with a machine gun or bombs. Despite work being done on the T.F.1, it was only considered as a test for a trench fighting aircraft and was never meant to enter service nor production.
Instead, the Royal Air Force was looking for an aircraft with a more powerful engine, which the Camel airframe could not accommodate. Sopwith looked instead to their recently developed Snipe fighter. The Sopwith Snipe aircraft had been designed in late 1917 as a successor to the esteemed Sopwith Camel. It would not enter widespread service until September of 1918 and would only see combat for three months before the end of the war. Despite its short combat service, the Snipe proved itself as one of the most advanced fighters of the time, thanks to its powerful engine and excellent maneuverability. All of this had yet to be proven, however, when the trench fighter derivative design was being drawn up, as the Snipe had only just started testing in late 1917.
Official work began on the trench fighter Snipe in January of 1918. This machine was seen to have several advantages over the TF1. The newer design of the Snipe proved to be much more agile and it was able to carry the powerful 230 hp Bentley BR2 rotary engine. There were three factors that sought to specialize the design of this new aircraft; engine, armor and armament. A rotary engine was favored over an inline on the aircraft because an armored cowling could easily fit over the engine and was thus less likely to be hit from ground fire. For armament, it was planned to have a single forward facing Vickers machine gun with two more in a downward firing position, akin to the armament of the TF1. This idea was ultimately scrapped and two forward facing Vickers were chosen instead, like the armament on the Snipe. Relating to the armor, the front section of the fuselage was made to be a heavily armored box that would protect the pilot and engine from enemy fire. It was optimistically thought only three things would be able to shoot this new aircraft down; a direct hit from anti-air artillery, damage to the flying wires or heavily damaging the main spar. Three prototypes of the new trench fighter aircraft began construction in late January 1918. The first of these would be airworthy and ready in April. By now, the aircraft had received an official name; the Sopwith T.F.2 Salamander.
Design
The Sopwith T.F.2 Salamander was an early ground attack aircraft based on the Sopwith Snipe fighter. The two aircraft shared many components, but the Salamander would have a number of features that would make its design unique. It had a wingspan of 19ft 6in (9.5 m). The wings were of two bay construction and consisted of a frame covered in canvas. The fuselage was of all wooden construction and covered in fabric, like the Snipe. It had a length of 19ft 6in (5.9 m). In total, the aircraft had a height of 9ft 4in (2.8 m). The sides of the fuselage were flat, being a change from the rounder fuselage of the Snipe.
In the front of the aircraft would sit the 230-hp Bentley B.R.2 air-cooled radial engine. The eleven-cylinder Clerget 11E engine was an alternative to the Bentley, but no Salamander would be equipped with this engine. The engine and cockpit section of the aircraft would sit in an armored box that would protect its most vital assets. The armored box was 8 mm thick in the front (the armor over the engine and the engine itself also factored in as frontal protection), 6 mm for the sides, 11 mm for the floor, and 10-gauge sheet metal with an additional 6-gauge sheet at the rear. In addition to the armored box, the engine would have an armored cowling over it. The aircraft had around 650 Ibs of armor in total. The sheer amount of armor was meant to protect the aircraft from German anti-armor rounds fired from short range, something it would no doubt deal with at the frontlines.
The controls and cockpit were likely carried over from the Snipe. Behind the cockpit was an armored head fairing that was not present on the Snipe. This detail is a distinct visual difference that one can use to identify the Salamander over the Snipe. Beneath the cockpit was the undercarriage and landing gear. During testing, it was found the armor made the aircraft quite hard to land, and the landing gear was further reinforced during development to assist in this area. The fuselage would taper towards the rear and tailplane. Beneath the tail was a simple landing skid. The tail and rudder were small at first on the prototype Salamanders, like on earlier Snipes, but this would be replaced by a larger rudder and tailfin on the production versions. At first, the tailplane was rigged via wires but this was replaced by four steel tubes connecting at the top and bottom.
For fuel, the Salamander would carry less than the Snipe to accommodate the extra weight of the armor. The fuel delivery system was composed of a Badin vacuum-feed system with a Weyman hand pump connected to the main petrol tank for standby use. The fuel delivery system was protected with armor and rubber along the piping to prevent leaks or fire. In addition to the main petrol tank, there was an oil and gravity tank connected via piping.
The armament of the Salamander went through a number of iterations before its final layout. Originally, the aircraft was going to have a single forward facing Lewis machine gun, with two more facing downwards into the hull, but this was replaced by two synchronized Vickers guns that were staggered to house more ammunition (1000 rounds each). There exist other known layouts pf the Salamander but it is unknown if any of these were tested at any point. These included eight downward firing guns in one layout and two downward facing Lewis guns with two more over the center (in addition to the standard two Vickers). No photos of these two layouts exist. For special missions, the Salamander could carry up to four 20 Ib (9 kg) bombs or a single 112 Ib (51 kg) bomb.
The Sopwith Salamander: World War Woes
The Salamander would have its first flight on April 27th at Brooklands. The prototype Salamander, E5429, shared the wing mainplane, ailerons and tail control surfaces with the early model Snipe, but these would be improved later on the production models. The improvements were the same as done on the Snipe, which included increasing the size of the rudder. On May 9th, the first Salamander prototype was sent to France for service testing. There is a strange overlap in information with the prototype. Some sources claim that it returned to England on June 30th for further testing at Martlesham Heath, but others claim the prototype was lost to a crash in France on May 19th. Perhaps this was confused with the 3rd prototype, which did crash at a later unknown date. By this point, the other two prototypes were completed (E5430 and E5431). Testing found that the aircraft performed well, but problems appeared with the controls, which were found to be sluggish due to the extra armor.
The Salamander did have its fair share of critics, with several pilots being harsh towards the slower controls of the aircraft and some even finding the concept of an armored aircraft a waste of resources. Many of those who were strong critics of the aircraft criticized it as they did conventional fighters of the time, glossing over its specialized role of ground attack and arguing its armor would make it sluggish in a dogfight, when the aircraft was never intended to operate as a dogfighter. Originally, a plan for 6 prototypes was made but the last 3 were canceled. The 3rd prototype would stagger its machine guns to accommodate the increased amount of ammunition the Salamander had over the Snipe. This change would be present on all Salamanders going forward. With the aircraft performing well in testing, an initial order of 500 aircraft was requested in the early summer months of 1918. Sopwith would begin building production Salamanders at their factories, being constructed alongside the Snipe. In addition to Sopwith, several other aircraft manufacturers would begin constructing Salamanders as well; Air Navigation Co Ltd, National Aircraft Factory No.1, Palladium Autocars Ltd, Glendower Aircraft Co Ltd and Wolseley Motors Ltd. The production versions differed from the prototype Salamanders, having the larger tail fin and rudder as well as the ailerons from the production Snipes being fitted, as well as the staggered machine guns from the 3rd prototype.
As the year went on, production for the Salamander increased, as the order jumped from from 500, to 600 to 1400 by the war’s end. Producing the Salamander was found to be more difficult than the Snipe, thanks to its complicated wiring due to the extra steps of creating the armored cockpit area. Problems also began to be found with the armor, as the box was found to warp after some time and distort the frame. This was not a known problem at first, but it plagued many of the early production versions after the war. In October, production Salamanders began being painted in unique disruptive camouflage patterns. This practice started on the 3rd prototype. This would be one of the first times the RAF would officially camouflage paint aircraft, something that would eventually become a mainstay in the next World War. By early November, two Salamanders were sent over and stationed in France, with one being assigned to No 86 Squadron at Phalempin. No 86 Squadron had just been assigned as a dedicated ground attack unit when it arrived. Back in Britain, squadrons No 95 at Weyton, and No 157 at Upper Heyford were also reworked to be dedicated trench fighting squadrons and equipped with five Salamanders each. No 157 Squadron was scheduled to leave for the front on November 21st. With production rapidly increasing and the aircraft soon to be used at the front, all of this was suddenly brought to a halt when the Armistice was signed on November 11th.
Postwar Mediocrity
With the signing of the armistice, all plans to ship the Salamander-equipped squadrons to the front were canceled. Production was soon to be cut short as well, as the need for such a specialized aircraft disappeared. Gradually, the order of 1400 was decreased to a much smaller number. Sopwith and Glendower continued producing the Salamander until mid 1919, when total production was completely halted. The other companies mentioned before either stopped production entirely or produced only a few more Salamanders after the Armistice. The Salamander was prepared to be used in full force had the war continued into 1919, with an expected thirteen full Salamander squadrons stationed in France by May. There were expected delays with the production of the Bentley engine, so five of these squadrons were to be equipped with the aforementioned Clerget engines. The exact number of Salamanders produced varies from source to source. The most common number found is that 210 were produced in total, but other sources claim that the actual number is closer to 300. Others claim that almost 500 were built. None of these numbers can truly be confirmed but it is likely much more than the commonly thrown around 210.
Postwar, the Salamander did not find itself too popular, as many issues rose up with the design. The warping of the armor began to become a serious problem on early production Salamanders and it was also found the first 70 Salamanders built by Sopwith had upper wings from Snipes, which were not capable of supporting the heavier Salamander. All of these 70 aircraft were found to be extremely dangerous to fly and it took until December of 1918 for the problem to be realized and fixed. From what can be gathered, most of the production Salamanders were put into storage after the Armistice, with many being finished and immediately sent into storage. Flight testing of the type continued until 1920 despite all interest in the Salamander seemingly being lost in mid 1919.
In addition to the disruptive camo, there is mention of a Salamander being painted in a type of lozenge camo, similar to German aircraft schemes in the war, but no photos are known to exist. It was to be tested at Farnborough alongside the regular camo in July of 1919 but it was unlikely anything became of the tests. Despite the lack of interest, the Salamander did occupy a number of squadrons post war, however the details of where and when are sparse. The latest Salamanders mentioned in RAF service were a squadron stationed out of Egypt in 1922. This would have coincided with the Chanak Crisis against Turkey. A few Salamanders were sent to foreign nations for testing. An unknown Salamander was sent to France to be tested by the Section Technique de l’Aéronautique (Aeronautical Technical Section) in Villacoublay, France. Salamander F6533 was sent overseas to America for trials and testing by their Army Air Service. No further orders or Salamanders were made by America after this and the sole example was known to have been still at McCook Airfield as late as 1926. It is likely the warping issue happened with this particular aircraft, as beneath the cockpit “This machine is not to be flown.” was printed and was seen in photographs of the aircraft.
Many combat aircraft of the First World War found new life in the following years in the hands of private collectors or attending airshows for spectacular performances. The Salamander was unfortunately not one of these aircraft due to its specialized nature and slower performance compared to the fast aircraft that were featured in such displays. With the purpose of the aircraft now gone and with no future in sight, the Salamander was left to be forgotten as newer aircraft replaced it in squadrons and eventually all would be scrapped. None survive to this day.
Conclusion
The Salamander was one of the first British attempts to create a dedicated ground attack aircraft. In addition, it first tested camouflage patterns on RAF aircraft. Unfortunately, it came too late, if only by a few weeks, to be tested in combat. With the war over and the need for such an aircraft gone, the dream of the Salamander strafing enemy positions died and it fell into obscurity as the type was eventually completely scrapped. Had it entered combat, it would have encountered the same problems it did postwar, which would have left the aircraft prone to accidents of its own design and would have taken time to repair in the field. A strange, and perhaps sad, note is the Salamander was the last Sopwith aircraft to enter service with the RAF before the company became defunct in 1920.
Variants
Sopwith T.F.2 Salamander Prototypes – The first prototypes for the Salamander had many of the same features as the Snipe, including sharing the mainplane, unstaggered guns and the tailplane was supported by wires.
Sopwith T.F.2 Salamander Production – The production version of the Salamander had staggered guns, provisions for carrying bombs, and the tailplane was supported by four steel rods. The first 70 production aircraft accidentally were equipped with the upper wings of the Sopwith Snipe.
Operators
United Kingdom – The Sopwith Salamander was built as a dedicated Trench Fighter for the Royal Air Force, but hostilities would stop before it could be sent to the frontlines. After the war, most Salamanders would be put in storage, but a few would be sent abroad, such as to Egypt.
United States of America – A single T.F.2 Salamander (F6533) was sent to McCook Field for testing.
France – A single T.F.2 Salamander was sent to France for testing with the Section Technique de l’Aéronautique in Villacoublay, France.
Throughout the Second World War, the job of the interceptor would become ever more challenging. Their targets, mostly bombers and photo reconnaissance aircraft, would fly ever higher and faster thanks to new advancements in turbo and supercharging. With Germany under a state of permanent siege and surveillance by aircraft like the Boeing B-17 and De Havilland Mosquito, it was clear the Luftwaffe needed a specialized interceptor to effectively reach these high flying threats and the multitude of new fighters that were appearing in growing numbers. After several failed attempts to develop the Fw 190 into such an interceptor, Kurt Tank designed the Ta 152H. The short lived design incorporated all of the available developments in high altitude flight available to German aviation in an attempt to create the ultimate high altitude fighter.
High altitude threats and Interceptors
In the summer of 1941, the Mosquito was making its first reconnaissance sorties and becoming one of the gravest threats to German aerial defenses. Operating above 7km and capable of reaching speeds upwards of 560 km/h, the aircraft was almost untouchable after it had reached its destination. Once they had taken their photos, they turned for home and entered a shallow dive that allowed them to accelerate to speeds beyond those of pursuing fighters who were not already chasing them from a higher altitude. With such a small interception window, they were a chief concern to the Luftwaffe. Doubly so were the bomber variants of the aircraft, which raided targets all over North Western Europe.
The following year saw the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, their air force possessing some of the most capable high altitude aircraft at the time. Investments in engine turbocharging allowed them to field a number of bombers and fighters with exceptional high altitude performance. B-17’s were conducting regular operations above 7 km. At first, they undertook operations at significantly lower altitudes, never straying too far from their air bases in southern England, but it was becoming clear that they would soon pose a threat that the Luftwaffe was ill equipped to combat.
The only two fighters of consequence employed by the Luftwaffe, the Bf 109 and Fw 190, were effective low to medium altitude fighters. However, through 1942, both were operating with engine power restrictions, and supercharger related performance bottlenecks. While inferior alloys and lubricants were causing a variety of issues, that was less of a concern than the engines themselves not being designed for use at high altitudes. The Bf 109G’s DB 605A, with its variable single stage blower, provided a full throttle height of roughly 6.5 km, depending on the variant. The Fw 190’s BMW 801, with its significantly simpler, single stage, double speed supercharger, was even worse off. Its critical altitude was only roughly 6 km, leaving it, and the 109, distinctly lacking in power at the over 7.5km B-17’s often flew at. Above these altitudes, neither engine could maintain the manifold pressure needed for combat power, putting them at a distinct disadvantage in trying to catch the Mosquito, or fighting American high altitude fighters which were soon making forays into German airspace. As the USAAF began its strategic bombing campaign against Germany proper, there were deep concerns within the Luftwaffe about the battle they were soon to fight, and for which they were clearly technically unprepared for. Even more concerning was the fear that the RAF would soon be operating the Vickers Wellington V bomber, which was reportedly capable of operating at an almost untouchable altitude of 12 km. They never entered service, but were the impetus for the creation of a specialized high altitude fighter with the Höhenjäger program.
With these anxieties building, the RLM convened a conference on the development of high altitude fighters on May 20, 1942 at Messerschmitt’s plant in Augsburg. In addition to the high altitude British bomber, further concerns were spelled out over the recent study of the new Merlin 61 engine, which, with its two stage, two speed supercharger, promised to make the Spitfire and Mosquito even more challenging opponents at high altitude. Of particularly grave concern was that the German aviation industry could not simply follow the same development path as the Allies. The poor qualities of their available alloys and the inadequate supplies of high octane fuels meant that even, if they had a factory furnished with all the tools to manufacture an engine like the Merlin 61, they simply could not build or operate it with the materials at hand.
As such, they had to pursue less conventional means of improving performance. Messerchmitt proposed a redesign of a former naval fighter proposal for high altitude use. The Me 155 carrier based fighter design, with its very long wingspan, was proposed to be converted for high altitude use, the work being done mostly at the S.N.C.A.N plant in Paris. The design would later be taken up and heavily altered by Blohm & Voss, who went on to design the Bv 155, with turbochargers and GM-1 nitrous boosting. Neither design came to fruition. A secondary design, the Bf 109H, would involve stretching the wingspan of a Bf 109F, and later G, and installing the high altitude GM-1 engine boost system. Likewise, this design was not pursued. In the end, Messerschmitt would go on to design a mass production, high altitude variant of their standard Bf 109G with a pressurized cockpit and nitrous boosting. While it would prove fairly adequate for the time, it was held back by the need for GM-1, which was difficult to transport in large quantities without a pipeline.
Focke-Wulf would face an even greater challenge with their program. While their Fw 190 was proving to be among the best medium altitude fighters of the war, its short wingspan and outdated supercharger meant it would take a considerable effort to make a high altitude fighter out of it.
The Höhenflieger Fw 190
Focke-Wulf first pursued turbocharging to get their fighter to reach the adequate level of performance for the Höhenjäger project. Almost immediately, they ran into the issue that it was almost impossible to fit a suitable turbocharger into a Fw 190A, though an externally mounted, and almost completely unwieldy unit was suggested. The first serious effort came with the proposal for the Fw 190B fighter, or Höhenjäger 1, in August of 1942. The design would take the then in production Fw 190A-3, increase its wingspan from 10.5 to 12.4 meters (increasing its area from 18.3 to 20.3 m^2), and install a pressurized canopy. The engine was initially unmodified and nitrous boosting was not pursued, in the hope a suitable turbocharger would be developed. The prototype, Fw 190V-12, began testing, but was abandoned in favor of using older, pre-production Fw 190A-0 prototypes before moving on to pre-production. The Fw 190B-0 received the new BMW 801 D-2 and several other modifications going into the new A-5 fighter. It began testing in December of 1942, and despite some faults with the pressurized canopy, which were later corrected, the aircraft had considerably better high altitude handling than the original A model. All four of the A-0’s were converted, but the program showed little promise. Despite the effort, the improvements were not enough and the aircraft was still too slow at high altitude. It was clear that the aircraft needed a heavily modified, or entirely different engine, in order to attain the level of performance needed.
In parallel with the B-project, the decision was made to re-engine the aircraft with either the Junkers Jumo 213, or Daimler Benz’s DB 603. Both promised better high altitude performance over the BMW 801 along with a considerable overall increase in engine output. The DB 603 project would proceed with the designation Fw 190C, and the Jumo 213, Fw 190D. The first Fw 190C prototype, V13, had a DB 603 installed, with an annular radiator at the nose of the aircraft and its supercharger intake mounted between its two oil coolers, these modifications presenting a longer, but more streamlined profile. Little drag was added to the airframe with the modifications initially, but they would be forced to mount the supercharger scoop externally. The aircraft first flew in March of 1942, and overheating, along with general teething issues would be noted. Two more prototypes were converted, V15 and 16, receiving the longer wing from the B-project and GM-1 equipment. Turbocharging was also proposed, but not pursued until much later on. The program continued through May at a decent pace and they were achieving high speeds, one aircraft reaching 696 km/h at 6,950 m, but overheating and engine failure remained serious issues. Similar problems were likewise being experienced with the Jumo 213. The results, however, prompted Focke-Wulf to expand the program with six more prototypes, V13,15,16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, and 27 carrying the DB 603, and V22 and 23 using the Jumo 213. Despite the focus on the DB 603, the company was prepared to switch to the Jumo 213, which they could obtain a much larger supply of.
The final design for the Fw 190C featured the DB 603A with its supercharger intake mounted on the port engine cowling, with various provisions for an armament of MG 131 machineguns, MG 151/20, and MK 108 autocannons. Its highest tested speed was an impressive 722 km/h at 9 km, without armament or armor plates. Production was strongly considered, and then canceled. The DB 603, in its fighter configuration, was still proving troublesome, and V13 was written off after an engine failure forced the pilot to crash land. The engine itself had a comparatively small production run compared to the Jumo 213, and was being shared with a number of twin engine bombers and night fighters. As the older, and massive Jumo 211 production lines were transitioning to the more powerful Jumo 213, it was by far the better choice for a new mass production fighter.
The Fw 190D or ‘Dora’ project continued, though its development path did not lead to a mass produced, high altitude fighter. Rather, it became a project to facilitate getting the Jumo 213 into a fighter as fast as possible, as it was one of the few German engines capable of competing with Western Allied models in most areas. The only mass produced variant, the D-9, is often mislabeled as a high altitude fighter, though its engine was designed for low to medium altitude use. A small number of high altitude models, with the appropriate engines, were produced, but were nothing compared to the D-9’s production run of well over a thousand aircraft by the end of the war.
Shifting programs aside, Focke-Wulf would continue with the new Höhenjäger II project, now seeking to build a truly superb high altitude fighter by taking several of the Fw 190C prototypes and equipping them with Hirth TK 11 turbo-superchargers. With the Fw 190B improvements, the 2000 hp DB 603 S, and a pressurized cockpit, it was hoped that a number of exceptional high altitude fighters could be produced, even if they could never reach the production figures of the Dora. They attempted to solve the earlier issue with the unmanageable size of the turbosupercharger by installing it partially outside of the fuselage, with an air scoop at its front. V18 received the necessary modifications and flew in December of 1942, with serious cooling problems being noted. Further modifications were made after the first several flights, most notable being that a larger oil cooler was mounted, the tail was enlarged to improve high altitude control, and the next prototype, V30, was re-equipped with a four bladed Schwarz propellor. Their extreme high altitude performance was superior to the C, with the aircraft reaching a speed of 670 km/h at 11 km, though they were proving far more temperamental. Turbine and engine issues continued to cut test flights short, though more prototypes were constructed through early 1943, V29 to V33. However, turbine issues persisted, and the entire scoop set up was found to be aerodynamically poor, and the design was proving very disappointing in comparison to the fully recessed models in service with the USAAF. Its performance too was deemed inadequate, and the project was canceled.
Falling behind
Apart from expedient designs, like the GM-1 boosted Bf 109’s, German efforts to produce a high altitude fighter had largely stagnated during 1943, and by the beginning of 1944, they were at a distinct disadvantage. For the past two years, most of the aero engine industry was working hard to modify their existing models to run at their full power using the inferior materials and fuel that were available to them. Among the clearest problems this caused was with the Messerschmitt Bf 109 G, or ‘Gustav’ model, which was only finally cleared to run at its full combat power in the summer of 1943, almost two years after its introduction. Under such conditions, developing new engines was a mostly hopeless effort, and to make matters worse, Allied developments in this field were unfolding brilliantly. While Focke-Wulf and Messerschmitt had failed to deliver on their high altitude fighters, the RAF began to fully transition to the use of the two-stage Merlin in their Spitfires, while the even more powerful Griffin was in development. By the end of 1943, USAAF finally introduced the P-51B, using a licensed Packard Merlin engine, and the P-47 had seen significant performance improvements which gave it unparalleled performance above 9 km. The P-51 proved perhaps the most concerning, as it not only had the benefit of a significantly more advanced engine, but it had been designed with aerodynamic concepts that were not available to aircraft designers before the war. It was an altogether modern aircraft, whereas the German air force would remain dependent on modified versions of planes which had been flying before the war had begun. The Bf 109G had fallen behind its Western contemporaries in most areas of performance, while the Fw 190 still clung to a competitive edge in low to medium altitude engagements. At high altitudes, especially above 7.5 km, there were only a comparative handful of GM-1 boosted Bf 109G’s that could really challenge the Allies, and even then, not on equal terms.
Germany did not possess the materials needed for robust and reliable exhaust valves, bearings, or more efficient, high pressure, high temperature radiators like those on Western Allied planes. However, there were areas of hopeful improvement. Foremost was that, by the autumn of 1943, German engine manufacturers had developed nickel coatings for engine pistons to overcome corrosion problems, and had modified the DB 605’s oil scavenge system to allow it to run at its originally planned combat power. While they would not be able to produce engines as reliable as those in the service of the RAF and USAAF, it was clear that the performance disparity could be reduced. Just as crucially, improvements were being made in regards to radiator design, particularly the annular units which were being tested on the high altitude Focke-Wulf projects. The new AJA 180 on the Fw 190 series was both approaching the pressure and temperature tolerance of Allied models, and was very compact, allowing the Fw 190 to retain its aerodynamic sleekness even when it switched engines.
While Messerschmitt had already succeeded in producing an acceptable high altitude fighter in the GM-1 boosted Bf 109G, Focke-Wulf’s projects took a different turn. The high altitude Fw 190D project shifted focus to produce a medium altitude fighter, the Fw 190D-9, and another project would seek to build a successor to the Fw 190, the new plane being named Ta 153. The designation changed to reflect Kurt Tank’s role as the head designer at Focke-Wulf. With this new design, hopes for significant high altitude improvements were again stoked, but as had become clear by their earlier failures, such improvements could not come from any unfamiliar solutions or technically complex methods, like turbocharging.
The Successor
The Ta 153 was so designated as it was not a variant, but a successor to the original aircraft. It featured a new fuselage and wings and the occasionally troublesome electrically driven landing gear actuators were changed for hydraulically driven ones. Being almost entirely divorced from the Fw 190’s supply chain, it was thus denied for production in March of 1943, given the amount of labor and time it would take to set up tooling. A compromise model between the design and the Fw 190D was selected, designated the Ta 152.
There were several types planned, namely Ta 152 A,B,C and H. These were standard fighters, heavy fighters for use against bombers, fighter bombers, and a high altitude interceptor. The A and B were designed to use the Jumo 213A & E, respectively, the C the DB 603, and the H, the Jumo 213E. To avoid impacting the production of the Fw 190D, the high altitude model was the first to be developed. These planes featured a hydraulic landing gear system as opposed to the electric actuators on the Fw 190, an improved vertical stabilizer from the Fw 190C program, larger wings, and a half meter fuselage extension in the rear fuselage, with the ensuing redistribution of weight helping to correct for an issue with the aircraft’s center of gravity.
While it may seem odd that they were essentially pursuing two fighter designs to succeed the Fw 190A, the Luftwaffe was desperately looking for higher performance fighters. Hopes were placed on the new Jumo 213 in the Fw 190D, and the new DB 605D in the Bf 109K, to keep pace with the Allies. The Dora was an expedient solution which could use the same supply chain as the original fighter, and the Ta 152 would be a more thoroughly improved model which would be transitioned to once the Dora’s supply chain was well established. In any case, only the high altitude Ta 152 variant was pursued with any substantial amount of resources, given it would be assigned a mission the Bf 109K and Fw 190D models were not suitable for. Jets were, of course, also quite promising, but they were still an immature technology, and it was clear that the leap from pistons to turbines could not be made in 1944.
The new fighter would be designed with both high altitude and low altitude performance in mind. To meet this challenging requirement, both the GM-1 high altitude, and MW 50 low altitude engine boost systems were to be installed aboard the aircraft. Kurt Tank selected several of the old Fw 190C prototypes to be converted for the new program, these being V18, 29, 30, 32, and 33. V33 was the first to undergo modification and was redesignated V33/U1, now featuring a three bladed VS 9 propeller, a forward fuselage lengthening of .5 meters, a rear fuselage lengthening of 0.772 m, a new high aspect wing with an area of 23.5m^2, a hydraulically actuated undercarriage, and two 20 mm MG 151/20’s mounted in the wing roots.
It first flew on July 13, 1944, and was lost after it crashed during its 36 minute test flight at Vechta. The second prototype, V30/U1, flew on August 6, and like the first, was again lost, though this time resulting in the death of its pilot, Alfted Thomas. More success was had with the third prototype, V29/U1, which flew on September 29, 1944, and the fourth, V18/U2, which flew shortly after. With pre-production beginning in November, this left them about a month to perform flight tests on their surviving prototypes. Serious trouble with the program was encountered as late as November, when test pilot Hans Sander had to crash land his aircraft after his engine seized due to fuel starvation. It was found a hydraulic valve had been installed in the fuel line, an accident most likely a result of the aircraft’s rushed development.
The losses and damages experienced at this point in testing were threatening to seriously interrupt the pace of the project, but in the end, they rushed through development with some of the stability issues unresolved. This effectively led to the aircraft entering production with only slight adjustments from the prototypes. However, the plane was achieving good high altitude performance, both in terms of speed and ceiling. Test pilot Friedrich Schnier would fly V29/U1 to an incredible height of 13.6 km on January 20th, 1945. Beyond this, the fourth and final converted aircraft was V32/U1, which was fitted with a four bladed Schwarz propeller and the new MG 213 revolver cannon. It first flew in January of 1945, though none of the equipment would be worked into any production aircraft.
The H was unique among the Ta 152 series, with its long, high aspect wings designed for high altitude use, a pressurized cockpit, and the installation of both the GM-1 high altitude, and MW 50 low altitude boost systems. While together, they promised incredible performance at any height, GM-1 was never carried aboard any of the operational fighters due to its container’s adverse effects on stability. Eager to have this aircraft as soon as possible, Focke-Wulf sprinted through its development, and the Ta 152H entered pre-production in November of 1944. The extremely rapid pace of development was emblematic of the very desperate situation the German air force was in at the time. This resulted in the delivery of an aircraft that was effectively unfinished.
The Ta 152H-0 entered service without several of the key features that the plane was set to carry, lacking the outer wing fuel tanks, and the engine boost systems. As such, it was considerably lighter, and better handling than the planned production model, but without the boost systems, it was much slower. For the time being it judged necessary, as there were serious weight distribution issues with wing fuel tanks and boost systems aboard. While it was designed with wing tanks, GM-1, and MW 50, the production model of the aircraft would not be permitted to fly with all three. In the end only the MW 50 and the wing tanks were permitted to be used together, but the GM-1 system would prove more troublesome. A stop gap solution late in the war would allow for the use of GM-1, but only GM-1. By the time the war ended, there was still no solution on how all three pieces of equipment would be added to the plane without jeopardizing its flying characteristics.
It was in this rough state when it was delivered to the Luftwaffe for testing in December. Due to supply chain issues, production was slow and the aircraft were finally delivered to the Luftwaffe until January 27, 1945.
Operational History
Given their very late introduction during the war, the Ta 152H saw very little action and its combat record is extremely limited. The aircraft was only supplied to the Stab, the squadron staff group, and Gruppe III of JG 301, a dual night and day fighter squadron which transitioned to them from Fw 190A-8’s on January 27. The squadron had a good pool of experienced pilots already familiar with Focke-Wulf aircraft, though their mechanics would have a far more difficult task, as the Ta 152H-0 had been pushed into service without maintenance manuals. At the airfield at Alteno, they received 11 aircraft, with 16 others having been destroyed or damaged on the ground before they could reach the unit. Familiarization and training proceeded until the end of February and was not without incident. One aircraft (150037) was lost in a training incident, a second damaged but repaired, and serviceability fell from 75% to 30% after an incident with water contaminating fuel supplies. The squadron would go on to receive several more aircraft before rebasing to Sachau when Alteno was overrun. They would attempt to engage Allied bombers on March 2, but the 12 Ta 152H’s would fail to reach them, as they were attacked by the Bf 109s of another squadron which mistook their unfamiliar planes for the enemy. No aircraft were lost in the engagement. A second high altitude interception against a DeHavilland Mosquito was also attempted, though engine trouble forced the pilot to return to base before contact was made.
The unit rebased again to Stendal near Erfurt, where they joined JG 301’s Gruppe II, during which one aircraft was lost, and the pilot, Jonny Wiegeshoff, was killed on the landing approach. This was believed to be the result of the propeller reduction gear failing and becoming stuck in an almost feathered position. By March 14th, the understrength unit was supplied with several Fw 190A-9s. Outnumbered and with little security, the Ta 152H’s often flew top cover for the rest of the unit during what few operations were undertaken. On April 10, Erfurt was contested, and during the fighting, the eight serviceable Ta 152’s engaged a flight of fifteen P-47’s near Brunswick, resulting in one victory claim.
Gruppe III’s last actions were conducted from Neustadt-Glewe. On April 15th, the unit suffered its first combat loss. During operations that day, four Ta 152s sortied to attack a pair of RAF Hawker Tempests engaging in a low level sweep. According to Obfw. Willi Reschke, the Ta 152H in the number two position, flown by Obfw. Sepp Sattler, suddenly lost control and crashed before contact was made, seemingly suffering a fatal malfunction, while other accounts claim he was brought down by one of the RAF Tempests. The remaining two Ta 152’s engaged the Tempests of No. 486 Squadron. In the ensuing battle, Obfw. Willi Reschke entered an intense, low level dogfight with one of the Tempests. Near the beginning of the engagement, he fired on and struck the tail of a Hawker Tempest flown by Lt. Mitchell, his gun’s electrical circuit seemingly failing shortly after. However, when Mitchel attempted to turn away from his opponent, he lost control of his damaged aircraft and crashed. Reschke swore by the low speed maneuverability of the Ta 152, which he felt was critical in this engagement, and his survival through the last days of the war. The Ta 152H flown by the Schwarm leader, Oberstleuteneant Fritz Auffhammer, suffered an engine failure, though the pilot successfully restored power and returned to base with his supercharger broken. Sattler and Mitchel were both buried at a cemetery in Neustadt-Glewe.
The last actions of the squadron were in the last stages of the Battle for Berlin, and on April 24th, the Ta 152s and Fw 190As of the IInd and IIIrd Gruppe attacked Soviet positions and engaged Yak 9’s. The final mission was flown over Berlin in poor conditions, and during an engagement with a flight of four Yak 9’s, Hauptman Hermann Stahl was killed during the engagement, with the four Yak-9’s being claimed by the unit. After the surrender, the unit rebased to Leck in Schleswig-Holstein, where they were disbanded and one of the serviceable Ta 152H’s was transferred to England by the RAF so that it could be evaluated. A second Ta 152H was also claimed by the USAAF for evaluation purposes, the plane being another H-0 which likely belonged to a testing unit at Rechlin.
In all, the Ta 152H was never actually used for any high altitude combat operations and its service was restricted to a single under strength unit. With at most ten victories and four operational losses, it is difficult to give any appraisal for its performance from its brief career with JG 301. Obfw. Josel Keil, was the only pilot to qualify as an ace on the Ta 152H, and together with Willi Reschke, who had two credits in the Ta 152H, and 24 in other aircraft, held nearly all of the aircraft’s combat credits between them.
Handling and Flying Characteristics
While the Ta 152H’s combat record leaves a lot of questions left unanswered, most pilots who had the chance to get behind the controls of the aircraft can at least agree that the aircraft flew very well. Among its most famous advocates was Royal Navy Test pilot Eric Brown. He would praise its excellent climb performance, maneuverability at high altitude, stability, and good landing characteristics. His only negative remarks were that its roll rate was reduced over the older Fw 190A, that its stick forces were notably heavier, and that its wheel brakes were still awful and prone to fade after a few moments of use. He otherwise considered it an excellent aircraft and the best high altitude piston engined fighter he had flown, comparing it favorably to a Spitfire Mk IXX. It must be noted that he misidentifies the aircraft as an H-1 in his book, and not the substantially lighter H-0, which is visually identical.
Captain Brown’s remarks are matched by those of the pilots who assessed the aircraft in the Stab and III/JG 301. The Ta 152H-0 had the best evaluation received by a front line operator of a Focke-Wulf aircraft. The aircraft possessed most of the best qualities of the earlier Fw 1,0D-9 without having its poor accelerated stall characteristics. While still described as uncomfortable like the Fw 190D it was so similar to, it was much improved and less prone to the aggressive snap rolling. So, while the aircraft was less maneuverable, generally speaking, most pilots were more comfortable pulling harder turns. In tests at the unit, some new pilots in Ta 152H’s were able to turn with seasoned pilots in Fw 190A’s. Take off runs were short, and the landing approach could be conducted at low speeds. Generally speaking, it was a fairly forgiving aircraft. The only negative notes on the aircraft were from the findings of the Rechlin Test Center, which found the aircraft became seriously unstable in dives exceeding 600 km/h and that level flight required excessive trimming of the horizontal stabilizer.
The stick forces were notably fairly high, but they were harmonized well, and the push rod control system ensured inputs were very responsive. Stability about the vertical axis was poor, and there was a tendency to skid. This tendency grew worse at higher altitudes and motivated them to install a level flight autopilot. The aircraft possessed good visibility to the back, sides, and rear, with the view over the nose being mediocre to poor. The controls were placed conveniently, with the instrument panel layout being clean and easy to read.
Most of its good qualities were not found in the fully equipped H-1 production model of the aircraft. Numerous problems were encountered when the full set of engine boosting equipment and fuel tanks were installed and filled. The added weight of the boost systems and wing tanks was substantial, and asymmetric. The GM-1 system and the wing tanks were particularly problematic, and the aircraft was unstable if the GM-1 container and fuel tanks were filled. Stability with the GM-1 system was only possible with a ballast kit, empty wing tanks, the removal of the MW 50 system, and a set fuel limit for the rear fuselage fuel tank. These issues were not resolved by the time the war ended, and there was no way the aircraft could use any combination of these systems without seriously jeopardizing its flying characteristics. MW 50 was usable aboard only the H-1 production model, but it may not have been available to JG 301 in the field. The squadron was still mostly composed of BMW 801 equipped Fw 190A’s which did not use the system.
Mechanics generally found the aircraft easier to maintain than the Fw 190, however there were some issues. The new hydraulic system for the landing gear was experiencing teething and quality control issues. The position of the landing gear wheel well was also found to be at issue, as when launching from damp conditions, the propeller cast mud and water into the well, which made its way inside the wing. This caused issues with the hydraulic systems and the autocannons fitted in the wing root.
Comparisons with contemporary fighters
Aircraft (manifold pressure)
Speed at Sea Level (km/h)
Speed 3050 m (10,000 ft) (km/h)
Speed 6096 m (20,000 ft) (km/h)
Speed 9144 m (30,000 ft) (km/h)
Speed 9.5 km (31,168 ft) (km/h)
Ta 152H-1 (1.92 ata)
580
640
690
725
732
Fw 190D-9 (1.82 ata)
611
645
689
653
645
P-51B-15 (75″ Hg)
616
675
709
688
685
P-47N-5-RE (72″ Hg)
587
643
708
740
759
P-47M (72” Hg)
587
646
701
753
762
P-38L (60” Hg)
550
608
646
663
659
Spitfire Mk 21 (+21 lbs)
592
658
700
704
703
Me 262 A-1a
800
x
870
845
x
*The Ta 152H-1 could reach a maximum speed of 760 km/h at 12.5 km using the GM-1 boost system. While it was never cleared for operational use, on paper, it made the Ta 152H the fastest fighter at that altitude. The Fw 190D-9 represents a late model, having received an MW 50 boost system, as was available near the end of 1944.
The Ta 152 entered service on a battlefield where the Western Allies already had high altitude supremacy, and had a number of improved designs that had yet to make their debuts by the time the war in Europe was ending. By January of 1945, the German air force was no longer dealing just with long range escort fighters over its own soil, but virtually every fighter the Allies could throw at it, such as P-47’s, Spitfires of several marks, La-7’s, and Tempests, just to name a few.
Against its contemporary Fw 190D-9 counterpart, it is clear that the Ta 152H did not represent a comprehensive upgrade. The Dora shared much of the same fuselage, though it retained the wings and tail sections of the older Anton series fighter, and it carried the Jumo 213A engine designed for use at lower altitudes. In regards to linear speed and acceleration below 6 km, the Dora roughly matched or exceeded the Ta 152H. This, however, was not the case at higher altitudes, where the high altitude specializations of the fighter showed their worth. The Ta 152H was known to be more maneuverable in flat turns and much more forgiving in most aggressive maneuvers, a result of its high aspect ratio wings which lacked the less than ideal tendency for snap rolling without much warning that the older Fw 190’s were known for. In a dive, the Dora was notably superior, as the aforementioned wings of the Ta 152H made it notably unstable at high speed. The H-1 carried, but was not cleared to use GM-1, nor does it seem they would have ever been supplied with the mixture. This is a discrepancy of several hundred kilograms, leaving the true climb performance of the aircraft somewhat ambiguous, with a claimed 20 m/s at sea level without MW 50.
The P-51B’s and D’s had marginal differences in performance They were among the most aerodynamically clean fighters of the war, boasting an extremely streamlined fuselage, laminar flow wings, and a radiator scoop which produced thrust that offset upwards of 90% of its own drag. To increase maneuverability in high speeds and in power dives, the control surfaces were internally sealed and used a diaphragm to reduce stick forces. The engine was a Packard Merlin V-1650-7 with an intercooled, two stage, two speed supercharger. Even though the engine was actually geared for lower altitude use than its predecessor, the combination of these features made the aircraft a very fast, maneuverable fighter which could boast of high performance at most altitude ranges.
Against the Ta 152H-1, the Mustang held to a higher top speed at low to medium altitude, better maneuverability at high speed, and far better dive performance. At extreme altitudes, the H-1 outstripped the Mustang in top speed, and across most altitudes would have had better low speed maneuverability. The high aspect ratio wings of the Ta 152 both gave it better handling at high altitude, and much improved stall characteristics over its predecessors down low. Curiously enough, both the Ta 152H and the Mustang were far more maneuverable than their wing loading would suggest, a result of high aspect ratio and laminar flow wing designs, respectively. However, in the Ta 152’s case, this came at the cost of a slower roll rate, and unstable high speed dive characteristics. While the Ta 152H could prove an exceptionally challenging high altitude opponent to all of the contemporary Allied fighters, it was a competitive, but not particularly impressive aircraft at lower altitudes. Performance wise, it could be said to fly like a more maneuverable, if slower, Fw 190D when at lower altitudes.
There is of course the story of Kurt Tank himself escaping a pair of P-51’s at low altitude in a Ta 152 prototype. Near the end of 1944, the designer himself was flying one of the prototypes to a conference in Cottbus, Germany, where he was happened upon by two P-51’s. Using the MW 50 boost system in the aircraft, Tank slipped away from his pursuers and arrived in Cottbus unscathed. Some laud this encounter a sign of the aircraft’s superiority, however, it is not a useful measure of the performance of any of the combat models of the aircraft. At Kurt Tank’s instruction, the prototype in question was unarmed and, more than likely, carrying no armor plate, which would have made the aircraft substantially lighter than any operational Ta 152H fighter.
The Spitfire Mk 21 represented the final evolution of the wartime Spitfire, by then nearing its tenth year in the air. A far echo from the Mk I, the 21 featured a vastly more powerful Griffin 61 engine. Much like its late Merlin powered predecessors, it possessed an intercooled, two stage, two speed supercharger. Unlike them, it was massive and much more powerful. After incorporating structural improvements and modifying controls for high speed, the Spitfire aged perhaps the best of any fighter of the war. Compared to the Ta 152H, it lacked the sheer distance in top speed performance of the P-51, but more than challenged the Focke-Wulf in linear speed and climb rate across most altitudes. However, at and above 7 km, the 152H had a confident advantage in speed and maneuverability.
Compared to the most modern Allied high altitude fighters, the Ta 152H lost most of its edge. The P-47N and M represented the final evolution of the American high altitude fighter, featuring a new 2800 hp, R-2800 turbocharged engine, and a variety of aerodynamic improvements to increase control at high speed. By the late Summer of 1944, the Western Allies had already gained air superiority over Europe, and so the new aircraft was stockpiled in the US for use in the Pacific, with the first deliveries being made in September of 1944. There was a similar performing model in Europe, the P-47M, though it was a limited production aircraft designed for chasing V-1 flying bombs and other high speed targets. Teething issues would keep it from entering service roughly until the Ta-125H did, in March of 1945. In the end though, the Luftwaffe had become so degraded that clearly no new updated models would be required and the performance increases would not justify the effort to refamiliarize pilots and maintenance personnel.
In terms of top speed, the P-47M&N handily outperformed the Ta 152H at all altitudes, the only exception being at extremely high altitudes when the Ta 152H employed GM-1. In contrast, the Focke-Wulf enjoyed a better climb rate and was likely the more maneuverable of the two, although it was certainly less capable in a dive. The late war Thunderbolts were certainly the fastest high altitude fighter which saw combat, the Ta 152H’s of JG 301 never having carried GM-1.
The P-38L was the last fighter variant of the Lightning fighter, the first model having been in service prior to the US entry to the war. With its turbo supercharged Allison engines, it was among the first fighters of the war that was designed for high altitude use. However, by the end of the war, it left something to be desired in terms of both its top speed, and like the Ta-152H, its high speed dive performance. Its low critical Mach number meant that the plane encountered compressibility at lower speeds than all of the fighters presented here. At high speeds and altitudes, the plane locked up and would remain uncontrollable until its high speed breaks were deployed, or it had descended into lower, denser air. Of all the Allied high altitude fighters, the Lightning compared fairly unfavorably with the Focke Wulf.
Most easily glossed over is the performance compared to jet fighters, which by the time the Ta 152H was introduced, could not exactly be called new. The Messerschmitt 262 had re-entered service in November of 1944 after earlier operational problems, and once training and maintenance programs were revised, the plane quickly proved itself. While it was slow to accelerate and climb, it was unapproachable in terms of top speed. Extreme high altitude use of the temperamental Jumo 004 turbojet engine was limited, though as a means of attacking high altitude formations of Allied bombers, it was by far the best equipped aircraft Germany possessed. Its slow acceleration meant that any energy-demanding maneuvers were largely off the table, but when flown by a pilot that understood its strengths, the plane was untouchable save for when it was taking off or landing. Though largely an issue post war, the Me 262 demonstrated the difficulty in justifying further piston engine fighter development at this point in aircraft development.
Overall, the Ta 152H certainly was not a Wunderwaffe by any means. At all but the highest altitudes, the aircraft was not a particularly better performer than its preceding, and much more numerous, Fw 190D counterpart. Even at extreme altitudes, it more than had competition in the form of the Thunderbolt N and M, which not only outstripped it in performance in a number of areas, but beat it into production by several months. It’s only truly exceptional performance was achieved using a high altitude engine boost system that was never made available to the unit carrying the aircraft, and in any case, it would have required a redesign of the aircraft to be used properly. Nevertheless, it represented a stark improvement in high altitude performance over previous German fighters. It too, could boast of extreme maneuverability at high altitudes, even if it didn’t lead the pack in pure speed. Top speed aside, its wings lent it a great degree of maneuverability at high altitude, and its overall performance at and above the altitudes Allied bombers flew at was considerable. This is also to say nothing of its trio of cannons; two 20mm MG151/20’s and its single 30mm MK108, which leant it incredible striking power. While the incorporation of the Jumo 213E, MW 50, and on paper, GM-1, did not produce the pinnacle of fighter design, the result was still a capable high altitude interceptor capable of engaging the highest flying targets of its day.
Construction
The construction of the Ta 152H’s fuselage was essentially that of a modified Fw 190A-8. The fuselage was largely the same with the following modifications: the forward fuselage was lengthened by 0.772 m in order to fit in a Mk 108 autocannon, the wing connecting section was moved forward 0.420 m to correct for the center of gravity, and the rear fuselage was lengthened by 0.5 m. The leading edge of the tail was exchanged for that on the Fw 190C, being considerably larger. Given the deteriorating situation near the end of the war, the new tail surfaces were wood, rather than metal skinned. The fin and rudder were enlarged for better control, with the new surface area of the tail stabilizers measuring 1.77 m2 for the vertical and 2.82 m2 for the horizontal. The changes to the fuselage necessitated strengthening, which saw some duralumin framing elements replaced with steel. In order to reduce the number of assembly jigs they needed to produce, the forward fuselage extension was bolted through the former engine attachment points.
The Ta 152H-1 featured all the tanks pictured here, the preproduction H-0 had only those in the fuselage. (Deutchesluftwaffe.de)
The wings were entirely redesigned from the Anton and changed to a high aspect model which increased the wingspan to 14.4 m, and to an area of 23.3 m2. Structurally, it remained a monocoque structure, but its rear spar and leading edge were used to absorb transverse forces and it was structurally reinforced with additional stiffening ribs. The landing gear were the same as the Fw 190A-8’s, but they were hydraulically and not electrically operated. They mounted 740 mm by 210 mm wheels to accommodate the increased weight of the aircraft. The inboard section of the wing mounted an MG 151/20 autocannon with provisions for 175 rounds of ammunition each.
The aircraft possessed a pressurized canopy to reduce the physiological stresses of high altitude flight. It was a very rudimentary system, with the cockpit rivets being sealed with DHK 8800 paste, and the sliding hood being sealed by means of a cylindrical rubber tube liner. Pressurization was regulated by means of a 1 liter air bottle supplied by a Knorr 300/10 air compressor which was geared to the engine with no intermediate gearing. The system was engaged at 8 km and maintained a constant .36 atmospheres. To prevent windscreen fogging, it was double-paned, with silica packets installed in the gap. Quality control issues saw varying effectiveness at altitude. On the record setting flight, Friedrich Schnier reported the system leaked badly above 12 km and shortly after he suffered joint pain, impaired vision, and numbness in his extremities due to low air pressure.
The Ta 152H carried an armament of two MG 151/20 20 mm cannons in each wing root and a centerline MK 108 30 mm cannon which fired through the propeller hub. The 20 mm guns were supplied with 175 rounds per gun, and the 30 mm with 90. The gunsight was the standard Revi 16b sight, which was eventually supposed to be replaced by the new EZ 42 gyroscopic sight which, when properly used, gave the pilot an accurate gunsight lead against his target. The aircraft was well armored with two engine plates, and six to protect the pilot, with a combined weight of 150 kg. The 8 mm plate behind the pilot was judged inadequate, though plans to increase its thickness to 15 mm were not carried out. A single hardpoint could be attached to the underside of the aircraft to install a 300 liter drop tank, but there were no provisions for carrying bombs.
The engine was a 35 liter Jumo 213E inverted V-12. Originally developed from the Jumo 211, which saw heavy use in bombers much earlier in the war, the new Jumo 213 was what most of the Luftwaffe’s hopes were placed on to compete with newer, more powerful Allied engines. It featured a new AJA 180 streamlined annular radiator that supported the oil and engine coolant. Critically, it was able to operate at significantly higher temperatures and pressures than older models, though not quite at the standards of the Western Allies. However, unlike Allied models, the Jumo was heavily automated. The Bediengerat, or control device, was a hydro-mechanical computer that managed the propeller RPM, mixture, supercharger speed, and radiator based on the pilot’s throttle inputs. This helped to relieve the pilot’s workload, as the Kommandogerat did on the BMW 801 powered models.
The Jumo 213E was the high altitude model which featured an intercooled, two stage, three speed supercharger. To further improve on high altitude performance, the aircraft would use a GM-1 nitrous boosting system. The system consisted of an 85 liter tank behind the pilot, and a crescent shaped liquid nitrous tank that sat at the right front side of the cockpit. The mixture was fed into the supercharger by a pump when the system was activated. As an oxygen carrier, the job of the nitrous is to provide an oxygen rich mixture to the engine when the supercharger is operating at altitudes where it is unable to provide the compression, and thus enough oxygen, needed to maintain a high manifold pressure. For the Jumo 213E, this was above 11 km. The drawbacks of the system were its uselessness below 11 km, and the bleed off of the evaporating liquid nitrous, which prevented it from being efficiently stored aboard the aircraft beyond several hours. Unlike its use on other aircraft, like Bf 109’s and Ju 88’s, the position of the nitrous tank aboard the Ta 152H proved dangerous, as it severely impacted the plane’s stability. It is unlikely the system would have been very effective without a major redesign of the fuel and mixture tanks, as even with a ballast kit that stabilized a GM-1 carrying plane, the aircraft could not carry anywhere near its full fuel load or its MW 50 boost system. While, on paper, the system promised unparalleled performance at extreme altitudes, it was almost unusable given its unstable configuration.
The MW 50 system was the low altitude boost system. It consisted of a 70 liter tank in the port wing containing MW 50, being roughly 49% methanol and 49% water, with the remainder being an anti corrosion measure. When active, the solution was pumped into the supercharger. The system was designed to boost engine power and overcome the less than ideal quality of German aviation fuels. Poor detonation characteristics, especially of the lower octane B4 fuels, forced the Germans to run at lower manifold pressures and thus lower power to avoid damaging their engines. Methanol boosted the octane rating of the fuel-air mixture entering the manifold, and the water cooled the mixture, with both factoring to bring major improvements in engine power via their combined anti-detonation, or knock, effects. The system made its debut in the summer of 1944, and was essential in allowing the later Bf 109G and Fw 190D series aircraft to stay competitive with their Allied counterparts. However, it was not without its drawbacks. It could not be used effectively above around 6 kilometers, and it was highly corrosive, severely limiting the lifespans of corrosion prone German engines. Aboard the Ta 152, it was to be installed in either a 70 liter wing tank or a standard 115 liter tank behind the pilot.
The engine had a bore and stroke of 150 mm and 165 mm, a compression ratio of 6.5:1, and a dry weight of 1040 kg. It differed from the standard model in that it had a slightly smaller bore, and the larger supercharger assembly and the associated intercooler added some 300 kg. It used B4 fuels which had a minimum octane rating of 87. The engine drove a constant speed 3.6 m VS 9 wooden propeller with a reduction gear of 1:2.40, and produced a maximum of 1753 PS (1729 hp) at sea level and 1260 PS (1242hp) at an altitude of 10.7 km. The oil header tank sat atop the front of the engine, and the coolant tank sat at the rear. On the Jumo 213A, these had a capacity of 55 and 115 liters respectively. The entire engine assembly was a Kraftei, or power-egg, consolidated unit, allowing the engine and its associated coolant systems to be easily removed or added to the aircraft.
Its radio and navigation systems included the FuG 16ZY ground control transceiver to allow it to be tracked and directed from ground based stations, a FuG 25A erstling IFF, and a FuG 125 radio direction finder for beacon homing. Some aircraft were also fitted with a K 23 level autopilot to reduce fatigue when flying the aircraft at high altitudes and in poor weather. The autopilot was accompanied with a heated windscreen and a FuG 125 Hermine radio navigation system as part of the R11 Rüstzustand equipment package.
Production of the Ta 152H
The Ta 152H was introduced in an environment where all quality control measures had already been cut down for every aspect of production. The lack of skilled labor and poor materials meant that building a reliable aircraft engine in Germany had become almost impossible by the spring of 1944. Slave labor and foreign, drafted workers had become the base of the labor pool, as most of Germany’s factory workers had been drafted to fight, resulting in a sharp decrease in quality. This was not only a result of poor working conditions and the inexperience of the workers, but sabotage became widespread, especially among those pulled to work from concentration camps. Even more desperate measures began to be instituted in the summer of 1944, as the re-use of parts from salvaged aircraft became more commonplace, and engine test runs were ever more limited to conserve dwindling fuel supplies.
The first Ta 152H-0 was completed in November of 1944 after considerable delays due to several sets of blueprints being found to be inaccurate, and sets of jigs had been lost in France the previous summer. The first planes were sent to the Rechlin test center in December of 1944, while Focke Wulf considered how to accelerate production. While doing so, they were hobbled when the Jagerstab, which managed strategic fighter production, shifted more and more resources to jet fighters and older, established piston engined fighters. Ta 152H production standards continued to decline in the midst of the widespread economic collapse of Germany. Near the end of January 1945, it became almost impossible to build any more Ta 152H’s, as the decentralized production system began to collapse, the rail system became unusable, and the wing and fuselage production center at Pozen was overrun by the Allies.
By the war’s end, approximately 60 Ta 152H fighters had been completed at the Focke Wulf facility at Cottbus. The series suffered extreme quality control issues in service with JG 301, which included supercharger surging and the failure of a propeller reduction unit, which resulted in the death of a pilot. In April of 1945, the plans were sold and shipped to Japan, where unsurprisingly, there was no new production of the aircraft.
Conclusion
The Ta 152H is often seen as one of the great ‘what if’s’ of the Luftwaffe, but in reality, the aircraft was a good, rather than truly exceptional fighter. While on paper, the Ta 152H was to be an incredible aircraft at high altitude, it’s rushed development, and hasty introduction into service saw it fly without the GM-1 boost system that it needed to achieve these feats, and in a rather regrettable state in terms of build quality. It stacked up well against many of the older aircraft in the theaters it fought in, like the Yak-9, Spitfire Mk IX, or the P-38L, and against its contemporary Allied rivals, it was a competitive fighter at high altitudes.
Specification:
Specification
Ta 152H-0
H-1
Engine
Junkers Jumo 213E
Junkers Jumo 213E
Engine Output
1753 PS, 2050 PS w/ MW50
1753 PS, 2050 PS w/ MW50
Empty Weight
4031 kg
Loaded Weight
4730 kg
5220 kg
Maximum Range
2000 km
Maximum Endurance
3.3 hrs
Maximum Speed [At altitude]
approximately 720 km/h [10.9 km]
760 km/h w/GM-1 [12.5 km]
Service Ceiling
15 km w/ GM-1 (estimated)
Armament
1×30 mm MK 108, 2×20 mm MG 151/20
same
Crew
1x pilot
same
Length
10.82 m
10.82 m
Wingspan
14.44 m
14.44 m
Wing Area
23.3 m^2
23.3 m^2
Height
3.38 m
3.38 m
Variants:
Ta 152H-0: Pre-production model, no wing fuel tanks, no MW 50 provisions, GM-1 capability but never cleared for operational use.
Ta 152H-0/R11: Poor weather pre-production series with level autopilot. Most pre-production aircraft were built in this configuration.
Ta 152H-1: Production model, wing fuel tanks, 85 liter GM-1 provisions but not supplied due to operational concerns. 70 liter MW 50 low pressure system installed. Fuel tankage increased from 595 liters to 995 liters with unprotected bag tanks in wings.
Ta 152H-1/R11: Poor weather model, autopilot. Most production aircraft were built in this configuration.
Ta 152H-1/R21: Equipped with Jumo 213EB intercooled engine, high pressure MW 50 system installed. Not operational.
Ta 152H-1/R31: Jumo 213EB, ballast kit to allow GM-1 use. No MW 50 and fuel capacity restricted. Not operational.
Ta 152H-2: FuG 15 radio set instead of FuG 16. Canceled in December 1944.
Ta 152H-2/R11: Bad Weather model.
Ta 152H-10: Photoreconnaissance model based on H-0.
Ta 152H-11: Photoreconnaissance model based on H-1.
Ta 152H-12: Photoreconnaissance model based on H-2.
Illustrations
Credits
Article written by Henry H.
Edited by Henry H. & Stan L.
Ported by Henry H.
Illustrated by Hansclaw
Sources:
Primary:
Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment Boscombe Down Spitfire F. Mk. 21 LA.187 (Griffon 61) Climb and Level Speed Trials. 10 October 1945.
Einmotorige Jäger: Leistungsdaten, 1.10.44
Ersatzteil-Liste TA 152. Konstruktionsgruppe 7 Triebwerksanlage. Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau G.M.B.H. Bremen.
Fighter Offensive Performance at Altitude Model P-47N-5RE Engine P&W R-2800-73 GP=45:1 Propeller-4 Blades- 13’0” DIA. (Curtis 836) War Emergency- 2800/2800 S.L. to Critical Altitude G.W.=13962 LBS. Republic Aviation Corporation. Farmingdale L.I., New York.
Horizontalgeschwindigkeit über der Flughöhe mit Sonderleistung. Leistungsvergleich Fw 190 – Ta 152. Focke-Wulfe Flugzeugbau G.M.B.H. 3.1.45
P-51B-15-NA 43-24777 (Packard Merlin V-1650-7) Performance Tests on P-38J, P-47D and P-51B Airplanes Tested with 44-1 Fuel.(GRADE 104/150). 15 May, 1944.
Smith F., M.A. and Brotherton J. Note on the performance in flight of the German jet-propelled aircraft Messerschmitt 262, Heinkel 162, and Arado 234. Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough. October 1945.
Secondary:
Brown, Eric Melrose. Wings of the Luftwaffe. Hikoki, 2010.
Douglas, Calum E. Secret Horsepower Race: Second World War Fighter Aircraft Engine Development on the Western Front. TEMPEST, 2020.
Green, William. The Warplanes of the Third Reich. Doubleday & Company. 1970.
Harmann, Dietmar. Focke-Wulf Ta 152 the Story of the Luftwaffe’s Late-war, High-Altitude Fighter. Schiffer Military History. 1999.
Smith, J. & Creek, Eddie. Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Vol. 3: 1944-1945. Specialty Pr Pub & Wholesalers. 2015.
Smith, J. & Creek, Eddie. Me 262 Volume Two. Crecy Publishing. 2007.
Weal, John. Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Aces of the Western Front. Osprey Publishing. 1996.
The end of the battle of Britain was the beginning of an escalating air war which would claim nearly all of Europe as its theater. While neither air force could be said to claim the Channel in its entirety, low level fighter sweeps, tactical bombing raids, and high level photoreconnisance efforts would be conducted with ever more sophisticated methods and technology over the coming years. High flying recon planes, in particular, would prove the most challenging to combat, as specialized aircraft, like the Ju 86p, began to appear alongside ever faster fighter planes equipped with cameras. With the air war quite literally being taken to new heights, it would take a considerable effort to modify existing fighter planes to enable them to deal with an enemy operating at extreme altitude. In Germany, such efforts would produce the high altitude, ‘odd numbered’ variants of the Bf 109G, which would incorporate nitrous boosting systems and pressurized cockpits to enable them to chase targets far above their unmodified counterparts.
No laughing matter
Prior to the Second World War, high altitude fighter development was a largely secondary issue, in comparison to the build up of aircraft geared for combat at low and medium altitude. The premier fighters of the battle of Britain, the Spitfire Mk I and the Bf 109E, both exemplified this, the latter possessing a single stage, two speed supercharger, and the former a single stage mechanically driven variable speed type. The performance of both aircraft declined considerably as the planes rose above six kilometers. After the battle of Britain, the once highly active theater of Western Europe became secondary to the battles waged in the Mediterranean and the East. The primary activities there soon became focused on intelligence gathering and nuisance raids; there was an escalating nightly strategic air war, however, it was largely dislocated from the efforts of both the RAF’s and Luftwaffe’s daylight forces.
In 1941, both sides would introduce two aircraft which would largely shape the high altitude mission, namely the Ju 86P and the DeHavilland Mosquito. Neither aircraft could be caught by the conventional models of either the Bf 109 or the Spitfire, and thus a race to design high altitude models of the fighters began. For the Germans, the process would be far more complicated, as the reduced supply of certain critical materials meant that the traditional methods of increasing performance were off the table. There was insufficient nickel for corrosion resistant exhaust valves, no tin for heavy duty bearings, and eventually, less cobalt and chromium for heat resistant alloys. On top of this, a transition to synthetic fuels would further complicate matters. While the Battle of Britain-era Bf 109E could boast of both good performance and reliability, its succeeding F model would be plagued by a number of issues, and its increased performance was accompanied with horrible mechanical reliability. In short, nickel poor exhaust valves corroded and failed and the untested C3 synthetic fuel degraded in rubber fuel tanks and escaped into the oil system. Fuel escaping into the oil system was common on most aircraft, but it often happened in small quantities that were subsequently boiled off. The droplets which failed to aerosolize in the DB 601N tended to be of a larger than normal volume, and combined with Daimler Benz engines running cooler than most, they often failed to boil off.
With the new model of Bf 109 in such a sorry state, any new major modification of the engine was forgone, and boosting high altitude performance would fall on some external system. However, the Germans already possessed and employed such a system the year before. GM-1, or Goering Mixture-1, was a nitrous oxide injection system which was used to boost the high altitude performance of a late and uncommon model of the previous aircraft, the Bf 109E-7NZ. The mixture worked as a means of delivering oxygen into the engine’s combustion cycle at altitudes where the supercharger’s boost could not supply the boost pressure to run the engine at emergency power. Additionally, the mixture had the added benefit of cooling the engine when the mixture was injected at a low temperature. Carried in bottles behind the pilot’s seat, the mixture would be pumped into the compressed air circulating in the supercharger, after which it entered the manifold. Even when the supercharger was failing to produce the compression needed, any decrease in the volume of oxygen would be offset by that which was being delivered by GM-1. However, the system was not without its disadvantages. Namely, it increased the weight of the aircraft and provided only a marginal increase in power at low to medium altitudes, where a supercharger had no difficulties in providing sufficient boost to the engine. In short, GM-1 was dead weight below an engine’s full throttle height and, thus, the system had no real place on board a general use fighter plane. Transporting the mixture was also an issue, as GM-1 had to be transported either by pipeline or refrigerated trucks, after which it was transferred to smaller bottles. As it was kept cool, it could not be kept aboard a grounded aircraft and was usually loaded aboard as part of its pre-flight preparations.
Its limitations aside, it was clear that GM-1 was the only means by which the Bf 109 could achieve the much needed high altitude performance.
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
The trouble with the Bf 109 F’s DB 601N engine would be solved mostly by the introduction of the DB 601E. The new engine switched the fuel source to the lower octane B4, its direct injection pumps were adjusted to prevent fuel drops from entering the oil system, and some of the more fragile components of the engine were redesigned. Prior to this, the Bf 109F ran at a reduced maximum output prior to the Spring of 1942. With the restriction rescinded, it was allowed for the maximum rated manifold pressure to rise from 1.3 ata to 1.42, and it could finally run at its intended, full emergency power.
The new engines were installed aboard the Bf 109F-3 and F-4, and were largely satisfactory, but the delay in achieving their full performance was considerable. The success of the new model DB 601E meant that high altitude developments could continue, and the first new model, after over a year, was the Bf 109F-4/Z. The engine was similar to the early DB 601N aboard the high altitude E-7Z, and delivered roughly the same level of performance, however, the structural and aerodynamic improvements of the F model allowed for better handling and maneuverability. Like the earlier E-7Z series high altitude fighter, there were no standardized provisions for photoreconnisance equipment. The GM-1 system too was improved and expanded on. The tanks were moved from behind the pilot into the wings, which increased the total to 100 kg. The mixture too was stored in a chilled, liquid state which increased its potential horsepower increase from +3 bhp per gram to +4.
It is difficult to ascertain the success these aircraft had, as no distinction was made between F-4 subtypes for kill claims. However, an F-4 of JG 1, a unit which did possess the high altitude variant, brought down a Mosquito at high altitude on August 19, 1942. Lieutenant Gerd Scheiger engaged Mosquito W4065 on a bombing raid to Bremen, at a height of 8.8 km. Given the extreme altitude of the engagement, it is very likely the aforementioned Bf 109 was a high altitude model.
The few Bf 109F-4Zs would serve on every front with considerable success, though access to GM-1 could be problematic across the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front. However, these troubles were nothing compared to the issues soon to arise with the aircraft’s successor. The Bf 109G series hoped to bring a much desired increase in performance with its DB 605A engine. Effectively developed by boring out the cylinders of the preceding DB 601E, its volume and compression ratios were increased considerably. Along with improvements to its supercharger, and built with a crankshaft able to handle higher RPMs, great hopes were placed on the engine. They were soon shattered. Almost as troublesome as the DB 601N, the engine faced a variety of harsh teething issues. Worst of all were its fragile, corrosion prone exhaust valves and an insufficient oil scavenge system made worse by a switch from ball to sleeve bearings. The series would not reach its potential for almost two years, as Daimler Benz worked through these issues. However, in perhaps the clearest example of the confusing and disjointed relationship between the Luftwaffe and its contractors, they failed to ensure a continuity in materials between the engines in its development branch and those being produced for the Luftwaffe. At an RLM meeting on May 19, 1942, it was revealed that the valves on the test engines had a nickel content of 14%, while those shipped to the Luftwaffe possessed only 8%. This, and similar discrepancies delayed effective testing for some time.
Regardless of the disasters brought on by the lower quality economy alloys, and the misadventures between the Luftwaffe and its contractors, development of the high altitude Bf 109 continued apace.
Under Pressure
The new supercharger on the Bf 109G was extremely promising, and was one of the only things that really worked when the aircraft was introduced. With it, a new high altitude model and standard fighter were produced. The G-1 and 2 were largely built along the same lines as the late F-4 series, with a series of improvements to its armor and instrumentation. The G series also incorporated a series of standardized, modular Rustsatz kits, which could represent anything from bomb racks to photographic equipment. However, these initial models brough little improvement, as they were soon prohibited from running above 1.3 ata in manifold pressure, or in other words, without an emergency power setting. However, the G-1 would prove fairly innovative thanks to a number of new features.
Of the two, the G-1 was the specialized high altitude model, which would include both the ability to carry the GM-1 system, and was equipped with a pressurized cockpit. The cockpit pressurization allowed for a pilot to remain at extremely high altitudes without encountering any of the discomfort one would otherwise experience. Without these aches, pains, and numbness, a pilot was far less likely to become fatigued after long flights at extreme altitudes. The cockpit pressurization system was rudimentary, and was kept pressurized by a compressor which drew from a small scoop left and forward of the pilot. Silica pellets were also installed in the canopy and windscreen to prevent fogging. The GM-1 system too was improved, being made modular and paired with a set of fuselage racks which allowed for the fitting of a reconnaissance camera. GM-1 would also be made available to all subsequent models of the Gustav, regardless of pressurization gear.
The first of these aircraft were built in May of 1942 at the Erla plant and were subsequently handed off for testing and familiarization with Luftwaffe crews. These planes were then used by the 11th staffel of JG 2, noted as their high altitude unit, and began operations on July 17. The unit was first based in St. Pol in the Netherlands and would be assigned to the area before later being redeployed to Germany, and then to the Mediterranean in November, and then transferred to JG 53 before the end of the year. JG 5 also received a number of the planes some weeks after JG 2, the unit being assigned to various bases in Western Europe until the end of the war. Beyond these combat units, the aircraft was operated by the training units Ergänzungs-Jagdgruppe West and JG 105.
In service, the aircraft performed well. In particular, the pressurized canopy was well regarded, and performed well enough to see its inclusion in several succeeding models of the aircraft. Curiously enough, the aircraft were not reserved exclusively for high altitude use and was instead used much like the standard version of the fighter. Their use as high altitude interceptors was more typical of the European squadrons, which had the benefit of better access to GM-1. Even then, G-1’s were still sortied to engage targets at all altitudes. Among the earliest victories came on July 11,1942, when Unterofficier Herbert Biermann engaged and downed a low level Mosquito which had attacked rail traffic near the Danish town of Tonder, after a raid on the U-boat pens in Flensburg. The plane had been damaged during the raid, which undoubtedly helped the pursuing Messerschmitt.
The Up Swing
In spite of the debacle that was getting the DB 605A into service, improvements were slowly being made. Experiments with face hardened, chrome plated exhaust valves would give way to a workable solution to corrosion, and combined with added oil throwers and a new oil centrifuge, would eventually allow the plane to run at its highest power setting. The restrictions would finally be released by August 1943, over a year after the aircraft first entered service.
At the beginning of the year, the Bf 109G-3 had superseded its predecessor. The aircraft’s largest difference, apart from its engine improvements, were its larger tires. Small bulges were added to the top of the wing to accommodate the enlarged landing gear, and the larger tail wheel was now non-retractable, adding a not inconsiderable amount of drag. These changes were made to give the aircraft better ground handling and allow it to better operate out of rough airfields in the Eastern Front and the Mediterranean.
Unlike the previous model, the G-3 saw increasing use against USAAF daylight bombing raids. The raids had started small in late 1942, often against targets nearest England. By the Summer and Autumn of 1943, the raids had escalated continuously and were increasingly focused on targets within Germany. By then, the major focus was on the so called ‘panacea’ targets, which numerous war planners thought could bring an early end to the fighting. Ball bearing and aircraft assembly plants received particular attention.
The bombers of the 8th Air Force often flew at extreme heights, with B-24’s averaging about 22,000 ft, and the lighter loaded B-17 at or above 25,000. Despite being above the altitude where most Luftwaffe fighters could not sustain emergency power, this advantage, and the heavy defensive armament of these bombers, did not translate into a sufficient defense against fighters. While the high altitude Bf 109G-3’s did have the edge, it was largely unnecessary, as the Luftwaffe only made massed attacks against the formations until after the bombers had passed over the Low Countries, where their fighter cover could not follow them. Thereafter, they were harassed by all manner of fighters, from light single-engined types, to night fighters pressed into daylight use.
In the case of the Bf 109, they followed Generalmajor Adolf Galland’s recommendation. The method involved attacking bomber formations at frontal angles in massed attacks using formations no smaller than the four plane schwarm. These attacks were conducted to help cope with the somewhat inadequate armament of the Bf 109, and to reduce the likelihood of being hit by the defensive gunners of the bomber. During a frontal attack, a bomber’s pilots and engines are the most vulnerable, which is quite important considering the single 20 mm aboard the Bf 109 was regarded as inadequate for bringing down a heavy bomber and thus needed to be directed toward these critical areas. Underwing gunpods were somewhat commonly fitted, though their impact on flight performance was considerable. The real breakthrough in anti-bomber weaponry came with the 30 mm Mk 108 autocannon, though its late introduction meant supplies were tight until mid 1944. The frontal attack also ensured the highest possible closure rate with the formation, making the small fighter a much more difficult target for any defensive gunner, and allowed the fighter to strike at the bomber’s engines and cockpit.
Large scale anti-bomber tactics employed early warning radar to track bombers during their ingress into German held airspace, and after they had passed the range limitations of their escorts, the Luftwaffe tracked the formation using trailing Ju 88’s and other long range aircraft. Fighter units would be massed over radio beacons until they received the order to attack and were vectored on to the bomber formations, where they could meet them in numbers. The height of their success was seen in Autumn of 1943, when USAAF planners were hoping to accelerate their progress on Operation Pointblank, seeking to cripple the German aviation industry. On August the 17th, the 8th Air Force prepared for its largest raid yet, with 376 B-17’s dispatched to attack the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt and a Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg. Both of these facilities were located deep within Germany and most of the journey would see the B-17’s outside the area where they could be escorted. To compensate for this, the flight over Regensburg would continue over the Alps and into Allied controlled Tunisia. It was hoped that flight over the Alps would prove easy, and in the case of the Schweinfurt force, they believed that the German fighter squadrons would still be on the ground refueling after their first attacks while the bombers made their return. Both waves would be met with disaster, as the Luftwaffe would hit both forces after their escort fighters turned for home, and the Luftwaffe fighters had taken to the air again as the Schweinfurt raiders made the return trip.
Of the 376 bombers to leave England, 60 would be shot down, 176 were damaged, and 30 remained in North Africa, where they awaited repairs at the overburdened facilities in Tunisia. Losses in combat and written off airframes amounted to 31% of the dispatched force; in contrast, the Germans lost only 28 fighters. In effect, the Luftwaffe was able to effectively deny large portions of their airspace to the raiders. A stalemate in the air ensued in the following months, with new challengers further shifting the balance of power next spring.
Wilde Sau
In addition to the typical daylight squadrons, several Bf 109G-3’s and 5’s were passed on to the single engine night fighter unit JG 300, its sister squadrons 301 and 302, NJG 11, and the first staffel of the 10th Night Combat division. The new G-5 was much the same as the 3, save for its 7.92 mm guns being swapped for 13 mm ones. Originally formed as an experimental unit in the spring of 1943, JG 300 was meant to test the suitability of single engine fighters for night interception use. The initial premise of the unit was to engage RAF bombers over their targets, where the light of the fires and searchlights would make the planes more visible against the ground and cloud cover, and thus enable interception without the use of ground control and onboard radar systems. The squadron saw mixed success and was expanded upon after the bombing of Hamburg, when the RAF succeeded in spoofing the shared frequency of Wurzburg ground based and Fug 202 airborne radar systems with chaff. The Luftwaffe would recover in the span of several weeks, though the attack made the idea of radar-less night fighting alluring.
The group was expanded upon with the 301st and 302nd squadrons being established. While the hope of transitioning daytime fighter squadrons to night use was deemed infeasible due to the amount of training required, the combined unit would continue its task, being joined by a staffel of the 10th Night Combat Division. The task of carrying out the interceptions over raided cities was an exceptionally dangerous one, as they shared the space with flak units, and by the end of the year, enemy night fighters.
There was also a transition away from the unguided wild boar tactics to ground directed interception in order to deal with high flying Mosquito pathfinders and bombers, which no Luftwaffe aircraft could effectively catch until the Me 262B provisional night fighter was introduced. In this role, the single engine night fighter would be directed into a fixed ‘Himmelbett’ intercept zone which covered either the approach, or departure path of the detected enemy aircraft. There, the target would be tracked by the Himmelbett zone’s dedicated radar and searchlight units while the fighter would be guided on to the target. This was an exceptionally difficult task owing to the speed of the Mosquito, and could prove exceptionally dangerous if the aircraft being chased turned out to be a night fighter. As RAF night fighters began to escalate their intruder missions, transiting to and from interception areas became much more dangerous. While the Mosquito night fighters were larger and less nimble than the Bf 109, their radar systems allowed them to catch the otherwise “blind” daylight fighter.
The success of these units was mixed, though some extraordinarily capable pilots achieved some very impressive results. The best of them was Lt. Kurt Welter, who by the end of the war was in command of the only night fighter unit equipped with Me 262’s. On the night of August 30th, 1944, Lt. Welter flew a Bf 109 which had been vectored over the Stettin raid area. In the span of ten minutes, he attacked four Lancaster heavy bombers, two of which were later confirmed destroyed, these being 115 Squadron’s PB131 and 12 Squadrons’s PD 273, representing his 14 and 15th confirmed victories. Most pilots, however, achieved considerably less success owing to the extremely high level of flying and combat proficiency their missions demanded. Mosquito interception duties were the most difficult owing to the speed and altitude of the light bomber, which could often exceed 8 km. To aid these pilots, a number of rare Bf 109G-5’s with high altitude DB-605 AS engines were made available to these squadrons. Nonetheless, Mosquito interception remained a gamble depending on the distance at which the bomber was detected, whether a fighter could be launched fast enough to climb, and still have enough time to be vectored into its flight path.
Crowded Skies
By the end of 1943, the newest and last iteration of the high altitude series was in service. The new Bf 109G-5 now carried a pair of 13 mm MG 131’s in the place of its 7.92 mm MG 17s, this increase being installed after long standing complaints regarding the inadequacy of the machine guns in the upper cowling of the plane. The heavier guns and the enlarged cowling meant the aircraft was slower than the one it replaced. This proved fairly concerning, as no major improvements in engine output were expected for the foreseeable future. These aircraft were distributed to units on all fronts and used much like their standard, non-pressurized counterparts. Most were deployed in the strategic air defense of Germany, where they soon faced a new, and very dangerous opponent.
The P-51B Mustang appeared to be the solution to bomber offensive’s ills, being a fast, maneuverable fighter with incredible range and high altitude performance. The danger of this new threat was quickly recognized by one Generalmajor Joseph Schmidtt, who began to advocate for the need for GM-1 equipped Bf 109s to act as top cover for the previously secure massed fighter formations. In this, the aircraft proved a mostly adequate stop gap, performing much better than other models, but it still lagged behind the American P-51B and the P-47D at altitude. In short, the Bf 109 was an old airframe, operating with an engine which had become fairly outdated after significant delays in getting it to reach its highest power ratings. Even worse, many of the airframe’s changes over the years had negatively impacted its performance, especially the addition of the non-retractable tail wheel, and the enlarged upper cowling to accommodate the larger machineguns.
However, there were still some areas of improvement. In particular, the supercharger was swapped for an enlarged version which came from the DB 603 engine. Switching the engine entirely was completely unfeasible. The Luftwaffe’s research and development could be chaotic at the best of times, and 1944 certainly was not the ideal environment for such a big risk. The bombing raids too were making their mark as, while they had failed to curtail the German aviation industry entirely, they had forced a consolidation of existing designs. In effect, German bomber production plummeted in order to bolster production of a series of fighter designs which saw very slow modification rates. The vastly expanded use of slave labor in the following months also created no shortage of trouble, with quality slipping sharply as skilled workers were increasingly drafted into the Wehrmacht, and slaves increasingly sabotaged components.
The final models of the G-5 used the DB 605AS engine, with the much larger supercharger designed to improve high altitude performance. The effort was largely successful, though only a few Bf 109G-5’s would ever be equipped with the engine. As much as pilots enjoyed the comfort of the pressurized canopy, it was an expense that Messerschmitt and their directors at the Jagerstab were no longer willing to accept. The G-5 would be the last model to carry it. The Luftwaffe’s fortunes too declined sharply, as P-51 fighter sweeps periodically attacked airfields once considered safe, and the brutal war of attrition had eroded the number of remaining experienced pilots further. Attacks on Germany’s synthetic fuel production in the summer of 1944 introduced a final, and catastrophic crisis which largely left the Luftwaffe crippled for the remainder of the war.
G-5 production was phased out entirely in June of 1944, as Messerschmitt moved to consolidate Bf 109 production with the G-14. The supply chain would however remain disjointed, as they produced models using the standard DB605A, and the high altitude DB605AS. The G-14, with its standardized, low altitude MW50 boost system, did help reduce the performance disparity at low altitudes, with the aircraft possessing an excellent rate of climb and acceleration, but high altitude performance equivalent to the best Allied fighters would elude the Bf 109 for the rest of the war.
Handling and Flight Characteristics
The Gustav, as with nearly all Bf 109 models, was maneuverable, but its increased weight had made it somewhat more cumbersome than its predecessors. Initially developed to be as light as possible while carrying with it a powerful engine, the continued added weight with a comparatively little increase in horsepower resulted in control harmony compared to earlier models. Test pilots noted that while aileron and rudder forces were light, while the elevator was fairly heavy, an issue which was exacerbated at high speed. While the aircraft was exceptionally nimble at low speeds, which was well aided by the wing’s leading edge slats, heavy rudder forces and stiff elevator controls severely impacted handling at high speed. At lower altitudes, the rudder forces became excessive at around 500km/h IAS, at higher altitudes, upwards of 7 km, the controls remained lighter at higher speeds and permitted better control. Dive performance was respectable, though given that the controls were nearly seized in a high speed dive, it could prove very dangerous at lower altitudes. Maximum level speed was decidedly mediocre, though the aircraft boasted a high climb rate and good acceleration thanks to its high thrust to weight ratio.The plane was otherwise stable and, by most accounts, with good level flight performance.
The cockpit was both cramped and provided exceptionally poor visibility. The deep set seat, with its heavy cockpit framing, greatly restricted the pilot’s view, especially towards the forward and rear aspects. A few late production Bf 109G-5s were equipped with the improved Erla canopy, as became standard on late war 109’s, and provided much better visibility to the sides and rear of the aircraft. The cockpit was among the smallest on any fighter during the time period. Pilots often felt it claustrophobic, which is understandable considering the centerline cannon for the aircraft rested between the pilot’s shins.
Operation of the Gustav was extremely straightforward, given the high level of automation the DB 605A possessed. The engine was controlled through a series of linkages between components which adjusted one another as the pilot adjusted the throttle lever. The supercharger, radiator, propeller RPM, and mixture were all managed automatically, though manual control was also possible. The core of these linkages was the propeller RPM, which was preset to an accompanying manifold pressure. The rest of the engine largely adjusted itself around this setting. In stark contrast to this truly modern feature, the plane still had manually operated flaps, which were retained through the end of the war. The aircraft lacked traditional trim tabs. Instead, the aircraft’s trim was set on the ground to match its cruise speed. The pilot could however correct for pitch by adjusting the angle of the horizontal stabilizer. Flying the aircraft was otherwise very convenient.
The takeoff run was fairly simple and the aircraft could easily be corrected for the torque produced by the engine. Visibility was poor on the initial run up, but given the relatively controllable nature of the aircraft, it was something pilots easily adjusted to. The same cannot be said of late war versions of the 109, which possessed engine outputs upwards of +1800 PS. Landings under ideal conditions were notably very easy, though were much more difficult in poor weather or when operating from hastily constructed frontline airfields. There was some improvement after the G-1, when the tire tread was increased, but landings and ground handling required a pilot to ensure solid directional control, as the narrow landing gear base could cause trouble.
Comparison with other single engine high altitude fighters, up to the Summer of 1944
Aircraft
Speed at Sea level (km/h)
Maximum speed at critical altitude, unboosted (km/h)
Speed at 10 km (km/h)
Maximum Output (hp)
Bf 109G-1 -Mid 1942-
506
630 at 6.6 km
640 (with GM-1)
1213
Bf 109G-5 -Late 1943-
510
620 at 6.5 km
635 (with GM-1)
1454
Bf 109G-6AS -Early 1944-
506
653 at 8.3 km
630
1415
Bf 109G-5AS w/GM-1 (estimated) -Mid 1944-
“
“
660*
1415
MiG-3 (AM 35) -Early 1941-
472
621 at 7.8 km
<550
1350
Spitfire HF Mk IX -Late 1943-
529
668 at 8.5 km
651
1710
Spitfire Mk XIV -End of 1943-
583
717 at 7.6 km
706
2050
P 47D-10 -Late 1943-
535
700 at 9.4 km
692
2300
P-51B-15 w/wing pylons -Early 1944-
586
685 at 7.2 km
667
1720
*It should be noted that the Spitfire Mk XIV saw service in low numbers, and was a very rare sight until almost a year after its introduction at the end of 1943. The rest of these planes were otherwise quite common.
Along with the Bf 109E-7Z, Mikoyan Gurevich’s MiG-3 debuted as one of the earliest high altitude fighters of the Second World War. The MiG-3’s AM-35A engine had high compression ratios and possessed a single speed supercharger which had been geared for high altitude performance. This allowed the aircraft to achieve a respectable level of performance above 7 km. It did, however, come at the steep cost of having mediocre low altitude performance, and above 8 km, its top speed fell dramatically. The aircraft also earned a reputation of being challenging to fly, a chief issue being its minimum landing speed, which was considerably higher than other Soviet fighters. Due to the lack of action at high altitudes over the Eastern Front, the aircraft was subsequently re-equipped with the AM-38 engine, for low altitude use. Production ceased early in the war, and its assembly lines were turned over to produce IL-2s.
The British followed the Germans in developing high altitude fighters with specialized boost systems. They would go on to produce a series of pressurized, liquid oxygen boosted Spitfires, operating on a very similar set of principles as the GM-1 boosted 109s. These however, did not see as widespread a use, as they were not quite as versatile or reliable, though this is not to say they were unimpressive. The Spitfire Mk VII with a Merlin 71 and LO could reach a speed of 618 km/h at an altitude of 12 kilometers. However, owing to a lack of available information, it will not be discussed in depth here.
A more versatile high altitude Spitfire also existed in the form of the HF Mk IX, which was powered by the Rolls Royce Merlin 71. This aircraft featured an intercooled engine with a two stage two speed supercharger, which provided it phenomenal high altitude performance, along with its broad elliptical wings. The addition of the second stage allows for further compression once the first stage alone reached its limit, and the use of the intercooler increases the upper limit of compression by reducing the temperature of the air entering the manifold. This allowed the engine to be run at a higher boost and was able to maintain combat power at altitudes far higher than the previous single stage 40 and 50 series Merlin engines. In comparison to the Bf 109, the engine can be could at combat power at high altitudes without needing to worry about depleting the supply of nitrous, which at most could last 22 minutes. In comparison, the Bf 109’s DB 605A, which operated using a variable speed supercharger which, while less powerful than the intercooled two stage type, lacked the performance gaps that came with the fixed gearing of the Merlin’s supercharger. In the case of the GM-1 powered series, however, there would have been a similar gap between roughly 7 and 8 km, between the aircraft’s critical altitude and the minimum height for GM-1 use. The use of GM-1 on the later DB 605AS powered Bf 109’s would have likely allowed them to exceed these high altitude Spitfires in respect to linear speed at extreme altitude. The performance figures for the Spitfire Mk XIV, equipped with the significantly more powerful Rolls Royce Griffon, speak for themselves.
The P-47 series of fighters achieved their tremendous high altitude performance through a different method entirely, turbocharging. Much of the interior space below and aft of the cockpit was taken up by a turbo supercharging system which managed to prevent any significant loss in horsepower up to 25,000 ft. The exhaust driven turbine proved a phenomenal means of attaining high altitude performance. Like the variable speed supercharger on the DB605A, the turbo-supercharger was not dependent on mechanically geared stages and thus lacked the associated performance gaps. However, a clear drawback to the system was its complexity, as in addition to the throttle and RPM levers, there was also a turbine lever. While it was possible to link the supercharger and throttle levers together on all but the early models, this was advisable only at certain altitudes. Running the turbine at higher speeds than necessary resulted in some horsepower loss. Regardless of this, many US pilots considered the P-47 far and away the best fighter above 30,000 ft. At high altitudes, where drag was minimal, and with over 2000 hp driving it, the P-47 possessed a speed and maneuverability far greater than its size might suggest possible. Further refinements to the design saw the aircraft exceed 720 km/h above 32,000 ft (~10 km).
The P-51B was driven by largely the same engine as the Spitfire Mk IX and it was eventually geared with usage at medium altitude in mind. In addition to its powerful Packard Merlin, which gave good high altitude performance, what set the P-51 above most was its extremely low drag airframe and wings. Having been designed later than most of the aircraft discussed here, it had the benefit of being able to incorporate the most recent breakthroughs in aerodynamics. Most notably, the use of laminar flow theories in its wing design, its drag eliminating radiator scoop, and its superbly streamlined fuselage, made it among the most exceptional fighters of the Second World War. Its high speed maneuverability too was largely unparalleled, as the laminar flow wing gave it an exceptionally high critical mach number, and its internally sealed control surfaces ensured effective control at very high speed. While its Packard V-1650-7 engine was geared for medium altitude use, it still outpaced both the standard high altitude models of the Bf 109 and Merlin powered Spitfire. When run on 150 octane fuel, as was more or less standard by mid-summer 1944, its performance largely matched that of the Spitfire Mk XIV, though the Griffon engine gave the Spitfire an incredible edge above 30,000 ft. Only the Bf 109G’s equipped with the DB 605AM high altitude engine could give comparable high altitude performance with the Mustang. They could both keep pace with one another above around 9km, though few of the pressurized high altitude model were built.
Production
Production of the Bf 109G began with centralizing supply chains around the Messerschmitt factory in Regensburg, and the subcontracted Erla machine factory. The escalating bombing campaign in 1943 forced a dispersion of the industry, and many components were built at dispersal sites before final assembly took place at either the Regensburg plant, the one at Erla, and later, the Wiener Neustadt aircraft factory. The Bf 109 was fairly well suited to this scheme, but nowhere near as suited as the Fw 190, which made use of much more convenient sub-assemblies. By the start of 1944, the Jagerstab was established to boost fighter production further, in order to compensate for potential losses incurred by bombing raids. They were very successful in this regard; production surged, and the average construction time of a Bf 109G declined from around 5000 hours to approximately 2500. The cost, however ,was substantial. Bomber production was cut to the bone, fighter designs were frozen over long periods, and the long standing use of slave labor skyrocketed. Bf 109G production became more complex as the war went on and the number of subtypes expanded. These would grow to G-1 through 6 and a separate high altitude series of Bf 109G-5/G6-AS aircraft. There was some consolidation between the disparate models with the G-14, though the still separate standard and high altitude models continued to complicate production and supply chains.
Messerschmitt was among the first to mass implement slave labor in late 1942, when they requested and received 2,299 inmates who were forced to work at the aircraft plant at Augsburg. They subsequently requested the construction of co-location camps for the rest of their factories. This marked a transition from skilled paid workers, who were of a dwindling number due to conscription, to a largely unskilled base of prisoners who sought opportunities for sabotage. Brutal retaliation from the SS, who managed security, and a severely declining standard of living saw rates of sabotage climb heavily as the war went on. By the Autumn of mid 1944, it was fairly common to see aircraft losses attributed specifically to sabotaged components. Other unsafe corner cutting practices became more common as well, and even saw the re-use of components scavenged from downed aircraft.
Bf 109G-1 Production
Werknummer
Factory
Period
10299-10318 (20)
Erla
May to June 1942
14004-14150 (147)
Regensburg
February to June 1942
Bf 109G-3 Production
Werknummer
Factory
Period
16251-16300 (50)
Regensburg
January to February 1943
Bf109G-5 Production
Werknummer
Factory
Period
15200-16000 ( with G-6)
WNF
March to August 1943
26000-26400 (mixed with G-6)
Erla
August to September 1943
27000-27200 (mixed with G-6)
Erla
September to October 1943
110001-110576 (dedicated production)
Erla
November 1943 to June 1944
*a total of 475 G-5s were built, at least 16 converted to G-5AS/R2 recon planes at the Erla plant in Antwerp
Construction
Much like its predecessors, the Bf 109G was a fairly conventional late 1930s fighter design, which sought to install the most powerful engine in a small, lightweight airframe. At its fore was the engine section, mounted on a steel mount with rubber vibration isolation. The engine oil cooler was mounted to the lower engine cowling, in order to give better access to the Bosch PZ 12 fuel injectors, with the section otherwise containing all of the motor associated systems save for the coolant radiators and GM-1 boost system. Above the engine and on the port side was the compressor scoop for the cockpit pressure system, where it remained until the Bf 109G-5, whereafter it was moved to the starboard side and slightly ahead of the MG 131 fairing. The system consisted of the compressor equipped with a relief valve, an air filter, a three way cock, a pressurizing valve, a negative pressure relief valve, a compensating valve, a pressure line, and removable silica gel cartridges. These components were distributed around the engine and canopy. The system proved fairly robust and was a much welcomed addition to the aircraft. The rest of the fuselage followed a largely conventional semi-monocoque construction, aside from the landing gear, which was mounted to the fuselage and swung inward when deployed. On the G-3, the tires were increased by a width of roughly a centimeter, such that they possessed a tread of 16 cm and a diameter of 66 cm. The associated bumps on the wing tops are the only external feature that allow differentiation between it and G-1. The control surfaces at the rear of the fuselage were operated through a standard cable linkage and were fabric skinned. The incidence of the horizontal stabilizer was adjustable in flight to set the pitch of the aircraft.
The cockpit was seated deep within the fuselage, in order to reduce the frontal windscreen area, though this choice drastically decreased the pilot’s visibility. The thick canopy framing made this issue worse, especially on the pressurized aircraft, which possessed reinforced beams and a non-removable armored seatback formed the rear of the pressurized canopy hood. The cockpit itself was noted as quite cramped by virtually all who flew it, offering little in the way of headspace and shoulder room, and made all the more claustrophobic by the lack of adjustable rudder pedals. At the front of the canopy was an integral 60 mm armor glass windscreen. As with the rest of the canopy frame, it contained silica to prevent condensation at low altitudes, which could then cause icing higher up. Several Bf 109G-5AS aircraft received higher visibility Erla canopies, though they lost their pressurized features. The layout of the instrumentation was clean if dense, though the pilot was aided by a high level of automation, which meant he could largely fly the plane through just the throttle lever. Raising or lowering the flaps and adjusting the stabilizer was done manually through a pair of wheels at the pilot’s left.
The plane’s elliptical wings were attached to the fuselage through a main, centerline bracket and possessed only a single mid wing spar. Connections for the hydraulic lines, which drove the flaps and landing gear, and radiator coolant lines, connected automatically when the wings were bolted to the fuselage. Each wing possessed a radiator located inboard, with airflow controlled by two outlet covers at the rear of the radiator matrix. These covers moved along with the outboard section of flaps when the plane was adjusted for takeoff and landing. The outermost rear section contained the fabric skinned ailerons. The leading edge of the wing had a slat which would extend during hard maneuvers and improve the turning abilities of the aircraft. These could prove troublesome on earlier models in regards to unwarranted deployment and jamming in place, but had been worked out by the G model.
The GM-1 system consisted of the nitrous bottles, compressed air, and the control system. On the Bf 109G, the system existed as part of a Rustzustand or Umbausatz kit which could be installed at a Luftwaffe field workshop or maintenance center, in the latter’s case. The pressurized models shared this with the standardized models, however, they differed in that the glass-wool insulated nitrous bottles were installed in the port wing, instead of in the fuselage, behind the pilot. Later models could have the tanks stored in either position. The GM-1 was kept in a chilled liquid state, which was found to provide a higher boost effect, providing +4 bhp per second per gram over the gaseous +3 bhp. The total volume of the bottles was 115 L, not counting the compressed air which was used to force the mixture through the system. The chilled nature of the nitrous did, however, bring a drawback in that it was released as it warmed and evaporated. An aircraft would need to have its tanks filled immediately before take off in order to have the longest duration. The boost could be maintained up to 22 minutes if the tanks were filled immediately before flight, falling to 19 minutes in the winter and 16 in the summer if the aircraft departed twelve hours later. In the summer, all of the GM-1 could be expended if the aircraft was left parked for two days. The weight of the entire system was considerable, at roughly 100 kg.
Use of GM-1 on the DB605A was prohibited below 8 km, where it provided little benefit, and below which the system was mostly dead weight. With the larger supercharger on the DB 605 AS, this height increased to 10 km. In the cockpit, the pilot possessed a pressure gauge and an on and off switch to control the system. Once activated, it took up to five minutes to have the greatest effect, whereafter the pilot could turn the system on or off as they pleased. At the initial activation height, the mixture could boost the top speed of an equipped Bf 109 by approximately 30 km/h and recover as much as 300 PS at high altitude.
The Bf 109G-3 through G-5 carried either the DB 605A or high altitude DB 605AS, both being an inverted, 35.7 liter, V-12. The reason for it being inverted was to ensure the propeller shaft was as low as possible. This would enable the low mounted, centerline cannon to fire through the eye of the engine without its recoil seriously jeopardizing the aircraft’s stability. This was achieved through the use of direct fuel injection, which was fairly common practice in German aviation by the start of the war, though rare elsewhere. The engine also possessed a high level of automation, which let the pilot manage the engine and most of its associated systems just through the throttle lever. These were essentially a series of linkages between components that adjusted one another as the pilot increased or decreased engine power. It did not possess a true engine control unit, as was used in the BMW 801. Additionally, the engine used a single stage, variable speed, centrifugal supercharger which was mechanically driven by the engine and used a hydraulic coupling for variable transmission. The fluid coupling supercharger automatically adjusted itself via barometric control and was easily the most impressive feature of the engine, allowing it to smoothly adjust its boost as it climbed or descended. This allowed the aircraft to avoid the performance gaps otherwise encountered with engines using fixed speed settings. The engine used B4, which was originally 87 octane, as most of the C3 high performance stocks were dedicated to squadrons flying Fw 190s.
In spite of these innovative features, the engine’s performance was fairly modest for its day. It produced up to 1475 PS, though this was only possible after several major modifications which saw the replacement of the original exhaust valves for chrome plated sets, among other major modifications. The system also had its oil system improved through the use of additional oil throwers to improve flow, and an oil centrifuge to address issues with foaming. Between 1942 and late ‘43, the high power settings on almost all of these engines were disabled in order to keep failure rates manageable. The supercharger too would eventually lag behind its contemporaries, as despite its smoothness, its volume became a bottleneck. This was most apparent in any comparison to the two-stage, intercooled models of the Merlin engine. Some later models would mount an enlarged supercharger with 30% greater volume, derived from the larger DB 603. Nearly all would be equipped with an anti-knock boost system in the form of MW50 by the summer of 1944, which would boost output up to 1800 PS, though the corrosive mixture of methanol and water decreased the engine’s lifespan. Engines with the larger supercharger were designated DB 605AS, those with the boost system 605M, and those with both were 605ASMs. Several Bf 109G-5’s were fitted with the high altitude engine, though none received the low altitude boost system, for obvious reasons.
The engine measured 101.1 × 71.9 × 174 cm, had a bore and stroke of 154 mm (6.1 in.) x 160 mm (6.3 in.), and weighed 745 kg (1,642 lb). Two coolant header tanks were set to either side of the engine, while the oil tank was placed at the front. Compression ratios were 7.5/7.3:1 (left and right blocks) with B4 aviation gasoline, ratios were different using C3 fuel, though this was not used aboard this series of fighters.
Early models were equipped with a pair of MG17 7.92 mm machine guns and a single, centerline MG151/20 autocannon. On the G-5, the MG17s were swapped for 13 mm MG131 heavy machine guns, which both provided a heavier armor piercing bullet, and a round with a small explosive core. While the standard G-6 could carry a centerline 30 mm autocannon, the modification was not available for any of the high altitude fighters. This was likely due to the necessary changes in the canopy required for mounting the larger weapon, which may have been incompatible with the pressurized model. As a firing platform, the 109G was excellent, especially in that all its weapons were placed at the center of the aircraft and thus required minimal adjustments for weapon convergence. However, the aircraft was very lightly armed, especially on the MG17 equipped models. Many pilots considered the armament inadequate, and the addition of supplementary underwing guns severely hampered the aircraft’s performance. These sentiments went as high as the General of Fighters, Lt. General Adolf Galland.
Conclusion
The pressurized models of the Bf 109G proved to be an expedient means of boosting the performance of high altitude squadrons. The pressurized canopy, while later seen as an expensive luxury, was well appreciated by pilots who often flew at great heights on interception and photorecononniance missions. As with their standard counterparts, the series was handicapped considerably by the limitations and troublesome DB 605A. While the aircraft offered good performance for 1943, without any substantive increase in power, the pressurized Gustav series fighters began to lag considerably behind their Allied opponents the following year.
Bf 109G-1 configuration (shared with G-2)
Modification type
Specification
Bf 109G-1/R 1
Rüstsatz
Mid fuselage bomb rack. ETC 500 or Schloss 503 A-1.
PR 16 radio direction finding gear, designation not usually applied
Bf 109G-5/U2
Umbausatz
GM-1 boost system
Bf 109G-5/R2
Rüstzustand
Rb 50/30 camera fitted
*Rüstsatz kits are removable on a mission basis, Rüstzustand are installed at workshops, Umbausatz are kits that are built into an aircraft at the factory or a maintenance and recovery center.
Aircraft with FuG 16y radio sets, for command aircraft, received a -y suffix. For example, Bf 109G-5y/U2/R 3 would be a fighter equipped with a radio set for ground control, GM-1, and an external fuel rack.
Bf 109G-1
Specification
Engine
DB 605A
Output
1475 PS
Gross Weight
3050 kg
empty weight
–
Combat Range (internal fuel only)
668 km
Maximum speed (prior to downrating)
660 km/h at 7 km
Armament
2x 7.92 mm MG 17, 1x 20 mm MG 151/20
Crew
Pilot
Length m
8.84
Height (without propeller) m
2.6
Wingspan m
9.924
Wing Area m2
21.6
Bf 109G-5
Specification
Engine
DB 605A, DB 605 AS
Output (DB 605 AS)
1475 PS (1415 PS)
Gross Weight
3350 kg
Empty weight
2543 kg
Combat Range (internal fuel only)
625 km
Maximum speed (DB 605 AS)
630 km/h at 6.5 km (650 km/h at 8.5 km)
Armament
2x 13 mm MG 131, 1x 20 mm MG 151/20
Crew
Pilot
Length m
8.84
Height (without propeller) m
2.6
Wingspan m
9.924
Wing Area m2
21.6
Plane
In use with
Bf 109G-1
I/JG2, 11./JG2, 11./JG26, II./JG51, JG 53,
Bf 109G-3
11./JG 2, 11./JG26, I./JG1 (later II./JG11)
Bf 109G-5
III./JG 1, II./JG 2, I.& II./JG3, II./JG11, III./JG 26, II./JG27, I./JG300, I.&II./JG302, II./JG 11, II.&III./EJG 1, NAG 2, NAG 12, NAG 13, (F)/123
Credits
Article written by Henry H.
Edited by Henry H. and Stan L.
Ported by Henry H.
Illustrated by Hansclaw
Illustration:
Sources:
Primary:
Bf 109G-2 Flugzeug Handbuch (Stand Juni 1942).Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. November 1942.
Bf 109G-4 Flugzeug Handbuch (Stand August 1943). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. September 1943.
Bf 109G-2 Flugzeug Handbuch (Stand August 1943). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. October 1943.
Flugzeug Flugleistungen Me 109G-Baureihen. Messerschmitt AG Augsburg. August 1943.
Daimler-Benz DB 605 Inverted V-12 Engine. National Air and Space Museum Collection. Inventory number: A19670086000.
Flugzeugmuster Bf 109 G-1 mit Motor DB 605A. Rechlin E`Stelle Erprobungsnummer 1586. 1943.
Memorandum Report on P-47D-10 Airplane, AAF No. 43-75035. Army Air Forces Material Command. Wright Field Dayton, Ohio. 11, October 1943.
The performance of Spitfire IX aircraft fitted with high and low altitude versions of the intercooled Merlin engine. Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment Boscombe Down. 4 March 1943
Leistungszusammenstellung Me 109G. Messerschmitt AG. Augsburg. 1 January, 1944.
Leistungen Me 109G mit DB 605 AS. Messerschmitt AG. Augsburg. 22, January 1944.
Leistungsmessung Me 109 G mit GM 1 – Zusatzeinspritzung. Messerschmitt AG. Augsburg. 21, September 1943.
Me 109 G-1. Ausführung. Messerschmitt AG. Augsburg. 21 May, 1942.
Speed vs Altitude P-51B-15 43-24777. Flight Test Engineering Branch Memo Report No. Eng-47-1749-A. 20 May 1944.
Kurz-Betriebsanleitung für Flugzeugführer und Bodenpersonal für GM 1-Anlagen in Bf 109 G. E-Stelle Rechlin R 3 a 1.
Me 109 G DIMENSIONS, WEIGHTS AND PERFORMANCE. A.I.2(g) Report No. 2142. 31, December 1942.
Spitfire F. Mk. VIII(Conv) (Prototype Mk.XIV) JF.319 (Griffon RG5SM). Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment Boscombe Down. 27 October 1943.
Power Boosting By Liquid Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide Injection On Spitfire & Mosquito Aircraft Respectively. Engineering Report. Eng. 8723.
Secondary:
Douglas, Calum E. Secret Horsepower Race: Second World War Fighter Aircraft Engine Development on the Western Front. TEMPEST, 2020.
THE EFFECTS OF POOR QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING GERMAN AVIATION MANUFACTURING ON THE LUFTWAFFE DURING WORLD WAR II. MICHAEL J. GALLANT, MAJOR, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
B.A Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 2006.
Radinger, W. & Otto W. Messerschmitt Bf 109F-K Development Testing Production. Schiffer Publishing. 1999.
Prien J. & Rodeike P. Messerschmitt Bf 109 F,G, &K Series An Illustrated Study. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1997.
Mosquito Fates, based on AirBritain files. Donated files, Mossie.org.
Nazi Germany (1935)
Fighter Aircraft– 20 to 22 Bf 109A and 341 Bf 109B Built
When the Nazis came to power in Germany during the early 1930’s they sought to modernize their armed forces with more modern military equipment. The founding of a new air force, the Luftwaffe as it was known in Germany, was one of the main priorities of the new regime. Massive resources were channeled into the construction of a great number of airfields and other forms of infrastructure necessary for the air force. In addition, many new and thoroughly developed military aircraft designs were requested. Among these new designs was the Bf 109, which would go on to later become the most widely produced fighter aircraft in the world.
Rise of the Luftwaffe
After the collapse of the German Empire following their defeat in the First World War, the Allies prohibited the development of many new military technologies, including aircraft. The Germans bypassed this prohibition by focusing on developing gliders which provided necessary initial work in aircraft development and crew training. Another solution was to develop civil aircraft that could be relatively quickly rebuilt and modified for military use. The efforts to hide these developments were finally discarded when the Nazis came to power in 1933. One of the first steps that they undertook was to openly reject the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that prohibited the Germans to expand their army and develop new military technologies.
The founding of the Luftwaffe was seen as a huge military priority among Nazi officials. The Luftwaffe would then begin a massive reorganization and expansion project that would see it expand into a formidable fighting force. Much of the Luftwaffe’s attention and energy during this period was focused on developing a new fighter aircraft to replace the then obsolescent Ar 68 and He 51 biplanes. For this reason, in 1934 the Reichsluftfahrtministerium RLM (German Air Ministry) issued a competition for a new and modern fighter plane that could reach speeds of 400 km/h. For this competition, four companies were initially contacted including Arado, Focke-Wulf, and Heinkel. Besides them was a rather small and less-known manufacturer, Bayerische Flugzeugwerke BFW (Bavarian Aircraft Works,) which was under the leadership of Willy Messerschmitt. Despite lacking the experience of their contemporaries in military aviation designs, this small company despite its inexperience would go on to win the contract and build what would become Germany’s then-most modern combat aircraft
The man behind the design
Wilhelm Emil ‘Willy’ Messerschmitt was from his early years interested in aviation. When he was 13, he met Friedrich Harth who was an enthusiast and a pioneering glider designer. He would become a mentor and help Messerschmitt develop his passion for building gliders, together designing and building several gliders. When the First World War broke out in 1914, Harth was drafted into the Army, and in 1917 Messerschmitt would follow. Fortunately for both of them, however, they were stationed at the same flight training school near Munich and were thus able to continue their work. Both of them survived the war and went back to doing what they both loved: designing and building gliders. As gliding was something that became highly popular in Germany after the war, Messerschmitt undertook further education by enrolling in Munich Technical College. With this knowledge, Messerschmitt managed to design and build his first glider in 1921, which he designated simply as S9. After gathering sufficient financial resources, Messerschmitt and Harth together opened a flying school in 1922. This did not last long, however, and the following year disagreements between Messerschmitt and Harth arose.
Messerschmitt then decided to work on his own and opened a small aviation company which he named Flugzeugbau Messerschmitt. His first proper aircraft design was the M17. It was a small all-wood, high-wing, sport aircraft powered by a British Bristol 29 hp engine. This aircraft was quite successful and even managed a 14-hour flight from Bamberg to Rome in 1926. The pilot was a World War One veteran Theodor Croneiss. A little-known fact, this was actually the first flight of such a small aircraft over the Alps ever attempted successfully. The M17 would later be lost in an accident when Messerschmitt himself was learning how to fly an aircraft. He crashed, losing the aircraft but surviving the hard landing, after which Messerschmitt spent some time in hospital. This did not greatly affect Messerschmitt’s new company as his next design M18 also proved to have good overall performance. Now in partnership with Croneiss, they managed to make a deal with Lufthansa, a German civil airline, to use the M18 for passenger transport.
Messerschmitt’s company received a number of production orders for their M18 aircraft. However, Messerschmitt lacked the money, resources, and production capabilities to actually deliver these aircraft. At some point, he came in contact with the Bavarian government in hope of finding a solution to his problem. He got an answer, that the Bavarian government was willing to help with one condition, Messerschmitt would have to merge his own company with the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke BFW. This company itself was in the midst of a huge financial crisis but possessed a great number of skilled workers and equipment that could greatly help Messerschmitt in his future work. While both companies would be technically independent, Messerschmitt was to give first production rights for any of his new designs to BFW. BFW on the other hand would provide the necessary manpower and equipment. Messerschmitt agreed to this condition and was positioned as chief designer of both companies. Representation of the company was relocated from Bamberg to Ausburg.
In 1928 Messerschmitt focused his work on a civil design intended for transporting passengers. His next design was the 10-passenger transport aircraft designated M20. During a flight test, part of the wing fabric cover peeled away, and pilot Hans Hackman possibly in a panic decided to bail out at a height of 76 m. His parachute failed to open properly and he died. This led to the cancellation of production orders for the M20 by Lufthansa. Messerschmitt developed an improved second M20 prototype which was presented to, and tested by Lufthansa officials. After an evaluation, the aircraft was deemed safe and a production order for 12 improved M20. However, tragedy would strike in two serious accidents involving the M20 aircraft, in which 10 people were killed. The first accident happened near Dresden in October 1930, where two pilots and six crew members were killed. The second occurred in April of the next year, with the death of both pilots. To make matters even worse, German Army officers were among the casualties. This affected Messerschmitt’s further work, who despite developing more aircraft designs failed to gain many production orders for them. While his own company did not suffer much, BFW was not so lucky and was forced into bankruptcy in 1931. In the next few years, Messerschmitt’s work was relatively stable as he saw some success selling his aircraft aboard. With better financing, he managed to acquire sufficient funds to reinstate BFW in May of 1933. The name was changed to BFW AG, a publicly-traded company. Unfortunately for Messerschmitt, a newly appointed Secretary of State for Air, Erhard Milch, opposed the idea of BFW operating under Messerschmitt. Erhard Milch’s hatred for Messerschmitt was personal, as the test pilot who flew on the doomed M20 prototype was his friend. He never forgave Messerschmitt who he deemed responsible for the accident. He forced BFW AG to accept production orders for Heinkel aircraft designs. This was also partly done to provide adequate financial resources so that the company could operate successfully.
Despite this distrust by Nazi officials, Messerschmitt was contacted in the summer of 1933 by the RLM to design a sports aircraft to represent Germany on the Challenge de Tourisme Internationale. Seeing a new opportunity Messerschmitt took great care in fulfilling this order. His ultimate design would be the highly successful Bf 108 (initially designated M37.) This aircraft would be crucial in the later stages of Bf 109 development. With the success of the Bf 108, Messerschmitt managed to gain support from some top Luftwaffe officials. One of these was the newly appointed Hermann Goring who replaced Erhard Milch in the position of commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe. While there were still some who wanted the Bf 108 to be canceled, with the support of Hermann Goring they could do little about it.
A new fighter
In March of 1933 RLM issued a document (designated L.A. 1432/33) that laid the foundations for the development of the future German fighter aircraft. In it a shortlist of general characteristics that this aircraft should meet was given. It was to be designed as a single-seat fighter that must be able to reach speeds of at least 400 km/h at a height of 6 km. In addition, that height had to be reached in no more than 17 minutes. The maximum service ceiling was set at 10 km. Armament was to consist of either two machine guns each supplied with 1,000 rounds of ammunition or one cannon with 100 rounds of ammunition.
In February 1934 this document was given to three aircraft manufacturers, with these being Arado Heinkel and BFW AG. The last to enter the competition was Focke-Wulf who received this document in September of 1934. While not completely clear as some sources suggest, Messerschmitt and the BFW AG were not initially contacted but were later included in this competition. Realizing this competition as a great opportunity, Messerschmitt gathered the best team he could find. Some of these included the former Arado fighter designer Walther Rethal, who became Messerschmitt’s deputy. Another prominent figure was Robert Lusser who took a great part in the Bf 108 development. He would also later play a great part in the future Bf 110 aircraft design.
According to RLM conditions, all interested companies were to provide a working prototype that was to be tested before a final decision was to be made. Arado and Focke-Wulf completed their prototypes, the Ar 80 and Fw 159, by the end of 1934. Heinkel and Messerschmitt’s prototypes took a bit longer to complete. Messerschmitt and his team set a simple but ambitious plan. Their aircraft would be simple, cheap, and possess lightweight overall construction. It was to be powered by the strongest engine they could get their hands on. Work on this new fighter began in March 1934, at this early stage, the project was designated as P.1034 (while sometimes in the sources it is also mentioned as Bf 109a). A simple airframe mock-up was completed shortly in May the same year, but the work on a more complex and detailed mock-up took some time. By January 1935 it was finally ready. The engine chosen for it was the Jumo 210A. As this engine was not yet available, the license-built 583 hp Rolls-Royce Kestrel engine was used temporarily instead. Ironically this engine was available thanks to the good business relationship between Heinkel and the British Rolls Royce motor company. Thanks to this cooperation the Germans managed to purchase a number of these engines.
The first prototype named Bf 109 V1 (registered as D-IABI) was flight tested by Hans Dietrich Knoetzsch at the end of May 1935. The first flight was successful as no problems were identified with the design. While later prototypes would be tested with a weapon installation, the V1 was not outfitted with any armament.
Messerschmitt designation
Before we continue, it is important to clarify the precise designation of this aircraft. Sometimes it is referred to as Me 109 (or as Me-109). While technically speaking this is not completely incorrect given that it was designed by Messerschmitt and his team. The Bf stands for Bayerische Flugzeugwerke, the company which constructed the aircraft. While the 109 has no specific meaning, it was just next in the line after the 108 design.
In 1938 this company would be renamed Messerschmitt AG and all future designs from this point on would receive the prefix ‘Me’. The older designs including the 108 and 109 would retain the Bf prefix during the war. It is worth pointing out that both the Bf and Me designation was used in Messerschmitt’s own archives. In German service prior to and during the war, it was not uncommon to see both designations being used. So using either of these two designations would be historically accurate, this article would use the Bf 109 designation for sake of simplicity but also due to the fact that in most sources this designation was used.
The Bf 109 trials
As no major issue was noted in its design, the Bf 109 V1 was to be transported to the test centers located at Rechlin and Travemunde starting in October 1935. Here, together with all competitor designs, they would be subjected to a series of evaluations and tests. The Ar 80 and Fw 159 proved inadequate almost from the start after many mechanical breakdowns and even crashes, which ultimately led to both being rejected. The He 112 and Bf 109 on the other hand proved to be more promising designs. The Bf 109 had a somewhat bumpy start as the Rechlin airfield was unfinished and had a rough runway. During a landing, one of the Bf 109’s landing gear collapsed. Despite what appeared at first glance to be catastrophic damage, turned out to be only minor.
The second prototype was completed and tested by the end of 1935. The V2 (D-IILU or D-IUDE according to some sources) was powered by a domestically developed 680 hp Jumo 210A engine. It was moved to Travemunde for evaluation and testing in February 1936. The V2 was put into a series of test flights where it showed superb flying performance, in contrast to the other competitors. Unfortunately, during one test flight undertaken in April, part of the pilot’s canopy peeled away, forcing the pilot to make an emergency landing. A decision was made to not repair this prototype but instead to use its fuselage for ground testing and experimentation.
That same month that the V2 was damaged, the V3 (D-IQQY) was flight tested. This prototype served as the test aircraft for the installation of offensive armament. There is a disagreement between sources, as J. R. Beaman and J. L. Campbell mentioned that the armament was actually tested on the V2 aircraft. Regardless of which prototype was first armed, it possessed two 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns. These were placed above the engine, close to the cockpit. The engine was once again changed, this time with the installation of the even more powerful 700 hp Jumo 210C. Another experimental feature was the installation of a FuG 7 radio unit. This necessitated adding a triple wire antenna, which was connected to the top of the fin, and the edges of the stabilizers to the cockpit. This aircraft would be extensively used for testing, and would later serve as the basis for the first production version. Later prototypes were used to test various additional equipment and weapon installations. For example, prototypes V4 to V7 were used to test various different armament arrangements. The V5 was used to test the installation of an automatic reload and firing system, among other features.
During the initial evaluation flights carried out on both the Bf 109 and He 112, the latter was favored by many test pilots. Heinkel at that time was among the largest and most well-known German aviation manufacturers. It supplied the new Luftwaffe with a series of aircraft, and thus was well connected to RLM top officials. Further examination of the Bf 109 showed that the aircraft had several persistent issues. The most serious problems were the Bf 109’s tendency to widely swing to the left during landing and take-off. Another major issue was the design of landing gear, which was too narrow and generally weak. This in turn would often lead to crash landings. In retrospect, these two problems would never be fully resolved, but with sufficient training and experience, these problems could be overcome by the pilots. Other complaints included the limited visibility due to the canopy’s small design. The cockpit interior was also regarded as too cramped. The Bf 109 was also notorious for its high wing loading, which was pointed out by the test pilots.
Most of these complaints do not necessarily indicate a flawed design. We must take into account that the test pilots were mostly experienced in older biplanes. This new single-wing fighter concept was completely strange to them. For example, the biplanes had a simple and open cockpit, so complaints regarding the Bf 109 cockpit design represented a refusal to adapt to newer technologies rather than a bad design.
During the series of test flights, the performance of the two competitors was quite similar, with some minor advantages between them. In the case of the Bf 109, it was slightly faster, while the He 112 had lower wing loading. In addition, the He 112 had a better-designed and safer landing gear assembly. As the He 112 had to be constantly modified in order to keep pace with the Bf 109, the RLM commission was getting somewhat frustrated. Despite Heinkel’s connections and experience in designing aircraft, the Bf 109 was simply more appealing to the RLM commission, given that it was simpler, faster, and could be put into production relatively quickly. At that time the Germans were informed by the Abwehr intelligence service that the British were developing and preparing for the production of the new Spitfire. RLM officials were simply not willing to risk taking a chance on an aircraft design that could not quickly be put into production. Thus the Bf 109 was seen as the better choice under the circumstances.
Technical characteristics
The Bf 109 was a low-wing, all-metal construction, single-seat fighter. In order to keep the production of this aircraft as simple as possible, Messerschmitt engineers decided to develop a monocoque fuselage that was divided into two halves. These halves would be placed together and connected using simple flush rivets, thus creating a simple base on which remaining components, like the engine, wings, and instruments would be installed.
The central part of the fuselage was designed to be especially robust and strong. Thanks to this, it offered the aircraft exceptional structural integrity. It also provided additional protection during emergency crash landings. The fuselage itself and the remainder of the aircraft were covered with standard duralumin skin.
Its wings also had an unusual overall design. In order to provide room for the retracting landing gear, Messerschmitt intentionally used only a single wing spar which was positioned quite to the rear of the wing. This spar had to be sufficiently strong to withstand the load forces that acted on the wings during flight. The wings were connected to the fuselage by four strong bolts. This design enables the wings to have a rather simple overall construction with the added benefit of being cheap to produce. During the Bf 109 later service life, the damaged wings could be simply replaced with others on hand. The wings were also very thin, which provided the aircraft with better overall control at lower speeds but also reduced drag which in turn increased the overall maximum speed. At the wing’s leading edge were slats that automatically opened to provide better handling during maneuvers at lower speeds. This had a secondary purpose to greatly help the pilot during landing. The tail unit of the Bf 109 was a conventional design and was also built using metal components. It consists of a fin with a rudder, and two vertical stabilizers each equipped with an elevator.
The cockpit was placed in the center of the fuselage. It was a fully enclosed compartment that was riveted to the fuselage. The Bf 109 cockpit itself was quite cramped. Most of the available space was allocated to the control stick. Left and right of the pilot were two smaller control panels with the main instrumental panel being placed in front of him. While the side control panels were a bit small, their overall design was more or less the standard arrangement used on other aircraft. The front instrumental panel contained various equipment such as the compass, and an artificial horizon indicator. Messerschmitt engineers also added an ammunition counter, which was somewhat unusual on German fighters. Another innovative feature was the installation of a FuG 7 radio unit. In front of the cockpit, a firewall was positioned to shield the pilot in case of an engine fire.
The overall framework for the canopy was fairly small, but despite this provided decent all-around visibility for the pilot. Its main drawback was limited forward visibility during take-off. The canopy opened outwards to the right. This was a major issue as it could not be open during the flight. To overcome this, it was designed to be relatively easily jettisoned. In case of emergency, the pilot would actuate a lever positioned in the rear. It was connected to two high-tension springs. When activated, the lever would release the two springs, which in turn released the canopy, which would then simply fly away due to airflow.
When designing the Bf 109 great care was taken for it to have a simple design. This is especially true for the engine compartment. The engine was easily accessible by simply removing a series of panels. The engine was mounted on two long ‘Y’ shaped metal bars and held in place by two quick-release screws. The necessary electrical wires were connected to a junction box which was placed to the rear of the engine. All parts inside the engine compartment were easily accessible and thus could be replaced in a short period of time. The Bf 109 “L” shaped fuel tank was located aft of the pilot’s seat and slightly underneath it. It too had easy access by simply removing a cover located inside the center of the wing. The total fuel capacity was 250 liters.
Once the Bf 109 was accepted for service, a small production run of the Bf 109B-0 was completed. It was powered by a 610 hp Jumo 210B, and served mainly to finalize the later production version. The Bf 109B-1 was powered by a 635 hp Jumo 210D engine and had a fixed-pitch two-blade wooden propeller. Later during the production, it would be replaced with a new all-metal two-bladed variable pitch propeller. This engine was equipped with a two-stage supercharger. The maximum speed achieved with this engine at the height of 3,350 meters (11,000 ft) was 450 km/h (280 mph). The engine oil cooler, which was initially placed close to the radiator assembly, would be repositioned under the right wing.
The Bf 109 possessed quite an unusual landing gear arrangement. The landing gear was mainly connected to the lower center base of the fuselage, which meant that the majority of the weight of the aircraft would be centered at this point. The two landing gear struts retracted outward towards the wings. The negative side of this design was that the Bf 109, due to its rather narrow wheel track, could be quite difficult to control during taxiing. Messerschmitt engineers tried to resolve this issue by increasing the span of the two wheels. This actually complicated the matter as it necessitated that the two wheels be put at an angle. In turn, this created a weak point where the wheels were connected to the gear strut, which could easily break during a harsh landing. This also caused problems with the Bf 109 tendency to swing to the side prior to take-off. When the pilot was making corrections to keep the aircraft headed straight, excessive force could be applied to the pivot point of the landing gear leg, which sometimes cracked.
The first series of the Bf 109 were only lightly armed, with two 7.92 mm electrically primed MG 17 machine guns. While this may seem like underpowered armament, we must not forget that in the period between the wars, mounting larger caliber guns in fighters was rare. Larger calibers at this time used were usually 12.7 mm. The two machine guns were placed in the upper fuselage, just forward of the cockpit. The port-side machine gun was slightly more forward than the starboard. This was done to provide more space for ammunition magazines. These were fully synchronized to be able to fire through the propellers without damaging them. In the early stages, the ammunition load consisted of 500 rounds for each machine gun, but this was later increased to 1,000 rounds.
However, the double MG 17 layout was eventually deemed somewhat weak, so Messerschmitt was instructed to increase the offensive firepower. As Messerschmitt initially did not want to add any armament in the wings, another solution was needed. The installation of a third machine gun inside the centerline of the engine block was tested. While this would be initially adopted, this installation proved to be problematic mostly due to overheating and jamming problems. So this machine gun was often not installed and removed on those aircraft that had it. A possible installation of a 20 mm cannon in its place was also tested. This was the 20 mm MG FF cannon, which was in fact a license-built version of the Swiss Oerlikon cannon. While it was tested on a few prototypes, it too proved unusable due to excessive vibration. On the other hand, the installation of two non-synchronized machine guns in the wings proved to be more promising, and this was implemented and installed on the later Bf 109E. For the reflector gunsight, a Revi C/12C type was used.
The Bf 109A and B versions
The Bf 109 A version is somewhat of a mystery in the sources. Usually this version, besides a few mentions, is rarely described in the sources. According to Messerschmitt’s own documents, a small series of 20 to at least 22 aircraft of this version were built. It appears that in every aspect, it was the same as the later B version. The only major difference between these two versions was that the A was solely equipped with the two machine guns in the upper engine cowling.
This is probably why most sources barely mentioned the A version, likely lumping them in with the B version. To further complicate matters author D. Nesić mentioned that while version A was planned to enter production, it was abandoned due to its weak armament.
Once the Bf 109 was accepted for service, a small pre-production run of 10 Bf 109B-0 was completed. It was powered by a 610 hp Jumo 210B, and served mainly to finalize the later production version. The Bf 109B-1 was powered by a 635hp Jumo 210D engine. This engine was fitted with a fixed-pitch two-blade wooden propeller. It was armed with three machine guns, with two placed above the engine compartment, and the third fired through the centerline of the engine and propeller hub. During the production run of the B-1, some minor changes were introduced. The three-wire radio antennas were replaced with a single one. To provide better cooling of the machine guns, several vent ports were added. The Bf 109B-1 was then replaced with the Bf 109B-2. The 109B-2 was initially powered by a 640 hp Jumo 210E but was replaced with a stronger 670 hp Jumo 210G. The wooden propeller was upgraded to a new completely metal, variable-pitch, two-bladed propeller.
While at first glance, the infamous Bf 109 seems to be a well-documented aircraft, this is not quite the case. Namely, there are significant differences in the sources regarding the precise designation of the B series. For example sources like R. Jackson (Messerschmitt Bf 109 A-D series) and J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (German Aircraft of the WW2) divided the B series into three sub-series: the B-0, B-1, and B-2.
On the other hand sources like R. Cross, G. Scarborough and H. J. Ebert (Messerschmitt Bf 109 Versions B-E) mentioned that in the Messerschmitt archives, no evidence for the existence of a B-2 series was found. In addition, while the Jumo 210G may have been tested on the Bf 109B series, there is also little evidence that it was actually installed in them. This is also supported by sources like Lynn R. (Messerschmitt Bf 109 Part-1: Prototype). This particular source indicated that all alleged modifications to the B-2 were actually implemented on the B-1 aircraft.
Early Bf 109 operational use
The Bf 109 was shown to the general public for the first time during the 1936 Olympic Games held in Germany. The following year several Bf 109’s (including the V10, V13, two B-1, and one B-2) participated in the international flying competition held in Zurich, Switzerland, easily winning several awards including fastest dive, climbing, and flew a circuit of the Alps, etc. The event was not without incident, as the Bf 109 V10 had an engine problem, and its pilot Ernst Udet, was forced to crash land it.
In Spain
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Francisco Franco, who was the leader of the Nationalists, sent a plea to Adolf Hitler for German aid in providing military equipment including aircraft. At the early stages of the war, nearly all of Spain’s mostly outdated aircraft were in the hands of the Republicans. To make matters worse for Franco nearly all forces loyal to him were stationed in Africa. As the Republicans controlled the Spanish navy, Franco could not move his troops back to Spain safely. Franco was therefore forced to seek foreign aid. Hitler, seeing Spain as a potential ally, was keen on helping Franco and agreed to provide assistance. At the end of July 1936, some 86 aircrew personnel, together with 6 He 51 and 20 Ju 57 were secretly transported to Spain. This air unit would serve as the basis of the so-called German Condor Legion which operated in Spain during the war. The Ju 52 transport aircraft proved instrumental in transporting the Francoist forces to Spain. The operation was a success, but the enemy was quite busy with their own preparations.
On the other side, the Republicans were greatly supported by the Soviets, providing them with some 30 I-15 fighters in late 1936. Additionally, the Republicans operated a number of Soviet SB-2 bombers. The few He 51 fighters of the Condor Legion were outdated and outnumbered by the enemy air force, so a request was made to send additional and more modern aircraft. Seeing an opportunity to test the performance of the Bf 109 in real combat situations, it was agreed to send a few to Spain. One of the first Bf 109 V4 to be sent to Spain was unfortunately damaged in an accident. Several delays later on the 14th of December, the Bf 109 V3 arrived in Spain. These arriving aircraft were initially used for a few weeks for testing and training. Initial evaluation of these early aircraft proved to be more than satisfactory, and additional aircraft of this type was requested. Besides the V3 and V4, the V6 was also sent to Spain. The fate of the V5 is not clear; some sources mentioned (like R. Jackson) that it was also used in the Spanish Theater. Lynn R. (Messerschmitt Bf 109 Part-1: Prototype) on the other hand informs us that the V5 was used during 1937 for weapon trials and thus not sent to Spain.
In early 1937 the first of the Bf 109s began to arrive. It is unclear which exact version was first issued for service, these were either version A or B. Author Lynn R. ( Messerschmitt Bf 109 Part-1: Prototype) mentioned that the first aircraft used were of the A version. He indicated that this was the case for several reasons, one of which was the use of only two machine guns. In addition, these were not equipped with the later-developed automatic cycling gun mechanism, which alleviated ammunition jam and misfeed issues. In total, at least 16 aircraft of the early Bf 109 would be sent in this shipment. Sources like R. Jackson (Messerschmitt Bf 109 A-D series) mentioned that only the B version was used in Spain.
In March 1937, with the arrival of the first group of the new Bf 109, two fighter groups were formed. These were the I and II/Jagdgruppe J.88 under the command of Lieutenant Günther Lützow. Interestingly, these aircraft were initially to be given to JG 132 stationed at Döberitz-Elsgrund. Due to the urgent need to reinforce the Condor Legion, JG 132 pilots with the Bf 109 were transported to Spain instead. Besides markings, they also received numerical designations beginning with 6-1, 6-2, and so on. The precise method which was used to determine the numbering designation is not clear. For example, the V3, which arrived second, received the 6-2, and later 6-1 designation. The Bf 109 that served with the Condor Legion received a large black circle on the fuselage for identification. Two additional black circles with a large white “X” were painted on the wings. An additional black X was painted on the rear tail.
Initially, it was planned that the Germans would act as instructors for their Spanish allies. As the Spanish had problems piloting the newly supplied aircraft, many German instructors would themselves see extensive combat action during the war.
Lützow was also the one who achieved the first kill of the Bf 109B that was used in Spain. He managed to shoot down a Republican I-15 on the 6th of April 1937. Three more victories were achieved during that month. At the end of April, the II.J/88 provided protection for bombers that raided the small town of Guernica. Initially, the few Bf 109 that were available did not have much effect on the war efforts of the Nationalists. The Republicans had nearly 150 modern Soviet fighters and thus had a clear advantage. During the heavy fighting at Madrid in July 1937, the Bf 109 engaged the enemy I-16’s for the first time in the conflict.
In July of 1937, a Bf 109 from the II.J/88, managed to shoot down three SB-2 bombers, one Aero A.101 light bomber, and three I-16. But the J.88 also suffered its first casualty of the war, a Bf 109B which was piloted by Guido Honess was shot down by an I-16 on the 12th of July. On the 17th, another Bf 109 was shot down but the pilot Gotthard Handrick managed to survive. The next day, another Bf 109 was lost but the pilot was only lightly wounded.
In August 1937, the Nationalists launched an offensive toward Republican-held positions around Santander. The heavy fighting that lasted up to October saw extensive use of air forces on both sides. The Nationalists were reinforced with the I.J/88 under the command of Harro Harder. By late October this commander managed to bring down 7 enemy aircraft. At the end of 1937, an incident of note occurred where a Bf 109A piloted by Otto Polenz was forced to land on Republican-held territory. His aircraft was captured almost intact and shipped to the Soviet Union for examination. During the German Invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, this particular aircraft would be recaptured.
On the 16th of December, the Republicans launched an offensive toward the city of Teruel. Given the severe winter, the J.88 was unable to provide air support and the city fell to the Republicans. From late January and early February on, thanks to better weather, the German Bf 109s were once again active. On the 7th of February 1938, Wilhelm Balthasar managed to alone shoot down four SB-2 bombers alone during one flight. He too was forced to a harsh landing having received numerous hits by the bomber’s defensive fire, but Balthasar survived the landing.
By April 1938 the Nationalists realized that a direct attack on Madrid would be almost impossible without heavy casualties, and decided on another approach. They instead focused on the southern parts of Spain. The J.88 too was repositioned there and took on the enemy aircraft. Several Bf 109s were lost during this time, but most of these were either to mechanical breakdowns or pilot errors. For example, on one occasion two Bf 109s collided in midair on the 4th of April. While one pilot was killed, the second managed to escape by using a parachute. The following month saw extensive fighting on the ground and in the air. The Bf 109 pilots, thanks to their better machines and experience, achieved a series of victories over their opponents. On one occasion in late July 1938, three squadrons of Bf 109 took on a group of 40 I-15 and I-16. After a long engagement, the enemy lost six planes, while the Nationalists lost none. The Germans pilots were achieving so many victories that they had to invent excuses in order to not be sent back to Germany. According to official regulations, once a pilot had achieved 5 kills, he was to be replaced by another pilot. This regulation was clearly ignored as pilots like Werner Molders achieved some 14 victories. Other pilots were also very successful, Otto Bertram achieved four victories during August. While Werner Molders scored 8 victories through this period. During 1938, an additional 26 Bf 109B-1 with coded numbers, ranging from 6-19 to 6-45 arrived in Spain.
By early 1939, the Nationalists managed to gain almost complete air supremacy, thus air to air combat became a rare event. The J.88 aircraft were from this point on mostly used for ground attack operations. The last J.88 air victory of the war was achieved on the 5th of March when an I-15 was shot down. Out of some 130 Bf 109s that saw service in Spain, between 20 to 40 aircraft were lost (depending on the source). Not all were lost in air combat, most were lost due to mechanical breakdowns, pilot errors, or hard landings.
While the Republicans would fly in loose formations with any proper tactics, the Germans would employ a so-called Schwarm (swarm) tactic. This basically consisted of using a group of four aircraft, which would fly in a reverse ‘V’ shaped formation, with some 200 meters separating each aircraft. When attacking, these would be divided into two groups of two aircraft. Which were intended to provide each other with cover in the event enemy fighters gave chase.
In German Service
While the Bf 109 was initially used for various tests and participated in sporting events, these aircraft were soon allocated to Luftwaffe units. The first such unit to receive the Bf 109 B-1 was the Jagdgeschwader (fighter squadron) JG 132 in February of 1937, being supplied with 25 aircraft. Due to some delays in production, the second unit equipped with the Bf 109, II./JG 234, was formed nearly nine months later. In early 1938, the production of the Bf 109 was greatly increased which provided a sufficient number of aircraft to equip additional units.
The early Bf 109s were prepared to see potential action during the political crisis regarding the German relationship with Austria and later Czechoslovakia. Even by the end of 1937, the pressure on Austrian politicians was great as the Germans wanted to install a more friendly government. All these political machinations ended in March 1938 when German troops entered Austria without any resistance.
The German request for territories belonging to Czechoslovakia was initially met with fierce resistance from the Western Allies, France, and the United Kingdom. These tensions could have easily cascaded into open war. This particularly caused huge concern in the RLM, as the German Air Force was not yet ready for a war. The situation was so desperate that even some He 112 were accepted for service. In the end, the Western Allies backed down, not willing to go to war, and allowed the Germans to take disputed Czechoslovakian territory.
As the new and improved models of the C and D versions began to be available, the Bf 109B were slowly being allocated to secondary roles, such as training. In this role, some would survive up to 1943. By the time of the invasion of Poland in September, the majority of Bf 109 in use were the D version, with ever-increasing numbers of the new E version. While some Bf 109B were still present in frontline units, their fighting days were over.
Production
For the upcoming Bf 109 production, initially BFW AG was responsible. As it lacked production capabilities given that it was already under contract (made earlier with RLM) to build several other aircraft types, another solution was needed. When BFW AG completed all previously ordered aircraft, it was to focus its production capabilities on the Bf 109.
To increase overall Bf 109 production, other manufacturers were also contracted. Some 175 were built at Erla Maschinenwerk from Leipzig, with 90 more by Fieseler, and only 76 aircraft by BFW. The production run of the Bf 109A lasted from December 1936 to February 1937. In 1937 some 341 Bf 109B would be built.
Production Versions
Bf 109 V – Prototypes series aircraft
Bf 109 A – Proposed production version built in small numbers
Bf 109 B-0 – A small pre-production series
Bf 109 B-1 – Production version
Bf 109 B-2 – Slightly improved B-1 version incorporating a new propeller. Note that the existence of this particular version is disputed in sources.
Surviving Aircraft
Today only one Bf 109B-0 V-10 is known to have survived. Given its rather low production numbers, this is not surprising. It is in a private collection of the “Bayerische Flugzeug Historiker” Oberschleissheim in Munich, Germany.
Conclusion
Despite focusing mainly on civilian aircraft, Messerchmitt and his team of engineers managed to design a fighter that bested all the other well-established manufacturers for Luftwaffe’s new fighter program. The Bf 109 was inexpensive to build and possessed good overall flight capabilities. While a good design, there was plenty of room for improvement, mainly regarding its armament and engine, which would be greatly improved in subsequent iterations.
Me 109B-1 Specifications
Wingspans
9.9 m / 32 ft 4 in
Length
8.7 m / 28 ft 6 in
Height
2.45 m / 8 ft
Wing Area
16.4 m² / 174 ft²
Engine
Jumo 210D
Empty Weight
1,580 kg / 3,483 lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight
1,955 kg / 4,310 lbs
Maximum Speed
450 km/h / 280 mph
Cruising speed
350 km/h / 220 mph
Range
690 km / 430 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling
8,200 m
Crew
1 pilot
Armament
Initially three 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns, later changed to four same type machine guns
Illustrations
Credits
Written by Marko P.
Edited by Stan L. Henry H.
Illustrations by Hansclaw
Source
D. Nesić (2008) Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka. Beograd.
D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books.
R. Jackson (2015) Messerschmitt Bf 109 A-D series, Osprey Publishing
J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1972) German Aircraft of the WW2, Putham
R. Cross, G. Scarborough and H. J. Ebert (1972) Messerschmitt Bf 109 Versions B-E Airfix Products LTD.
J. R. Beaman and J. L. Campbell (1980) Messerschmitt Bf 109 in action Part-1, Squadron publication
Lynn R. (1980) Messerschmitt Bf 109 Part-1: Prototype to ‘E’ Variants, SAM Publication
During the 1930’s the Aeronautica Regală Română ARR (Romanian Royal Aeronautics or Airforce) was in great need of more modern aircraft design. Their fighter force was poorly equipped with obsolete aircraft such as the PZL P.11 and P.24, being of dated Polish origin. Thus the Romanians were in desperate need of better designs. Luckily for them, the Heinkel factory was more than willing to supply them with one of their failed competitors for the new German fighter, the He 112. The Romanians were impressed and placed an order for 30 such aircraft which would remain in use up to 1946.
A brief He 112 history
Prior to the Second World War, the Luftwaffe was in need of a new and modern fighter that was to replace the older biplane fighters that were in service, such as the Arado Ar 68 and Heinkel He 51. For this reason, in May 1934 the RLM issued a competition for a new and modern fighter plane. While four companies responded to this request, only the designs from Heinkel and Messerschmitt were deemed sufficient. The Heinkel He 112 was a good design that offered generally acceptable flight characteristics and possessed a good basis for further improvements. The Bf 109 on the other hand had slightly better overall flight performance and was much simpler and cheaper to build. Given the fact that the Germans were attempting to accelerate the production of the new fighter, this was seen as a huge advantage over the He 112. Ultimately it would not be accepted for service, and only 100 or so aircraft would be built. These would be mainly sold abroad, with those remaining in Germany used for various testing and evaluation purposes.
While the He 112 project was canceled by the RLM, to compensate for the huge investment in resources and time to it, Heinkel was permitted to export this aircraft. A number of countries such as Austria, Japan, Romania, and Finland showed interest, but only a few actually managed to procure this aircraft, and even then, only in limited numbers.
Technical Characteristics
The He 112 was an all-metal single-engine fighter. The monocoque fuselage consisted of a metal base covered by riveted stress metal sheets. The wing was slightly gulled, with the wingtips bending upward, and had the same construction as the fuselage with a combination of metal construction covered in stressed metal sheets.
During its development life, a great number of different types of engines were tested on the He 112. For the main production version, He 112 B-2, the 700 hp Jumo 210G liquid-cooled engine was used, and some were equipped with the 680 hp Jumo 210E engine. The He 112 had a fuel capacity of 101 liters in two wing-mounted tanks, with a third 115-liter tank placed under the pilot’s seat.
The landing gear was more or less standard in design. They consisted of two larger landing wheels that retracted into the wings and one semi-retractable tail wheel. The He 112 landing gear was wide enough to provide good ground handling and stability during take-off or landing.
The cockpit received a number of modifications. Initially, it was open with a simple windshield placed in front of the pilot. Later models had a sliding canopy that was either partially or fully glazed.
While the armament was changed during the He 112’s production, the last series was equipped with two 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns and two 2 cm Oerlikon MG FF cannons. The ammunition load for each machine gun was 500 rounds, with 60 rounds each for the cannons. If needed, two bomb racks could be placed under the wings.
In Romanian Hands
While Heinkel was desperately trying to sell more of the He 112 fighters, a potential new customer arose in the Balkans. This was Romania, which during the 1930s was severely lacking in aircraft, and the strength of its Air Force was worryingly low in comparison to most European countries. Its main fighter at this time was the obsolete P.Z.L P.11 and P.24 fighters which were acquired from Poland. A smaller number of these were purchased, with the majority being built under license. In an attempt to find the solution to this urgent problem, Romanian King Carol II himself went to visit several potential aircraft manufacturers in Europe. The Germans in particular were quite keen to have a good relationship with Romania, mostly due to its rich oil fields. The Romanians were very interested in acquiring the new Bf 109 fighter, but as it was slowly entering production in Germany, it was not yet audible in sufficient numbers for export. As a temporary solution, the He 112E, an export model based on the B version, was proposed instead. One He 112 was acquired in 1938 and was extensively tested by both the Romanian Air Force pilots and by the engineers at Industria Aeronautică Română I.A.R. (Romanian Aeronautic Industry). While some issues, such as rather poor rudder response and handling during flight, were noted, due to the urgent need for a modern fighter and a lack of alternatives, the initial order for 24 was increased to 30 aircraft. These were the He 112V-1 and B-2 versions equipped with the Jumo 210E and G engines.
Prior to shipment, a group of Romanian pilots arrived in Germany to be sufficiently trained to operate this fighter. This transition to a new, low-wing aircraft, with a fully enclosed crew cockpit and retractable landing gear, was not easy for the Romanian pilots who needed time to adapt to the new design. Once the whole training process was completed the 30 aircraft were sent to Romania. They arrived during a period of late August to early October 1939. During their flight from Germany to Romania, one He 112 was lost in an accident, while a second was damaged but later repaired at I.A.R. The Romanians tested the newly arrived He 112 against the domestically developed I.A.R.80 fighter. The Romanian aircraft proved to be a better design overall, but the He 112, thanks to its good overall handling and firepower, were also deemed satisfactory.
The 5th Fighter Group
The Romans used the 29 He 112 to equip the Grupul 5 Vânătoare (5th Fighter group). This unit consisted of the Escadrila 10 and 11 (10th and 11th Squadrons), later in October 1939 renamed to Scadrila 51 and 52. The main purpose of this unit was to protect the capital from any potential aerial threat. In April 1940, Germany sent one replacement aircraft for the one lost in transit the previous year, so technically Romanian operated 31 He 112’s in total. In May 1940, the He 112 was first presented to the Romanian public during a military parade.
The Romanian-Hungarian War
In Summer the rising tension between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania reached a critical point. Transylvania was part of Hungary but was lost after the First World War when it was given to Romania. In 1940, the Hungarian Army began preparing for a possible war with Romania. As neither side was willing to enter a hastily prepared war, negotiations began to find a possible solution. But despite this, there were some minor skirmishes. Hungarian aircraft made several reconnaissance flights over Romania. The Romanians responded by repositioning 12 He 112’s to the border but these failed to achieve any success against the enemy reconnaissance operation. On the 27th of August, an He 112 managed to intercept a Hungarian Ca 135 severely damaging it and forcing it to land. Ultimately, at the end of August, Romania asked Germany to arbitrate the issue regarding the disputed territory. Hungary managed to get to the northern part of Transylvania. On the 12th September 1940, one He 112 was lost when during a training flight, the aircraft caught fire from the engine compartment, and the pilot lost control and crashed ground, losing his life in this accident.
In Combat
Following the start of the Second World War with the Soviets, on the 22nd of June 1941, the 24 available (the remaining aircraft were under repairs) He 112’s were repositioned to the Focșani-North airfield in mid-June 1941. Their main task was to attack a Soviet Airfield and other ground targets. While not particularly designed for this role, thanks to its strong armament and even a small bomb load, it had enough firepower to deal serious damage. But the pilots were not trained in this manner nor the aircraft was sufficiently protected, lacking armor to protect the pilot and self-sealing fuel tanks. Occasionally they provided support cover to Romanian bombers. The Romanian main fighter in service at that time was the I.A.R. 80, so the He 112 was to fulfill secondary combat roles.
The He 112 began their first combat actions of the war against the Soviets by flying in an escort mission for the Romanian Potez 63 bombers on the 22nd of June 1941. These were heading toward the Soviet airfields at Bolgrad and Bulgarica. The attack on Bolgrad was successful despite strong Soviet anti-aircraft fire. As the Romanian air group was approaching the Bulgarica airfield they were met with resistance of some 30 Soviet I-16 fighters. One He 112 piloted by Teodor Moscu attacked two I-16 that were in the process of taking off from the airfield. Moscu managed to shoot down one I-16 on his first run. While he was pulling off from his attack another I-16 attacked his He 112. Moscu managed to shoot down this aircraft too, but his He 112 was badly damaged and losing fuel. He managed to reach a Romanian airfield and land the damaged fighter. Teodor Moscu was officially credited with achieving the first air victory for the Romanians during the War with the Soviets.
On the 23rd, the He 112’s mostly performed ground attack operations against Soviet targets. The same day, some 12 He 112 attacked the Bolgrad airfield. The Soviets responded by sending 7 I-153 fighters. After a brief clash, the Soviet fighters managed to shoot down one He 112. On the 24th, two He 112 were damaged in an accident. On the 28th of June, an He 112 was lost when it was shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft fire. The same day another He 112 was lost when the pilot made a mistake during landing, ultimately leading to an explosion with the aircraft and the pilot being lost. One more was badly damaged when it caught fire after battling a Soviet fighter.
On the 2nd of July, two more fighters were lost again due to Sovie ground anti-air efforts. Three days later the He 112s once again attacked the Bulgarica airfield, attacking the Soviet aircraft with bombs, cannons, and machine gun fire. One I-153 that attempted to take off, but was intercepted and shot down. One He 112 was damaged in the process. Later that day, the He 112’s provided a bomber escort mission where they engaged a group of 12 Soviet fighters. In this engagement, the Romanian pilots managed to bring down 4 enemy fighters but lost one He 112 in the process.
On the 7th of July, two He 112’s attacked a column of Soviet cars near Comrat. The He 112s managed to destroy several of these cars. An interesting event occurred on the 12th of July. On that day, a He 112 was operated by Ioan Lascu while searching for targets in the area of Valea Hârtoapelor. The pilot quickly spotted an enemy armored column and proceed to attack it with bombs. After that, he went for another run and attacked them using the He 112 two cannons. This time the Soviets returned fire and the He 112 was hit by tank gunfire. The He 112 burst into flames and hit the ground, killing the pilot in the process.
In mid-july, the Soviets launched an attack in an attempt to destroy the Romanian Țiganca-Porumbiște bridgehead. Both the Romanians and the Soviets sent substantial air forces to this battle. Thanks to some 150 aircraft, the Romanians managed to repel the Soviet attack. The He 112 saw extensive action during this battle, losing one He 112 and another aircraft being damaged.
By the end of July, only 14 He 112 were reported operational while 8 were under repairs. With the arrival of the domestically built IAR 80 fighters, the He 112 was relocated to Romania in August 1941. These were temporarily allocated for defending the Romanian skies. With the great losses suffered by the 5th Fighter group, its 52nd Squadron was disbanded and its surviving aircraft relocated to the 51st. Out of necessity, the He 112 were in October, once again brought back to the front in the Odessa region, which finally fell to the Axis by mid-October. The He 112 equipped units were placed in this area carrying out either patrolling or reconnaissance missions above the Black Sea. Enemy aircraft were rarely encountered. Only one aircraft, an I-153, was shot down in the spring of 1942 in this area. This was actually the last kill achieved by the He 112 during war. Due to its inexperienced pilot, one He 112 was lost in this area.
In Late October the Romanians issued a war report where the He 112 performance was described. While the diving speed was excellent, the low horizontal and climbing speed was deemed quite poor. The fuel tanks and the pilot seat were not armored which led to unnecessary losses in men and material. The possibility to carry six 12 kg bombs was deemed satisfactory. The quality of ammunition used was poor as too often targets that were hit, did not receive any major damage.
Retirement from the frontline service
Combat around Odessa would be the last major engagement of the Romanian He 112. At the start of July 1942, the 5th Fighter Group was to be equipped with the I.A.R.80 fighters. By this time the remaining He 112 were mostly stored awaiting repairs. On the 19th of July during a Soviet night bombing raid over Bucharest, one He 112 took to the sky attempting to intercept the Soviet Bombers. This was the Romanian Air Force’s first use of fighters in a night raid attack. Even in this role the He 112 would be quickly replaced with the Me 110 twin-engine fighter.
In 1943 the surviving He 112 were placed under the Corpul 3 Aerian (3rd Corps) and acted as training aircraft on several different air bases. When the Romanin switched sides in August 1944, some 9 of the 19 available He 112 were still used as trainers where they awaited the end of the war. The last two surviving Romanian He 112 aircraft were finally scrapped in 1946.
In Soviet Aircraft Role
An interesting story related to He 112 in Romanian service was that they achieved some success in cinematography. Namly for the filming of the Italian-Romanian film ‘White Squadron’, where the He 112 were reused as Soviet fighters in September 1942. These were painted in simple gray color and received a large black star. It is unusual to use a black instead of a red star, but given that this was a black-and-white movie this was not a major issue.
Conclusion
The He 112 provided the Romanian Air Force with a capable fighter until a proper replacement could be found. With its armament, it performed generally well in ground attack operations. Due to its inadequate protection, many were brought down quite easily by enemy return fire. Due to attrition, their service life would be severely limited to only a few months of the war before being brought back to Romania to perform a secondary but vital training role. .
He 112B-2 Specifications
Wingspans
29 ft 10 in / 9.1 m
Length
30 ft 2 in / 9.22 m
Height
12 ft 7 in / 3.82 m
Wing Area
180 ft² / 17 m²
Engine
One 700 hp Jumo 210G liquid-cooled engine
Empty Weight
3,570 lbs / 1,620 kg
Maximum Take-off Weight
4,960 lbs / 2,250 kg
Climb Rate to 6 km
In 10 minutes
Maximum Speed
317 mph / 510 km/h
Cruising speed
300 mph / 484 km/h
Range
715 miles / 1,150 km
Maximum Service Ceiling
31,170 ft / 9,500 m
Crew
1 pilot
Armament
Two 20 mm (1.8 in) cannons and two machine guns 7.92 mm (0.31 in) machine guns and 60 kg bombs
Credits
Article written by Marko P.
Edited by Henry H. and Pavel. A
Ported by Henry H.
Illustration by Godzilla
Source:
Duško N. (2008) Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemаčaka. Beograd
J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1990) German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam
D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
T.L. Morosanu and D. A. Melinte Romanian (2010) Fighter Colours 1941-1945 MMP Books
D. Bernard (1996) Heinkel He 112 in Action, Signal Publication
R.S. Hirsch, U, Feist and H. J. Nowarra (1967) Heinkel 100, 112, Aero Publisher
C. Chants (2007) Aircraft of World War II, Grange Books.
Number built: 1 prototype plus 12 production aircraft
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite its rather undeveloped industry and infrastructure, still possessed several aircraft manufacturing companies. During the 1930s, these produced a series of aircraft that would be adopted for military use. These were mostly training aircraft but there were also several fighter designs that would see service with the Kingdom of Yugoslavian Royal Air Force (RYAF). Among them was the IK-3 fighter, created by the well-known Yugoslavian aircraft engineers Ljubomir Ilić, Kosta Sivčev, and Slobodan Zrnić.
History
During the 1930s, the RYAF was mainly equipped with old and obsolete biplane fighters. While this would be eventually solved by the introduction of more modern, foreign designs like the Bf 109 and the Hawker Hurricane, some Yugoslavian aircraft engineers wanted to develop domestic fighter designs. This motivated two aircraft engineers from Ikarus, Ljubomir Ilić and Kosta Sivčev, to start working on such a design. They were already involved in designing a new high-wing fighter named IK-2. This aircraft proved to be superior to older biplane fighters that were in RYAF service. But after a small production series of 12 aircraft, it became obvious that this aircraft would quickly become obsolete, in contrast to other nations’ low-wing fighters.
For this reason in 1933, Ljubomir Ilić and Kosta Sivčev began working on improved fighters on their own initiative. While initially, they tested various ideas, eventually both agreed that a low-wing design was the best option. While having experience in fighter design, these two quickly realized that this project would require more work than the two engineers could achieve on their own. So they asked another engineer Slobodan Zrnić to assist in their work. All three of them worked on this project under the veil of secrecy. Finally, in 1936 they had a finalized project which was presented to the RYAF officials. After some time spent considering this new proposal, the RYAF gave the green light for it at the end of March 1937. A deal was made for the construction of a single prototype for testing and evaluation. While the IK-2 was built by Ikarus, the construction of the new aircraft was given to Rogožarski instead. Given the experience this company had working with wooden airframes, the new fighter was to have a primarily wooden construction to reduce costs and speed up development time.
Name
This project would receive the IK-3 designation. At that time it was common practice that any newly developed aircraft was to be named based on the designer’s initials. In this case, I stood for Ilić and K for Koča, which was Kosta Sivčev’s nickname. The number 3 represents the third fighter project of these two engineers.
Construction of the Prototype
After one year of work, the first prototype was completed. In appearance and design, this was quite a modern aircraft. It was built using a mixed construction and was powered by a 925 hp V-12 Hispano-Suiza 12Y29 engine. It was flight tested for the first time on the 14th of April, 1938. An initial series of test flights were carried out near the capital of Belgrade at Zemun. The test pilot at this early stage was Captain Milan Bjelanović. These flight tests lasted up to the late summer of 1938. During this time, there were no major problems reported with its design, and the aircraft was given to the RYAF for future testing.
A commission of several RYAF officials was elected for the planned army testing and it was agreed that the whole process should last 100 flight hours. For this, the aircraft was to be fully armed which included a centerline mounted 20mm cannon which fired through the propeller hub, and two 7.92 mm machine guns placed in the upper engine cowling.
Following the conclusion of the testing by the RYAF, a report was issued in which its performance was deemed sufficient. The armament was installed and functioned without any major issues, however, it was desirable to add two more machine guns in the wings. The aircraft offered good overall flying performance though its controls were noted to be somewhat problematic and some changes were requested. To resolve this it was asked to improve the design of the flaps, by increasing their deployed angle and size. The canopy was of rather poor quality and was reflective, forcing some test pilots to fly the aircraft with open canopies. The engine had overheating problems which required extensive work before finally being solved by adding an improved cooling system. During these trials, the maximum speed achieved was slightly over 520 km/h. While not bad, the RYAF commission wanted it to be increased to at least 540 km/h, which was not achieved on this aircraft. Overall, this aircraft was deemed worth developing further by the RYAF commission, which gave a recommendation for a small series of 12 aircraft to be produced.
The production of the IK-3
Following the production orders for the IK-3, an accident happened that threatened the realization of the project. On the 19th of January 1939, an accident occurred during a test flight, and test pilot Captain Milan Pokorni was killed, and the plane was lost. A commission was formed to examine what went wrong. After analyzing the wreckage it was determined that the IK-3 prototype’s structural design was not at fault, nor did the pilot make any mistakes. Prior to this accident another pilot Dragutin Rubčić, had a harsh landing, damaging the aircraft in the process. Why this was not properly examined before another take-off by Captain Milan Pokorni is unclear. In another account, during a dive, the canopy broke free which probably made the pilot enter a climb. This seemingly caused enough force to be put on the already damaged aircraft, resulting in structural failure.
While this accident did not lead to the cancellation of the whole project, it did cause huge delays in the delivery of new aircraft. The RYAF officials wanted the aircraft to be thoroughly examined and tested before any further production order was given. Finally, in November 1939, the project received a green light again.
The second prototype, which was also the first aircraft of the first production series, was completed in December 1939. This aircraft was examined in detail over the next few months. As no major issues with the prototype were found, the production of additional 5 aircraft was completed by the 17th of April 1940. The other six aircraft could not be completed as the IK-3’s propellers had to be imported. As there were delivery problems with the last six aircraft, instead of the hydraulically controlled Hispano-type propeller, they were equipped instead with Chauviere-type propellers. It used pneumatic commands which necessitated changes to the engine and its compartment. These were finally completed in July 1940. Once all were available these were allocated to the 51st Fighter Group in July 1940. These were divided into two six-aircraft strong squadrons (the 161st and 162nd) stationed at Zemun airfield near the capital Belgrade.
Second series proposal
In march 1940, the Rogožarski company proposed to the RYAF another production run of 25 to 50 new IK-3 aircraft. It was to incorporate a number of improvements like self-sealing fuel tanks, a redesigned radiator, adding radio equipment, armor for the pilot seat, an aerodynamically improved engine cowling, and a new gunsight. The company proposed that these could be completed in a period of 9 months. To speed up the developing process, one IK-3 (serial number 7) was selected to be converted as the prototype of this new series. This aircraft was completed by the end of March 1941. It was flown in early April, managing to reach a speed some 15 to 20 km faster than the standard IK-3. Its further development was stopped due to the outbreak of the war.
Further IK-3 modification proposals
Some accounts claim that the aircraft was tested with a DB 601 from one of the RYAF’s imported German fighters. According to eyewitness accounts, this model was fully completed and tested. If this was true, it was not confirmed by any historical documentation or photographic evidence. At the same time a Hurricane aircraft was tested with this engine (known as LVT-1). It is possible that an eyewitness simply confused these two.
Another proposed project was the IK-3/2 two-seater trainer. It was planned to add another position to the rear of the pilot, reduce the armament to two machine guns, and move the cooling radiator some 50 cm to the rear. As a number of modern Bf 108 aircraft were acquired, this project was dropped with no prototype ever constructed.
In service, prior to the war
The newly produced IK-3 entered service at the end of 1940 and was used primarily in training flights. They were especially used to test their performance against the Bf 109, which was also in service with the RYAF. The Bf 109 offered better horizontal and climbing speed. In comparison, the IK-3 possessed better horizontal maneuverability, possessing a smaller turning radius of 260 m, the Bf 109 on the other hand had a turning radius of 320 m. The IK-3 also had a somewhat more stable armament installation, providing better accuracy during firing. As the pilots who flew on the IK-3 were not entirely accustomed to flying on modern airplanes, harsh landings were quite common. This necessitated that many IK-3 were often in workshops awaiting repairs of their landing gear units.
The sixth produced IK-3 would be lost in an accident that happened on the 3rd of September 1940. During a mock dogfight with a Potez 25, pilot Anton Ercigoj lost control of the fighter and fell into the Danube river. The pilot was killed on the spot and the aircraft could not be salvaged. While it was not clear how the accident happened, it was speculated that it did occur due to the pilot being too tired from previous flights.
In War
Just prior to the outbreak of the so-called April war, from the 6th to 17th April 1941, between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Axis forces, only 6 IK-3 were combat-ready. The remaining 5 aircraft were awaiting repairs. Three were located at the Rogožanski workshop in Bežanijska Kosa, and two more at the Zemun Airfield. The war began with massive Luftwaffe bombing raids on vital military, communication, infrastructure, and civilian targets. The capital, Belgrade, was a primary target of strategic bombing and was majorly hit. The whole 6th Fighter Regiment, to which the 51st Fighter Group belonged, was tasked to defend Northern Serbia and parts of Croatia and Bosnia from any potential enemy attacks. The 51st Fighter Group reinforced the 102nd Fighter Squadron equipped with Bf 109 and was tasked with defending the Northern sector. Its primary defense point was the capital Belgrade.
The 51st Fighter Group was informed of a possible enemy attack almost an hour before it occurred. At 0645, the unit was informed of two approaching enemy aircraft formations. Five minutes later, all available IK-3s took to the sky to defend the capital. One aircraft, due to engine problems, had to abort the flight and went back to the base.
During the first engagement, some 5 to 6 enemy aircraft (at least one Ju 87) were shot down. One IK-3 was shot down and three more were damaged. Two of these were badly damaged and they were not used in combat after this point. The defenders were then left with only three operational IK-3 aircraft. Late that morning, another bombing raid was launched by the enemy. While only three IK-3 were available at this point, their attack was supported by the Bf 109s from the 51st Group. While the Yugoslavian fighters reported no losses, they managed to take down one Bf 109 and damaged two Ju 87. During the first day of combat, the Germans used nearly 500 bombers which dropped some 360 tonnes of bombs on Belgrade.
The following day, enemy activity came in the form of smaller formations that attacked specific targets. The Ik-3s once again saw action, managing to shoot down more enemy aircraft. While they received no losses, many aircraft were badly damaged by enemy return fire. For example, the IK-3 fighter piloted by Milisav Semiz received 56 hits. The engine itself received some 20 direct hits. While fully covered in engine oil the pilot managed to land safely at the Zamun airfield, the aircraft had to be written off. This unit was reinforced with one IK-3 of the second series. Due to heavy enemy activity, the unit was repositioned some 50 km away from Belgrade at Ruma. For the next few days due to bad weather, the IK-3 was not used. On the 11th of April, the Yugoslavian positions were discovered by a Me 110, which proceeded to attack the airfield. It failed to do any damage, but one IK-3 began a pursuit of it. Eventually, it managed to close in on it and shoot it down. Later that day, two IK-3s took to the sky and managed to shoot down two Ju 87s.
At 1700 hours, due to an enemy ground advance, it was decided to move the available units to Bosnia. The retreat was to commence on the 12th of April, but due to sudden enemy advances and poor weather, the evacuation could not be achieved. The unit commander and pilots agreed to burn down any surviving aircraft to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. This action basically marked the end of the IK-3 service with the RYAF.
In total both the 161st and 162nd squadrons reported some 15 air victories. These included two Ju 88, one Do 17, two Ju 87, two Bf 109, three Me 110, and one He 111. The remaining claims remain a mystery.
In German hands
The victorious Germans managed to capture a number of operational and damaged IK-3s fighters. Most were captured at Rogoarski repair workshops, with a few more at the Zemun airfield, all being abandoned. This included the IK-3 with serial numbers 2151 (which was actually the second prototype) 2152, 2153, 2157, 2158, 2160, and 2161. Most of these would be left exposed to the elements, near the capital Belgrade, until 1942 when they and many other captured aircraft were scrapped. At least one IK-3 was transported back to Germany. It is unlikely that it was used for testing, and some sources suggested but instead placed in the Berlin Aviation Museum. Its fate is unknown but likely lost when the museum was bombed by the Allies in 1944.
Technical characteristics
The IK-3 was a low-wing, mixed-construction single-seat fighter. Its fuselage consisted of welded chrome-molybdenum tubes supported with wooden stringers, and covered in duralumin skin. The rear part of the fuselage was covered in plywood and canvas. The wings were mostly made of wood with some metal links added for better structural stability. The IK-3 wings were covered with birch plywood which was in turn covered in bakelite. The ailerons were made of metal, but covered with canvas. While the trailing edge flaps were made of duralumin, assembly was made using the same materials as the wings.
The IK-3 was powered by a 925 hp, V-12 Hispano-Suiza 12Y29 liquid-cooled engine. It used a Hamilton-type constant-speed propeller. The cooling airflow was adjustable by changing the angle of the grills located on the radiator intakes.
The canopy initially was made by using concave-convex side panels. These proved to be problematic as they distorted the pilot’s vision and were replaced with simpler flat sides. The instrument controls panel and command were directly copied from French designs. The first prototype and the later first-moved aircraft of the second series were only equipped with radios.
The landing gear was of a conventional design consisting of two front legs which retracted outwards, with the tail wheel being fully retractable. To provide better landing, the front landing gear units had shock absorbers. The IK-3 landing gear was of rather poor quality and it often broke down during landing, and led to many aircraft being constantly under repair.
Initially, the armament consisted of one 2 cm HS 404 cannon placed behind the engine, and two 7.7 mm M.31 Darne machine guns, positioned above the engine. This was used on the prototype for firing testing. Later production models were rearmed with one 2 cm Oerlikon M.39 cannon supplied with 60 rounds of ammunition. The 7.7 mm machine guns were replaced with two 7.92 mm Browning machine guns. The ammunition load for each machine gun consisted of 500 rounds.
Production
Despite its advanced design, only one prototype and 12 aircraft would be built. This took an extended period of time to be completed from December 1939 to July 1940. While proving to be one of the better domestically developed aircraft, the RYAF was reluctant to order more IK-3 fighters as it was heavily dependent on imported parts.
Production Versions
IK-3 Prototypes – Two prototypes were completed
IK-3 – Production version
IK-3 II Series – One aircraft converted to this version
IK-3 powered by a DB 601 engine – Allegedly one aircraft was modified this way, but the evidence is lacking
IK-3/2 Series – Proposal for a two-seater trainer, none ever completed
Conclusion
Despite being a very capable design, the IK-3 saw only limited production. This was mainly the case due to many of its parts having to be imported, something that could not be easily done in war-torn Europe. When used in combat, despite the limited number of operational aircraft, they performed well, with claims for 10 enemy aircraft at the loss of only one IK-3. Ultimately they could do little to turn the tide of the war, and most were either captured or destroyed by their own crews to avoid being captured.
IK-3 Specifications
Wingspans
10.3 m / 33 ft 4 in
Length
8 m / 26 ft 3 in
Height
3.5 m / 10 ft 9 in
Wing Area
16.5 m² / 178 ft²
Engine
925 hp V-12 Hispano-Suiza 12Y29 liquid-cooled engine
Yugoslavia (1933)
Fighter – 2 Prototypes & 12 Production Aircraft Built
During the early 1930’s, the Royal Yugoslav Army Air Force (RYAF) was mainly equipped with old and obsolete biplane fighters. The introduction of a new fighter was desirable, but its development was hampered by the resistance of leading military officials, and pilots who still believed in the superiority of the biplane. Once Ikarus commenced production of the new high-wing IK-2, it readily demonstrated its superiority over the biplanes of the prior generation.
History of Ikarus
Ikarus was one of the first Yugoslavian domestic aircraft manufacturers. It was formed in October 1923 by a group of businessmen from the city of Novi Sad. The aircraft development department was led by Josip Mikl and Dimitrije Konjević. Josip Mikl had previously been involved in the development of hydroplanes for the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I, while Dimitrije Konjević was a former high-ranking officer in the Yugoslav Naval Air Force. The company saw success during the twenties and received a series of new orders for the production of aircraft, mostly for training. In 1927 thanks to increasing revenues, Ikarus opened a new production plant located in Zemun near the capital of Belgrade. It was heralded as a great success when it received a large production order for some 200 license-built Potez 25 aircraft in 1932.
The IK-2 Development
In early 1930, the main fighter of the RYAF was the aging Avia BH-33 biplane fighter. In the hopes of replacing it with a new domestically-developed fighter, two aircraft engineers from Ikarus, Ljubomir Ilić, and Kosta Sivčev began working on a new design. Interestingly this was a private venture and not ordered by the state, which was unusual.
While initially intended to be a low-wing fighter with retracting landing gear, due to fierce opposition from many Air Force officers and pilots who favored the old biplane design, this new concept had to be abandoned at an early stage of development. The two engineers then decided to proceed with a high-wing fighter design that was to be powered by a strong engine. A wooden mock-up was completed in 1933 which would be tested using a wind tunnel in Paris. After the first drawings and testing of the mock-up were completed, the result of this work was given to the RYAF officials in September 1933. After an analysis of all available data, a green light was given for the project, and Ikarus was instructed to build the first prototype.
At this early stage, the new fighter received the IK-L1 designation. As was common in Yugoslavia at the time, new aircraft designs usually received a designation based on the designer’s initials. In this case, I stand for Ilić and K stands for Koča which was Kosta Sivčev nickname. The L1 represents L for Fighter (Lovac in Yugoslavian) and the number 1 indicates the first prototype. The first fully functional prototype was completed by September 1934.
Testing the First Prototype
While the IK-L1 prototype was scheduled to be flight tested shortly after the first prototype was fully completed in September 1934, due to numerous delays it wasn’t conducted until April 1935. Unfortunately for the Ikarus and its design team, the first prototype had a very short and abrupt service life. As it was being prepared for the first series of test flights, an upswell of opposition, mainly from Captain Leonid Bajdak and other pilots, vehemently objected to the introduction of such a radical new design, arguing that the biplanes were superior. Regardless, Bajdak was chosen to fly test the IK-L1 prototype.
The maiden flight was made on the 22nd of April, 1935 at an airfield near Belgrade in Zemun. The first day of flying was rather successful, with the prototype exhibiting generally good performance. The test the following day produced largely similar results, but upon landing, some of the wing’s fabric skin was noted as slightly loose. Regardless, it was agreed that the testing should carry on. On the 24th of April, while flying the prototype, Captain Bajdak performed a series of unplanned aerobatics. At a height of 1,000 meters, he made a sharp dive, followed by an abrupt climb. This of course caused massive stress on the wing, which led to part of it breaking off the aircraft. Bajdak lost control and had to bail out. While he survived without injury, the IK-L1 prototype crashed and was completely destroyed.
According to Captain Bajdak in his report, he wrote that the IK-L1 had good controls and was pleasant to fly. The most obvious issues were the lack of visibility, due to the high-wing design. Another of his objections was the long take-off of some 300 meters. This was a surprisingly fair report from a pilot who professed such serious misgivings about this new design.
Work on a New Prototype
After an analysis of the IK-L1 wreckage, it was discovered that the accident was primarily due to poor build quality. As Captain Bajdak’s report was insufficient to make a final conclusion, Ikarus officials decided to produce another prototype. This time great care was taken to ensure the overall quality of its construction. Another change made was that the aircraft was built using mostly metal construction, with the exception of the aft fuselage and tail. The second prototype was designated IK-02 and took about ten months to be built, completed in June 1936. A new test pilot was chosen, Flight Lieutenant Janko Dobnikar. The series of flight tests were carried out at the newly opened test center stationed at the Zemun airfield. Early flight tests were quite satisfactory, with the IK-02 reaching a top speed of 435 km/h.
In 1937 the IK-02 prototype was tested in a mock dogfight against the Hawker Fury, the RYAF’s then-current biplane fighter. After a series of 16 such exercises, the IK-02 easily beat the Hawker Fury in almost every category of flight performance, speed, climb rate, and turning ability, among others. Frustrated by the success of the new fighter, Captain Bajdak and Lieutenant Dobnikar frequently got into fierce quarrels. It ended with Lieutenant Dobnikar challenging Captain Bajdak to a flight contest. The conditions of the contest were as follows: both pilots had to reach a height of 4 km over Zemun, after which they were to race a distance of 140 km from Belgrade to Novi Sad and back. The competition was meant to end in a mock dogfight between the two. Lieutenant Dobnikar IK-02 easily won the first two rounds of the race. The mock dogfight was fierce but Captain Bajdak’s Fury was constantly overtaken by the superior IK-02. In the end, he had to admit defeat and thus concede that the IK-02 had bested the biplane. Unfortunately, the IK-02 would be lost when it was hit by lightning during a flight. As the aircraft began to catch fire, the pilot bailed out. While he survived, the aircraft crashed and burned, completely destroying it.
Limited Production
Despite both prototypes being lost to separate accidents, their overall performance was deemed acceptable and a small production order was given. In November 1937 Ikarus was instructed to produce 12 IK-2 aircraft. The first six were delivered in December 1938, with the remaining aircraft arriving by February the following year. After a brief period of adjustment and training, the IK-2 was allocated to the 6th Fighter regiment stationed in Zemun. In October 1939, the IK-2 was redeployed to Zagreb and given to the 4th Fighter Regiment. Just prior to the Yugoslavian entry into World War II, the 4th Fighter Regiment would be repositioned to Bosanski Aleksandrovac close to Banja Luka. It was part of the 107th Squadron with the task of protecting the 8th Bomber Regiment, consisting of some 23 Bristol Blenheim bombers.
Technical Characteristics
The IK-2 was a high-wing, single-engine, almost all-metal fighter aircraft. Its fuselage was constructed of a chrome-molybdenum steel tube frame which was then covered with duralumin skin. The rear section of the fuselage close to the tail unit was covered with fabric.
The semi-cantilever wings were built using the same principle as the fuselage. The difference was that the first prototype used a fabric skin. The second prototype and the production aircraft used a duralumin skin. Two larger struts were placed beneath each wing. The tail unit was of a standard design, with one horizontal and two vertical stabilizers.
The fixed landing gear consisted of two larger wheels and a smaller tailwheel. To help during landing the front landing gear was equipped with pneumatic shock absorbers. These were also fitted with brakes. The tailwheel was steerable. Initially, the front landing wheels were covered in a protective cover, also known as ‘spats,’ which were later removed.
The cockpit was fully enclosed. Interestingly its sliding canopy actually slid down into the fuselage sides. Quite similar to those used on ordinary cars. Due to the high wing design, the pilot’s visibility was severely limited. To somewhat remedy this issue two small glass windows were placed on the cockpit fuselage sides to help during landing.
The two IK-2 prototypes were powered by an 860 hp Hispano-Suiza V-12 engine. It was equipped with an adjustable pitch three-blade propeller. The fuel tanks were located just aft of the engine in front of the cockpit. The production aircraft was powered by an 860 hp Avia HS engine. This engine was built under license in Yugoslavia. Overall performance of the aircraft did not change much, as the engine swap was mainly done to facilitate ease of maintenance.
The IK-2’s armament consisted of two 7.7 cm Darne Mle 1930 machine guns, and one 20 mm Hispano HS-9 cannon. The machine gun’s ammunition load consisted of 250 rounds each, and 60 rounds for the cannon. The cannon fired through the center of the propeller shaft, while the two machine guns were placed on each side of the front of the fuselage. Some IK-2’s had their cannon replaced with a 7.92 Browning machine gun. But by the time of the war, all available aircraft were equipped with the 20 mm cannon.
According to D. Babac, the two Darne Mle 1930 machine guns were at some point replaced with two 7.92 Browning machine guns. In addition, this author notes that the machine guns were placed above the engine compartment and not on the sides.
In War
When the war broke out on the 6th April 1941 the 4th Fighter Regiment had only 8 fully operational aircraft ready for service. Four IK-2’s suffered from mechanical breakdowns and were undergoing repairs at Zemun and Zagreb workshops. Author Z. Rendulić mentioned that only 10 IK-2 were available.
In addition, the 4th Regiment had 18 to 20 Hawker Hurricanes, making this unit among the most up-to-date in the RYAF. On the first day of the war, the IK-2 was mainly used for reconnaissance. The following day, two IK-2s tried to bring down a German reconnaissance aircraft but failed to do so. One IK-2 would be lost, possibly due to mechanical breakdown. The first proper combat engagement of the IK-2 occurred on the 9th of April when during reconnaissance, a group of some 23 Bf 109 were spotted. While one IK-2 had to land to refuel, the second one provided a delayed action in hopes of giving the 4th Fighter Regiment enough time to muster its available fighters. Shortly after, some 5 or 6 IK-2 and 8 Mk.I Hurricanes joined the fight. The German fighters were attacking in well-coordinated groups, protecting each other, while the Yugoslav fighters entered the battle in a somewhat disorganized manner. After a fierce skirmish that lasted some 10 minutes, the Germans broke off and retreated back to their base of operations in Austria. The Germans lost two aircraft, while the Yugoslavians lost three, one IK-2 and two Hurricanes. In the next few days, engagements with the enemy were rare, but the IK-2 managed to shoot down one Ju 88, in addition to two other Luftwaffe aircraft.
The 4th Regiment would meet its fate on the 14th of April when the pilots decided to destroy their remaining aircraft in order to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Despite their attempts, the Germans managed to capture one slightly damaged IK-2 belonging to the 4th Fighter Regiment. Four additional aircraft were acquired when the repair workshops in Zagreb and Belgrade were captured. Some internet sources noted that up to 9 aircraft were captured by the Germans, but this seems highly unlikely and that the number of 5 is probably correct.
In NDH Service
Following the defeat of Yugoslavia, the Independent State of Croatia, a German puppet state was created. In June 1941 a request was made to the Germans to provide over 50 captured Yugoslavian aircraft including the IK-2, in an attempt to create a Croatian Air Force. The Germans were more than willing to give the most obsolete aircraft including four IK-2. The fate of the fifth aircraft is not clear. It may have been cannibalized for spare parts, or even sent to Germany for evaluation, but due to a lack of precise sources, we can not be sure. The Croatian Air Force regularly had problems acquiring spare parts for the Yugoslavian aircraft, as these were either destroyed, sabotaged, or commandeered by the Germans. Surprisingly the IK-2 remained in service for a few years until 1944 when they were finally withdrawn from service. They were rarely used by the Croats who often complained about its poor visibility. Sadly no IK-2 survived the war, with all likely being scrapped.
Production Versions
IK-L1 – First prototype aircraft that was lost in an accident only a few days after initial trials were conducted
IK-02 – The second more successful prototype
IK-2 – Production version
Operators
Kingdom of Yugoslavia – Eight were used during the April War.
Independent State of Croatia NDH – Used four aircraft supplied by the Germans, their service was limited.
Conclusion
The Ikarus IK-2 was one of the earliest Yugoslavian attempts to develop the first proper fighter aircraft and was intended to replace the aging biplanes then in service with the Yugoslavian Royal Air Force. While it proved to possess superior performance to biplane fighters, it too was quickly made obsolete by the introduction of new low-wing fighter aircraft. Regardless, the IK-2 was a sound design, which proved that the Yugoslav aviation industry, despite its small size, was capable of producing a viable mono-wing fighter aircraft.
The Ikarus’ powerful engine and impressive armament paved the way for Yugoslavia’s later advanced monoplane, the IK-3. Its performance in key areas gave it an advantage over the Hawker Fury. The IK-2 saw combat against Germany’s advances in the early 1940s before it was ultimately superseded by more advanced aircraft.
IK-2 Specifications
Wingspans
11.4 m / 37 ft 4 in
Length
7.88 m / 25 ft 8 in
Height
3.84 m / 12 ft 6 in
Wing Area
18 m² / 59 ft²
Engine
One 860 hp Avia HS12YCrs
Empty Weight
1.500 kg / 3.300 lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight
1.875 kg / 4.130 lbs
Climb Rate to 5 km
In 5 minute 25 seconds
Maximum Speed
450 km/h / 280 mph
Cruising speed
250 km/h / 155 mph
Range
700 km/ miles
Maximum Service Ceiling
12,000 m / 39.370 ft
Crew
1 pilot
Armament
Two 7.7 mm machine guns and one 2 cm cannon
Credits
Written by Marko P.
Edited by Henry H. & Ed J.
Illustrated by Ed J.
Sources
T. Likos and D. Čanak (1998) The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War, Nacionalna i Sveučilišna Knjižnica Zagreb
V. V. Mikić (2000) Zrakoplovstvo nezavisne države Hrvatske 1941-1945, Target Beograd
Č. Janić i O. Petrović (2011) Kratka istorija vazduhoplovstva u Srbiji, Aero Komunikacije
D.Babac Elitni vidovi Jugoslovenske vojske u Aprilskom ratu.
Z. Rendulić (2014) Lovačka Avijacija 1914-1945, Teovid
B. Dimitrijević, M. Micevski and P. Miladinović (2016) Kraljevstvo Vazduhoplovstvo 1912-1945
Independent State of Croatia (1942)
Fighter – 16 Operated
Following the creation of the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia), its Air Force was plagued with many problems from the start, including a lack of modern aircraft. While generally heavily reliant on the Germans to provide them with better equipment, they were unwilling to secure any deliveries of aircraft. To resolve this issue the NDH’s Air Force officials managed to persuade Italy to sell them 10 Fiat G.50bis fighters, which remained in use up to 1945.
A Brief History of the NDH
Following the end of the First World War, Kraljevina Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca (The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – SHS) was formed in December of 1918 with the aim of uniting all Southern Slavs. This new state was, at least in theory, based on the principles of equality for these three nationalities. In reality, this Kingdom was a politically and ethically divided country. During the 1920s, there were huge political disagreements between the major parties which brought about questions regarding the continued existence of the Kingdom of SHS. This division was especially noted between the Serbian and Croatian politicians, which ultimately culminated in the assassination of several Croatian Peasant Party members, including the leader, Stjepan Radić, by a Serbian Politician in 1928.
On 6th of January, 1929, King Aleksandar Karađorđević, in an attempt to avoid the incoming political crisis, led the country into a dictatorship by abolishing parliament. He also introduced a number of political changes, including changing the name of the country to Kraljevina Jugoslavija (Kingdom of Yugoslavia.) This essentially did not resolve any of the existing problems, as inter-ethnic tensions persisted. During the early 1930s, the first mentions of Croatian Ustaše (the precise meaning is unknown, but could be roughly translated as insurgent) ultranationalist revolutionary organizations began to appear in Yugoslavia. Their main aim was the liberation of the Croatian people from Yugoslavia, by all means necessary, even by force. One of the most prominent figures of this organization was Ante Pavelić.
The Ustaše organization participated in the assassination of the Yugoslav King, Alexander Karađorđević, in Marseille in 1934. This assassination backfired to some extent for the Ustaše organization. Not only did it not lead to the collapse of Yugoslavia, but relations with Italy also improved under the Regent Prince Pavle Karađorđević in the following years. This led the Italian authorities to effectively end their support for the Ustaše and even arrested some of its members, including Pavelić.
After years of inactivity, the Ustaše benefited when the Yugoslavian government, which supported the Axis, was overthrown by pro-Allied officers in a military coup at the end of March 1941. Adolf Hitler almost immediately issued an order that Yugoslavia should be occupied. The Italians, preparing to join the war against Yugoslavia, began to support the Croatian Ustaše movement once again. With the collapse of the later Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the Axis invasion after the short April War of 1941, Croatia, with German aid, was finally able to declare independence, albeit becoming a fascist puppet state. Ante Pavelić was chosen as the leader of this puppet state. Officially, the NDH was announced on 10th April 1941. The new state received a significant territorial expansion by annexing most of western Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, parts of Serbia, and Montenegro. The Adriatic coast, while nominally part of the NDH, was actually controlled by the Italians until 1943.
Formation of the NDH Air Force
Following the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, NDH began organizing its newly-created armed forces. Its Air Force was created on the 19th of April, 1941. The leadership of the new Air Force was given to Colonel Vladimir Kren. Immediately, work began on creating adequate structural organization, acquiring manpower, and procuring equipment. Initially, plans for arming this Air Force were ambitious, including some 140 modern aircraft, such as the Ju 88 and Me 109. Its officials were quite disappointed as Germans were not willing to provide these. Instead, the NDH officials had to make do with the leftovers of the Former Royal Yugoslav Air Force, which was in German hands. NDH officials made a request that included over 50 aircraft. The Germans once again disappointed them and gave NDH only those aircraft that were mostly obsolete, while transferring the better aircraft, like the Hurricanes, to Romania instead. The only other way to acquire more capable aircraft was to ask the Italians. This is what the NDH Air Force officials did in early 1942.
The Fiat G.50 brief history
During the thirties, the Italian Ministry of Aviation (Ministero dell Aeronautica) was interested in adopting a new, all-metal monoplane fighter and ground-attack aircraft for the Italian Air Force. In April of 1935, engineer Giuseppe Gabrielli began working on a new low-wing, all-metal plane named G.50. On 28th September 1935, Gabrielli submitted his project to the Ministry of Aviation. Military officials were impressed by the design and asked him to proceed with its work. As Fiat’s production capacities were overburdened, work on this new project was instead moved to the CMASA works at Marina di Pisa, part of Fiat since 1931. Giuseppe Gabrielli was finishing his last drawings and the list of needed materials and equipment in June 1936.
The prototype was finally ready at the beginning of 1937 and was transported to the city of Turin for further testing. This prototype, under registration number MM 334, made its first test flight on 26th February 1937. Once accepted for service, the Fiat G.50 would become the first Italian all-metal fighter. Between 1938 to 1943 some 774 to 791 of all versions of the G. 50 would be built. These saw combat service starting from the Spanish Civil War, until 1943 when the few surviving aircraft were reassigned to secondary roles.
In Yugoslavia
The Fiat G. 50 participated during the short Invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Two fighter groups, the 24th, and 154th, which had 53 G.50 fighters in total were allocated for this operation. They mostly performed a few escort missions. Due to the rapid collapse of Yugoslavia’s Royal Army, these saw limited actual combat use, if any. Afterward, the Fiat G.50 was allocated to other fronts. During 1942 and 1943, limited numbers of these aircraft were used for ground attack operations against the Yugoslavian Partisans.
In NDH’s Hands
By 1942, most of the available aircraft in NDH Air Force were in poor condition, mostly due to a general lack of spare parts. NDH Army officials approached Italy with a request for 9 improved Fiat G.50 and one two-seater version. The Fiat G.50bis were slightly modified versions that had an increased fuel load, a redesigned rear fuselage and vertical stabilizer, better glazing of the cockpit, and other minor changes. But in essence, it did not offer many improvements compared to the basic version. The G.50 B bipost (two-seater) was a modified G.50 fighter version with a new cockpit and dual controls for a pilot and trainer. The front section of the cockpit was fully enclosed, in contrast with the rear which was open. The main armament was removed on the G.50 B. This version was very successful, as it was easy to build and offered almost the same flying performance as the single-seat version.
A group of six NDH pilots was sent to the Fiat company in Torino for training in January 1942. The entire acquisition process of new aircraft took several months to complete. The 9 Fiat G.50bis (serial number MM.6178 to 6186) were finally allocated to the NDH. These arrived in Croatia in April 1942. The Fiat G.50B two-seater took even more time to be delivered, arriving in late June 1942. These would be stationed on the Borongaj airfield near Zagreb. Initially, these were used for pilot training. Due to the poor condition of the airfield, two were lightly damaged during landing.
Combat Use
Almost from the start, the new NDH regime began the persecution of all non-Croatian citizens. The Serbian, Roma, and Jewish populations were especially targeted, with numerous atrocities and arrests. Croatians who did not agree with this regime were also persecuted. In response to the NDH’s actions against Yugoslavian civilians, resistance movements began to emerge on its territory. Their Air Force was used in various roles during this time, but due to generally obsolescence of equipment, their impact would be quite limited.
The acquisition of more aircraft like the Fiat G.50 offered a slight increase in its offensive capabilities. Once in service, these received new registration numbers ranging from 2501 to 2509. The single Fiat G.50B received the 3510 designations. In July, five would be allocated to the Rajlovac airfield near Sarajevo. In September three were moved to the Banja Luka to be part of the 16th squadron.
After April 1943 most were pulled back to Zagreb where they were attached to the 1st Squadron. When Italy capitulated to the Allies, all warring parties in Yugoslavia rushed in to take over the abandoned Italian weapons, armored vehicles, and a few remaining aircraft. At Zadar airfield, there were six Fiat G.50 aircraft. These would be captured by the NDH forces. Three of them received 5686, 5956, and 5186 designations. The newly acquired fighters were primarily positioned at Kurilovac and Velika Gorica airfields.
By 1944 it was becoming obvious that the Axis would lose the war, as a result many soldiers and pilots from the NDH Army and Air Force tried to escape to the Partisans. On the 2nd of September 1944, air force pilot Andrija Arapović with a Fiat G.50 (reg. Num. 3505) escaped to the island of Vis, under the control of the Yugoslav communist Partisans. Partisan forces put the captured G.50 to use during the war and it would remain in service up to 1946. An interesting fact about Andrija Arapović’s G.50 aircraft is that it still exists today and can be seen in the Belgrade Military Aviation museum near the Nikola Tesla Airport in Serbia. This is the only surviving example of a G.50 in the world. Another Fiat G.50 escaped joining the Allies in Italy.
By this point the Allies had achieved almost complete air supremacy over southern Eastern Europe, thus flying the slower Fiat G.50 became quite dangerous. In April 1944 several NDH aircraft, including two Fiat G.50, were destroyed in an Allied bombing run on Borongaj. Due to their obsolescence, even the NDH’s best fighters could do little against Allied bombers. In addition, the chronic lack of fuel led to a reduction in combat flights. By mid-September 1944, only 7 aircraft were listed as operational. In October most were allocated to the 2nd Squadron, which was also equipped with MS 406 fighters. When the Partisans liberated Zagreb, some 9 aircraft in various conditions would be captured. Some would be put to use after the war, but their use would be limited. These would be removed from service by the 1st of April 1946.
Technical Characteristics
In NDH service no known modifications were made on the Fiat G. 50. The G.50 was a single-seat, low-wing, all-metal fighter plane. The main fuselage was made from four angular-shaped longerons. The wing construction consisted of a center section which was made of a steel tube connected to the lower fuselage and two metal spars connected with ribs. The fuselage, wing, and tail were covered with duralumin sheets. The only fabric-covered parts were the movable control surfaces in the wings and the tail. It was powered by the 840 hp (626 kW) Fiat A 74 RC 38, a 14-cylinder radial piston engine. An all-metal three-blade propeller produced by Fiat was used.
The G.50 was equipped, like most modern aircraft of the time, with inward retracting landing gear, but the rear tail wheel was fixed. In later improved versions, the rear tail wheel was changed to a retractable type.
The main armament consisted of two forward-firing 12.7mm Breda-SAFAT heavy machine guns, with some 150 rounds of ammunition for each machine gun. The guns were placed behind the upper engine cowl and were synchronized in order not to damage the propeller.
Conclusion
The Fiat G.50 was one of few modern fighters available for NDH service. Their use would be greatly hampered by ever-increasing Allied Air supremacy, lack of fuel, and fear of their pilots defecting. Despite being acquired in relatively small numbers many of them would survive the war albeit in poor condition, while some would see a few more years of service by the newly created Yugoslav Air Force.
Fiat G.50 Specifications
Wingspan
10.9 m / 35 ft 11 in
Length
8 m / 26 ft 3 in
Height
3.28 m / 10 ft 7 in
Wing Area
18.25 m² / 196.5 ft²
Engine
One 840 hp (626 kW) Fiat A.74 RC.38, 14 cylinder radial piston
Empty Weight
1,975 kg / 4,350 lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight
2,415 kg / 5,324 lbs
Fuel Capacity
316 l
Maximum Speed
470 km/h / 292 mph
Range
445 km / 267 mi
Maximum Service Ceiling
10,700 m / 35,100 ft
Climb speed
Climb to 6,000 m (19,700 ft) in 7 minutes and 30 seconds
Crew
One pilot
Armament
Two 12.7 mm Breda-SAFAT heavy machine guns
Credits
Written by Marko P.
Edited by Henry H. & Ed J.
Illustrated by Haryo Panji
Sources:
D. Nešić (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Italija, Beograd.
G. Cattaneo, The Fiat G.50, Profile Publications number 188
P. Verganano (1997), Fiat G.50,, La Bancarella Aeronautica – Torino.
D. Monday (1984, 2006), The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft Of World War II, Aerospace Publishing Ltd.
V. V. Mikić, (2000) Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945, Vojno istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije.
T. Likso and Danko Č. (1998) The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War, Nacionalna Sveučilišna Zagreb.
The Dewoitine D.520 was the most advanced French fighter aircraft of the World War II period to have been employed in large numbers during the Battle of France. It was superior to the Morane-Saulnier MS.406 and Bloch MB.152. Often considered the only French fighter able to challenge the dominance of the Luftwaffe’s Bf 109E, the D.520 garnered a strong reputation and popularity among the general public in France. Though this aspect of its history is typically overlooked, the Dewoitine would also see extensive service after the Battle of France, particularly in the air force of the Vichy Regime, but also with Germany’s Italian and Bulgarian allies.
Dewoitine: French Pioneer of Interwar Metal Monoplanes
The Constructions Aéronautiques Emile Dewoitine (Emile Dewoitine Aeronautical Manufacturing) society was founded in 1920 under the lead of the eponymous engineer. Dewoitine had previously been employed by Latecoere during the First World War, which gave him experience on the subject of military aviation.
Dewoitine’s company was located in South-Western France, in Toulouse – an ideal location for strategic industry, as it was about as far as one could be in France from what was still viewed as a potential future adversary in 1920, namely Germany.
Dewoitine’s main products quickly became monoplane fighters. Though other types of planes were also developed, it was with parasol wing monoplanes that Dewoitine met its initial success. While the company failed to procure major domestic orders, Dewoitine fighters such as the D.1, D.9, or D.25 were export successes, seeing service in a number of countries such as Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Italy or Argentina. Dewoitine’s fighters were occasionally quite innovative – for example, the Dewoitine D.9 was an entirely metal parasol wing fighter, which was quite remarkable for a plane which first flew in 1924. While rejected by France, it was licence-produced by Italy as the Ansaldo AC.3, with 150 being manufactured for the Regia Aeronautica. Dewoitine also manufactured small numbers of D.9s for Belgium, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Hungary.
In large part due to none of its planes being adopted by France’s military, Dewoitine faced considerable woes in the late 1920s, being liquidated in January of 1927, before being re-founded the next year. The 1930s would prove more fruitful for Dewoitine. Most notably, the company won some sizeable contracts in the mid 1930s for its Dewoitine D.500, D.501 and D.510, which were low wing, or cantilever-wing, monoplanes, the latter two featuring, a 20 mm autocannon firing through the propeller hub. With more than 300 aircraft ordered for French service, and some limited export contacts, the Dewoitine cantilever wing monoplanes powered the company through the 1930s, and formed the bulk of France’s fighter force all the way up to 1938-1939.
Dewoitine first experimented with a cantilever-wing monoplane fighter with a retractable landing gear in the form of the D.513 fighter which first flew in January of 1936. It generally proved quite disappointing, suffering from instability, and was unable to reach the speed that was expected of it, while also suffering from cooling and landing gear problems, leading to the fighter quickly being discontinued.
The Birth of the “520”
In the French Air Force’s nomenclature, the role of single-seat fighters was classified “C1” (C for chasseur, the French equivalent of fighter, and 1 for single-seat). The air force department in charge of equipment procurement, the Service Technique Aéronautique (STAé – ENG : Aeronautical technical service), would regularly publish calls for aircraft manufacturers to design fighters to fill this role along with a series of required specifications. By late 1936, the last design request had been formulated more than two years prior, in March of 1934. The aircraft from this program, which was being considered for adoption, Morane-Saulnier’s MS.405 (which would become the MS.406), was still in the prototype phase, and had yet to receive orders for production.The MS.405 was already a fairly modern fighter, being a cantilever wing monoplane with a retractable landing gear. But Dewoitine believed that more advanced fighters using the same features could be developed. Anticipating a new design request for the C1 role, Dewoitine began development of a single-seat fighter in late 1936. It was not long before the STAé issued a new request. On the 12th of January 1937, aircraft manufacturers were asked to design a fighter able to reach a maximum speed of 520 km/h, climb to 8,000 meters in less than 15 minutes, land on a runway of 400 meters, and featuring a centerline Hispano-Suiza 20 mm HS.9 autocannon and two 7.5 mm MAC 34 machine-guns, equivalent to the armaments on the D.520 and MS. 405/406.
As the Dewoitine fighter project was still very early in development when the specifications were issued, its design took them into account. The requested maximum speed, 520 km/h, ended up being the project’s number designation.
Another major event happened in March of 1937, when Dewoitine’s Constructions aéronautiques Emile Dewoitine was nationalized by the French state. This was part of a massive nationalization plan that concerned all aspects of France’s defense industry, which was being run by the socialist-leaning popular front government in power since May 1936. Though this meant Dewoitine’s company was now state property, Emile Dewoitine was not displaced in his function as main engineer and leader of the company. The company, however, took a new name – Société Nationale des Constructions Aéronautiques du Midi (SNCAM – ENG: National Society of Aeronautical Constructions of the Midi -‘Midi being the area allotted to the company near Toulouse).
Though Dewoitine was still in full control of his company, all of the reorganization that took place in 1937 meant that work on the D.520 was mostly postponed or paused, resuming only in 1938. On the 3rd of April 1938, SNCAM obtained a contract for the construction of a prototype. Production of the first D.520 began and the prototype, D.520-01, would take off for the first time on the 2nd of October 1938.
Design of the Dewoitine fighter
The fighter aircraft designed by Dewoitine and his team was a low, cantilever-wing monoplane fighter that used an Hispano-Suiza 12Y in-line engine. The plane used riveted duralumin construction, both in structure and skinning.
The D.520’s wings used a one-piece, reinforced single-spar structure. Two MAC 34 7.5 mm machine-guns with gun cameras were installed towards the front, closer to the fuselage, while further inboard in the wings, a 120 liter fuel tank was located. To the rear were the flaps, which were also the only part of the aircraft covered with fabric instead of duralumin. Without the flaps, the wings had a surface of 13 square meters. The flaps had a surface area of 1 square meter, and each wing had a surface area of 14 square meters in total. When counting the wing root, where the fuselage and wings meet, the surface area was 16 square meters. On the first prototype, there was no radiator in the fuselage, and instead a radiator was installed under each wing.
The D.520-01 prototype used a Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 V12 890 hp engine, without the cannon installed, though later prototypes, followed by production models would use more powerful versions of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y engine with provision for a 20 mm gun firing through the propeller hub. Between the engine and pilot, a 396 liter fuel tank was located (though typically it would only be filled for ferrying, and not combat operations). With a total fuel capacity of 636 litres, the D.520 had high endurance, with a ferrying range of up to 1,500 km in good weather.
The landing gear of the D.520 opened outwards. The definitive production model of the D.520 had a length of 8.6 meters, a wingspan of 10.2 meters, and a height of 3.435 meters.
Prototype Testing
The first prototype, D.520-01, was in some ways more of a demonstrator than a true prototype. From the start, the prototype had a number of differences from the standard models. The model of Hispano-Suiza 12Y that was used, the 12Y-21, did not have a provision for a propeller-hub-firing cannon, and with 890 hp, was less powerful than what was later installed. The wing machine-guns were not mounted either. During its first flight, the prototype failed to reach the desired speed of 520 km/h, not exceeding 480, and several issues were found. The two wing radiators caused too much drag, and a fuselage-mounted radiator was chosen instead. The tail’s control surfaces were found to be too small, and were enlarged. New exhaust pipes were also installed. The 12Y-21 engine was replaced by a 12Y-29, which produced 910 hp. Lastly, a variable pitch propeller was also installed.
The first D.520 prototype undertook a second flight on the 11th of January 1939. This second attempt was much more successful, and showed great promise. It possessed good dive capabilities, with the prototype reaching more than 800 km/h in a dive, and reached 525 km/h in level flight, exceeding the 520 km/h required of the specifications.
The second prototype of the D.520, D.520-02, had its first flight on the 28th of January, 1939. This prototype was much closer to the production model. It was fully armed, including the 20 mm propeller mounted autocannon, and had incorporated all the changes the D.520-01 had undertaken, as well as some new ones: a new landing gear and larger empennage. On the 5th of May, the third prototype, D.520-03, took to the air for the first time. This example featured the 12Y-31 engine, with full armament.
With successful trials of the second prototype, a production order for the D.520 was first placed on the 7th of April 1939, with 200 fighters ordered. The successful trials of the third prototype led to an additional order, initially for 600 aircraft, though reduced to 510 in June. In September, France entered into conflict with Germany, which saw widespread industrial mobilization and orders for new equipment. The total number of D.520s on order rose to 1,280 and through most of 1939, production was being set up at SNCAM’s facilities at Toulouse. Orders continued to accumulate, with 2,250 aircraft on order in April of 1940, including 120 for the navy.
In the meantime, testing continued on the D.520 prototypes. On the 11th of January 1940, D.520-02 was flown by pilot Leopold Galy in diving trials. During a dive from an altitude of 8,000 meters, the aircraft reached a speed of over 900 km/h – Leopard Galy indicated that the instruments showed the speed that the aircraft reached as 920 km/h.
Production Model: Features and Performance
The first D.520s from the production run took to the air in November of 1939. A number of additional features had been added to Dewoitine’s fighter. The newer Hispano-Suiza 12Y-45 engine was chosen, as this model produced 935 hp and featured a much improved Szydlowski-Planiol supercharger, providing the Dewoitine with better high-altitude performance.
The armament of the production model consisted of a Hispano-Suiza HS.404 20 mm autocannon firing through the propeller hub (the prototypes used the earlier HS.9). The HS-404 had a rate of fire of 700 rpm, with a drum magazine holding only 60 rounds, the D.520 could expend its 20 mm ammunition in 9 seconds of continuous fire. The MAC 34 machine-guns were provided with more ammunition. Chambered for the 7.5×54 mm French cartridge adopted in 1929, the MAC 34 machine-guns had 675 rounds each. With a rate of fire of 1,200 rounds per minute, the MAC 34 would expend their ammunition in a little over half a minute. These machine-guns were electrically heated to avoid ice jamming the gun action at high altitudes.
Empty, the D.520 had a weight of 2,050 kg. The aircraft had a structural weight of 892 kg, the engine block empty 517 kg, additional engine accessories 373 kg, empty fuel tanks 56.4 kg, and additional equipment 252 kg. 650 kg would be added on average to get the plane into operation: 337 kg of fuel (the aircraft’s fuel tanks had a capacity of 636 litres), 226 kg including the guns and their ammunition, and an average of 87 kg for the pilot and his equipment. The weight of the plane in operation would therefore be 2,740 kg. With a wing surface of 16 square meters, this meant the D.520 had a quite high wing load of 195 kg/cm2. The D.520 used a three-bladed Ratier variable pitch propeller, with a diameter of 3 meters.
The plane had an automatic fire extinguishing system controlled from the cockpit. As for fuel capacity, the plane featured a 396 liter self-sealing fuel tank located between the cockpit and the engine. Each wing featured a 120 liter fuel tank. The D.520’s fuel capacity of 636 liters was fairly considerable by 1940, and would give it a better range than most one-engined fighters used in Western Europe, with a ferry range of about 1,500 km.
The D.520 could reach a maximum speed of about 535 km/h at the altitude of peak engine performance, which was 6,750 m, and with the engine running at 2,400 rpm. Cruising speed at the same altitude was of 400 km/h with the engine running at 2,000 rpm. The stall speed was 125 km/h.
The rate of climb was 12 meters per second for the first 1,000 meters of flight. 4,000 meters could be reached in a little under 6 minutes, and thanks to its supercharger, the D.520 retained a good climb rate at high altitude. It reached 6,000 meters in 9 minutes and 8,000 meters in a little under 14 minutes. The D.520 would typically be capable of reaching those altitudes before the Bf 109E. The ceiling of the Dewoitine fighter was 11,000 meters.
Though the first examples of the D.520 were completed in November of 1939, some changes were still made, notably, the engine block was lengthened by 16 cm, meaning the first examples produced had to be retrofitted. The D.520 would only commence delivery to the air force in January of 1940, and by May, only a single fighter group had been equipped, though several would receive the new type as production was hastened during the Battle of France.
The aircraft were painted in the standard French air force camouflage scheme of brown, green, and gray color during their manufacturing process. The rudder section was painted in the colors of the French flag. The type of the aircraft (Dewoitine D.520) as well as the aircraft’s production number were indicated in black letters over this French flag-colored tail. French roundels were featured on the wings and on the central fuselage. The underside was typically painted in the same metallic gray color as parts of the fuselage and wings. The propeller hubs and propeller were painted in black.
Future Production Models as Planned in 1940
Improved versions of the D.520 were quickly scheduled for production, and it was planned that these improved models would quickly be introduced to the production lines in the summer of 1940, if everything went well.
The D.521 was an experimental aircraft which mated the D.520 fuselage with the British Merlin III engine. Only one prototype was built, and it was not meant for serial production. The D.522, 523, 524 and 525, however, were D.520s powered by more powerful versions of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y engine.
The D.522 actually went back to the old Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 860 hp engine block, which was significantly less powerful than the 12Y-45 on paper. It would, however, be fitted with a new Hispano-Suiza supercharger, larger in size than the Szydlowski-Planiol and providing better high-altitude performance. The planned production run for the D.522 was of 75 aircraft, from the 526th to the 600th Dewoitine fuselages, which would likely have meant the production run would have commenced in July of 1940. The D.522 would then have been succeeded by the D.523.
The D.523 used the 12Y-51 model of the 12Y engine, but retained the Szydlowski-Planiol supercharger. This new model of the 12Y produced up to 1,000 hp at optimal altitude. One D.523 prototype was produced (using the 45th D.520 fuselage), and underwent trials from the 9th to the 14th of May 1940. It was able to reach a maximum speed of 570 km/h at the optimal altitude, and climbed faster than the D.520 by a significant margin. This would have made this model a powerful rival to German Bf 109E and F fighters.
Though the D.525 was nominally the last, it was to be produced between the 523 and 524, and was more closely related to the 523 than the 524 was. The D.525 merely combined the 12Y-51 engine from the D.523 and the Hispano-Suiza supercharger from the D.522. Just 30 were to be produced, fuselages 751 to 780.
Finally, the D.524 was to be the last direct derivative of the D.520 scheduled for production by 1940. Its main improvement over previous models was to be the Hispano-Suiza 12Z engine – the most refined model of Hispano-Suiza’s 12Y engine yet, it was to produce 1,300 hp. While very promising in concept, the D.524 was yet to reach the prototype stage by the Invasion of France. While D.520 variants using the 12Z would come to be built at prototype stage later, the D.524 was canceled with the fall of France. It was expected to reach a maximum speed of around 616 km/h at 7,000 m, and climb to 8,000 m in 8’20’’.
By the armistice of June 1940, which put a temporary end to the D.520’s production run, about 440 aircraft had been manufactured, of which closer to 350 had been accepted by the French Air Force. This meant that no further D.520-derived models would see production, and plans to produce them were indefinitely shelved and never revisited.
A floatplane fighter version of the D.520, the HD 780, had also been designed, with one prototype being produced. It incorporated many differences, such as folding, gull-shaped wings, a larger engine block, and two large floats. The prototype was completed in March of 1940, but remained inside its factory and would never take flight.
Into GC I/3
While the first serial-production D.520 had been delivered in November of 1939, these aircraft would later have to be revised and were by no means ready for service.
The D.520 would start effectively entering service during the first months of 1940, with the first squadron, GC I/3, being entirely outfitted with the type in the months of April and early May 1940. There, the D.520 replaced the Morane-Saulnier MS.406. Although another monoplane fighter with a retractable landing gear, the Morane was a plane which had noticeably lower performance in comparison to the Hawker Hurricane or Bloch MB.152, let alone the “triad” of modern fighters available by 1940, which would consist of the Spitfire Mk.I, the Bf 109E and the D.520.
As such, by the start of the campaign, the French Air Force had one squadron fully outfitted with the new fighter type. This fact, however, was tempered to a considerable extent. As mentioned previously, the fighters had only just been delivered to the squadron by the time fighting began in May of 1940. In other words, there had been little to no time for the pilots to accommodate with the newer fighter and become properly accustomed to it – which would prove a larger issue than anticipated, as the D.520 would prove a quite complicated and technical plane to pilot. Many of the pilots which flew the D.520 into combat during the Battle of France – perhaps even more so in the squadrons which would receive the plane during the campaign, would engage in combat during some of their first ten or even five flights of the D.520. Under these circumstances, one could hardly expect good performance with the pilots under such duress.
As hostilities began on the 12th of May, GC I/3 quickly moved into position at the airfield at Wez-Thuisy, in the Marne region of North-East France. From this point, the squadron would be engaged for the rest of the campaign all the way until the 17th of June, when it would retreat to the other side of the Mediterranean to avoid the capture of its planes.
The typical missions of the squadron were defensive, as simply put, the French Armée de l’Air struggled to impose any form of threat against the Luftwaffe. A large number of reasons for this can be attributed to this defensive role of the French air force. One could easily identify the comparative lack of modern fighters in comparison to a Luftwaffe that now universally operated the Bf 109E, a lack of coordination between the French air and ground forces, and many other limiting factors. As such, the D.520 would typically be used to try and intercept flights of German bombers, typically Heinkel He 111s or Dornier Do 17s, as these harassed French logistical centers and cities. In this role, the D.520 would enjoy some successes. It was faster at straight and level flight, and a better climber than previous French fighters, which was quite significant as the German bombers were moderately fast aircraft. The Morane Saulnier MS.406, notably, always struggled to catch the fast German bombers, while the D.520 could do so with relative ease.
The D.520 was credited with its four first victories on the 13th of May, when planes from GC I/3 shot down an He 111 bomber from KG 55 as well as three Henschel Hs 126 reconnaissance planes. The next two days, 14th and 15th, would see very heavy engagements for the squadron. On the morning of the 14th, the squadron would be engaged against a strike force of Dornier Do 17 and He 111 bombers under escort by Bf 109Es. The D.520 of GC I/3 would claim six confirmed kills in the morning, two on He 111s, two on Dornier Do 17s and two on Bf 109s, plus a claimed but unconfirmed kill on another Bf 109. In the late afternoon, D.520s of the squadron would engage in combat against a flight of Bf 110 heavy fighters from ZG 26. As often when the Bf 110 was faced with single-engine fighters without backup from Bf 109s, this ended up fairly bloody for the German squadron which lost four planes, with an additional probable Bf 110 killed claimed by the French.
On the 15th, defence against German raids in the morning would see the squadron claim three confirmed and a probable Dornier Do 17 kills, as well as a confirmed Bf 110 and He 111. In the early hours of the afternoon, D.520s would claim one confirmed and two probable Bf 109s.
The squadron’s actions would wind down in the following days, as it retreated from its first airfield to a new one in Meaux-Esbly, closer to Paris. With German pressure now concentrating against the encircled French and British forces in the North, action would be more sporadic. Between the 15th of May and the 3rd of June, the squadron would claim confirmed kills on an He 111, a Bf 109 and a Do 17, as well as further probable kills for another He 111 and another Dornier 17.
From early June onward, with the Dunkirk pocket liquidated by German advance, attention would shift towards the south once again as Germany progressed further into France, while the French organized a fairly desperate defense on the so-called “Weygang Line.” On the 3rd of June 1940, the squadron claimed its first Ju 88 kill, as well as claiming another Bf 109, and probable shoot downs on three Dornier Do 17s and a Heinkel 111. The 5th and 6th of June were particularly intense in terms of combat with German fighters, with the D.520 claiming four Bf 109s and an Hs 126 on the 5th, and a further two confirmed and two probable 109s as well as a confirmed Do 17 on the 6th. The 7th saw the squadron claim a confirmed Do 17 and Bf 109, and two further probable Do 17s.
The 9th of June 1940 saw the D.520 make the most claims of the Battle of France. The squadron was engaged against a raid of Dornier Do 17s escorted by Bf 109s around noon, claiming four fighters and a bomber. In the late afternoon, the squadron was engaged again against Dornier Do 17s and Junkers Ju 87s once again escorted by Bf 109s, seeing the French fighters down a confirmed Do 17 and Bf 109 as well as two Ju 87s, with a further two probable Do 17 and Bf 109.
The 9th of June 1940 would also begin to see the squadron retiring from its airfield near Paris to go further south, to avoid the now very threatening German advance on the ground. Though a further few engagements were fought fromt the 14 to 16th, most of the action was now behind the squadron. From the 17th to the 21st of June, the squadron would jump from airfield to airfield, from Southern France, to Algeria, finally settling in Kaala-Djerda and later Tunis-El Aouina in French Tunisia.
GC I/3 had claimed a considerable number of victories during the campaign, showing the qualities of the aircraft despite the general lack of training that was to be found in a squadron only recently introduced to its fighter. In total, the squadron claimed 55 confirmed and 19 probable victories. This was at the cost of 32 D.520s lost – of which 21 were lost in aerial combat, the rest being victims of either bombing runs or accidents. This was a rather decent success for a unit which had just received the new fighter type.
Other Squadrons
A number of other squadrons did receive the Dewoitine D.520 during the campaign and used it against German and later Italian forces.
The first squadron to receive D.520s after GC I/3 was GC II/3, which transitioned to the D.520 in 10 days from the 10th to the 20th of May. This was a very short transition for the new fighter, which many would imagine to be fairly worrying for the performance of the squadron. Nonetheless, GC II/3 would perform quite admirably during the campaign. Engaged heavily from the 20th of May onward, it would claim a single victory, an He 111, on its first day of combat, five confirmed and two probable victories on Dornier Do 17s, He 111s and Me 110s on the 21st, and ten confirmed victories (eight Ju 87s and two Hs 126s) on the 22nd. During the entire duration of the campaign, GC II/3 would claim 31 confirmed and 15 probable victories at the cost of 20 D.520s, though only three pilots were killed. The squadron notably counted on Czechoslovak pilot Cukr Vaclav, who would claim two confirmed kills and six shared kills, as well as French Capitaine Raymond Clausse, with three confirmed, and two probable kills on his own, as well as two confirmed, and two probable shared kills.
Other squadrons received their D.520s later in the campaign and would see the fewer kills , among other factors, due to the D.520 being received later in the campaign, at which point German air superiority had more or less been established, and sometimes having to work in mixed squadrons that still incorporated slower Morane-Saulnier MS.406s. GC II/7 was one such mixed squadron, receiving their first D.520s around the 25th of May, while at the same time retaining Moranes until at least the 1st of June. The D.520s of the squadron would still claim more than a dozen victories at the cost of nine of their own aircraft.
GC III/3 fought the most intense parts of its campaign with MS.406s, but was refitted with the D.520 in late May, seemingly not engaged from the 20th of May to the 5th of June, during the transitional period. Going back into action with the Dewoitine, pilots of the squadron would go on to claim eight confirmed, and one probable victory in June, with three confirmed Bf 109s shot down, and another probable, one each of the He 111, Me 110, Dornier Do 17, and two Hs 126s.
GC III/6 is one of the most well known of the D.520 squadrons despite receiving the aircraft late into the campaign. By mid-June 1940, the squadron was in the process of converting from the MS.406 to the D.520, when the entry of Italy into the war forced it to be put into action against Italian aircraft. Under these conditions, French pilot Capitaine Pierre le Gloan would first shoot down two Fiat BR.20 bombers on the 13th of June. On the 15th, Le Gloan took off on a routine patrol around 11:45 pm, originally comprised of three Dewoitines, but soon reduced to two due to technical issues of one aircraft forcing it to return to base. The two remaining fighters, operating near Saint-Tropez on the Mediterranean coast, encountered a force of twelve Fiat CR.42 biplanes of the Italian squadron 23e Gruppo CT. The two D.520s engaged the biplanes. Le Gloan damaged two, one that caught fire and was later written off, and the other pilot ejected, before the faster French fighters broke off. Le Gloan’s wingman’s guns jammed, forcing him back to base as well. Not content with merely two CR.42 shot down though, Le Gloan encountered a further patrol of CR.42s from 18e Gruppo, shooting one down before evading the others in a dive using the largely superior speed of the 520. Le Gloan then returned to Luc airfield, where GC III/6 was stationed, shooting down a CR.42 attempting strafing runs. Lastly, he would down a BR.20 attempting photo reconnaissance of the airfield, attempting to identify the effects of Italian strafing. The Dewoitine was out of cannon ammunition by this point and the BR.20 had to be shot down by machine-gun fire, requiring a total of five passes. This action would have been sufficient to make Le Gloan an ace not just in a day, but in a single sortie, though he had already scored two victories previously. While it was performed using the higher speed of the D.520 against slower biplanes, which would not effectively pursue the French fighter, it remains an impressive feat and likely the most famous action of the D.520 during the campaign of France. Le Gloan’s victories also appear to be the only confirmed ones scored by GC III/6 with the D.520.
Two other French army squadrons, GC II/6 and III/7, began transitioning to the D.520 in June but could not be made operational on the aircraft in time to meaningfully take part in the Battle of France. This was also largely the case for two ground-based squadrons of the French navy’s Flottile F1C, AC 1 and AC 2, which received a few D.520s in the later stages of the Battle of France.
The Tricolor Cockade and the Balkenkreuz: Dewoitine versus Messerschmitt
A topic which inevitably comes up when discussing the D.520 is its comparison with the mainstay German fighter at the time, the Bf 109E. This comparison has been a considerable subject of debates, particularly in France, where a significant amount of pride has often been instilled in the D.520 as the only modern indigenous French fighter that saw intense action and was able to challenge the German fighter.
In practice, the duel between the two aircraft was a rather complicated matter – which was known to the French air force, as a Bf 109E captured during the Phoney War was quite extensively tested in comparison to the D.520 in April of 1940.
The Bf 109 had a clear climb rate advantage over the D.520, which was particularly felt at low altitude, due to being better engined than the French fighter, which was sometimes found to be lacking in horsepower. German engine cooling was also found to be superior, which allowed the aircraft to run for longer at full throttle, while French pilots would often have to temporarily limit running the engine at full throttle to avoid overheating. This would usually allow the German fighter to dictate the terms of engagement, but considering the mostly defensive use of the D.520s, the Bf 109s were forced to provide cover to German bombers, and were often operating in escort, and not air superiority sweeps.
Where the D.520 is often said to have had an advantage is in maneuverability. The D.520 had the advantage of more subtle and less abrupt controls in comparison to the Bf 109E, which would typically give an advantage to the French fighter in a prolonged dogfight. The Dewoitine also enjoyed good engine torque, and in comparison to the BF 109E the cockpit of the D.520 offered far greater visibility which would prove an advantage in such a situation. This was not, however, a massive advantage, and the comparative trials held in April of 1940 saw a duel typically last for several minutes before one of the two aircraft could mount an advantage over the other. In turning fights, the D.520 had a known issue where it was vulnerable to stalling and temporary loss of control during some turns. This was an issue if the enemy fighter was in a favorable position at the moment, though in some engagements it was found that the stalling could be used as an evasive maneuver if the enemy fighter was at a considerable speed advantage. In general, the D.520 was found to still be more comfortable to pilot than the 109 in prolonged dogfights. In turnfights, the D.520 would typically win when the turns were towards the right, but the Bf 109 could be expected to win those towards the left.
In general, while French patriotism would encourage many French authors to claim the D.520 as equal or sometimes even superior to the Bf 109, in practice, the German fighter could arguably be claimed to usually have a slight edge – its ability to dictate the terms of engagement was not entirely compensated for by the maneuverability of the French fighter. This, however, does not paint the full picture. While one may ponder at length over whether the D.520 could be considered equal or slightly inferior to the Bf 109E, it remains clear that it was highly superior to the pre-existing fighters in the French air force, such as the Curtiss H75, Bloch MB.152, and particularly the Morane-Saulnier MS.406, when it came to intercepting fast German bombers such as the He 111, and particularly the Do 17 and Ju 88. The MS.406, notably, would often struggle to catch up with German bombers, while the D.520 could do so relatively easily – giving the French air force a far better tool against enemy bombers, though obviously one which arrived way too late. As such, the D.520 represented a major improvement in the capability of the French air force – which would have been further reinforced by additional new fighter types entering service in June of 1940, the Bloch MB.155 and Arsenal VG.33, with the later managing even better performance than the D.520, with a less powerful engine of the same type, and likely offering a serious competitor to the Bf 109 and Spitfire had the war not abruptly interrupted for the French Third Republic.
An Arrow through the Cockade: Vichy’s Workhorse
Absolutely defeated on the ground by a better equipped, led, and coordinated German army, France was forced into an armistice with Germany, negotiated on the 22nd of June 1940 and going into effect on the 25th of June 1940. In this Compiègne Armistice, the Third Reich inflicted on its French archenemy what was, in many ways, a revenge and repeat of Versaille, with the French as the victim, seriously limiting the size of the French army and its ability to produce new equipment.
However, strategic requirements are a more important matter than symbolism. The French government was in control of many colonial areas around Africa and Asia which Great-Britain was now interested in seizing to further their situation and, with the sinking of the French fleet of Mers-El Kébir on the 2nd of July 1940, this set a major precedent of hostility between the new French regime and the British. Under these conditions, allowing the new Vichy French government to retain a military that could offer resistance to British and Free French attempts to seize colonial territories and naval assets was a useful prospect for Germany. As such, France was allowed to keep a number of squadrons and military units operational – most notably in French North Africa and the French Levant, but also Metropolitan France to an extent.The air force was allowed more strength than the army, which could not operate any armored vehicles outside of Panhard 178s downgraded to a machine-gun armament in mainland France.
As such, authorization was given for the Vichy regime to maintain squadrons I/3, II/3, III/6, II/7 and AC1 operating the D.520. All would be stationed first in French North Africa, with all being located in Algeria outside of II/7 operating in Tunisia. The motive behind putting Vichy’s best fighters in French North Africa was that this location was now the most valuable colony still in the hands of the regime, and was much more vulnerable than the French mainland to potential attack attempts by the Allies. At the same time, while the D.520’s range could allow it to comfortably ferry over the Mediterranean and generally operate in a theater where longer ranges could be desirable, Vichy did retain a number of squadrons operating the shorter-ranged Bloch MB.152 in Metropolitan France. With the Bloch fighter unable to reasonably make the crossing, and ill-equipped to reasonably protect French North Africa, the D.520 was pretty much the only possible choice outside of a now incredibly outdated MS.406 that was on its way out of Vichy’s air force.
During their service life, Vichy aircraft were given a number of recognition markings to differentiate them from British or Free French aircraft and avoid friendly fire incidents from German or Italian planes. At first, this manifested in the form of a white line going through the rear and center of the fuselage, with the cockade superimposed on top and an arrowhead in the direction of the front of the plane. This was put on from the late summer of 1940 onward. From early 1941 onward, these were judged insufficient to reasonably identify Vichy’s aircraft, and they saw their tail sections and propeller hubs painted yellow to further ease identification; it is with these identification markings that the Vichy D.520 would fight during the Levant campaign in May of 1941. In the summer of 1941, the recognition markings were pushed even further, with orange stripes included within the yellow sections, and in many cases, parts of the engine cover painted in the same yellow and orange scheme as the tail.
In April of 1941, with German approval, production of the D.520 resumed to fulfill an order for 550 new planes for Vichy’s air force. The goal was now to make the D.520 the standard fighter of the French air force to the greatest extent possible, first replacing the MS.406 in the squadrons then operating it, and in the further future the MB.152 and MB.155 operated by the fighter groups in Metropolitan France. Two new fighter groups operating the D.520 were created, GC I/2 in Châteauroux, Metropolitan France, and GC II/6 intended for French Occidental Africa, while four squadrons operating other types were re-equipped with the D.520 in Metropolitan France, these being GC I/1, GC III/9 and GC II/1. The last squadron, GC II/5, located in Casablanca, Morocco, was in the process of switching during the Allied invasion of French North Africa, Operation Torch, in November of 1942.
In a fairly cruel twist of irony, what was once the only fighter able to offer resistance to Germany’s Luftwaffe, by 1940 now flew for the Vichy Regime, and only truly became the most common French fighter under this collaboration government. The D.520 would see considerable action in defending Vichy’s colonial territories against British, Free French and American intervention, now fighting a whole different set of aircraft. However, this would once again be under lackluster conditions; pilot training under Vichy was not as extensive and long as under the pre-armistice conditions, partly due to lack of fuel restricting the flight hours which would be performed. While the pilots who fought under Vichy during the Levant campaign and Operation Torch had had more time to accustom themselves to the D.520 than those flying during the Battle of France, these were often the same men from the same squadrons which had now made the switch to the D.520 during the Battle of France. They flew fewer hours per year overall, and as such had their skills not as “well maintained” as their Allied counterparts that were regularly flying combat missions against the Regia Aeronautica and Luftwaffe over North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Under the Vichy regime, studies were also performed in outfitting the D.520 with more powerful engines in order to make the Dewoitine a viable fighter for later in the war. This resulted in the D.520Z, fitted with a Hispano-Suiza 12Z 1,600 hp engine. This project would result in work on a prototype, completed in February of 1943 with German approval, but would only fly in 1947. A project modernizing the D.520 further, the M.520T, would never even reach prototype stage. Vichy had hoped the D.520Z would be serially produced, and postwar trials indeed indicated the fighter had respectable performance even by mid-war standards, being able to reach 659 km/h at 9,150 meters, and could climb to 4,000 meters in 4 minutes 10 seconds, to 8,000 meters in 8 minutes 22 seconds, and to 11,000 m in 14 minutes 19 seconds. This was a very significant improvement in comparison to the D.520, though it came at the cost of the 12Z being a sometimes unreliable engine that would require a lot of maintenance. The occupation of the Vichy regime would prevent any further development, despite a production of up to 230 having been hoped for in the middle of 1942.
Dewoitines Against Hurricanes: The Levant Fiasco
On the 1st of April 1941, a coup in previously British-influenced Iraq brought to power a pro-Axis government, the Golden Square, which would result in the Anglo-Iraqi War lasting for much of the month of May. Germany and Italy, eager to use this opportunity to open another front against the British Empire in the Middle-East, pushed Vichy France to allow Axis planes to use the French colonies of Syria and Lebanon as a base to get to Iraq and support their troops against British Commonwealth forces.
After the end of this campaign, this breach of Vichy’s non-belligerence in favor of Axis support would lead to British, Australian, Indian, and Free French troops invading the Vichy colonies of the Levant. The Vichy regime attempted to put up a defensive effort, which, in the air, relied on Dewoitine fighters.
Prior to May of 1941, only the older MS.406 were located in Levant. With the rise of tensions as the colony now hosted Axis planes, GC III/6 was relocated from Algeria to Rayack in Lebanon on the 27th-28th of May 1941. This airfield would be used until late June, when the squadron would move to Alep. During the Levant campaign, GC III/6 would be joined by GC II/3, which moved into the Levant, transiting through Axis-occupied Greece and would operate from Homs and later Alep during the campaign. The French Navy’s AC 1 squadron would be deployed to the Levant as well.
The opposition the French would face consisted of Hawker Hurricane and Curtiss Tomahawks (P-40), as well as occasionally older Gloster Gladiators, escorting bomber formations typically composed of Blenheim bombers.
The French squadrons put up considerable opposition in the air, with the D.520 still being a decent adversary for the fighter aircraft they were facing. GC II/3’s scoreboard was fairly moderate, with two Blenheims and a Tomahawk shot down on the 2nd of July, with one confirmed and one probable Tomahawk on the 11th of July. GC III/6, present in the operations for longer, would feature a much more accomplished score-board during the campaign. They claimed 16 confirmed and 2 probable Hurricanes, a Fulmar, a Maryland, a Tomahawk, and three Gladiators. Pierre le Gloan, still flying with GC III/6, claimed seven victories: six Hurricanes and a Gladiator. As for the Navy’s AC 1 squadron, it would claim seven confirmed and one probable kill.
Though these were some considerable victories, the D.520 suffered some significant losses during the campaign, with about 40 planes lost, though only eight pilots were killed. Most of these were not shot down in flight. The issue the French faced in Levant were limited aviation facilities that featured little to no anti-aircraft defenses. Against a considerably numerically superior adversary, this resulted in the French being unable to defend their airfields against strafing runs, which decimated the fleet of Dewoitine aircraft. As British forces were progressing through the region swiftly, the three D.520 squadrons were redeployed to Algeria transiting through Greece in early July, so that the remaining fighters, and most importantly their pilots, could participate in the defense of French North Africa, now that the French Levant was irredeemably lost.
It should be noted that two D.520s left behind by Vichy’s air force in the Levant would be captured by the Free French and re-used for a short while in order to train the pilots of Free French GC 3 “Normandie.” This squadron would, from late 1942 onward, be deployed to the Soviet Union, operating with great success using Soviet Yak fighters for the remainder of the war, and gaining great fame as the only Western Allied fighting unit on the Eastern Front, and a highly successful squadron by both Free French and Soviet standards. Previously, the Free French had operated three D.520s that had defected from France to England in June of 1940. Two were conscripted into the force which attempted to seize Dakar in September of 1940, and following the failure of this attempt, they were unloaded in French Equatorial Africa, a colony which joined the Free French. One was lost in an accident, and the other left at its airfield when Free French pilots moved to Egypt to be equipped with Hawker Hurricanes.
French Droplets on the Torch
In November of 1942, with the war in the desert in Libya clearly going to the advantage of the Allies, French North Africa appeared as an increasingly appealing territory to seize to further the position of the Allies in North Africa. The large colony, comprising Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, was however fairly well defended, with the heaviest military forces still in the hands of the Vichy Regime located there. In terms of squadrons using the Dewoitine, these being GC I/3, II/3, III/3, III/6, II/7 and AC 1.
The Anglo-American landings were performed on the 8th of November. For air cover, they relied on large numbers of Grumman F4F Wildcat/Martlet and some Hawker Sea Hurricanes, which were still fighters the D.520 could hope to challenge – and the French squadrons did put up some considerable opposition to Operation Torch.
GC I/3, operating near Oran, racked up a considerable score on the 8th of November, shooting down six Fairey Albacore light naval bombers, five Douglas C47 transport planes, five Hurricanes or Sea Hurricanes, and even a Spitfire. GC III/3, operating near Oran, appears to have claimed nine victories for seven D.520s lost. GC II/3, III/6 and II/7 were not located in areas as hot as the major Algerian harbour of Oran, and appear not to have claimed any victories during the battle. The French Navy’s AC 1 operating in Morocco claimed two F4F Wildcats for no aerial losses.
However, while the French Dewoitines could still put up quite a fight against an F4F in the air, the numerical superiority of Allied fighters, and lack of French airfield defences would once again come back to haunt the French air force, with the AC 1 losing 19 of its 27 D.520s against strafing and bombing runs during the three-days of fighting during Operating Torch.
Luckily for the French, the colonial authorities of North Africa swiftly decided not to continue a vain opposition to Allied advances, and instead sided with the Allies against the Axis. With this, the Vichy squadrons, comprising a little over 130 D.520s, were now fighting against Axis troops. One was repainted in American colors and tested by the US Army Air Corps.
However, the end of the service of the D.520 in North Africa would be fairly swift, with the squadrons soon refitted with fighters such as Hurricanes and Spitfires for further operations, the D.520 no longer being seen as an up-to-date fighter and they lacked the facilities in France likely necessary for the manufacture of spare parts. The Dewoitine was relegated to a training role, in which it was still used in early 1944.
Case Anton: The Dewoitine Under the Balkenkreuz
Days after French North Africa was invaded by the Allies, attention would now turn to the unoccupied part of France under the jurisdiction of the Vichy Regime. On the 11th of November 1942, Germany launched Case Anton, the Wehrmacht rushing to take control of Southern France, facing no resistance from Vichy troops that had been ordered to stay in their barracks and not oppose the Germans invaders. With this swift move, Germany captured around 250 Dewoitine D.520 fighters as well as the facilities which were in the process of producing more.
The French production facilities would continue to work during German occupation, albeit at a reduced rate, seeing as the D.520 was a very low priority by late 1942. About 60 further fighters would be completed under German occupation.
Within the Luftwaffe, the D.520 was put to use as a trainer aircraft. Though now obsolete as a frontline fighter, it could still provide a decent introduction to modern, metal monoplanes with retractable landing gear. For this purpose, JG 101 was outfitted with the D.520 and operated in occupied France, mostly from Pau, in the South, where it would be free from sweeps and raids performed from the British Isles. JG 103, operating during the remainder of the war in the Netherlands or Austria, also used the D.520, as did JG 105, operating near Paris and Chartres, and JG 107 in Nancy. In German service, the D.520s were painted in a light gray color with darker gray spots on much of the aircraft, something typically found on many late-war German aircraft. The underside of the aircraft, and in some cases the nose and tail sections, were painted in a garish yellow color, likely for identification purposes as a training aircraft. The planes received a Balkenkreuz marking on the central fuselage and a swastika on the tail.
The D.520 was noted to not always be a very easy plane to pilot, as it had some unforgiving flight characteristics and suffered from some mechanical issues, such as landing gear which at times failed to retract completely. However, in comparison to German fighters of the time, it offered much smoother and lighter controls for the pilot in comparison to the now quite heavy Bf 109G which were being operated by this point. There would nonetheless be several accidents, with at least three German pilots killed and two wounded on the Dewoitine. A number were also destroyed by Allied bombings of French airfields used by the Luftwaffe.
Outside of a training aircraft, there was another use the Germans could find to the D.520 by the second half of the war. It offered a convenient ‘hand-me-down’ aircraft to outfit the air forces of Axis states which requested fighters from Germany, without diverting any frontline German fighters being manufactured by this point. Two German allies would be outfitted with considerable numbers of D.520 in this fashion, Italy and Bulgaria, though it is sometimes claimed some outfitted Romania as well.
The French Fighter of the Regia Aeronautica
The Regio Esercito (Italian Army) captured 30 Dewoitines during the Battle of France, with many more being transferred to Italy after German capture in France.
The D.520s were assigned to various Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) fighter groups, tasked with intercepting American bombers in the defense of various major cities, an endeavor which was met with mixed results. As Italy began to fall, some Dewoitines were destroyed by retreating Italians, or recaptured by the Germans.
It is of note that the Italians regarded the D.520 largely inferior for various reasons, but did praise the aircraft’s armament, making mention of the formidable 20mm cannon.
The Shield of Bulgaria
The other Axis air force which received a large number of D.520s was the Bulgarian Air Force. Though a member of the Axis powers, Bulgaria had chosen to remain out of Operation Barbarossa, and to not declare war on the Soviet Union, with its contribution to the war effort mostly consisting of its occupation of parts of Greece and Yugoslavia as well as economic cooperation with the Reich. As such, providing fighters for the Bulgarian Air Force may have seemed to be a lower priority for Germany in comparison to other allies, such as Hungary and Romania, which were actively fighting on the Eastern Front. However, Bulgaria was nonetheless at war with the Western Allies and, from 1943 onward, the subject of air raids increasing in frequency and intensity.
The D.520 seemed to be an appropriate hand-me-down for this lower priority but not insignificant part of the Axis, especially as the aircraft, while obsolete against modern fighters by 1943, could still be used against bombers and Bulgaria was still mostly out of reach of Allied single-engined fighters. Up to 150 D.520s appear to have been offered to Bulgaria, of which 120 would be ordered and 96 effectively delivered, the first 48 in August of 1943.
A major advantage of the D.520 for Bulgaria was that the old Czechcoslovak fighters already in use by the Bulgarian air force, the Avia B-71 and B-135, already used engines of the Hispano-Suiza 12Y family, albeit older models. This meant that Bulgarian mechanics would already have some experience with engines similar to those found on the Dewoitines, and that some amount of parts commonality could be expected, easing the logistical burdens Bulgaria would suffer in comparison to obtaining a fighter with an unrelated engine.
The Bulgarian Dewoitines were painted in schemes generally similar to the German ones, with a light gray base, dark upper, along with mottled spots in between. They, however, made more use of brown and green colors as well. The cross of the Bulgarian air force was painted on the aft fuselage, with the individual fighter number behind it. A yellow or white band was sometimes featured in front of the cross, behind the cockpit. The tips of the wings and sometimes the propeller hub were also painted in yellow.
The Bulgarian Dewoitines were delivered to the 6th IP (Fighter Regiment), where they formed the core of the 1st and 2nd groups. They would be operated in intercept missions, fighting along with Bf 109G-2 fighters also operated by the Bulgarians. American raids at this time typically consisted of B-24 bombers escorted by P-38 twin-engine fighters. While these escorts were significantly faster and better armed than the Dewoitines, the Bulgarian fighters could still count on their superior maneuverability to avoid being shot down. It appears the first victories by Bulgarian Dewoitines were scored on the 24th of November 1943, when three to four American planes were shot down by a Bulgarian fighter force composed of 24 D.520s and 16 Bf 109s. The first loss in combat appears to have been on the 10th of December, when one of 22 D.520s flying to intercept a flight of 60 B-24s and 60 P-38s was shot down. Ten days later, on the 20th, D.520s would score two victories, including an escorting P-38. On the 10th of January, Bulgarian pilots, flying 23 D.520s and 16 Bf 109s, in cooperation with 30 German Bf 109s, would claim four B-17s and four P-38s for the loss of a D.520.
The 30th of March 1944 saw the largest air raid of the war on Bulgaria, with more than 360 B-17s and B-24s attacking Sofia. The Bulgarian air force scrambled all aircraft it could muster, including some Avia B-135s from training schools in addition to 28 D.520s from the first group of 6th Fighter Regiment (I/6) and 6 from the 2nd group (II/6). The Dewoitine-equipped groups claimed a B-17 for I/6, and two bombers and a P-38 for II/6. By this point however, losses were starting to increase for Bulgarian fighters, with 4 to 5 D.520s lost against P-38s and defensive fire from the bombers. By the spring of 1944, American air raids now included P-51 and P-47 escorts in addition to the P-38, further complicating the task of Bulgarian pilots. The D.520s appear to have been falling out of favor in comparison to Bf 109s for interception purposes by this point. While 44 Dewoitines were still available to the Bulgarian air force on the 1st of May 1944, they would claim their last victory on 5th of May with a B-17 shot down. Losses started to mount at this point, mostly due to bombing runs against Bulgarian airfields as well as lack of spare parts to support continued operation. By the 1st of September 1944, only 32 D.520s were still in Bulgarian hands, with only about half in flying condition. Overall, the D.520s appear to have claimed 5 B-17s, 2 B-24s and 4 P-38s, attacking in intercept missions against the USAAF, at the loss of seven D.520 in combat. Eight to ten were actually lost in accidents, and overall, eight Bulgarian pilots were killed flying the Dewoitine.
As Soviet forces reached Bulgaria, a communist coup took over on the 9th of September 1944 and Bulgaria joined the war on the side of the Soviet Union. Remaining Bulgarian D.520s would operate against German forces from September to November, with a further two planes being lost, before the type was sent away from the frontlines in November of 1944. D.520s would remain in use by Bulgarian flight schools until 1947, when the type was finally retired from the service of the Bulgarian air force, and surviving aircraft were scrapped.
The Dewoitine into Liberation
By the 6th of June 1944, the D.520 was no longer used as a frontline fighter by any air force in the West. The Luftwaffe and Free French air force both operated the type as a trainer, with many of the Luftwaffe’s fleet of Dewoitines based in France.
While in the first two months following Operation Overlord, Allied progress would remain fairly slow and confined to Normandy, the breakthrough of Operation Cobra in late July saw a lightning-fast liberation of France by a combination of Allied mobile troops, and uprisings by the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the Inside or FFI) the leading organized French resistance. This would result in many D.520s being left behind on overrun airfields.
A first use of the D.520 by the FFI would be by a group of resistance fighters taking over the German occupied airfield at Châteauroux on the 20th of August 1944, where they found several damaged aircraft. Cannibalizing parts from different planes, the FFI managed to repair a single Dewoitine. Repainted in French colors, with a Cross of Lorraine on the tail, a French flag on the empennage, and “FFI” painted on the central fuselage, the Dewoitine was flown by a pilot that had not flown since the Battle of France, but ended up belly-landing. Two days later, German troops fleeing Southern France temporarily occupied Chateauroux again, with the FFI camouflaging their plane, and going into hiding until German forces finally left on the 10th of September.
A more organized and professional use of the Dewoitine by the Free French, or French Forces of the Interior (FFI) would be accomplished by the Marcel Doret fighter group. Following the Allied Landings in Provence on the 15th of August 1944, much of Southern France was liberated by Allied troops and FFI uprisings in the following days, including at German airfields in Southern France, the facilities of the Morane-Saulnier, the SNCASE-Dewoitine factories in Toulouse, and the surrounding area. This resulted in a considerable number of Dewoitines falling into the hands of the FFI, which would very swiftly put them to use. Under the command of Marcel Doret, the most prolific French test pilot in the pre-war era, a fighter group was established, operating two squadrons of D.520s, one in Toulouse and one in Tarbes, both in Southern France. This group was grown as the “1er Groupe de Chasse FFI” (1st FFI fighter group), or more colloquially as the “Doret group”. It appeared to have had a strength of 18 D.520s.
The Doret group was officially dissolved on the 1st of December 1944 – in practice, it was integrated into the formal structure of the French army as GC 2/18 “Saintonge.” The group was deployed to the Western French coast and used in recon missions as well as escorting Douglas A-24 Banshee bombers over the remaining German “pockets”, areas on the coast which remained under German control due to the presence of highly fortified U-Boat bases the Allies preferred to blockade, rather than attempt a costly take-over. In February of 1945, the D.520s were transferred to GC I/18 Vendée, continuing to see use in similar operations. This fighter group, the last operating the D.520 as a frontline fighter, was dissolved in October of 1945.
The camouflages used by the FFI were based on the German camouflages the D.520 were found with when captured, meaning a lighter gray base with darker gray spots. In some cases, the same brown as present on the D.520 previously in the service of the French air force was reintroduced on parts of the plane. Green could sometimes also be found. The FFI repainted the plane’s tail control surface with the French flag, as found on French air force aircraft prior to the armistice and the capture of the French fighters. A red cross of Lorraine was often found in the white stripe of this tail making. In the first months of operation, the D.520s also received the black and white invasion stripes in order to avoid any form of friendly fire incidents. In some cases, “FFI” appears to have been written in black letters in the white parts of the invasion stripes on the central fuselage. The D.520s also received French roundels on their wings, and later had their invasion stripes removed, with the space left on the central fuselage used for another roundel. A number in a circle was also present on the tail of many aircraft for identification purposes.
A number of FFI D.520s were also exhibited during an aviation exhibition in Paris in the spring of 1945.
The Undying Trainer
One would expect the conclusion of the war to finally have buried the old D.520, by this point completely obsolete against modern prop fighters, let alone jets. Nonetheless, the plane saw continued use in the training role it had often been relegated in the later phases of the war.
This trainer role saw a final variant of the D.520 be designed and produced, the D.520 DC, double commande (dual control.) As the name suggests, this was a D.520 with an extended cockpit to the rear, intended for two men, a cadet and an instructor. The plane would receive dual controls allowing the instructor to take over control of the plane.
The modification had been devised by a French air force adjutant, with a first D.520, n°243, converted in the autumn of 1945. This was a very much makeshift conversion, using pedals from an Fw 190, a control stick from a no longer flyable D.520, and seemingly a seat from an A-24 Banshee for the instructor. Nonetheless, after a first flight in October of 1945, impressions were positive, and after a few modifications were performed, a dozen of D.520s were converted to the DC standards in early 1946. These planes would be used to train a number of French air force cadets, including the first few women to obtain military pilot licenses in the French air force.
The training service of both DC and single-seat D.520s would continue in the following year, though the type was progressively retired as more modern aircraft, including jets, were introduced. The last flight of a D.520 in the French air force was performed on the 30th of September 1953.
Surviving Aircraft
A D.520 is present on static display at France’s Musée de l’Air et de l’Espace du Bourget (ENG: Museum of Air and Space of the Bourget) near Paris. It is painted as a fighter of GC III/6, the squadron of the type’s most successful pilot, Pierre le Gloan.
A D.520 in flyable condition is currently in the hands of the Conservatoire de l’Air et de l’Espace d’Aquitaine (Air and Space Conservatory of Aquitaine). It was restored to airworthiness from 2005 onward, after having been in storage for decades. A third D.520 is present in a hangar of the French navy, awaiting restoration alongside a number of other aircraft.
A fourth D.520, n°408, was part of the Musée de l’air et de l’espace as soon as it was phased out of service in 1957. Surviving as a warbird, it tragically crashed in July 1986, killing the pilot.
Variants
D.520-01 – The first prototype, utilizing a Hispano-Suiza 12Y-21 generating 890hp. No armament fitted. Numerous modifications included changes to the radiators, tail, exhaust, a 12Y-29 engine, and propeller.
D.520-02 – A fully armed prototype. Implemented all prior modifications, along with improved landing gear, and a larger empennage.
D.520-03 – Prototype with upgraded 12Y-31 Engine
D.520 – Main Production Version, fitted with the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-45 engine. Around 900 produced.
D.521 – Prototype utilizing the British Merlin III Engine.
D.522 – Version fitted with the slightly older Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31, fitted with a new Hispano-Suiza supercharger, providing better high-altitude performance. Production was scheduled to start in July 1940, but never occurred due to the German invasion of France.
D.523 – Fitted with the improved Hispano-Suiza 12Y-51 mated to a Sydlowski-Planiol supercharger, producing up to 1,000 hp at altitude. Also offered significant speed and climb advantages over the original D.520. Only one prototype produced.
D.524 – Scheduled for 1940 production, would have used the Hispano-Suiza 12Z engine, a refined version of the 12Y engine, expected to have produced 1,300 hp. None built.
HD 780 – Prototype floatplane naval version of the D.520 featuring foldable, angled, gull wings, increased engine size, and two floats. Was completed in March 1940 but never flown.
D.525 – Combined the Hispano-Suiza 12Y-51 engine with the Hispano-Suiza supercharger used on the D.522. Only 30 produced.
D.520Z – Produced under the Vichy Regime in 1943 with German approval, this prototype installed the Hispano-Suiza 12Z engine, making 1,600 hp, a considerable boost in power. First flight didn’t take place until 1947.
M.520T – Project to further modernize the D.520, never reached the prototype stage.
D.520DC – A two seat trainer version developed immediately post-war. DC roughly indicates ‘dual control.’
Operators
French Armée de l’Air (French Air Force) – The French Air Force hastily produced and deployed to active squadrons mere months before hostilities broke out between Germany and France. After the conclusion of the Battle of France, and subsequent armistice, the aircraft would continue to serve under the air force the Vichy Regime.
Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI / Free French Forces) – Organized FFI forces operating in recaptured areas of France after Allied breakthroughs in 1944 assembled a few small squadrons and began flying reclaimed D.520s, most notably the “Doret Group,” before being reabsorbed into the formal structure of the revitalized French Army.
Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force [Axis]) – The Italians managed to acquire several dozen D.520s throughout the course of the war, and pressed them into domestic service defending and intercepting allied bombers over the Italian mainland.
Luftwaffe (Nazi Germany) – During Germany’s various incursions into France, several hundred D.520s came under their control, in addition to continuing serial production under German occupation. The Dewoitines that found their way into German service were primarily used as trainers, or were transferred to Axis allies, namely Italy and Bulgaria.
Bulgarian Air Force – As Bulgaria was an ally of the Axis powers, upwards of 98 D.520s were transferred to the country’s air force, and used to intercept Allied bomber raids.
Conclusion – The Incarnation of “Trop peu et trop tard”: The D.520 in French Mythos
Since the end of the Second World War, the D.520 has progressively gained a near-mythical status in French military enthusiast circles. The reasons for this are quite easy to identify. The D.520 was the best performing French fighter introduced in large numbers during the Battle of France, and seemingly the only one which posed a credible threat to the Bf 109. However, it arrived too late, and numbers too small to Germany’s advance. In this regard, it was one of a considerable amount of fairly advanced pieces of equipment the French army was close to introducing in 1940, but never could due to the Armistice, similar in this fashion to its fellow Bloch MB.155 and Arsenal VG.33 fighter aircraft, the two Richelieu-class battleships, and the MAS 40 semi-automatic rifle of the French army.
This massive place in French mythos, reinforced by Pierre Le Gloan’s commendable combat record with the type, could be said, however, to have caused some bias to exist in some French analysts, where placing the D.520 as an equal to the Bf 109 has become sort of tradition. While the D.520 was much closer to competing with the German fighter in comparison to the previous MS.406 or MB.152, in some ways, the German fighter could be said to still be a little better performing. It is also questionable whether or not the D.520 could have evolved to become a mainstay fighter for the French air force for the rest of the war, as the Spitfire was for the Royal Air Force and the Bf 109 for the Luftwaffe. In some ways, the VG.33 airframe, which slightly outperformed the D.520, with a previous and weaker version of the same engine, may eventually have provided a better long-term mainstay fighter for France. In any case though, difficult circumstances prevented the VG.33 from ever reaching service, but the D.520 would have the opportunity to live an active service life in a number of air forces, one which saw it in action against both Axis and Allied forces alike.
Dewoitine D.520C-1 specifications
Wingspan
10.18 m /
Length
8.75 m /
Height
2.55 m /
Wing Area
16 m² /
Engine
Hispano-Suiza 12Y-45
Power at Critical Altitude
935 hp at 4,200 m
Max RPM
2,400 RRM
Propeller
Three-bladed Ratier or Chauvière (3 m diameter)
Empty Weight
2,050 kg /
Maximum Takeoff Weight
2,740 kg /
Wing Load
195 kg/m²
Fuel Capacity
400 liters standard
640 liters with wing fuel tanks
Time to Altitude
4,000 m in 5’13”
6,000 m in 7’57”
8,000 m in 13’24”
Maximum Speed
425 km/h at sea level
535 km/h at 6,750 m
Cruising Speed
400 km/h
Stall Speed
125 km/h
Range
Around 900 km with standard fuel load
1,500 km at max fuel fuel load (equipped w/ wing tanks)
Maximum Service Ceiling
11,000 m /
Crew
1 Pilot
Armament
20 mm HS-404 firing through the propeller hub with 60 rounds
4x MAC34M39 machine-guns with 675 rounds per gun in the wings
Number Completed
Around 900 (produced 1939-1944)
Gallery
Credits
Written by Marisa Belhote
Special Thanks for Contributions to the Italian Section by Arturo Giusti
Nazi Germany (1944) Rocket Powered Fighter – Around 370 Built
Following the successful testing of the previous Me 163A series, the Germans began developing a new improved version that was intended for operational use. This would lead to the Me 163B series, which was the first, and last, operational rocket-powered aircraft to be used in active combat. In comparison to its predecessor, the Me 163B offered a number of improvements to its design and shape. By the war’s end, less than 400 aircraft of this type would be built.
History
Work on the second series of the Me 163, which would be built in greater numbers than the experimental A-series, began at the start of September 1941. In comparison to the predecessor, the B-version had a number of modifications. The most obvious change was the completely redesigned fuselage, which was larger and had an overall more aerodynamic shape. Its armament was installed in the wing roots, the engine was replaced with an improved version, and the pilot cockpit was enlarged.
Initial plans for this aircraft were quite ambitious, as Messerschmitt had predicted that the production of four operational prototype aircraft with additional airframes should commence in October 1941. Once the first few prototypes were completed, a small series of 66 aircraft were to follow. The actual responsibility of building these was given to Messerschmitt production plants at Regensburg with assembly at Obertraubling. It was estimated by RLM (Reichsluftfahrtministerium – Ministry of Aviation) officials that, after the first batch of 70 aircraft was built, it would take some 7 months to actually begin mass production of fully operational aircraft.
As was the case with many German wartime projects, it suffered from delays due to a lack of resources. The work on the initial group of prototypes started only at the end of 1941. Once again, further delays due to the slow delivery of engines postponed production until March of 1942. At this stage, the Germans were replacing the R II 209 rocket engines with the modified RII 211. The new engine used different types of fuel tanks which necessitated the redesign of the fuselage interior. This engine used a combination of T-Stoff and C-Stoff (a mixture of hydrazine hydrate, water, and methanol). As the construction of the Me 163B V1 prototype was approaching completion, it was proposed to switch to the older R II 203 engine to save development time, but this modification was not carried out. The development of the rocket engines was very slow and plagued with many setbacks, especially the limited production of fuel, which eventually led to huge delays in the Me 163 production. Finally, for the Me 163 production aircraft, the improved HWK-509 engine was chosen.
In May 1942, Me 163 B-0 V1 (KE+SX) was completed, minus the engine, and was tested as an unpowered glider. By 1943, it was obvious that Messerschmitt alone could not cope with the wartime demands, so RLM officials decided to bring aboard another aircraft manufacturer. They chose Klemm’s Stuttgart-Boeblingen factory, with a monthly goal of some 30 Me 163 aircraft. Klemm was also tasked with providing additional workers for Messerschmitt. Delays in delivering essential parts, such as weapons, caused setbacks in the Klemm Me 163 production.
Despite the problems with the Me 163 production, a small number of available aircraft were allocated to the Erprobungkommando (EKdo) 16 unit from April 1942 onward.
First Flights by EKdo 16
Once the first prototype was available, it was flight-tested as a glider by Heini Dittmar in late June, or May of 1942, depending on the source. Heini Dittmar had plenty of experience as a test pilot flying the Me 163A aircraft. The BV1 prototype would be, from this point on, mainly used as a training glider aircraft. From this point forward all aircraft built would be transported to Bad Zwischenahn near Oldenburg. Once there, they would be flight-tested by a number of pilots under the command of Karl Voy from EKdo16. This unit, which was formed in April of 1942, had the primary function of testing and evaluating the newly built Me 163 and helping in the development and improvement of its overall design. Another purpose that this unit had to fulfill was the training of new pilots for the Me 163.
An interesting episode in EKdo 16’s history is connected to the well-known German test pilot Hanna Reitsch. After a number of attempts to get permission to flight test the Me 163, she was finally allowed to do so at the end of 1942. Shortly after she took off, the jettisonable takeoff dolly refused to successfully detach from the aircraft, preventing it from using the landing skid. She managed to land the aircraft but was badly wounded and was placed in a hospital for some time. She later requested permission to fly the Me 163 again, but was explicitly rejected and was forbidden from flying it.
In early 1943, this unit was also tasked with testing jet-powered aircraft that were currently in development. These included the Me 262 and the He 280. EKdo 16 began receiving the first operational Me 163Bs only in July, or February of 1943. Due to extensive Allied Air Force activity near EKdo 16’s base of operation, the unit began the process of relocating its aircraft to Anklam. By this time, the unit had some 7 Me 163A and 1 of the B version. Due to poor ground conditions for Me 163 operations, the aircraft was relocated back to Bad Zwischenahn in late August. The delays with the construction of auxiliary support buildings on this airfield meant that crew training could not begin until October 1943. These initial training flights were carried out using two-seater gliders. Due to a lack of C-Stoff fuel, another series of delays impacted progress on training. In November, the Me 163As were used for crew training. In November and later in December, two aircraft were lost in accidents with the loss of life of both pilots.
In the following months, due to a number of factors like slow production, bad weather, and Allied activity, the Me 163 training program progressed at a slow pace. By May 1944, only a small group of fewer than 50 pilots had a chance to fly either the powered or towed versions of the Me 163. Once these were successfully tested, they would be then allocated to the 1./J.G. 400. unit.
The first combat action of the Me 163 was conducted on 14th May 1944, piloted by Major Spate. Amusingly, just prior to the first flight, his Me 163 BV 41 (PK-QL) aircraft was painted in red. This was done by the unit mechanics, who wanted with this small gesture to bring good luck to their pilots. Seeing no harm in it, Major Spate gave instruction that his aircraft be fully fueled and armed. During his flight, he attempted twice to attack Allied bombers but failed to properly engage them. It seems the red paint did not help with the luck.
During May, a number of unsuccessful combat flights with the Me 163 were undertaken. At the end of May, the airfield at Bad Zwischenahn was heavily bombed. During this attack, several Me 163s were damaged. This attack left the airfield at Bad Zwischenahn unusable for some time. To continue the training of pilots, the whole operation was temporarily moved to Brieg on the Oder. As this airfield lacked any proper workshops, the dismantled aircraft could not be assembled again and, for this reason, no test flights were ever carried out from Brieg.
Interestingly, on the 12th and 13th June 1944, three Me 163s from the EKdo 16 were demonstrated to the Japanese and Italian military delegations. As, at that time, EKdo 16 could not provide a fully operational Me 163, these were instead taken from 1./J.G. 400.
On 15th June 1944, the unit was once again back to Bad Zwischenahn. At their disposal, there were 2 prototypes, 7 gliders and 11 fully operational Me 163 aircraft. A few days later, another accident occurred when the towing aircraft lost power to one of its engines. The towed Me 163 was released at some 50 meters of altitude and the pilot was forced to land at a nearby lake. While the aircraft was heavily damaged, the pilot managed to survive.
In July 1944, a second auxiliary unit (Erganzumgsstaffel) was formed. It was also subordinated to the 1./J.G. 400. It had 6 Me 163s, of which only one was equipped with a rocket engine. It was intended to supplement the training of pilots for 1./J.G. 400.
In mid-August 1944, the airfield was once again attacked by Allied bombers. This caused further delays in training operations, until August 23rd. On that day, another accident led to the death of a pilot and the loss of yet another aircraft. Not wanting to waste the parts of the destroyed Me 163, these were collected and then sent to the training school at Fassberg.
At the start of September, Luftwaffe Generalmajor Adolf Galland told EKdo 16’s Commander Hauptmann Thaler, that the unit was to be disbanded and all personnel and equipment were to be relocated to Brandis. While the commanders of EKdo 16 were against such a decision, there was little they could do and, by the end of September, the unit was on its way to Brandis.
Technical Characteristics
The Me 163 was a high-speed, rocket-powered, swept-wing tailless aircraft. Its fuselage was constructed of metal, while the wings were wood. The fuselage could be divided into three sections, the cockpit, the central fuel tanks, and the rear engine compartment. In order to help the ground crew with repairs, the fuselage was specially designed to contain a large number of removable panels. Thanks to this, the replacement of damaged parts or even the whole engine could be done relatively quickly.
The wings were quite simple in design, consisting of two spars covered in 8 mm thick fabric. The Me 163 wings were swept to the rear at a 23.3° angle. At the wing’s trailing edges, ailerons were placed, which the pilot used for pitch and roll. For landings, large hydraulically operated flaps were added on the wings.
In order for the pilot to enter the cockpit, a ladder was placed on the left side of the aircraft. While the cockpit was not pressurized, it could be jettisoned to help the pilot escape the aircraft in case of emergency. Being unpressurized actually placed time limits for how long the pilot could endure without losing consciousness at altitude and during high-speed maneuvers. For this reason, the pilot had to endure altitude chamber training and had a specially designed diet. Despite attempts to improve visibility compared to the previous version, the Me 163B suffered from poor visibility, especially to the rear and in front of the aircraft’s nose.
The Me 163 was equipped with various onboard equipment, including a FuG 16 ZE radio transmitter and receiver. In addition, a FuG 25 IFF (identification friend or foe) transmitter and receiver was installed. Given its small size and limited overall weight, the onboard batteries had a limited capacity. In order to provide the necessary power, the Germans simply added a small windmill generator which was placed on the nose of the fuselage.
During its development, the Me 163B was tested with a series of different rocket engines. Ultimately, for the main production version, the HWK (Helmuth Walter Kiel) 109-509A rocket engine was chosen. This had a thrust power ranging from 100 kg (220 lbs) to 1,500 kg (3,300 lbs) or 1,700 kg (3,750 lbs), depending on the source.
The Me 163 initially used a fuel mixture of the T and Z-Stoff. T-Stoff consisted of a mix of hydrogen peroxide with oxyquinoline or phosphate. Z-Stoff was an aqueous solution of calcium permanganate. Z-Stoff would later be replaced with C-Stoff, which was a mix of methyl alcohol, hydrazine hydrate, and water. T-Stoff was stored in one main and two smaller auxiliary tanks. The smaller tanks were placed on both sides of the cockpit. The C-Stoff fuel tanks were placed in the Me 163’s wings. In order to help circulate the fuel, two centrifugal pumps were placed inside the Me 163.
These chemicals were extremely flammable and dangerous to handle and thus required safety procedures to be used properly. Before each flight, the fuel tanks had to be thoroughly washed with water. During refueling, the ground and the aircraft had to be sprayed with large amounts of water. If the safety procedures were not followed, there was a great risk of explosion, which happened on occasion. Due to the volatile nature of the fuel, any harsh landing with fuel still onboard offered a great chance of explosion as well, which led to a number of pilots being lost. Being highly corrosive and deadly to the touch, the maintenance crews and pilots had to wear specially designed protective clothing and gloves. Preserved photographs seem to indicate that these precautions were not always strictly adhered to. Given that the Me 163 operated in late 1944 were shortages of all kinds of equipment and materials were common, this should not come as a surprise. Still, handling the Me 163 fuel without this kind of protection was highly dangerous for the ground maintenance crews.
The fuel load consisted of 1040 liters (229 gallons) of T-Stoff and 492 liters of C-Stoff. The Me 163 was notorious for having only a limited powered flight endurance of 7 minutes and 30 seconds before its fuel reserve was spent. The actual flight could be much longer, however, since at sufficient altitude, the pilot could switch off the engine, and reactivate it as needed. After all rocket fuel had been spent, the pilot would then use the Me 163 as a glider to fly back to its base, or to any nearby German airfield.
The initial armament consisted of two 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons, which were positioned in the wing roots. To increase the firepower these would be replaced with the stronger 30 mm MK 108 cannons. The Me 163B-0 series was armed with the weaker 20mm cannon while the Me 163 B-1 with the stronger 30mm cannon. While the Mk 108 had sufficient firepower to outright destroy or heavily damage enemy aircraft, it was plagued with low velocity. This combined with the extraordinary speed of the Me 163 made engaging targets difficult. For this reason, the Me 163 was tested with some experimental weapon systems. These include the 5.5 cm R4M air-to-air rocket, and the more revolutionary SG 500 Jagdfaust. This weapon consisted of five rockets usually placed under each wing, but on the Me 163 it was actually mounted vertically in the wings. It was provided with an optical sensor that activated its weapon load once it detected shadow, in theory, a shadow of an enemy plane. This was an automated weapon firing mechanism capable of friendly fire if not managed properly. But this situation would be rare given the fact that Me 163 was a short-range and unique interceptor that operated on its own without support from other aircraft.
The Me 163 utilized an auxiliary landing gear unit. This was mainly done to reduce the overall weight of the aircraft. Take-offs and landings were divided into two phases. For take-off, the Me 163 sat on a simple two-wheel dolly unit. Once at sufficient altitude the dolly was jettisoned from the bottom of the aircraft. On occasion, there were accidents involving this system, when, for example, the dolly refused to release from the aircraft, or even worse, it could bounce off the ground and strike the aircraft from below. Therefore the Germans worked on developing safer types of dollies. On landing, the Me 163 were to use a simple retractable landing skid, placed beneath the fuselage. In addition, to the rear of the aircraft, a small steerable tail wheel was added to help during take-off and landing.
While this takeoff and landing system offered the desired reduction in weight, it was not without its problems. Besides the issues previously mentioned, after a successful landing, the Me 163 was immobile and vulnerable to possible enemy attacks. To move it across the airfield the Germans designed and built a small specialized aircraft tug, called the Scheuchschlepper, especially for this task.
Operational Combat Use
The first operational unit that was to be equipped with the Me 163 was the Staffel of Jagdgeschwader 20./JG 1 located at Bad Zwischenahn. According to initial plans, this unit was to be formed at least by the end of 1943 or in early 1944 depending on the sources. In its inventory, there were some 12 fully operational Me 163 available. In addition, the Germans planned for the Me 163 to be positioned at a series of auxiliary airfields along Allied bomber routes. These would be fully equipped with spare parts, ammunition, and fuel, and positioned close to each other. This way, after an attack run, the Me 163 pilots could simply choose on which airfield to land, knowing that they could resupply without any problems.
But in reality, it took a few more months before the unit was actually officially formed at the start of March 1944. The development of a network of supporting airfields for the Me 163 was also never completed. The unit was by that time being renamed to Jagdgeschwader 1./JG 400 and stationed at Deelen. The commander of the unit was Oberleunant Rober Olejnik. They were relocated to Wittmundhafen as the airfield at Deelen proved unfit for the Me 163 aircraft’s operation.
The unit received its first operational Me 163 on the 10th of March, and seven more were to arrive by late April 1944. Concurrently, pilots were beginning to arrive from the EKdo 16 training unit. More test flights were carried out until mid-March 1944 when they had to be temporarily stopped. The reason for this was the lack of sufficient water supply which was essential for flushing the Me 163 fuel tanks in order to avoid any accidental explosion. To resolve this issue the unit personnel began drilling wells to collect water.
1./JG 400 was at this stage prohibited from making combat flights in order to avoid the attention of the Allies. However, the unit was permitted to conduct live firing trials during flights in order to test the Me 163 weapons systems. While generally successful, during sharp maneuvers at a speed of some 800 km/h, the ammunition belts proved prone to malfunction. While Olejnik suggested using a drum magazine, which was even tested successfully, his idea would not be adopted. On the 21st of April Olejnik had an accident during a forced landing where he spent some time in hospital thereafter.
In April and May, 1./JG 400 took delivery of a group of 10 aircraft, but one had to be returned to Klemm for modifications. That particular aircraft would be destroyed in an Allied bombing raid on Klemm. These were still prototype aircraft of the B pre-production version. The first Me 163B-0 series aircraft began to arrive from May 1944. At this time the Luftwaffe officials were determined to introduce the Me 163 to service. For this reason, the work on testing and experimenting with the Me 163 was stopped in favor of increasing the overall production of the Me 163 B-1.
With the expected increase in production, another unit, 2./J.G.400, was to be formed in May 1944. It was initially to be involved with crucial crew training. At that time, the size of both units was to be increased to 14 instead of 12 operational aircraft.
In July 1944, 1./JG 400 received permission to make combat flights. The Me 163 were then used in several failed attempts to intercept the Allied reconnaissance aircraft that made frequent flights over the base. At the same time, 1./JG 400 and other available Me 163 were being relocated to new positions at Brandis. The original plans to build numerous connected airfields were abandoned in favor of concentrating all available Me 163 in a few selected airfields. For this reason, Brandis would become the main key point for the Me 163 combat operations. It is from there that the Me 163s attempted to intercept a huge Allied air formation of some 766 bombers, supported with over 14 groups of cover fighters. The Me 163 did not engage the Allies probably due to the small number of available aircraft and the heavy fighter cover. By the end of July, the 1./JG 400 had only four operational aircraft out of 16 available.
In mid-August, Me 163s from this unit attacked an Allied B-17 bomber formation. While evading the fighter cover, they managed to heavily damage at least one bomber, killing two crew members. On the 16th of August, five Me 163 attacked a group of B-17s, and even managed to shoot down two of the bombers. The Germans lost one Me 163 during this engagement being hit by an Allied P-51. On the 24th of August, eight Me 163 managed to shoot down three more bombers while successfully evading enemy fighter cover.
On the 8th of September, the Me 163 were officially taken into service. Given the previous success, of destroying 5 enemy bombers with a limited number of available Me 163, attempts were made to increase the number of squadrons with 20 aircraft. This was never achieved, as the Allies destroyed the vital C-Stoff fuel production facility at Kiel in August. On the 11th of September, a single Me 163 attacked and destroyed a lone B-17.
During these initial combat engagements with the Allied bombers, German pilots noticed that the Me 163s armament had a huge flaw. The weapons were difficult to use with the standard attack tactics of the aircraft. This involved getting the Me 163 high above the Allied bombers and then plunging down at them with a dive speed of 885-930 km/h (550-580 mph). Due to its main cannon’s low velocity, and in order to avoid collision with the target, the pilot had only a few seconds available to engage the enemy. This meant that only the highly experienced Me 163 pilot had a chance of hitting the enemy aircraft. The Me 163 also had another flaw, as it could be only used when the weather was clear.
At the end of September 1944, II./JG400 was formed, under the command of Lieutenant Peter Gerth (3/JG 400) and Oberleutnant Franz Woidich (4/JG 400). These units were renamed in November or December 1944 to 5. and 6./JG 400. During this time the 7/JG 400 was also formed, which was stationed at Stettin-Altdamm. In late 1944 II./JG400 was repositioned at Stargard. Few sorties were carried out mostly due to lack of fuel. In November 1944 a Me 163 engaged a British Mosquito, damaging it and forcing its crew to abandon the aircraft.
Bad weather, lack of fuel and the rapid Allied advance on the West and East temporarily stopped all Me 163 combat operations. Combat operations began again in March of 1945. For example on the 16th March, an Me 163 managed to damage another Mosquito on a reconnaissance mission. While the Mosquito pilot managed to fly back to France, he was forced to crash land. A quite interesting Me 163 air victory was achieved on the 10th April 1945 while piloted by Leutnant Fritz Kelb. This aircraft was equipped with the experimental SG 500 Jagdfaust and managed to shoot down a British Lancaster bomber.
In late April I/.J.G.400 would be disbanded and its remaining few operational Me 163 were allocated to the J.G 7. The former I/.J.G.400 commander Wolfgang Spate, flying one of the remaining operational Me 163, managed to destroy 5 additional Allied bombers by the end of the war. The remaining ground personnel from the I/.J.G.400 were dispatched to the East to fight as infantry in Bavaria. There, they allegedly managed to destroy a Soviet tank using a MK 108 cannon removed from an Me 163, which was placed on makeshift undercarriage wheels, also taken from a Me 163. Given the chaotic state of Germany in 1945, it’s conceivable that the crew operating this gun may have found a way to make it work.
After the War
In May 1945 the Allied forces were rapidly advancing into Germany, capturing many airfields in the process. The crews of the Me 163 were often instructed to destroy their own aircraft to prevent them from falling into the enemy’s hands, but despite this, the Allies managed to capture a number of intact Me 163. This was the case of the II./J.G.400, which surrendered its 48 aircraft to the Allies on the 8th of MAy 1945. Of these, some 25 were transported back to the UK to be properly examined. The Americans also managed to capture a number of Me 163 in various working conditions across occupied Germany. The French Air Force received at least 4 Me 163 from the British after the war. The Soviets were not idle either as they also managed to acquire unknown numbers of the Me 163 including the rare two-seater trainer version Me 163S.
In an attempt to increase the Me 163’s performance, Junkers cooperated with Dr. Lippisch. This resulted in the development of a modified Me 163 (based on the BV6 prototype) which was slightly larger, had greater fuel capacity and had two engines. In theory, during take-off, both engines would be activated until a certain altitude was reached. This project would eventually evolve into Me 163C. This aircraft was to have a redesigned fuselage and cockpit. It was to be powered by HWK 109-509A-2 and HWK 509C engines. By the end of the war, only a few incomplete airframes were built.
Japanese Me-163B
In 1944, on Adolf Hitler’s instructions, a number of previously secret projects were to be shared with the Japanese. For this reason, several submarines were to transport parts of a disassembled Me 163B to Japan. While the one carrying the aircraft parts was sunk, the others that were carrying technical manuals managed to reach the German ally. Based on these, the Japanese managed to build a slightly modified copy of the Me 163. It was known in Japan as J8M1 Shuri (Rigorous Sword). During the first test flight, there was an accident in which the prototype was lost.
During negotiations between Japanese and German military officials, it was agreed to hand over to Japan a production license for many weapons including the Me 163 and Me 262. It was named Mitsubishi Ki-200, for the army, and J8M1 for the navy. The first Me 163B flew in July 1945 but was lost in an accident. Several more were built but the end of the war led to the end of the project.
Production
The production of Me 163 was initially allocated to the Messerschmitt Regensburg factory. As it was overburdened with other projects, it would then be allocated to a much smaller Klemm factory where less than 60 aircraft were built in total. Some sources also mentioned that the production was carried out at the Dornier factory in Oberpfaffenhofen and the Bachmann von Blumenthal factory in Fürth. On the 1st of September 1944, the production of the Me 163 was officially handed over to Junkers. To avoid concentrating the production in one location, given the Allied bombing campaign, Junkers dispersed it across numerous smaller companies. Each of these was tasked with the delivery and production of parts before being finally assembled at Brandenburg-Briest. This, in theory, would increase the overall production and avoid potentially being targeted by Allied bombers. In reality, this backfired, as it caused huge confusion and chaos with the delivery of parts, and poor quality in production. Junkers managed to produce around 299 aircraft of this type by the end of the war.
The question of how many Me 163B were produced during the war is difficult to pinpoint precisely. The sources give different numbers, for example, most state around 400 of all models, of which some 370 were estimated to be of B-version, were built by the war’s end.
Me 163B-0 – Pre-production aircraft
Me 163B-1 – Main production aircraft
Me 163C – Experimental twin-engine modifications of the Me 163B aircraft but only few incomplete airframes were ever built
Operators
Germany – Built less than 400 aircraft of which only a smaller number were ever used in combat
Japan – Built a small number of slightly modified Me 163B by the end of the war.
Soviet Union – Several Me 163B and one Me 163S, captured, were used for many different tests after the war. The results of these tests will lead to the development and creation of several different projects (The Lavochkin I-162 and Mikoyan-Gurevich I-270).
UK – Managed to capture some 48 or so Me 163 aircraft of which 25 were sent to the UK for testing and evaluation.
France – Received four aircraft from the British after the war.
USA – Acquired an unknown number of Me 163 at the war’s end.
Australia and Canada – Both received one aircraft from the British after the war.
Surviving Aircraft
Today at least several Me 163 are known to still exist. One could be found in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, and one in the Canada Aviation and Space Museum in Ottawa. Two are located in German museums: Luftwaffenmuseum at Berlin-Gatow and Deutsches Museum in Munich. Few more are in the USA Flying Heritage Collection, National Museum of the USAF, and Smithsonian National Air and Space Museums. And in the UK, RAF, Science and National Museum of Flight. The one captured by the Soviets existence is currently unclear.
Conclusion
The Me 163 was designed to be light and relatively cheap to build. This was certainly a strength if we take into account the huge shortage of resources and materials that the Germans endured during the later stages of the war. It also used special fuel that was specially designed for it, and thus there was no need for allocating the vital German fuel reserves to it.
With the two MK 108 cannons, the Me 163 was formidably armed given its small size. Just a few rounds of this cannon was enough to destroy or heavily damage an enemy target. Given its phenomenal speed during dive attack at the enemy formation, the Me 163 was essentially immune to enemy fighter cover and was unable to do much against it. That is until it ran out of fuel, at that point it was completely helpless and could only glide back to base.
On the other hand, it was overshadowed by a number of critical faults that were never corrected. For example, while the Me 163 was cheap, due to many reasons it was never produced in any sufficient numbers to cause any serious threat to the Allies. While the number of some 400 aircraft built seems significant, in reality only a dozen or so aircraft were ever used at any given time in combat. Most were used for training, either as gliders, or with an operational engine. Not all built aircraft would be delivered to the operational units, given the great confusion and chaos that the Germans were surrounded with from 1944 on. The fuel could never be produced in sufficient quantities. The problem with fuel was even complicated by the increase in production of the Me 163. Because of this the Germans simply had to reduce the number of aircraft that they used for combat, as there wasn’t enough fuel for all of them. The volatile nature of its fuel, occasionally lead to accidents and explosions, losing aircraft in the process, but more importantly the vital pilots. While its speed was great, its maximum burn time for the engine was only slightly longer than 7 minutes, however this capability could be stretched by the pilot’s ability to switch the engine on and off throughout the flight. Once the engine consumed all the fuel reserves, the aircraft essentially became a simple glider that was vulnerable to enemy fighter cover.
In the final analysis, the Me 163 theoretically possessed great potential for a rocket-powered aircraft. In reality, due to many delays, lack of unity in German aviation circles, and problems with its design and production, the Me 163 never managed to fulfill the role that its designer had intended for it. Its achilles heel was its dangerous and volatile fuel from which a number of planes and pilot lives were lost. Probably its greatest contribution was that it provided a good experimental platform for flight tests at transonic speeds. But due to its unusual design the Me 163 certainly deserves a great place in the history of the development of aviation.
Me 163B Specifications
Wingspans
30 ft 7 in / 9.32 m
Length
19 ft 2 in / 5.84 m
Height
9 ft 1 in / 2.77 m
Wing Area
199.4 ft² / 18.5 m²
Engine
One HWL 509A rocket engine
Empty Weight
4,200 lbs / 1,900 kg
Maximum Takeoff Weight
9.060 lbs / 4.110 kg
Fuel Capacity
1,530 liters / 400 US gallons
Maximum Speed
600 mph / 960 km/h
Engine endurance
7 minutes and 30 seconds
Maximum Service Ceiling
39,700 ft / 12,100 m
Crew
One pilot
Armament
Two 20 mmMG 151
Or two 30 mm MK108 cannons
Gallery
Credits
Written by Marko P.
Edited by Henry H. & Ed Jackson
Illustrated by Carpaticus
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