Category Archives: WW2

World War 2 saw the airplane rise to even greater importance than in the first World War. Air superiority became a crucial component of battlefield operations and air forces were massively expanded during the conflict.The Allied and Axis sides of the war developed enormous war machines, capable of developing and rolling out unprecedented numbers of advanced new military equipment in rapid response to changing conditions on the battlefield, as well keeping up with the technological advances of adversaries.

High altitude bombing raids and night fighting were hallmarks of the War for Europe, whilst aircraft carrier battles pitched the American and Japanese fleets against one another. The technology of the day was pushed to it’s limit with the use of superchargers in aircraft engines, the introduction of radar, and the rapid development of the jet engine by the war’s end.

The period ended as the Nuclear Age and subsequent Cold War were ushered in by the tremendous and tragic blows to Japan’s wearied people.

Me 309

Nazi Germany (1943)

Fighter: Four prototypes Built

The Messerschmitt Me 109, although an outstanding aircraft, still had room for improvement. Its most noticeable shortcomings included a rather small operational radius, significantly reducing its combat potential in prolonged engagements. To address this, Messerschmitt initiated the development of a successor model designated as the Me 309. However, from the outset, this new fighter was plagued with numerous mechanical faults that could not be resolved in the foreseeable future. Consequently, only four prototypes were built before the project was ultimately canceled.

The Me 309 first prototype. Source: https://www.luftwaffephotos.com/lme2091.htm

History

At the onset of the Second World War, Germany relied heavily on the Me 109 as its primary fighter aircraft. Renowned for its exceptional performance and cost-effectiveness, the Me 109 outmatched most of the enemy fighters it encountered over Europe. Following the fall of France in June 1940, Germany launched a significant bombing campaign against the UK. This prolonged engagement highlighted a critical issue: the Me 109’s limited operational range prevented it from carrying out long-range fighter sweeps, or being usable as a bomber escort.

Recognizing the urgent need for enhancements, Messerschmitt began experiments on improving the performance, and range, of the Me 109. Initial assessments underscored the necessity for substantial improvements, including an 85% increase in operational range and a minimum 25% boost in maximum speed. Additionally, there were aspirations to augment its firepower, introduce a pressurized cockpit, implement a tricycle undercarriage, and incorporate retractable radiators. Before commencing work on a completely new fighter, Messerschmitt opted to experiment with these features by modifying an existing Me 109F

Some of the changes such as the tricycle undercarriage were first tested on one Me 109. Source: https://militarymatters.online/forgotten-aircraft/the-messerschmitt-me-309-redundant-beauty/

The new fighter project was initiated by Messerschmitt in 1940. However, the German Aviation Ministry (RLM) was not enthusiastic about it, after significant delays. Actual work on the project didn’t commence until the end of 1941. The project, designated Me 309, was led by Woldemar Voigt and Richard Bauer. It’s worth noting that Messerschmitt’s previous attempt to develop a fighter, based on the record-breaking Me 209, failed because its airframe wasn’t suitable for military purposes. Despite the RLM’s initial skepticism towards the Me 309, they eventually ordered nine prototypes.

The side view of the Me 209V1 prototype. While initially used as a speed record-breaker, Messerschmitt tried to adopt it for the military role but ultimately failed in this. Source: ww2fighters.e-monsite.com

The first Me 309 V-1 (GE-CU) prototype was completed in June 1942, and immediately underwent ground trials at the end of that month. However, almost from the outset, a major issue became apparent, the new landing wheel configuration proved difficult to control on the ground. Subsequent flight tests revealed additional challenges, including strong vibrations at high speeds. In July 1942, after a series of modifications, the prototype underwent flight testing once more, only to encounter new problems with the landing gear. The hydraulic retraction system was found to be inadequate, and issues with engine overheating and aerodynamic instability persisted. On one occasion, test pilot Karl Baur was forced to abort the flight after just seven minutes in the air.

Addressing these issues required further modifications, including redesigning the tailplane and improving the hydraulic system for the landing gear. Despite these efforts, subsequent test flights did not yield significant improvements in the overall flight performance of the Me 309. Messerschmitt’s test pilot, Fritz Wendel, expressed dissatisfaction with the aircraft, noting that its flight characteristics were not markedly superior to those of the Me 109. He criticized the high landing speed and the poor design of the control surfaces.

Not ready to abandon the Me 309 prematurely, the first prototype underwent evaluation at the Rechlin test center for further assessment. On the 20th of November 1942, a report was issued deeming the overall performance of the Me 309 unpromising, even inferior to the new Me 109G. Consequently, the RLM reduced the initial production order from nine prototypes to just four. Initially, the RLM had little enthusiasm for the Me 309, and still preferred instead to prioritize increased production of the Me 109. Introducing another fighter design would inevitably cause production delays. Compounding the industrial challenges, perfecting the Me 309 design would likely require additional time,  months if not years of work.

Despite these setbacks, the development of the Me 309 continued at a sluggish pace. The first prototype was initially equipped with a 1,750 hp DB603A-1 engine. It would later be replaced by a 1,450 hp DB 605B engine instead during the testing phase. During one landing, the front landing gear collapsed, causing the aircraft to nose down. Fortunately, the damage sustained was minor. However, the same couldn’t be said for the second prototype (GE-CV), which underwent flight testing on November 28, 1942. Upon landing during its maiden flight, the front landing gear failed, resulting in a hard impact on the ground. The force of the impact nearly split the aircraft into two parts, rendering it extensively damaged and subsequently written off. Despite this setback, two more prototypes were constructed during 1943.

The Me 309 had a troublesome landing gear and a tendency to flip over the nose. In one such accident, the second prototype was lost. Source: https://militarymatters.online/forgotten-aircraft/the-messerschmitt-me-309-redundant-beauty/

Technical characteristics

The Me 309 was conceived as a single-seat fighter, featuring an all-metal construction with a low-wing design. There is limited information available regarding its overall construction. The fuselage was of an oval shape, while the wings were characterized by a dihedral angle with rounded tips, accompanied by automatic leading-edge slots for better maneuverability at low speed. Notably, the wings also incorporated large flaps extending from the wing roots to the ailerons’ end. The canopy was fully glazed, affording excellent visibility of the surroundings.

There is some disagreement among available sources regarding the precise engine used in this aircraft. According to J.R. Smith and A.L. Kay in (German Aircraft of WWII) it was initially powered by a 1,750 hp DB 603A-1 engine, which enabled the Me 309 to achieve a maximum speed of 733 km/h at an altitude of 8,500 meters. This claim is supported by B.C. Wheeler in (Aviation Archive: German Fighters of WWII)  although Wheeler does not specify which DB 603 engine was used. On the other hand, Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage, in (Aircraft of the Luftwaffe) mentions that the Daimler-Benz DB 603G engine model was used, with the same maximum speed being achieved. The DB 603G is the likely most correct engine used on the Me 309, considering it was an experimental high-altitude model that never entered mass use.

The later prototypes were powered by a smaller 1,450 hp DB 605B engine. Even the first prototype was eventually reequipped with this engine. As a result, the overall performance dropped significantly to 575 km/h, according to D. Nesić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka).

With a fuel capacity of 880 liters, its operational range extended to 1,400 km. Equipped with a retractable ventral radiator positioned under the fuselage, the aircraft’s landing gear retracted inward into the wings. A notable departure from convention was the absence of the standard tailwheel; instead, it featured a nosewheel, retracting rearward into the fuselage’s front section.

The Me 309 was initially tested with the DB 603A-1 engine with which it achieved a maximum speed of 733 km/.h. Source: http://www.luftwaffephotos.com/lme2091.htm
Rear view of the Me 309. Source: http://www.luftwaffephotos.com/lme2091.htm
The Me 309 incorporated some new features such as the new landing gear and a retracting radiator both of which can be seen here. Source: airpages.ru

Fate

Despite the considerable investment of time and resources into the Me 309 project, its overall flight performance fell short, ultimately leading to the project’s demise. By the beginning of 1943, the RLM had lost interest in the aircraft, prompting the cancellation of the project after the completion of four prototypes. Despite the cancellation, Messerschmitt proceeded to develop two additional prototypes.

One of these, the Me 309V-3 (CA-NK or CA-CW), was intended as a replacement for the lost V-2 prototype. Its maiden flight took place in March or April of 1943. The fourth prototype marked a significant milestone as it was the first to be equipped with offensive armament, including four 13 mm MG 131 (300 rounds), two 20 mm MG 151 (150 rounds), and two 30 mm MK 108 (65 rounds) cannons. Alternatively, it could be outfitted with two 15 mm MG 151 cannons and three 13 mm MG 131s. Although these armaments were primarily experimental and not used operationally, they were essential for various testing purposes.

Unfortunately, the fate of the last two prototypes remains unclear, with records suggesting they were lost during Allied bombing raids in 1944.

Despite the Messerschmitt hope the Me 309 would not be adopted for service, and the few built prototypes would be mainly used for various testing and evaluation. Source: http://www.luftwaffephotos.com/lme2091.htm

Even before the official cancellation, Messerschmitt officials were hopeful for a larger production order. To this end, they presented several variant proposals for the Me 309. The Me 309A was designed as a fighter variant, equipped with one MG 151 cannon and two MG 131 machine guns. The Me 309B was intended to serve as a fighter-bomber variant, armed with two 250 kg (550 lbs) bombs. As for the Me 309C, it was designed as a destroyer, featuring three MG 151 cannons and up to four MG 131s. An intriguing proposal was the Me 309 Zwilling (Eng. Twins), which involved two aircraft joined together in a configuration reminiscent of the post-war US F-82, but ultimately, this concept did not materialize.

A drawing of the proposed Me 309zw aircraft. Source: D.Sharp Luftwaffe: Secret Designs of the Third Reich

 

Interestingly in 1944 Japan expressed interest in its design and asked for plans and drawings of the Me309V-3 aircraft. But nothing came of this in the end.

Prototypes

  • Me 309V-1 – First prototype powered by a  1,750 hp DB 603A-1 engine
  • Me 309V-2 –  Second prototype lost during the first test flight
  • Me 309V-3 – This prototype was built in early 1943 as a replacement for the second prototype
  • Me 309V-4 – First prototype to be armed.

Proposed Variants

  • Me 309A – Proposed fighter variant
  • Me 309B – Proposed  fighter-bomber variant
  • Me 309C –Proposed destroyer variant
  • Me 309zw- Proposed twi-aircraft configuration

Conclusion 

The Me 309, despite the investment and the hope that it would be an adequate successor to the Me 109, proved to be a troubled design and pulled down by wartime pragmatism. From the start, it was plagued by various mechanical problems that were never resolved. The fact that RLM was never interested that much in such a project did not help either. As it would take considerable time to fully remediate all the noted issues, the project was abandoned in favor of the latter Me 262.

Me 309V-1 Specifications

Wingspans 11.04 m / 36  ft 2  in
Length 9.46 m / 31 ft 1 in
Height 3.4 m /  ft
Wing Area 16.55 m² /  178.08 ft²
Engine One 1,750 hp DB 603A-1
Empty Weight 3,530 5kg / 7,784 lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight 4,250 kg / 9,371 lbs
Maximum Speed 733 km/h / 455 mph
Cruising speed 665 km/h / 413 mph
Range 1,400 km / 870 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 12,000 m  / 39,360 ft
Climb to 8 km In 10 minutes
Crew 1 pilot
Armament

Illustration

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Oussama Mohamed “Godzilla”

Source:

  • D. Nesić  (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka. Beograd.
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books.
  • J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1972) German Aircraft of the WW2, Putnam
  • D. Myhra (2000) Messerschmitt Me 209V1, Schiffer Military History
  • M. Griehl () X-planes German Luftwaffe prototypes 1930-1940, Frontline Book
  •  D.Sharp (2018) Luftwaffe: Secret Designs of the Third Reich, Mortons
  • Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage (2009) Aircraft Of The Luftwaffe, McFarland & Company, Inc
  • B. C. Wheeler (2014) Aviation Archive German Fighters of WWII, Kelsey Publishing Group

 

 

Me 109 in Independent State of Croatia Service

Independent State of Croatia flag Independent State of Croatia (1944-1945)
Fighter –  15 to 30 Operated

Following the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the Axis invasions in April of 1941, the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Eng. Independent State of Croatia) was created. It immediately began forming its military, including an air force. This air force, while managing to acquire a few hundred aircraft of various types, always lacked fighter planes. Nothing major was done to improve them in this regard up to 1944, when finally, Germany agreed to send a small group of Me 109’s to the NDH to bolster their fighter force.

An Me 109G in NDH Service. Source: www.britmodeller.com

History

After Italy’s unsuccessful invasion of Greece, Benito Mussolini was forced to ask his German ally for help. Adolf Hitler agreed to assist, fearing that a possible Allied attack through the Balkans would reach Romania and its vital oil fields. In the path of the German advance towards Greece stood Yugoslavia, whose government initially agreed to join the Axis side. This agreement was short-lived, as the Yugoslav government was overthrown by an anti-Axis, pro-Allied military coup at the end of March 1941. Hitler immediately gave an order for the preparation of the invasion of Yugoslavia. The war that began on 6th April 1941, sometimes called the April War, was a short one and ended with a Yugoslav defeat and the division of its territory between the Axis powers.

With the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Croatia, with German aid, was finally able to declare independence, albeit becoming a fascist puppet state. It was officially formed on the 10th of April 1941. The new state received a significant territorial expansion by annexing most of western Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, parts of Serbia, and Montenegro.

While the conquest of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia proved to be an easy task for the Axis, holding these territories proved to be much more difficult. This was mainly due to two major resistance movements that were actively engaged in sabotage, destroying railways and bridges, and attacking isolated occupation units’ positions and strong points. Despite attempts to suppress these attacks, the resistance movements, especially the Communist Partisans, grew rapidly, forcing the Germans and their Allies to introduce ever-larger occupation forces. The NDH forces were especially targeted by the resistance as they committed numerous war crimes, including mass murders and deportations to concentration camps. Thanks to German help, they managed to form a small air force that had in its inventory all kinds of obsolete, and in rare cases, modern equipment. By 1943, it was in the process of reorganization, and the NDH officials during this period often asked their German overlords for more modern aircraft. Sometimes they even portrayed their own Air Force as being weaker than it was in the hope of getting military aid. Eventually, near the end of the war, several dozen Me 109s were sent from Germany to NDH.

A Brief Me 109 History

The Me 109 was Willy Messerschmitt’s response to the German Air Force’s request for a modern fighter in 1934. Despite being a completely unknown aircraft designer, his aircraft, thanks to its simplicity and performance, easily beat the competition. Soon after it entered mass production in 1936. It was quite an advanced design for its time and superior to most fighters around the world. Over the years various versions were built, each introducing various modifications. Some were even specially made for various other roles, such as training or reconnaissance. By the end of the war over 30.000 were built making it the second most produced military aircraft in history. Given the sheer number of produced aircraft, it should not be surprising that many were sold or given to various nations in Europe.

One of the most iconic fighters of the Second World War was the Me 109. Source: Wiki

The Need of the NDH Air Force

Following the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the NDH began organizing its newly created armed forces. Its air force was created on the 19th of April, 1941. Immediately, work began on creating an adequate structural organization, acquiring manpower, and procuring equipment. Initially, plans for arming this Air Force were ambitious and included acquiring the newest German aircraft design. For example, the main fighter aircraft was to be the Me 109E. A single fighter group would consist of 22 such aircraft. The Germans on the other hand decided to ignore this request, as these planes were needed for the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. They also did not fully trust the NDH officials. As a compromise, the NDH air force was to be equipped with the stockpiles of captured Yugoslavian aircraft. The Germans, once again disappointed in the state of their air force, gave the NDH only those aircraft that were mostly obsolete while transferring the better aircraft, like the Hurricanes, to Romania instead.

Prior to the war the Kingdom of Yugoslavia operated a number of modern Me 109E fighters. Despite the NDH’s constant requests to the Germans to deliver at least some of these nothing came of this. Source:  www.paluba.info

Under German Command

While the Germans did not provide the NDH with the Me 109, the Croatian pilots still got the chance to fly on them. While receiving no major import of equipment from their ally, the NDH still wanted to have a good relationship with the Germans. When the massive invasions on the Soviet Union were launched, while the NDH did not directly participate in this attack, its government issued a proclamation for volunteers at the start of July 1941. It called for volunteers among the Croatian population to join the German Army. The NDH Air Force also contributed to this voluntary enlisting. While it lacked equipment, it did not have shortages of personnel willing to go and fight the Soviets.  For this purpose, the 4th Air Force Regiment was formed. It consisted of the 4th Air Force Fighter Group and the 5th Air Force Bomber Group. The 4th Group had in total over 200 members. Once assembled, the fighter group was transported to Furth in Germany where their training was to commence. The training officially began on the 19th of July 1941. For this purpose, the Germans provided some Bu 133, Ar 96, and even some older Me 109D planes. During the training process, one pilot was killed in an accident. During this period the 4th Group was divided into two newly created 10th and 11th squadrons

At the end of September 1941, elements from the 10th Squadron were sent to fight on the Eastern Front. They arrived on the 6th of October and were allocated to the Jagdgeschwader (Eng. Fighter wing) 52. They were to pilot five allocated Me 109Es, with six more being expected to arrive later. Their first combat flight mission occurred on the 9th of October.  They were patrolling the area around Ahtijevka-Krasnograd when the unit spotted a lone Soviet aircraft. It was engaged and shot down by a German pilot who served as a liaison officer in this unit. The following month saw the unit mainly tasked with patrolling and protecting the German airfields in this region. On the 2nd of November, the first air victory was achieved by Croatian pilots. Seven days later another victory was scored. On the 16th of November, the German liaison officer  Lieutenant Baumgarten managed to achieve another victory. He died two days later when he collided in mid-air with a Soviet Aircraft. At the end of November, a Soviet I-16 fighter was shot down. At the start of the following month, the first Croatian pilot, Ivan Karner, lost his life in an accident.

During December they were stationed in the Azov area. During January, pilots from this unit managed to shoot down some 23 Soviet aircraft. By April 1942, 12 more enemy aircraft were shot down over the Kerch Peninsula. In May, the whole unit was renamed to Jagdgruppe Džal (Eng. Fighter Group Džal) which was a common thing for the Germans to name particular military groups for their commanders, in this case, Colonel Franjo Džal. By that time the unit operated the older Me 109E and requested the delivery of newer models. In July 1942, the first Me 109G-2 version began to reach this unit. July and August were quite successful for the Croatian pilots who achieved many air victories, some 137 at that point, against various types of Soviet aircraft, despite being used mainly for support missions.

The Croatian pilots returned to the NDH at the end of 1942 for rest and recuperation. By this point, they had achieved 164 confirmed air victories over 3,300 flights. The best fighter ace of this unit was Cvitan Galić who was credited with 24 air victories, plus 7 more that were not confirmed. The unit was not without casualties as six pilots were lost.  After a few months spent resting, they returned to the Soviet Union in February 1943. They were stationed in Crimea and saw heavy action there. Interestingly they encountered Allied-supplied Spitfires and P-39s. While they continued bringing down many more Soviet pilots, the rapid deterioration on the frontlines caused some of these pilots to second-guess their place in the war. In May and June, at least three pilots defected to the Soviet Union. Fearing that more would follow, the Germans prohibited any further flights by Croatian pilots. The unit commander was temporarily removed from this post but reinstated later in September 1943. In late October more combat flight patrols with new pilots were initiated. The 4th Group in October had only 8 fully operational aircraft.

The 4th Group mainly operated the Me 109E with a better model arriving later into the war. Source: www.destinationsjourney.com
In July 1942 first Me 109G-2 fighter versions began to reach this unit, followed by many more different versions. Source; T. Likso and D. Čanak The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War

This unit would remain active on the Eastern Front in 1944. In September 1944, two more pilots defected to the Soviet Side, forcing the Germans to once again forbid the remaining Croatian pilots from flying. In November, the unit was disbanded and its personnel received infantry training.  In early 1945 these saw action as standard infantry in Poland. After March 1945 those that survived were sent back to the NDH. In total the 4th Group that served over four years on the Eastern Front was credited with the destruction of over 300 enemy aircraft.

Despite being a small unit the 4th Squadron pilots managed to claim 300 enemy aircraft. Source: T. Likso and D. Čanak The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War

In NDH service

It was not until early 1945 that the first Me 109 began to arrive in the NDH itself. These included the G-6, 14, and 10 variants. These aircraft were acquired for the 4th Fighter Group (11th and 12th Squadrons). While nominally part of the NDH Air Force, the 4th Fighter Group was actually under the direct control of the Germans. While 15 aircraft were to be delivered, 5 of them never reached Croatia as they were lost during the transit. These numbers are according to T. Likso and D. Čanak. (The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War). However, both authors expressed their doubts about the precise number of delivered aircraft. They believe that that number was actually higher and that more than 15 aircraft were delivered.

Author V. V. Mikić (Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945) gives a different account. According to him, some 30 Me 109s were allocated to the NDH service. The first 10 aircraft arrived at the end of November 1944. The second group of 10 aircraft reached NDH  at the end of 1944. The last 10 were to arrive in January 1945. On transit flight two of them accidentally collided, with one more benign heavily damaged during the landing.

In The Balkans 

Given that these fighters arrived late into the war, there is little surviving documentation that mentions their use in combat. In March, two Me 109s were used to attack a partisan airfield Smrdan but without any success.

During March and April 1945, some of these newly arrived aircraft were used for crew training.  These flights mainly lasted between 10 to 15 minutes, and the older Me 109G-6 was used for this purpose. On the 26th of March, and later on the 2nd of April, ground attacks against Partisan-held airfields were made.

By 1945, defections from the NDH’s forces became a common occurrence, and they were having a hard time keeping the Army intact. The Air Force was not an exception to this, as its pilots often managed to escape either to the Allies in Italy, or the Yugoslav Partisans. On the 16th of April 1945, while flying a patrol mission, two Me 109s escaped to Italy and surrendered to the Allies. These were piloted by Josip Ceković, flying aMe 109G-10, and Vladimir Sandtner, in a Me 109G-14. The first pilot escaped to Falconara and the latter to Ancona. Allegedly, these two fighters had acted as a guard to a secret NDH delegation that was to fly to Italy and ask the Allies for peace, and possibly even switch sides.

In late April 1945 pilot Josip Ceković while flying a Me 109G-10 escaped to Falconara in Italy and surrendered to the Allies. Source: www.britmodeller.com

Two more pilots deserted with their aircraft, both flying Me 109G-10s, on the 20th of April. These were part of a group of four Me 109s that were tasked with attacking Partisan ground targets. Instead, two pilots defected and flew to the city of Mostar, which was at that time in Partisan hands. They were immediately put into partisan service after the NDH symbols were repainted. On the 7th of May, they saw action against the retreating Axis ground forces.

On the 23rd of April 1945 while on patrol, two NDH Me 109s spotted two Allied  P-51s. The Me 109 pilots managed to fly at a close range of some 80 meters and opened fire. One of the P-51s caught fire, and while the pilot tried to escape a second burst of cannon fire from the Me 109 brought it down. They were intercepted by two more P-51s. The NDH aircraft, despite receiving many hits, managed to damage another P-51. As more Allied fighters began to approach this engagement, the Me 109s began to fly away toward their base of operation, managing to escape the pursuers.

The few remaining Me 109s were used in the last days of the war. They tried to defend the Axis positions at the Sermian Front in the Eastern part of Croatia. This was a vital defense line for the remaining Axis Forces that was for some time besieged by the advancing Partisans. During this time, the Me 109 participated in a few skirmishes with the Partisan-operated Yak fighters. The NDH Me 109s generally avoided direct fights as they were severely outnumbered.

In the last days of the war, many of the Me 109 escaped to Austria. It is believed that up to 17 aircraft made this flight, and they were left abandoned, later to be put to use by the advancing Partisans

Camo and markings

The NDH Me 109s were left in German late time war-type camouflages. This usually consisted of  Dunkelgrun (Eng. Dark green) and Grau  (Eng. Grey) on the upper aircraft surfaces, and  Hellblau (Eng. Sky Blue) on the lower surfaces. A yellow-painted ring followed the black nose. To the rear, the usually yellow-painted band that goes around the fuselage was repainted in green. A standard Croatian white and red checkerboard coat of arms was painted on the tail unit. Starting from 24th February 1945 the NDH Air Force introduced the use of a black trefoil that was painted on the aircraft fuselage sides or wings.

A good view of the NDH Me 109 side view, notice the large black trefoil that was painted on the aircraft fuselage sides or wings. Source: falkeeins.blogspot.com

Technical Specification

The Bf 109 was a low-wing, all-metal, single-seat fighter. To keep the production of this aircraft as simple as possible, Messerschmitt engineers decided to develop a monocoque fuselage that was divided into two halves. These halves would be placed together and connected using simple flush rivets, thus creating a simple base on which remaining components, like the engine, wings, and instruments would be installed.

In order to provide room for the retracting landing gear, Messerschmitt intentionally used only a single wing spar which was positioned quite to the rear of the wing. This spar had to be sufficiently strong to withstand the load forces that acted on the wings during flight. The wings were connected to the fuselage by four strong bolts. This design enables the wings to have a rather simple overall construction with the added benefit of being cheap to produce. During the Bf 109’s later service life, the damaged wings could be simply replaced with others on hand. The wings were also very thin, which provided the aircraft with better overall control at lower speeds but also reduced drag which in turn increased the overall maximum speed

The cockpit was placed in the center of the fuselage. It was a fully enclosed compartment that was riveted to the fuselage. The Bf 109 cockpit itself was quite cramped. The Me 109 possessed quite an unusual landing gear arrangement. The landing gear was mainly connected to the lower center base of the fuselage, which meant that the majority of the weight of the aircraft would be centered at this point. The two landing gear struts retracted outward towards the wings.

As the production of this aircraft went on for years, various modifications and improvements were carried out to improve the flight performance. This included its overall shape, engine, armament, and instrumentation. For example, the Me 109B-1 which was introduced before the outbreak of the war in Europe, was powered by a 635 hp Jumo 210D engine and armed with three 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns

The later Me 109G-6 which was introduced to service in early 1943 was powered by a much stronger  1,475 hp DB605A engine. In addition, the armament was improved with either one 30 mm (1.18 in), or two 20 mm (0.78 in) cannons and additional two 13 mm (0.51 in) machine guns  It was a mass-produced fighter aircraft that stayed in service up to the end of the war. There were several sub-variants of the G-6 some of which were the R-2 reconnaissance, R-3 with larger fuel load, and R-6 with stronger armament in the wings.

The G-14 variant incorporated some minor changes mainly intended to standardize some parts of the Me 109 series. This includes using the erla haube type canopy, a larger tail fin, and standardized the use of methanol-water injection. The G-14 was an attempt to consolidate all of the modifications that had accumulated with the G-6 into a common variant, the G-10 was converted from old airframes to get the newer DB 605D engine into service faster.

The G-10 (essentially modified G-14/G-6) was an attempt to increase the overall flight speed and high-altitude performance by introducing the new DB 605D engine equipped with a larger supercharger. In addition, this variant received several modifications such as a reinforced, lengthened tail wheel strut, using wider front wheels, somewhat larger wings, etc. It was introduced to service in late 1944 and saw relatively limited combat action due to this.

Conclusion

The Me 109 was the best NDH fighter during the war. Unfortunately for the NDH, these began to arrive at the end of 1944. It is way too late and in too few numbers to have any meaningful impact on the war in Yugoslavia. Lack of fuel, the Allied air supremacy, and the rapidly collapsing Axis resistance meant that these stood little chance to effectively fight back.

Me 109G-6 Specifications

Wingspans 9,92 m / 32  ft 6  in
Length 9 m / 29 ft 7  in
Height 2.6 m / 8  ft 6  in
Wing Area 16.2 m² / 175 ft²
Engine One 1,475 hp DB605 AM
Empty Weight 2,700 kg / 5,950  lbs
Maximum Take-off Weight 3,200 kg / 7,055  lbs
Maximum Speed 620 km/h / 373 mph
Range 600 km / 620 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 11,550m / 37,895 ft
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • One 30 mm (1.18 in), or two 20 mm (0.78 in) cannons and two 13 mm (0.51 in) machine guns

Illustration

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by Henry H.
  • Illustrated by Godzilla

Source:

  • A. Pelletier (2002) French Fighters Of World War II in Action, Squadron/Signal Publication
  • J. R. Beaman (1983) Messerschmitt  Bf 109 in action part 2, Squadron publication
  • V. V. Mikić, (2000) Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945, Vojno  istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije.
  • T. Likso and Danko Č. (1998) The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War, Nacionalna Sveučilišna Zagreb
  • J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1990) German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
  • C. Chants (2007) Aircraft of World War II, Grange Books.

 

 

 

 

Messerschmitt Me 209A

Nazi Germany (1943)

Fighter: Four prototypes Built

Upon its introduction before the outbreak of the Second World War, the German Me 109 emerged as one of the premier fighter designs globally. While it proved formidable during the conflict, rival aircraft gradually matched and even exceeded its performance in several key areas. In a bid to secure a successor for the Me 109 late in the war, Messerschmitt endeavored to develop the Me 209A, a highly modified design based on its predecessor. Despite demonstrating promising flight attributes, logistical constraints hindered its adoption for active service.

The Me 209A Source: www.luftwaffephotos.com

History

While the Germans acknowledged the effectiveness of the Me 109, it became evident that a new fighter design, or serious enhancements to the existing model, would be necessary. In early 1941, Messerschmitt began developing a successor to the Me 109. This exploration resulted in the creation of the Me 309. It was a brand-new fighter aircraft that incorporated a new fuselage design, larger wings, and a tricycle undercarriage. It was powered by a 1,750 hp DB 603A-1. A few different armament systems were to be tested including four 13 mm MG 131 (300 rounds), two 2 cm MG 151 (150 rounds), and two 30 mm MK 108 (65 rounds) cannons. Alternatively, it could be outfitted with two 15 mm MG 151 cannons and three 13 mm MG 131s.

By June 1942, the prototype underwent flight testing. Despite an initially promising design, testing revealed that the Me 309 did not offer significant improvements over the Me 109G, which was already in mass production. Consequently, recognizing the impracticality of further investment, the Me 309 project was ultimately terminated.

The Me 309 was one of the Messerschmitt failed attempts to develop a successor for the Me 109. Source: www.luftwaffephotos.com

As the development of the Me 309 proved fruitless, Messerschmitt continued to strive towards a suitable replacement for the Me 109. Fortunately for the company, the German Air Ministry (RLM) initiated the development of a new high-altitude fighter on April 23, 1943. In response, Messerschmitt introduced the Me 209. Interestingly, this name was recycled from an earlier project, the original Me 209, which had been crafted specifically to set world-breaking speed records. However, it was ill-suited for military purposes and the project was ultimately shelved having fulfilled its original purpose. Despite this, Messerschmitt endeavored to develop a viable fighter based on the Me 209 but met with little success. To avoid potential confusion, the new project, which bore no resemblance to the record-breaking aircraft, was designated as the Me 209A (also occasionally referred to as the Me 209-II).

The Me 209 which had been crafted specifically to set world-breaking speed records, proved to be unsuited for fighter adaptation. Source: ww2fighters.e-monsite.com

In order to expedite development and minimize costs, the design of this new fighter used many components from the Me 109. A powerful engine was essential for achieving optimal flight performance. Thus, the prototype, powered by a 1,750 PS DB 603A-1 engine, underwent completion and testing in early November 1943, with Fritz Wendel as the pilot. To avoid confusion, it was designated as the Me 209V-5 (SP-LJ), distinguishing it from the original Me 209 prototypes, V-1 to V-4.

The success of the first prototype led to the completion and testing of a second prototype by the end of 1943, both exhibiting impressive flight characteristics. Encouraged by this achievement, construction of another prototype commenced. However, due to shortages of the DB 603A-1 engine, the decision was made to utilize the 1,750 hp Jumo 213E instead. This third prototype underwent flight testing in May 1944, prompting a designation change to Me 209A. The prototypes, with their alternate engine configurations, were then distinguished with the suffixes A-0, A-1, and A-2 for the first, second, and third, respectively.

Technical characteristics

Unfortunately given the obscurity of this project, its overall technical specifications are somewhat ambiguous. What is known is that it incorporated some 65% of its construction from the Me 109G. The original Me 109 fuselage was a monocoque design that was divided into two halves. These halves would be placed together and connected using simple flush rivets, thus creating a simple base on which remaining components, like the engine, wings, and instruments would be installed.

In order to accommodate the retracting landing gear, Messerschmitt deliberately opted for a single wing spar positioned towards the rear of the wing. This spar needed to be robust enough to withstand the flight’s load forces. The wings were attached to the fuselage by four sturdy bolts, simplifying the overall wing construction and reducing production costs. The Me209A boasted a larger wingspan and area, consequently increasing wing loading by 25% compared to the original Me 109. Furthermore, alterations were made to the wings and tail to address the Me 109’s strong yaw forces on takeoff. Whether these adjustments successfully rectified the issue in the Me 209A remains unclear according to available sources.

Initially, it was powered by a 1,750 hp DB 603A-1 engine which was provided with an annular radiator and a three-blade propeller. With this engine, a maximum record speed achieved was 724 km/h 450 mph at an altitude of nearly 7 km (22,960 ft). The third prototype (A-2) received a new 1,750 hp Jumo 213E engine. It too was provided with an annular radiator. With it, a maximum speed of 660 km/h (410 mph) was achieved at an altitude of 6 km (19/680 ft)

The canopy was placed in the center of the fuselage. It was a fully enclosed compartment that was riveted to the fuselage.

The Me 109 boasted an unconventional landing gear arrangement, at least for German standards, with the landing gear primarily affixed to the lower center base of the fuselage. This configuration centralized the aircraft’s weight at this pivotal point, while the two landing gear struts extended outward toward the wings. In contrast, the Me 209 utilized a wide-track undercarriage unit, with the pivot points being out on the wings.

Various sources have proposed different armament configurations for the Me 209. One suggestion was the installation of two 3 cm MK 108 cannons, each equipped with 70 rounds of ammunition, alongside two 2 cm MG 151 cannons with 250 rounds per cannon, all to be housed within the aircraft’s wings. Alternatively, another proposal suggested the placement of four MK 108 cannons within the wings and two MG 151 cannons positioned above the engine compartment. However, it remains unclear whether any of these proposed armament configurations were ever implemented on the Me 209A.

The side view of the only photograph of the Me 209A first prototype. Source: http://www.luftwaffephotos.com/lme2091.htm

Fate

In 1944, further testing ensued, yet for Messerschmitt, the advent of the new Fw 190D posed a challenge. The Fw 109D, slowly making its way into production, boasted better performance, being faster in both high and low altitudes. What ultimately sealed the fate of the Me 209A project was the swiftness and cost-effectiveness with which the Fw 190D could be put into production. While the Me 209 incorporated many components from the Me 109, setting up its production would demand considerable time. A luxury in short supply for the Germans in 1944. Additionally, Messerschmitt’s focus at that time was squarely on the new Me 262 production, leaving scant resources to spare for yet another piston-powered fighter.

Despite these challenges, Messerschmitt made a final push to advance the Me 209 project with the construction and testing of the fourth prototype, designated Me 209H V-1, in June 1944. This iteration underwent several modifications, including enlarged wings and propulsion by a DB 603G engine. Unfortunately, the first prototype fell victim to an air raid on August 14, 1944, casting uncertainty over the fate of the remaining aircraft. Although there were intentions to export the Me 209A to Japan, these plans never materialized. It was also competing with the Ta 152H, which was easier to put into production while also having better performance, at least on paper.

Prototypes

  • Me 209A-0- First prototype powered by a  1,750 hp DB 603A-1 engine
  • Me 209A-1- Secon aircraft is essentially a copy of the first prototype 
  • Me 209A-2- Third tested with a new 1,750 Jumo 213E engine
  • Me 209H V-1 – The fourth prototype powered by a DB 603G engine  and received  larger wings

Conclusion 

The Me 209A project ultimately reached a dead end, not because it was a poorly designed aircraft, but simply because it didn’t offer significant enough improvements to justify production. The new Fw 109D, boasting similar flight performance, was already in the production phase. Introducing yet another new design without any notable advancements in this fighter category would have been illogical and a waste of already meager resources.

Me 209A-2 Specifications

Wingspans 10.95 m / 35  ft 11  in
Length 9.62 m / 31  ft 6 in
Height 3.65 m /  12 ft  2 in
Wing Area 17.15 m² /  184.53 ft²
Engine 1,750 hp Jumo 213E
Empty Weight 3,475kg / 7,662 lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight 4,200 kg / 9,261 lbs
Maximum Speed 660 km/h / 410 mph
Cruising speed 490 km/h / 305 mph
Range 690 km / 430 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 13,000 m  / 42,650 ft
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • None

Illustration

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Oussama Mohamed “Godzilla”

Source:

  • D. Nesić  (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka. Beograd.
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books.
  • J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1972) German Aircraft of the WW2, Putnam
  • D. Myhra (2000) Messerschmitt Me 209V1, Schiffer Military History
  • B. C.Wheeler, German Fighters of WWII, Aeroplane Special
  • R. Jackson (2005) Infamous Aircraft, Pen and Sword
  • M. Griehl () X-planes German Luftwaffe prototypes 1930-1940, Frontline Book

 

Mitsubishi G4M1 Model 11 “Betty”

Empire of Japan (1941)

Multirole Medium Bomber: 1170 built

Ponderous looking, yet agile, the G4M1 proved to be among the most dangerous weapons in Japan’s Naval Arsenal for early years of WWII. (SDASM)

Designed as a replacement for the aging G3M ‘Nell’, as a long range bomber and torpedo attack aircraft, the G4M represented a comprehensive improvement. In this plane, the Imperial Japanese Navy found a high speed bomber capable of carrying out raids, and engaging enemy ships at sea at otherwise unheard of ranges. During the campaigns in China, and first year of war in the Pacific, the G4M wrought havoc on Allied forces on land and at sea. However, its range and speed were achieved in sacrificing crew and fuel protection, and as the tide of war turned, the same design philosophy that gave the G4M its lethal edge, would see the crews flying the aircraft endure staggering losses.

The Road to War

The Imperial Japanese Navy rose to rapid prominence in the late 19th to early 20th centuries, alongside the equally rapid pace of Japan’s industrialization. Its victory against the Qing during the first Sino Japanese war saw them claim Korea and lay the ground for future Imperialistic inroads into continental Asia. Against Russia in the Russo Japanese war, they shocked the world after demolishing two major fleets and seizing Port Arthur, this being the first time a European country had lost to a non-european industrial power. The rise of Japan’s naval strength was a necessity of its mission, accepted since it first began industrialization, to expand its economic sphere and gain access to the necessary resources which home islands lacked. Oil, rubber, and ore were the foremost of its material needs, but there was also a desire to prove the racial superiority of the Japanese over the people of Asia, and rise above the Europeans and Americans who dominated the region. In the long term, this set the stage for brutal wars of expansion, conducted using the most advanced weapons available, over distances that dwarfed nearly every military campaign that had since been conducted. However, to fight such wars, the newest weapons of war and methods of manufacture had to be sought out.

The United Kingdom would prove an ideal partner in this, and would prove to be a critical source for military aid and equipment, and an alliance began in 1902, lasting two decades. Britain’s aim in this agreement was to ensure that the Russian Empire would not become a challenge to them in Asia. Among the earliest and most visible boons of the alliance was the Battleship Mikasa, purchased from Britain, and serving as the Japanese flagship during the Russo Japanese war. Over the coming decades, the exchange would bring invaluable experience, and modern equipment to Japan. By the end of the First World War, Japan had grown considerably as a naval and industrial power, with an economy now dependent on agricultural imports from continental Asia, and oil from Borneo and America. Their European colonial challengers were also diminished in number, with Russia’s navy diminished even further during the revolution, and Germany losing its Pacific and Asiatic holdings, to Japan’s gain.

Naval planners thus looked to new opportunities and conquests. The greatest of these was China, by then descended into warlordism, but an economic power nonetheless. By the start of the twenties, the Washington Naval treaty would affirm the integrity of Chinese territory in spite of the conflict there, and assure equal economic rights for those wishing to trade. While the Japanese government would maintain these two principles for the rest of the 1920’s, the Navy itself was becoming more dominated by voices seeking to challenge the treaty and other agreements as being strictly tools of European and American naval dominance and interests. A faction led by Vice Admiral Kato Kanji would hold to a different principle, asserting that “the United States, by its limitless economic resources, by its pursuit of policies of economic aggression, and, in China in particular, by its provocation of anti-Japanese activities, threatens the Japanese position in China for which our nation has risked its destiny.”

While Japan had yet to experience the era of political turmoil, assassinations, and the subsequent rule by the military, the roots of the eventual conflict with the US were found in the years after the Great War. In accordance with the anti-treaty faction, the United States was selected as the chief ‘hypothetical enemy’ when the nation’s Imperial Defense Policy was revised in 1923. Doing so not only meant challenging a materially and technologically superior opponent, but also claiming much of Asia for itself as a matter of industrial, and racial, destiny.

Building an Arsenal

To face the United State and European powers, modernization was paramount. In aviation, the greatest step came with the post-WWI Sempill Mission. While Japan had a nascent aviation industry which had begun development during the Great War, nearly every plane in use was imported, and what was domestically produced was of foreign design. As part of the last major exchanges in the dying Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Japanese Navy requested assistance in the field of aviation from the British in 1920. While there were major disagreements within Britain on such a technology transfer, the hopes for major partnerships and sales with the British aviation industry overcame such doubts. The mission arrived the following year, led by former RAF officer Baron Sir Williams Frances-Forbes, who had brought with him experts in aircraft design, construction, training, and use. Materially, he brought airplanes of nearly every type from fighters to torpedo planes, numbering over a hundred in total. The mission at Kasumigaura would prove to be nothing less than a spectacular leap for Japanese military aviation, putting it well on the path to self sufficiency. Combined with the Royal Navy’s advice on the construction of the Japanese aircraft carrier Hosho, the first carrier built from the ground up for the role, Japan would now possess some of the most essential tools in the wars to come. Just as the technical assistance ended, so too did the alliance with Britain, which lapsed in 1923.

By the end of the 1920’s, the Japanese Navy was a world leader in new naval theories, especially aircraft carrier development. Here the carrier Akagi sports a triple deck arrangement, which was soon done away with. (wikimedia)

The airplane industry grew slowly, first as a series of small shops producing a modest number of mostly foreign planes, but growing into larger enterprises. The largest of these manufacturers were Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and Kawasaki, which provided the nucleus for the rest of the cottage industry based aviation sector. Arguably the largest of these was Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, through its branch, the Mitsubishi Internal Combustion Engine Co. at Kobe. Concurrent with the Sempill mission, the company’s aircraft manufacturing effort was shifted to Nagoya, which would remain the center for Mitsubishi’s airplane development and production. In the years to come, additional production plants would sprout from the main facilities in Nagoya, with separate airframe and engine departments being founded by 1935.

While the aviation industry was slowly rising, the primary means of war against the United States navy was to draw in, and then attack the enemy fleet once it was deep within Japanese territory. It was hoped that through this single decisive engagement that any war could be quickly be settled, and thus Japanese supremacy over Asia was assured. It wasn’t until far later that the US would heavily outnumber the Japanese fleet, and serious changes would need to be made to this strategy. The general approach to this disparity was two contradictory schools of thought. The first was to overmatch the enemy on the technical and operational level, most clearly demonstrated in the development of highly effective oxygen fueled torpedoes, outranging the enemy with superior long range gunnery, and the development of keen night-fighting training. Against this program was the belief that any material disparities could be overcome by the superior, unique qualities of the martial spirit of the Japanese soldier, whose supposed unwavering morale and willpower could deliver victory against a better equipped enemy.

This strategy was entirely battleship focused until the thirties, with aviation playing a very small role until several crucial technical developments were rolled out. Aircraft at the time had a very limited range of action, small payloads, and were very fragile. Even though the Japanese Navy had been among the first to use aircraft in combat in the First World War, the airplane was seen as a tool for local defense and reconnaissance. Torpedo aircraft were particularly promising, but in a naval doctrine that required striking out with overwhelming force at long ranges, wood and canvas biplanes simply were not up to the task.

It was the development of all-metal, streamlined, monoplanes that proved to be the deciding factor in shifting the idea of the airplane as a defensive weapon, to one which could deliver deadly blows from afar. As the striking range of aircraft increased, so too did the potential range of the ‘decisive battle’, which by the late 1930s was planned for around the Marianas. As these technical developments progressed, Japan would find itself evermore under the influence of the military, whose factions would launch a war against China. They would seize Manchuria in 1932, and planned larger campaigns deep into the Chinese heartland. Given the vast distances involved, the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy sought new bombers with unprecedented range to reach targets over a thousand nautical miles away.

Rikko

The war against China, and the predicted war with America, would require the use of aircraft in roles that were restricted by available plane’s very modest performance. Crucially for the Army and Navy, by the mid 30’s, light and medium bombers were growing ever more capable, and Japan’s aircraft carrier program was world class. At this time, Rear Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the chief of the technical bureau of the Naval Aviation Department, was pursuing a program to achieve technical independence from foreign manufacturers. However, he had not merely wished for autonomy in aviation, but was interested in developing several new, critical weapons.

Among the first of these was a long range, land-based attack aircraft or, Rikujo Kogeki-ki. At the direction of Vice Admiral Matusyama Shigeru, Rear Adm. Yamamoto and his team were directed to research the requirements for a long range bomber capable of engaging targets with bombs or torpedoes in support of the battlefleet. With their findings, they approached Mitsubishi with the requirements for a new aircraft. This materialized in the Mitsubishi G1M, a modern twin engine bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. The experimental plane first flew in 1934 and was to provide the basis for a new bomber design.

The G3M was a thoroughly modern bomber, if fragile. It served to prove the viability of the long range torpedo bomber. (sdasm)

The new Mitsubishi G3M was developed by head designer Honjo Kiro. Much like the G1M, it was a sleek, all metal, twin engine aircraft. It had a range of 1540 nautical miles and an 800kg payload, presenting a very impressive level of performance for 1935. Particularly impressive was its range, which was beyond any other bomber save for the nascent Boeing B-17 under development in the United States. Achieving this range was largely a factor of streamlining, and some very extreme weight saving techniques. This included foregoing any protection for the fuel tanks and crew. Fragility aside, the aircraft was almost exactly what the Navy was looking for, with Captain Onishi Takijiro, head of the Instruction division at Koku Hombu, expressing great satisfaction with the new plane when he inspected the Kisarazu Air Group in 1936, this being among the first of the new Naval land attack units.

The G3M would serve the Navy well in China, where it attacked distant targets, being defensive positions, and cities, in an attempt to prevent their fortification and cow the Chinese government into capitulating. The bomber was as the Navy wished, but they found that it was extremely vulnerable to enemy fighters, given its lack of armor and modest defensive armament. Despite the experiences in China, and the heavy losses incurred, the Navy was largely disinterested in the succeeding design possessing any greater protection than the G3M. Instead, they requested a twin engined design with a maximum speed of 215 knots at an altitude of 3 km, a range of 2600 nautical miles, and a combat range of 2000 nautical miles. They did not request any increase in payload size, but the overall design requirements were extreme. Given the G3M was already a streamlined design, which required major compromises to its protection in order to achieve its speed and range, producing an aircraft some 27 knots faster and capable of flying 460 nm further would prove extremely challenging.

The G3M wrought destruction across China, from the raids on Nanjing and Shanghai, to the sustained bombardment of the city of Chongqing. (SDASM)

There would be no competition for the design, as Mitsubishi received the development contract directly from the Navy in September of 1937. Honjo Kiro would again be called upon to lead the design effort, though he would be in the United States until October of that year. Finding the Navy’s requirements for the new plane bordering on unreasonable, Kiro would instead suggest a four engined design, feeling the requested pair of 1000 hp Mitsubishi Kinsei engines being inadequate. During early design proposals with Naval staff officers, he would attempt to introduce a four engined rikko, but was angrily rebuffed by Rear Admiral Misao Wada, the chairman of the congress. The admiral, nearly losing his temper, shouted “The navy will decide matters of operational need! Mitsubishi should just keep quiet and build a twin engined attack aeroplane in accordance with navy specifications! Erase the drawing of the four engined aeroplane on the blackboard at once!”

Honjo was thus forced to return to the twin engined concept, and was also given a new requirement that the aircraft feature a defensive 20mm cannon at its tail. The list of requirements now completely eliminated the possibility that the new design could be a derivative of the previous G3M. Heading the team on his return to Japan in April of 1938, Honjo oversaw the program, joined by Kushibe Shiro and Hikada Tetsuro. He had the benefit of wind tunnel research conducted the previous December, but would have the unenviable task of designing to the Navy’s unchanged requirements. The G4M materialized as a bomber with a wide, but streamlined fuselage, built in two halves to ease production. Such was the diameter of the fuselage that visiting German engineers from Heinkel were confused that the wide bulkhead they were inspecting was for a twin engined aircraft. The wings were built incorporating a massive integral fuel tank between the spars, with the surfaces of the wings representing the other walls of the container. These massive, but unprotected, stores contributed much to the aircraft’s enormous fuel capacity.

Much to the relief of Honjo, he was able to argue for more powerful engines, shelving the 1000hp Kinsei radials, for the new 1530hp Mitsubishi Kasei. Aside from this reprieve, the design of the aircraft was a fairly chaotic affair, as the engineers at Mitsubishi were being reshuffled between the G4M, and the A6M Type Zero fighter under development by Horikoshi Jiro’s team. The first prototype would be completed in September of 1939, and was transported from Nagoya to Kagamigahara for flight tests, as Mitsubishi lacked a company airfield at their factory. It was first flown by Mistubishi test pilot Kazuo Shima on October 23, the tests revealed some issues with handling, but the aircraft performed well. Military trials were conducted at Yokosuka in early 1940, where it was joined by the second prototype. Both aircraft impressed the Naval staff there, with the plane well exceeding the requirements placed on it, reaching a top speed of 240 knots and possessing a range of 3000 nautical miles.

The G4M prototype, here sporting a ventral gunner position. (warfarehistorynetwork)

Unfortunately for the design team, these impressive performance figures inspired the navy to request Mitsubishi develop the G4M as a heavy fighter. They wished to provide a long range escort to the G3M squadrons in China, which were without air cover on deep raids. There were also concerns that switching to the production of a new bomber would result in too steep a drop in G3M supplies, and reduce the complement of squadrons currently deployed. The new G6M ‘wingtip fighter’ featured a reduced fuel load and a pair of 20mm cannons in a ventral pod. In any case, the new weight distribution of the aircraft ruined the good handling of the G4M, and it simply didn’t have the performance needed. Some 30 planes were built and shelved to later be converted into transport aircraft.

Pre-production of the bomber proceeded only after the futile attempt at converting it to a heavy fighter. In December of 1940, it would officially be designated the Type 1 land attack bomber, for the Imperial year 2601. In service, the aircraft was typically referred to either G4M, or more casually as Hamaki, or cigar, in reference to the shape of its fuselage. Among Honjo’s team it bore the far less flattering nickname of namekuji, or slug.

The model accepted for service was some 520 kg heavier, and some 9 kts slower than the prototypes, after the typical design modifications were made. It too now only had a range of 2315 nautical miles once it was at a full combat load. This was, however, more than enough to satisfy the Navy. They began receiving growing numbers of the plane as pre-production began at Mitsubishi’s No.3 aircraft plant, with these 13 planes proceeding mass production. Apart from some minor leaks in the integral wing tanks, the bombers entered service without issue on April 2, 1941.

Debut in China

The next war with China escalated from a minor border dispute into one of the bloodiest wars ever waged. By 1940, the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy had pushed into the Chinese heartland, seized many of the largest and most important coastal cities, and had taken the capital of Nanjing, leaving it unrecognizable after an orgy of violence. The Nationalist Kuomintang government was, however, resolved to continue the war by whatever means. Despite Japan’s air superiority, the Chinese Air Force stayed mobile and well outside the range of Japanese fighters. They could vacate their airfields quickly and inflict heavy losses on Japan’s bombers which had been despatched against their airfields, flying great distances without fighter protection. It was with the introduction of the high performance G4M, and the extremely long ranged A6M fighter, that this strategy was to unravel.

The key feature of the G4M was its phenomenal range, achieved through its wide fuselage stores, and integral wing tanks. (rodswarbirds)

The first G4M’s to see combat were part of the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Service’s 11th Air Fleet, formed in January in 1941. This force was composed mostly of the old G3M, but had received 30 examples of the new model bomber in July. They were to continue the aerial bombardment of many Chinese cities, beginning with Chengtu, but were soon to attempt the further destruction of the Chinese air force. The A6M fighters that had made their debut the year prior had the range to pursue targets deep within China, but were unable to hold formation with the old G3M bombers without weaving, reducing their range, and left them unable to follow them at night. However, the new G4M had a cruising speed that the fighters could match.

These two aircraft were thus essential to operation O-Go, a gambit intended to cripple the Chinese air force in some three months. The raids were launched in the early morning well before sunrise, with the bombers acting as the navigational leaders for the fighters, which kept the formation with the bombers in single-file. The force would then arrive at sunrise, to give little warning, and allow the bombers to attack as many of the grounded planes as possible, with those who were able to get off the ground being attacked by the A6Ms. The first attack was carried out on August 11, against an airfield near Ichang. The Chinese’s air force SB-2 bombers had scrambled, leaving two unserviceable planes to be destroyed, and had sent up fighters to break up the attack. To their surprise, they found fighters guarding the formation, one far more advanced than their Soviet-made I-153 biplanes. The Japanese fighters, and the gunners of the G4M’s, would claim five victories against the defenders, suffering no casualties themselves.

The operation, however, would be canceled as tensions with America and Europe had risen to the point of conflict. O-Go was suspended, but had demonstrated the long range strike abilities of the IJNAF, and the shocking capability of its long range fighter escorts. Against the bases near Ichang, the raiders had flown 47 miles further than the distance from London to Berlin. Such a feat would not be replicated until P-51B was introduced with the US Army Air Forces, and flown deep into Germany some three years later. These distances also show the long range character of the war to be fought across the Pacific, and explains the otherwise seemingly unreasonable range requirements requested by the Navy.

Setting the Board

While the Japanese invasion of China had at first been decisive, and horrifically destructive in its opening phases, their lines of communication stretched on, and the Chinese Army was growing into a more dangerous opponent. Relations with other powers with major economic interests in China collapsed, spectacularly in the case of the United States, leading to the cancellation of the US-Japan Commercial treaty. The concerns of European powers were growing too, but far less so in the face of the German-Soviet invasion of Poland in August of 1939. Meanwhile in Japan, the Navy’s ambitions were again stoked, remembering their own territorial gains of the last major war between the European powers. The most vital of these potential spoils were oil fields of Borneo, held by the forces of the now occupied Netherlands. This would grant Japan energy independence from the US, against which they had been planning an inevitable war for over a decade.

Planning and theory, however, were swept aside when the US imposed a total trade embargo in August of 1941, with the UK and Netherlands following shortly after. Rather than be an incentive to pursue diplomatic means, it instead drove the hawks in Japan’s military-dominated government to at last embark on a conflict it had long been expecting. The Imperial Japanese Navy and Army thus began working on the arrangements in what would be a rapid series of offensives across the Pacific that would wreck the American Pacific fleet before it had a chance to be mobilized, seize the vital defensive perimeter of Malaya, and oil rich colonies of the Dutch.

The G4M1 was to be a decisive weapon across the Southern Asian theater. As the carrier was to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Rikko was to the offensive which spanned from Malaya to Borneo. (aviocampo)

In regard to the land based Naval Air forces, their task would be to decimate enemy air forces before they had a chance to strike at the fleets and armies that would soon take and occupy vast swaths of South East Asia. Squadrons of G3M and G4M bombers were thus based at Formosa, to strike the American Army Airforce in the Philippines, and from what was formerly French Indochina, to assault the British forces in Malaya. Of chief importance were two targets, the Royal Navy battleship Prince of Whales and battlecruiser Repulse, which were enroute to Malaya, and the large contingent of American aircraft based in the Philippines. From the 26 of November to the 7th of December, the Japanese Navy embarked on a silent offensive, as its fleets crept toward their targets in Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, Guam, and Hawaii. Even before the war was declared, bombers were enroute to attack their targets as part of an offensive that dwarfed all others in regard to time and space.

Bombing of the Philippines

The attack force set against the Philippines was the 11th Air Fleet, which had at its disposal 81 G4M bombers and a number of the old G3M, along with a complement of 90 A6M fighters. Based in Formosa, their targets were the American Army Air Corps’ Nichols and Clark’s airfields. The American complement at these bases was considerable, numbering 35 of the new Boeing B-17 bombers, and 107 P-40 fighter aircraft, for a total of 227 aircraft, representing a very modern, and heavy strike force.

The G4Ms would however, not be the first to attack, with the air wing of the aircraft carrier Ryujo having hit positions in Mindanao, to the South, and the Army’s bombers, hitting Luzon, in the north. Thick fog had delayed the launching of the December 8th attack, and the Nichols airfield mission shifted to attack the airfield at Iba. Clark airfield remained a vital target, with two waves of G4M’s departing under the commands of Commander Suda Yushio and Lt. Commander Nonaka Taro. Commencing several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, the commanders led the Takao and Kanoya Air Groups up to an altitude of 7000m with their A6M escorts, expecting a grueling fight to the targets ahead.

The Kanoya Air Group would prove to be among the oldest and well accomplished of the Rikko units, playing a crucial role across the Southern Asian front. (SDASM)

When news of the war broke out, the commander of the Far Eastern Air Force, Lt. General Lewis Brereton, attempted to launch an immediate attack against the Japanese forces in Formosa, using his in all likelihood, inadequate 35 B-17s. However, when he attempted to receive permission to launch the attack from the theater commander, General Douglas MacCarthur, he was instead held up by the General’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Sutherland. Unable to launch the attack, and uninterested in rebasing his bombers to a smaller airfield which he felt was unsuitable for his formation which was soon to receive further bombers, he instead kept his aircraft prepared for the attack, and sent out an early morning fighter patrol as cover.

By the time the Japanese strike force was well underway, Brereton’s fighters were turning back home to be refueled. Observers would spot the massive Japanese formation, but all attempts to warn Clark field failed, its only hope now was were its cover fighters from Del Carmen field. However, dust storms had kept all aircraft at Del Carmen grounded, and thus Commander Suda’s forces came upon a perfect target. With much of the US FEAF’s planes cleanly lined up around Clark field, the destruction was swift and overwhelming. Bombs smashed everything from the planes parked in ready positions, to airbases facilities, with the anti-aircraft batteries trying to hit the raiders using old and defective ammunition, the most recent of which was produced in 1932. Only four P-40’s were able to get airborne, and were soon lost, with the Japanese A6M fighters descending and attacking targets that had escaped the bombers. The Iba attack was equally one sided, and also claimed the only working American radar station in the Philippines. In all, both airfields were knocked out, the B-17’s were lost, and about 24 of the P-40’s were written off with many more damaged, representing a combat loss of two squadrons. The Japanese would only lose 7 planes, the only bomber lost to a landing accident on its return home.

The timing and breadth of the Southern Asian offensive seemed almost unimaginable before the war.  (campaigns of the pacific war)

The combined Japanese preparations, and the dysfunction of General MacCarthur’s command, had created a perfect storm that had largely annihilated the FEAF on the first day of the war. Even the staff of the Japanese Navy’s 11th Air fleet, Capt. Takahashi Chihaya believed, at the very least that, the B-17’s might have been rebased to the southern, and more defensible Del Monte airbase, which would have created serious challenges to the ongoing campaign to invade the Philippines. Few could have imagined the G4M’s strike could have been so decisive.

Force Z

While the FEAF was no longer mission capable, the next greatest threat in Southern Asia were the British garrison forces in Singapore, who were largely a responsibility of the Japanese Army, and Force Z, a pair of powerful warships dispatched weeks earlier to strengthen the British position after Japan had seized France’s Vietnamese colony. A battleship and battlecruiser, they represented a massive boost to British capabilities in the region, though the carrier support they were to receive was lost when HMS Indomitable ran aground and was laid up for repairs. Before the war had begun, these ships were merely intended to dissuade the Japanese from threatening Malaya and Singapore, as most of the Royal Navy was still tied down in Europe and the Atlantic. With the mission of deterrence gone on the morning of December 7th, the force’s commander, Admiral Tom Phillips, decided to take the most aggressive plan of action possible and attempt to thwart Japanese landing operations. Rather than choose to remain a fleet-in-being and attempt to shore up the defense of Singapore, or wait and attempt to merge with the joint Dutch-American naval forces, the Admiral gave the order to deploy his battleship, battlecruiser, and four destroyers into the sea of Siam.

The extreme range of the G4M1 allowed the IJN to strike at many targets once believed to be at a safe distance. Many western observers believed it to only have a range comparable to their own twin engine bombers. (sdasm)

It may seem foolish to have charged out without dedicated air cover, but until then, no heavy warship had ever been sunk by air attack, and he would have been out of range for nearly any other conventional torpedo bomber. The Royal Navy’s experience in Norway the previous year only reinforced this, as while German bombers had damaged several Allied cruisers, none had been lost. Beyond this, the airfield at Kota Bharu that would have supported him had been overrun by the rapid advance of the Japanese Army down the Malaysian peninsula. The Japanese Navy too had been landing marines down the coast, and when the Admiral received word at midnight December 9th that a landing force was unloading its forces at Kuantan, he set course to catch them at sunrise the next day.

As one of the Japanese Navy’s primary targets, Force Z was under considerable surveillance even before the war had begun. When they sortied on the 8th, Vice Admiral Osawa Jisaburo, the commander of the Southern Fleet, gave the Rikko units the mission to find and sink Force Z. Unable to pursue them the following day due to bad weather, the British fleet was spotted by submarine I-56 and its position was relayed to bombers. The next day, three Chutai comprising 88 planes of both the new G4M and the older G3M, launched at 06:44, to find and sink HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. Most of the force carried torpedoes, with the 27 G3M’s carrying armor piercing bombs. Force Z was again discovered by a Genzan Air Group Rikko, and when they were joined by the bomb-laden Mihoro units, made the first attack on British warships. The attack began in a text book fashion, with a high altitude unit carrying out a level bomb attack while the torpedo aircraft made their attack runs in the confusion. 9 G3M’s dropped strings of bombs on the warships, scoring one hit, while 16 G4Ms carried out their torpedo attack. One bomb struck Repulse amidships, with the rest sending up torrents of water around the heavy warships in a shower of near misses. Some ten minutes later, the G4Ms carried out a multi-direction ‘hammer and anvil’ attack against HMS Prince of Whales, and despite the intensive evasive maneuvers, one torpedo struck the battleship on its port aft section. The explosion disabled its portside propellers and caused water to surge up the shaft into the portside engine space. With the battleship now flooding and navigationally impaired, the Japanese bombers departed, leaving the British warship in a poor state while the next attack wave assembled.

The G3M’s carried out level bombing attacks on the two warships, while the newer bombers carried out torpedo runs. The assault would comprise elements of the Kanoya, Genzan, and Mihoro Air Groups (Wikimedia)

With the position and course of Force Z relayed, the assembled formation now turned to engage them, with Lt. Cmdr. Shichiso Miyauchi as formation leader. Even with the information on the position and course of the British fleet, they were still hidden by low cloud cover. When they reached the reported position, Lt. Cmdr. Shichiso spotted a seaplane launched from the HMS Repulse and gave the order to descend through the clouds. The bombers found themselves 11 nautical miles away from the British force, HMS Prince of Wales showing a list.

The Lt. Cmdr. lead the first 9 plane Chutai against HMS Prince of Wales, which in response increased its speed to 28 knots, and began veering to starboard. The second and third divisions of this force were unaware of the damage the battleship had sustained, and set course to anticipate it making an evasive maneuver to port. When this never came, they broke off and went for HMS Repulse. This left Lt. Cmdr. Shichiso’s 3 plane unit to deal the finishing blow. He ordered the plane’s pilot and co-pilot to refrain from releasing the torpedo until they were within 500 meters of the target, then his plane and the number 3 aircraft, dropped their torpedoes, the second having lost sight of the target through heavy anti-aircraft fire. HMS Prince of Wales was struck on the starboard bow, and below the bridge. Now mortally wounded, most of the formation turned its attention to HMS Repulse.

Unlike the battleship, HMS Repulse was mostly undamaged, and taking extreme evasive maneuvers in an attempt to throw off the attack of six incoming torpedo bombers. Well trained against evasive targets, the Rikko approached from both sides and all but one plane launched their weapon was released, the battlecruiser taking a hit on its port side. The plane that was unable to make its attack then turned its attention to the HMS Prince of Wales and launched its torpedo, striking the battleship on its aft starboard side.

The second Chutai, under Lt. Higashi was next, dividing its attention between stricken British warships. They succeeded in striking HMS Prince of Wales again, though failing to hit Repulse, as it maneuvered through the spread of torpedoes launched against it. The last strikes came from Lt. Haruki Iki’s Chutai, and after an appraisal of the two damaged ships, decided that HMS Repulse was the more important target. Lt.Haruki’s plane led the attack from an altitude of 30m, nearly grazing the ship as he passed it. With both of his wingmen going down in flames from anti-aircraft fire, but their torpedoes launched, Lt. Haruki’s shotai scored three hits on Repulse, with the opposing side of the attack scoring one hit as well. The order to abandon Repulse was given at 12:30 with the ship quickly succumbing to flooding, this quick decision allowing several hundred men to escape the ship before it capsized. HMS Prince of Wales went down about an hour later, taking with it Captain John Leach, and Admiral Tom Phillips.

For the Japanese airmen, only four aircraft had been lost and they had proven a decisive lesson which all Navies were quick to learn, ships without air support were in mortal danger from aircraft. While theoretically, it had seemed possible a capital ship could be sunk from the air, this was the first time two such warships had been sunk in true combat conditions. Not only had the Rikko crews proven air power was now the deciding factor at sea, but in a strategic sense they had cleared the sea of Allied capital ships from India to Hawaii, and the IJN could land troops along the coast without fear of ambush.

Lt. Haruki’s two wingmen were the only aircraft losses with fatal results, with one G3M crash landing on its return to Vietnam, and four more planes needing a great deal of repairs. On his next flight over this area, the Lieutenant dropped two bouquets over the scene of the battle.

The Attack on USS Lexington

While the Rikko enjoyed great success in the early days of the war, one encounter would prove to be a sign of the difficulties to come. In the opening weeks of the New Guinea campaign, a task force centered around the fleet carrier USS Lexington was preparing to raid Rabaul, a newly captured Japanese Naval anchorage which would prove pivotal to the Japanese thrusts into New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Detecting the force at long range, the 4th Air Groups was given the task of intercepting it on February tenth, 1942. 17 G4Ms were sortied in two groups against the task force, but without fighter escort, as the A6M units available lacked the necessary external fuel tanks needed for the mission. Led by Lt. Cdr. Ito Takuzo, they carried an armament of bombs. Detected, and set upon by Lexington’s fighters, several of the bombers were downed before having the chance to attack their target. The remaining aircraft of both units scored no hits.

The Lt. Cdr’s foiled attempt at Jibaku, or self destruction with the intent of dealing a blow to the enemy, his plane was struck by anti-aircraft fire as it neared USS Lexington. (WW2DB)

Lt. Cdr. Ito’s aircraft was badly damaged, one engine being entirely shot away by an American fighter. In their fatally damaged plane, the crew then attempted to try and fly into the USS Lexington. However, on the approach, their plane was riddled by anti-aircraft fire, and sent flying into the sea. In all, only two aircraft of the attack force were able to make it home, showing that unescorted attacks on ships with fighter cover were unlikely to succeed, and could only be made with extremely high casualties. Over succeeding campaigns, it would not be a lesson that would be taken to heart.

Battle for Port Moresby & The Bombing of Australia

While the IJN’s Fast Attack Force failed to eliminate the American Carriers in the Pacific, the loss of the American Battlefleet was a catastrophe, one that would allow the Japanese to advance swiftly through the central and southern Pacific. MacArthur would flee the Philippines, and Lt. General Arthur Percival would surrender Singapore, both after botched attempts at defending their territories. The Japanese Army and Navy would surge south, capturing rubber plantations, and the crucial Borneo oil fields. During this southern advance, the G4M would play a crucial role, in suppressing the RAF around Singapore, engaging American shipping around the Philippines, and harassing the joint American-British-Dutch-Australian cruiser force before its first, and only battle with the Japanese fleet.

With the vital resources of the Indies secured, the goal of the next phase was to build a defensive perimeter around the heart of this vast stretch of newly conquered territory. The next target was the anchorage of Port Moresby in Southern New Guinea, which if captured, would prove an excellent stronghold which directly threatened Australia. Before the carrier battle of the Coral Sea, G4M units were providing support to the amphibious landings in New Guinea. Lae and Salamaua were the first to fall in March, with the campaign continuing until the entire northern coast was held by the Japanese Navy. These operations would continue without challenge until the forces at Port Moresby were reinforced, first by a P-40 equipped squadron of the RAAF, and later by an American squadron flying P-39’s.

Against the defenders were the 4th and Tainan Air Groups.Their target was Port Moreseby itself, hoping to harass shipping and deplete the air strength of the defenders. The first major aerial engagement occurred on April 6th, where 7 G4M’s encountered five Allied fighters, surprisingly none were lost, though five returned with damage, and the loss of one crewmember. This encounter aside, the bomber units launched near daily raids against the Allied stronghold through May, even after the invasion force had been turned back after the Battle of the Coral Sea. After mid May, they sought to replenish their numbers, and returned to Port Moresby on June 16th, in support of an upcoming overland campaign by forces on the other side of the island.

Morale among the Rikko crews was exceptionally high after the initial victories across Southern Asia, remaining so until the Solomons. (rodswarbirds)

The loss of the four fleet carriers at Midway sent a shock through the entire Japanese war effort, and while it was not the fatal injury, or turning point, as it commonly seen, it forced a complete re-evaluation of how the war was being fought. In the shake up, many of the Rikko were redeployed, leaving the 4th and the Genzan Air Groups to continue the offensive at port Moresby. They would continue the bombing of Port Moresby, notably sinking the Australian transport ship Macdhui on the 18th of June. Air losses to enemy fighters were fairly light, as the bombers were given a considerable number of A6M fighters as escorts, and the night raiders met no meaningful resistance. Attrition was nonetheless an issue, as the Rikko were also tasked with the double duty of maritime patrols, which saw the men and machines of these units considerably overworked. While they had not demolished the Allied air forces in the region, the landing at Buna on the opposite side of the Island had succeeded, preparing the way for the Kokoda track campaign.

Concurrent with the operations to suppress Port Moresby were the raids on the city of Darwin, Australia, and its surrounding airfields. The first of these raids were unopposed, with the Takao Air Group flying over Western Australia in mid March. Their first encounter with enemy aircraft came on the 28th, during an unescorted raid by 7 G4Ms on the RAAF base at Darwin, which sent up a number of the American P-40E’s based there. They claimed one of the bombers, which returned the next day with nine A6M’s as escort, and bombed the airfield again without resistance. Hoping to keep up the pressure, the remaining aircraft of Takao Air Group returned from their mission in the Philippines, to the new base in Celebes. There they would launch the largest raid against Darwin on April 25th, with a force of 36 bombers and 15 fighters. This time however, the formation was met by a force of some 50 P-40’s, which claimed 6 bombers. In spite of these losses, they returned the next day with a strengthened 21 plane escort, seeing only the loss of one bomber. These raids saw a brief respite in May, before the Takao Air Group again made its appearance, bombing the city of Darwin with some 27 bombers on the 13th of June, suffering no losses. Having conducted the raid from a high altitude and with a large fighter escort, the P-40’s were unable to make the intercept. Losses remained low throughout the month, but given their position and strained resources, they switched to night bombing through the rest of the year.

Nocturnal nuisance raids remained the means of attack until March of the following year when the 753 Air Group launched a new series of daylight raids against Darwin. The first, launched on March 15, saw them target Darwin’s oil storage facilities with 19 G4Ms and 26 A6M’s. With the Australian air force having been substantially built up, the RAAF sent up a number of Spitfire Mk V’s. However, while they damaged some eight bombers, they suffered terrible casualties against the large escort force, and lost at least 14 of the new fighters. The IJN continued its assault on Darwin, focusing on its airbase, which had seen considerable build up. While they were generally successful against the RAAF bases at Darwin and Fenton, the slow accumulation of losses would see the last daylight raid flown on July 6th, 1943. The campaign was largely successful, as Darwin’s ability to host any significant naval forces was gone given its continued vulnerability to air attack, and the loss of its fuel stores.

Guadalcanal

With their homes now a warzone, these Papuan men became auxiliaries for the IJN (ww2incolor)

The loss of the fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu represented a grave loss for the Japanese Navy. However, it was not the decisive battle to end the war, as apart from the catastrophic loss of these ships and their airgroups, the IJN still possessed considerable offensive strength. The two most formidable IJN carriers remained, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and they were supplemented by the smaller fleet carriers Junyo and Hiyo, along with four light carriers.The IJN also retained its potent land based air arm. Against them were the American USS Enterprise, Saratoga, Hornet, and the smaller USS Wasp, along with a number of small escort carriers. While the United States could more than replace its losses the next year, if they suffered disastrous losses, like the one the Japanese Navy experienced at Midway, it could jeopardize Allied positions across the Pacific.

The area of greatest concern was the South Pacific, as while Port Moresby was still firmly in Allied hands, the Japanese Naval anchorage at Rabaul gave them control of the waters north of New Guinea. The Rabaul anchorage also proved a means of projecting force at the very edge of the Empire’s territory, which was soon to claim the otherwise unremarkable islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. In June, Japanese forces landed on these islands, and began the construction of an airfield on Guadalcanal. If completed, this outpost would give the Japanese Navy a powerful strategic position, allowing them to harass sea lines of communication from America to Australia. In a worst case scenario for the Allies, it could negate Australia as a position to build up forces for any major operation in the South Pacific. It would endanger the current operations to hold New Guinea, and force the main theater of the war from the Southern to central Pacific, where the Japanese Navy still held an advantage.

Before the completion of the airfield, the US Navy staged an amphibious assault with the First Marine Division going ashore on August 7th, with the support of a cruiser task force, the carriers USS Enterprise and Saratoga, and a screening force of sea planes for reconnaissance. This news came as a shock to the Japanese forces at Rabaul, with the first major response being a hastily assembled air raid of G4Ms of Rabaul’s 4th Air Groups. With such short notice, the Rikko were sent out with an armament of bombs, rather than switching to torpedoes before the 560 nautical mile flight. They flew out under the command of Lt. Egawa Renpei, a non-pilot officer, with 18 A6M fighters as escort, with one abort.

G4Ms of the Misawa Air Group (rodswarbirds)

The raiders were discovered first by coastwatchers, followed by USS Saratoga’s air search radar at 11:50. F4F wildcats from Enterprise and Saratoga were scrambled to meet them at 10,000ft. They met the bombers as they lined up on the cruiser task force, unaware of the presence of the American carriers. Under some disruption from the escorts, the Wildcats claimed two bombers outright, damaging another two which were lost to ditching. The raiders failed to claim any serious damage, and returned to Rabaul to prepare for an attack the following day. The 4th Air Group sortied 17 G4Ms under the command of Lt. Ikeda Hiromi, and were joined by a further 9 from the Misawa Air Group, for a torpedo attack on the American vessels at Guadalcanal. After several aborts, 23 planes flew to the target, joined by 15 A6M fighters.

With the American carriers having eluded Japanese reconnaissance efforts, the formation thus decided to attack the forces at the Guadalcanal beachhead. There they were met with a torrent of defensive fire from the task force’s cruisers and destroyers, and several wildcats from Saratoga and Enterprise. Only one torpedo found its mark in the destroyer USS Jarvis, and Lieutenant Junior Grade Takafumi Sasaki flew his fatally damaged bomber into the transport USS George F. Elliot, with the ensuing fire consuming much of the ship. In return, American forces would end up decimating the raiding force, which returned home with only five bombers and none of its officers, which would mark the highest losses for the entire campaign. Following the battle, the USS Jarvis would be found and sunk with all hands by patrolling G4Ms, and the George F. Elliot would be scuttled, its damage being too extensive to save the ship.

The Rikko pilots carried out attacks at extremely low altitudes, though often only the best of them would carry out the attack until the last possible moment. (WW2DBase)

The failure of the raid can be placed on the improved air defenses of American vessels, now mounting a considerable number of the 40mm Bofors guns capable of throwing out an enormous volume of fire, the presence of American fighter planes flown by aviators who had learned to fight the Zero, and also the decline of expertise of Japanese aircrews. One officer aboard the USS Astoria remarked that the Rikko of the 4th and Misawa air groups lacked the tenacity he’d seen in early battles, stating, “I’ve never seen them that bad before. Those crack Jap Navy pilots, the ones we tangled with in the Coral Sea, and at Midway–they don’t let up. Never. They come right at you, and they keep on coming until you get them or they get you. These punks–running away…”

While they had not faced the losses like the carrier based forces at Midway, casualty rates had been steady across the Southern Asian and Australian front, and the overly selective pilot training programs were now forcing these schools to rush students through to the Navy to try and meet demand. Pilots that went down in Rikko were also difficult to recover in the best cases, as their missions often took them to the limits of their own territory. In the case of the raid on October 8, 1942, those pilots who did survive took their own lives when the US Navy attempted to recover them. In the weeks to follow, many Rikko crews would refuse to bring parachutes, choosing to die, rather than bail out over enemy territory.

The day after the disastrous raid, a Japanese cruiser force would reach Guadalcanal, and in a night raid, destroy all but one of the American cruisers, and force the retreat of the amphibious forces, which had not had enough time to unload their cargo. The battle for Guadalcanal thus began in earnest, with the remote island being held by the First Marine Division against the Japanese 17th Army under Lt. Gen. Hyakutake Harukichi. Both sides were isolated on Guadalcanal, as the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul was nearly as distant as the American base at New Hebrides. The environment would prove dangerous, with malaria, dysentery, and dengue fever capable of sapping the strength of entire units, and the supply situation being so poor that some Japanese soldiers would begin calling Guadalcanal “Starvation Island”.

The Rikko would prove one of the only means of putting pressure on the now completed American airfield on the island, named Henderson for a pilot who had died at Midway. The naval air forces at Rabaul were also built up with the addition of the Kisarazu Air Group. Over the next few weeks, the assembled bombers would strike out at Henderson, with the first major raid comprising 23 planes against the airfield on August 25, suffering no losses of their own, as the American fighters were being used for ground support missions and were being rearmed when the bombers arrived. The next day, the Rikko returned with a strength of 16 planes under the command of Lt. Nakamura. Though suffering the total loss of two bombers, and two forced landings, the attack dealt a painful setback to the fledgling ‘Cactus Air Force’ at Henderson, as the bombers had torched 2000 gallons of avgas, and secondary munitions explosions damaged a number of planes. While they had escorts during these missions, the A6M’s had severe radio trouble due to their sets operating too close to the frequency of the faint radio emissions from their engine’s spark plugs. The fighter pilots typically opted to remove the troublesome sets to increase the range of their planes, but their situational awareness suffered accordingly.

 

The sheer size of the Solomon theater put the A6M’s endurance to the test. Most of the Rabaul Zeros had their radio sets removed due to onboard interference, and to further lighten the aircraft. Note the absence of the antenna aft of the cockpit (ww2db)

The raids would continue on a near daily basis, apart from a diversion to chase shipping around the area. For the most part, Guadalcanal was isolated, save for fast transports and deliveries by air. The Rikko claimed one of these transports on August 30th, sinking the USS Colhoun with a pattern of bombs. Heavy raids continued into September to support the Army on the Island, which would attempt to overrun the American positions in a night assault on the night of September 13-14. Defeated, the Imperial General Headquarters would reiterate that Guadalcanal was to be captured at any cost and placed more resources towards reclaiming the island. For the Rikko, this came in the form of two more Air Groups, the Kanoya and Takao, which had both arrived by the 23rd. This allowed them to rotate out the exhausted units at Rabaul, and continue the assault on Henderson.

Henderson however, had also seen some improvements. The Cactus Air Force was reinforced by USS Saratoga’s fighter squadrons while their carrier was sent away for repairs following an attack by Japanese Submarine I-26. They also had a new SCR 270 air search radar, set up in early September. They thus had a considerable number of Wildcats, and the ability to scramble them in time to the 8 km altitude the G4M’s flew. However, the radar system wasn’t perfect and could prove sensitive to the conditions on the ground. Sustained losses among the Rabaul’s squadrons grew considerably compared to earlier efforts. Naturally, daylight raids became less frequent, though they were still occasionally conducted and would inflict serious damage. On October 11th, a Japanese raiding force of 45 G4Ms under the command of Lt. Cdr. Nishioka Kazuo, departed to Henderson amidst poor weather. Several aircraft fell out due to the weather, but the remaining aircraft split into two units. As the first unit had completed its attack, the second made its way to Henderson and caught a dozen wildcats on the ground. They would return on the 13th, with Lt Makino Shigeji leading a 25 bomber raid on Henderson, this time failing to be intercepted due to weather obscuring the coast watchers. His force would set fire to a fuel depot, and destroy a B-17 on the ground.

The Kanoya Air Group was committed to the battle for Guadalcanal, during this deployment its fighter and bomber groups were divided, with the G4M1 units forming the 751st Air Group. (sdasm)

Night raids had begun in late August, and proceeded almost without end for a month. These were typically a single aircraft tasked with dropping a string of bombs on Henderson, with the intention of being disruptive, more than dangerous. As the conditions of the planes worsened, their engines began to grow desynchronized, leading to the aircraft making a terrible noise, earning these raiders the nickname ‘Washing Machine Charlie’. Contrary to popular myth, this sound was not intentionally created by mechanics tampering with the aircraft, the planes were simply badly worn out.

Fatigue, both of the air crews, and their equipment, resulted in the Rikko units being stood down for a time. Even with the reinforcements they had received, they had been pulling the quadruple duties of maritime patrol, anti-shipping, high altitude bombing, and night raider. From Rabaul to Henderson was about 565 nautical miles, which made for a flight time of about 6 hours. Near daily activity had rendered these units almost unserviceable.

The last major naval strike since the initial raid on the Guadalcanal came on November 12. Having detected a convoy of American ships, 19 G4Ms were sortied under the command of Lt. Cdr. Nakamura Tomo-o, who had an escort of 30 A6Ms. Led by Rear Adm. Daniel J. Callaghan, aboard the heavy cruiser San Francisco, Task Group 67.4 was primarily concerned with the presence of Japanese battleships in the area, but the air search radar on Guadalcanal informed them of an impending Japanese air attack. Detecting the force from over 100 miles away, they were able to vector a number of Cactus Air Force F4F and P-39 fighters to cover the formation.

Lt. Cdr. Nakamura brought in his formation just below the cloud cover, and after dividing his force into two units, sent them in after the American ships. As they did so, 16 American fighters rushed to intercept them. Keeping to almost wavetop height, the Rikko would attempt to press the attack while under heavy fire from the assembled American warships, and the enemy fighters which chased them frantically just over the sea. One unidentified F4F pilot went as far as resorting to ramming one of the bombers after his ammunition was expended.

Unlike the aviators that struck Repulse and Prince of Whales, many of the less experienced airmen were shaken by the volume of fire, and broke off their attacks as they closed in. None of the torpedoes hit their mark, but the pilot of one fatally damaged bomber chose to fly his plane into the USS San Francisco, rather than attempt to ditch on Guadalcanal. Anonymously, he flew his plane into the cruiser’s mainmast, the wreckage swinging over after impact, its pulverized engine and wing spilling burning avgas across the ship. The flames had spilled into the main battery director, and wrought havoc across the aft decks. In the end the fires were brought under control, but not before 22 lives were lost and further 22 were seriously injured.

USS San Francisco survived the air attack and played a crucial role in the first night of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal the evening after the plane attack. It also suffered a good deal of friendly fire from another American cruiser. (USN)

Despite the Japanese aircrew having discarded their parachutes, committing themselves to death before capture over enemy territory, a number of survivors emerged from the wreckage of the low level planes. As boats were sent out to recover them, a bewildering series of encounters awaited them. One gunner aboard a floating wreck began firing on a nearby US destroyer in a very short encounter, an enraged petty officer aboard the USS Barton ignored the orders of his skipper and gunned down a dazed pilot climbing from a wreck, and one rescue team attempted to bring aboard a young airman, only to be prevented by his superior who shot him before turning the gun on himself. Of the 19 planes that were sent on the raid, only two returned to Rabaul in working order, two crews crash landed on Guadalcanal and later returned, and three others ditched in friendly territory. In all, 10 of the 19 crews were lost outright in one of the harshest engagements the campaign had seen. This all but decimated Rabaul’s attack force, leaving 3 of its 4 air groups in tatters.

Solomons

The greatest advantage of the G4M1 lay in its incredible range, but the sheer distance from Rabaul to the Southern Solomons proved grueling for near daily operation. (Dennis Burns)

The attempts to take the island of Guadalcanal failed, with the last major land battle occurring in late October, 1942. The now wearied Japanese Army clung to the South Western corner of the Island, where destroyers acting as fast transports left oil drums full of supplies, and brought in a trickle of reinforcements. At sea, the Japanese Navy had begun the campaign with a stunning victory off Savo Island, but in the months following, had lost the battleships Hiei and Kirishima in gun battles off the coast of Guadalcanal. Yet, they had managed to sink the American carriers, Hornet, Wasp, and critically damaged Enterprise, leaving Saratoga as the only American fleet carrier in the Pacific for some time. In return, they suffered the loss of the light carrier Ryujo, and the fleet carrier Shokaku had been seriously damaged, worse though, was the loss of experienced aircrews which the Navy’s training programs were struggling to replace. These victories would not be enough without Guadalcanal, the capture of which could have proven a decisive blow against the supply lines and, crucially, morale of American forces in the Pacific.

The Imperial Army Headquarters would finally admit the loss of Gudalcanal several weeks after the end of any serious engagements on the island, on December 31, 1942. The next year would see the American forces march further north in the Solomons, where they had once only had a foot hold. For the most part, the heaviest forces on both sides were spent, and USS Saratoga was too valuable to lose. It thus fell on the cruiser and destroyer forces to continue the battle for the Solomons. For the Japanese Navy, which had suffered the loss of a number of its heavier warships, it was hoped that the Rikko could partially take up their offensive ability.

During this time, raids to support the Army in New Guinea, to inflict losses on the Allied air base at Milne Bay, and nightly nuisance raids across the theater were carried out. Major daylight raids became very rare following last year’s losses, though this isn’t to say none achieved major success. One 23 bomber raid on January 17th destroyed numerous aircraft on the ground at Milne Bay, with no losses sustained. Regardless, some tactics were sworn off as far too costly, namely daylight torpedo attack missions. The combination of improved anti-air armaments on American ships, the slow, level approach of attacking planes, and the ever more present threat of fighters, thanks to early warning radar, made daylight attacks a costly, futile affair.

A switch to night attacks brought dangers of its own, but given the high level of blind flying ability of the more veteran Rikko crews, it was far from suicidal. They would soon prove their abilities on the night of 29/30 January, after a sizable force of American warships was spotted near Rennell Island. The force in question was a task force consisting of the heavy cruisers USS Wichita, USS Louisville, and USS Chicago, the only surviving cruiser of the ill fated battle of Savo Island at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign. They were joined by two escort carriers, three light cruisers, and six destroyers. However, the green commander of the force Rear Adm. Robert Giffen had steamed ahead of his slower escort carriers in order to make a timely rendezvous with a number of destroyers, before reaching Guadalcanal.

Lt. Cdr. Nakamura commanded the G4M’s sorties against this fleet, comprising a mostly veteran force from the 705th Air Group, and was joined by 15 older G3M bombers from the 701st. Departing before dusk, Nakamura led the formation against TF 18. The bombers of the 705th made their attack at 19:19 hours, in dim light. The G4Ms made their attack free of interruption from enemy aircraft, but failed to score any hits. They had lost only one aircraft in the attack, which was remarkable as this battle marked one of the first uses of radar fused, proximity shells aboard American warships. At 19:38, the second force, composed of the older G3M bombers undertook their attack in darkness, with a spotter aircraft dropping a string of flares over the American fleet. The string of flares was dropped in the heading of the force, colored coded to denote the types of ships. Against the light of the flares, the 701’s planes went in. USS Chicago found itself in the sights of Lt. Cdr. Higai Joji’s flight, and after downing one of his ‘Nells’ on a torpedo run, the burning, floating wreck of the bomber now illuminated the cruiser.

USS Chicago found itself at the center of the enemy attack, with the oncoming bombers scoring two hits, one hitting the after engine space and disabling three of its four propeller shafts and flooding its turbogenerators, and another striking the forward engine room destroying the remaining active shaft, leaving the cruiser dead in the water. Swift damage control efforts set flooding boundaries and allowed the crew to save the ship for the time being. For the heavily damaged cruiser, two of Lt. Cdr. Higai’s aircrews were lost, including the veteran commander himself. However, the engagement was not yet over, as Rikko were now aware of the survival of the stricken cruiser and sought to finish it.

The task of sinking the USS Chicago lay with the 751 Air Group, a unit now composed mostly of new crews, who lacked the skills needed for the night attack the evening before. Nonetheless, they sortied 11 G4M’s under the command of Lt. Cdr. Nishioka. They found the USS Chicago under tow by the fleet tug USS Najavo at 16:10. Under escort from the other warships and F4F’s from VF-10, two of the bombers were lost before the run. However, the remaining aircraft pressed the attack and put four more torpedoes into the cruiser, with the four surviving bombers departing at as best a speed as they could make. Surveying the damage, it was immediately clear that the Chicago could not be saved, and the Navajo was ordered to cut its line. Some 20 minutes after the attack, the cruiser capsized, with the attacks having claimed 62 men. The destroyer USS La Vallette was also hit, though damage control efforts saved the ship, then taken in tow by the then available USS Navajo.

Through 1943 the fragility of the G4M1 became ever more apparent, but with no replacement in sight, and the desperation of the Navy’s position in the South Pacific, it remained an essential tool against the Allies.(SDASM)

While the battle of Rennell island again demonstrated the lethality of the Rikko, it was again another sign that daylight usage of the aircraft could not be continued without significant losses. It was also indicative of a growing problem that had now reached a tipping point, one that was being felt across all of Japan’s air forces. A vast gap in ability between the fresh and veteran aircrews was not only being felt in the capability of their units, but was forcing restrictions on mission planning. The inability for new crews to even perform the same tasks as the veterans in theater would not only prevent them from embarking on the same missions together, but would leave them relegated to more dangerous missions, unable to fly under the cover of darkness.

I-Go and the Death of the Admiral

Wishing to avoid an entirely defensive campaign, Adm. Yamamoto would commit his South Eastern forces to an offensive to shore up the position of Rabaul, and its defensive circle from Bougainville to New Guinea. In this offensive, carrier air groups were based alongside their ground based counterparts for attacks on enemy shipping and air bases through the region. The Rikko, with new replacements, were to take a center role in the offensive and resumed raids against Port Moresby. Despite only modest damage being inflicted across the theater, the operation was judged a success.

Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku salutes gathered airmen at Rabaul, shortly after this meeting he would board a G4M1 bomber to survey his forces on a nearby island. (Wikimedia)

It was to be entirely overshadowed by what was supposed to be a typical inspection of frontline positions. Adm. Yamamoto and members of his staff boarded a pair of G4M’s to view their positions on Balalle from the air. Not expecting to encounter any enemy forces, the pair of bombers flew to the island with a modest escort of six A6M fighters. Unbeknownst to them, American code breaking efforts had succeeded in discerning the Admiral’s plans, and 18 P-38G fighters were in route. Coming upon the flight, they ignored the fighters and went straight for the bombers before withdrawing. Overwhelmed, the escorts brought down only one of P-38’s that day, with both G4M’s being shot down.

Veteran pilot FPO1/c Tanimura Hiroaki was able to bring the second plane to the beach below in one piece, saving the lives of his crew, Vice Adm. Ugaki Matome, and Yamamoto’ chief of staff. However, the first aircraft was riddled with bullets and went down out of control, with the Admiral being struck with gunfire at the start of the attack.

The Admiral’s wrecked aircraft after its descent into the jungle. (warhistoryonline)

The loss of Yamamoto was not the blow as it has often been remarked, indeed, he was a keen strategist, but one that had made his fare share of mistakes. His talents could never have been relied upon to salvage the then rapidly deteriorating Japanese position across the Pacific. However, the lack of a central figure with his prestige meant that the war would be directed by officers that often did not fight the war according to a single, realistic plan. The Admiral’s passing was a key point in the war, marking the definitive end of the period where a strategy was pursued with clear aims that might bring the Allies to the negotiating table. It was a purely attritional battle now, one that they were not prepared to fight, and with no plan beyond hoping to outlast their enemies.

Clinging On

With the loss of Admiral Yamamoto and the retreat from Guadalcanal, the Japanese Navy was now on the backfoot. It still possessed a number of carriers, but the quality of their aircrews had declined considerably, and the American carrier force was being introduced to the new Essex class, along with the excellent new F6F fighter. These new carriers were arguably the most capable of any class produced during the war, with 7 being commissioned in 1943 alone, a figure larger than America’s entire complement of pre-war fleet carriers.

Rather than assault the stronghold of Rabaul directly, American and Australian forces moved to cut them off to the West and South. (campaigns of the pacific war)

Despite the losses borne earlier in the year, new Rikko units were deployed to bases in New Guinea and the Solomon islands, with training programs rushing to help cope with a now permanent shortage in personnel. By mid 1943, they were typically being used only for maritime patrol missions, with the Allied air presence across New Guinea and the Solomons having been considerably strengthened. Aided by the introduction of new models of fighters in the theater, like the F4U-1 Corsair, the P-40F, and P-38G, they were now ever more confident in their control of the air. They were thus able to deal serious blows to Japanese raiding forces, and were able to cover their own raiders with the long range P-38. Extremely high losses among the Japanese Naval Aviators had also seen a shift in strength across the theater that now saw the Army Air Force shouldering the majority of effort in the theater.

As the American forces climbed ever northward in the Solomon Islands, the Rikko were again called upon to help shut down their advance. Near the end of June, a major amphibious landing was threatening forces around New Georgia, and 26 G4Ms under the command of Lt. Cdr. Nakamura Genzo were sortied to attack the assembled task force. They located the fleet between Rendova and New Georgia, and found it covered by F4F and F4U fighters. Regardless, they pressed their attack with 10 bombers making their way to the fleet. They would succeed in putting one torpedo into the transport USS McCawley. It exploded in the engine room, killing 15 and cutting power to the ship, which would remain afloat until being mistakenly torpedoed by friendly PT boats later that evening. Casualties among the Rikko were again exceedingly high, with 19 planes being lost.

The American advance to New Georgia, and soon Vella La Vella, would enable them to base aircraft in a far more northern position in the Solomons. This directly threatened the Japanese air bases, Army and Navy, on the Southern and Northern ends of Bougainville, the largest and northernmost island in the Solomons. The Rikko were directed to support ground operations, bombing enemy field positions in daylight raids, and despite the considerable presence of their own fighters, casualties soon became too heavy, and after a raid on the 15th of July, were called off.

Recuperation lasted as long as September, when Allied landings along Northern New Guinea threatened the important air base at Lae, which covered oversea communication with New Guinea and the stronghold of Rabaul. The Rikko were sent to raid shipping in the area to stifle the invasion, but through the month achieved little damage. Their tactics were largely switched to anti-ship level bombing, which saw significantly lower casualties but little success, until the end of the month when desperation forced them to launch a daylight torpedo attack. Of the 8 planes sent to attack the landing forces at Finschhafen, only one returned to base with another aircraft ditching, with no hits being reported to any allied ships.

The encirclement of Rabaul had begun in earnest and it would suffer a major air raid on November 3rd, and in retaliation, Admiral Koga Mineichi would order an anti-shipping operation that would include a deployment of carrier air groups to aid their strained land-based counterparts. The Rikko would begin the offensive with a night attack on US shipping around Bougainville on November 8th. A composite flight of G4Ms from the 702nd and 751st Air Groups were committed to a night attack against the forces that had recently landed American forces on Bougainville. They would be joined by carrier based bombers in the attack, and succeeded in torpedoing the light cruiser USS Birmingham, smashing a 30 foot hole in its hull, aft of its chain locker. Regardless of a near miss from a dive bomber, a torpedo strike, and a second bomb which struck turret no. 4, Birmingham’s crew raced to stop the flooding and succeeded miraculously. In spite of the beating, the cruiser could still make a speed of 30 kts, allowing them to keep up with the rest of the formation, and avoiding the fate of the USS Chicago. Only two crewmen were killed in the attack, though many more were injured.

By 1943 the A6M was growing increasingly obsolescent. Designed around a light, low power engine, it had limited capacity for improvement. Against new American models, some exceeding 2000hp, it was at a decided disadvantage. (SDASM)

In spite of the cover of darkness, losses among the Japanese forces were high, with 7 G4Ms being lost. Much improved gunnery from the American ships was showing that advancements in radar direction, proximity fusing, and training, enabled them to match the feats of the night torpedo bombers. At 19:58 hours, USS Birmingham used its 5 inch gun battery to down a single G4M engaged in illuminating the task force at a range of 14,000 yards. Worse for the Rikko was that while some of the new crews were proficient enough in low light flying for night attacks, they could still find themselves overwhelmed when committing to the final run of the attack.

Rikko sorties continued the following days, with fewer losses, but also marginal success. On the night of November 12/13, the Rikko attacked Task Force 39 in 04:53 in the early morning. Three G4Ms were able to box-in the light cruiser USS Denver in a hammer and anvil attack, scoring a hit. Struck along the starboard aft engine room, Denver quickly lost propulsion and took on a 15 degree list. As damage control efforts continued, the cruiser was brought under fighter protection at six in the morning, and was able to retreat to safety. Two of the three Rikko that attacked the cruiser were shot down, with the successful strike being made by Lt(jg) Maruyama Hidezumi, whose plane returned home with 380 holes in it.

Another major attack was launched on the night of 16/17. During this sortie, SFPO Kobayashi Gintaro would succeed in torpedoing the USS McKean, a destroyer being employed as a high speed troop transport. When attempts to evade the torpedo failed, it struck starboard, aft of the rear magazine, which caused an explosion that cast burning fuel oil across much of the ship and the water around it. Sinking at the stern, the order to abandon ship was called well before the explosion of the ship’s magazines. Sixty four sailors lost their lives, along with a further 52 marines, with the survivors picked up by the other destroyers of the force.

These attacks imposed some losses against the forces invading Bougainville, but they were unable to stop the northern stream of American forces that were soon to capture the southern flank of Rabaul. Regardless of the extreme overclaiming of the Rikko crew, they were unable to deal significant damage to the amphibious forces, and were themselves taking serious losses in operations, which earlier that year, had guaranteed a good deal of safety. Eventually, the forces in Rabaul would be encircled and subjected to attack from attacks from the South and the West, before American carrier forces returned to the region in strength to deal an even greater blow. During this period, only the Rikko of the 751st remained in theater, but after a massive air raid in February of 1944, the remaining forces withdrew.

The Retreat

While 1943 lacked the intensive surface battles of the previous year, and saw no new major aircraft carrier engagements, it represented a string of serioust defeats for the Japanese Army and Navy. By year’s end, they had completely lost the ability to threaten the sea lines of communication from Australia to America, and thus any major strategic position that could threaten the ability of the Allies to continue the war in the South Pacific. Worse, they were now fighting a lost battle to retain control of Rabaul, with New Guinea being remarked as a hell on Earth from which men did not return, and their positions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands now being reduced to the outposts of Kwajalein, Enwitok, and Truk. The central pacific strategy was also non-viable, as the American carrier forces had been more than rebuilt, and had a year to build up their air groups, now flying the F6F fighter as the fleet’s standard, which was now more than a match for the A6M. Even moresow, now that Japan’s veteran naval airmen were either lost, or rotated out. This would leave all remaining air-fleet engagements extremely one sided.

The Rikko played a minor role in defending the Gilberts and Marshalls, apart from the base at Truk. At the beginning of 1944, this anchorage would find itself under attack numerous times by American carrier forces. The greatest blow came on February 17th and 18th, when it came under major air attack. Under siege from five American fleet carriers, the operation would thoroughly wreck the Japanese Navy’s air presence in the region, and prove that the anchorage was too vulnerable for any major use in the future. While there was largely very little the forces in the region could do against the American forces, one G4M flying from Tinian would make a solo night attack against the fleet carrier Intrepid.

This single plane managed to evade attention and make its attack against the carrier. The torpedo exploded 15 feet below the waterline, causing flooding, and jamming its rudder to port. Navigationally impaired, the crew had to fashion a sail to steer the ship back to Pearl Harbor for several months of repairs.

Now well established, the Allies conducted raids across New Guinea and the Solomons. Here an A-20G attacks grounded aircraft at Lae 1943. (ww2db)

Future attacks would take this form, as these night missions were less likely to be detected, and the pool of aviators who could actually carry out these attacks remained small. In the early months of 1944, the Rikko continued to make these attacks in piecemeal throughout the Pacific in response to the ever growing offensive on the part of the American Navy. The naval bombers also made their attacks in response to major landing efforts at Biak and Palau, while also making opportunistic bombing raids, such as one on June 5th against the airfield at Wakde island. There, a pair of G4Ms of the 753rd Airgroup destroyed six aircraft and damaged 80 more at the crowded air base, with a follow up attack hitting the base with three bombers on the 8th. However, for the most part, the effectiveness of most of these operations were indeterminate, as the scale of their operations diminished.

They also found themselves fighting more determined resistance in the air at night, as the USAAF and the Navy had advanced their own night fighter programs. Over Guadalcanal, the USAAF would first employ the P-70, a thoroughly disappointing conversion of the A-20 attack plane into the night fighter role. It had neither the speed, nor service ceiling, to catch a G4M at the 7km they typically flew during their nuisance raids over Henderson, and only one or two kills were made with this model over the course of the war. Frustrated with the P-70, Henderson resorted to using searchlight guided P-38G’s, and even modified some aircraft to carry an air search radar in a modified fuel tank. The pilot workload of the P-38G was already considered burdensome by many pilots, and the new device only worsened the situation. Greater success was found with the Marine’s converted Lockheed Ventura night fighters in the convoy defense role, but it wasn’t until the deployment of the P-61 in late 1943 that the G4Ms could effectively be pursued at night. Several dozen victory credits were tallied on the P-61, with two of the six aces made on the model being in the Pacific theater.

The US Navy’s solution to night torpedo attacks came in a more convenient form, as radar equipped models of existing carrier fighters. These were initially F6F-3N Hellcats, which placed an air search radar on the wing, which they would use in the final approach to the target after being vectored in by a supporting ship. Later models would become available, with more powerful engines, and a pair of 20mm cannons supplementing their .50 caliber guns. Marine and Naval aviators would shoot down considerably more aircraft than their land based counterparts, though fewer of them were G4Ms, with the majority being light patrol aircraft being used to track American warships at night. As was the case with American improvements in radar directed gunnery, the presence of these advanced night fighters made the Rikko’s night attack missions considerably more dangerous.

Replacement

The G4M1 Model 11 had served well past its prime, and was relieved by the improved G4M2 Model 22. The new model had Kasei Model 21 engines, which were rated at 1850 hp, with water injection. It had a new wing incorporating laminar flow research, increasing its size and fuel capacity, without increasing drag. However, it did not receive additional protection to its fuel tanks, nor did it implement anything more than token protection for its crew. Its defensiveness was somewhat improved by the installation of an additional 20mm machine gun in a powered dorsal turret, replacing the top 7.7mm machine gun mount. Later models carried the Type 3 Ku Mark 6 search radar, to allow for better target acquisition on night torpedo raids.

The G4M2 is easily distinguished by its elliptical vertical stabilizer tip, the expanded nose glazing, and powered turret, which isn’t visible from this angle. (ww2db)

The old G4M1 machines were considered old and outdated, both by Americans, and the Japanese Navy itself. The airframe itself was also somewhat dated, but better engines had improved its performance, and it was being supplemented by a lighter twin engine torpedo bomber, the P1Y Ginga, or Galaxy. Nevertheless, the Japanese position in the war was irrecoverable. The Japanese assembled carrier forces would be decimated by the loss of so many airmen in the battle of the Philippine sea, and leave the navy without a coherent strategy. The battle for the Philippines would be fought without a strategy that could even hope to bring victory. Even in the planning stage, it was evident that the remaining Japanese Naval forces could not hope to prevent an American amphibious operation in the Philippines, and they would only arrive well after the invasion force had disembarked all of its forces and cargo. With no hope of actually preventing the invasion, or claiming a victory of any strategic importance, the remainder of Japan’s Naval strength was sacrificed at Leyte Gulf.

1945 was a bleak year that saw the near collapse of Japanese society. In this last year of the war, a new model G4M3 was produced, in order to serve as a host aircraft for a rocket propelled kamikaze aircraft. It reflected the futile stubbornness of those who lead the country, with the military unwilling to terminate the war until it faced a near total blockade of the home islands, the loss of the USSR as a possible intermediary for negotiating the end of the war when it invaded Manchuria, the firebombing of most major cities, and the atomic bombing of two.

Peace

One of the Bataan flights taxis alongside guards. (ww2db)

In an unlikely coincidence, the G4M1 would play a role in ending the war that it had been engaged in since the first salvos. A renovated G4M1, and a transport model of a converted G6M heavy fighter, were selected to ferry the Japanese delegation to the base at Ie Shima. Under direction from Gen. Douglas McArthur, both planes were painted white, and marked with dark green capitulation crosses, so as to make them unmistakable. They also flew under the names Bataan 1 & 2, in remembrance of the first major battle between the US and Japanese Armies, and the forced march inflicted on the Allied troops.

A veteran pilot, Lt. Sudo Den of the Yokosuka airgroup, was selected to lead the delegation to Ie Shima. They departed Kisarazu on August 19th, and were joined by a pair of American B-25 Mitchells of the 345 Bomber Group, and a B-17H search and rescue plane. The trip went without issue, and Lt. Gen. Kawabe Torashiro and the other 15 delegates deplaned, and boarded a Douglas C-54, which would fly them to Manila. With the war over, they returned via the same track, but with Bataan 1 undergoing maintenance, they all boarded the G6M. In spite of a forced landing near the Tenryu river due to a fuel leak, the delegation made it home safely.

The final service of the G4M was in dispersing the remaining Rikko air and ground crew. It was on August 23 that the remaining serviceable Rikko were assembled at Komatsu. From there, the planes flew across Japan to deliver the former air and ground crews to airfields where they could make the last leg of their journeys home.

In spite of the high losses incurred by these units for much of the war, there were a number of aviators who had survived the entirety of the conflict. Perhaps the longest serving of them was Lt(jg) Tsuneo Otake, who had begun his service in the older G3M over China, before transferring to the Genzan Air Group, where he participated in the campaign over Guadalcanal until he returned back to Japan in May of the following year. From there he joined a transport squadron flying the G6M. By the war’s end he had flown 3022 sorties and accumulated 5255 flight hours. Another veteran was Lieutenant, later Captain, Haruki Iki. Capt. Iki was a veteran of the attack on Force Z, and dropped a bouquet of flowers in remembrance for those lost in the days after the battle. He was also among those who survived the war, and would go on to start an association for Rikko veterans.

Handling Characteristics and Tactics

As a design that was borne out of extreme compromises, the G4M nevertheless proved an easy aircraft to fly. It was easily controllable, even in bad conditions, and very stable, presenting a lighter workload for the pilot. Both of these would prove essential for an aircraft designed to fly over exceptionally long distances, and from bases that would be plagued with poor weather. Overall, pilots regarded the flight characteristics of the G4M as dependable. The only major drawback to the design’s airworthiness was the lack of feathering propellers, which made bringing the aircraft back a more strenuous job that required considerably more corrective flying to cope with the increased drag.

Under non-combat flight conditions, there were five members of the crew seated in the cockpit. The captain, navigator, and radioman pulled double duty as gunners. (9gag)

Protection was very poor. The only armor plate aboard the plane protected the ammunition for the 20mm, and was judged to be so useless that it was almost universally removed from the plane. All members of the crew were vulnerable to gunfire, which given the near universality of .50 caliber guns among American fighters, proved deadly. Worse was the lack of fuel tank protection, or self sealing containers. These aircraft were equipped with CO2 flushed atmospheres beside the wing fuel stores, and CO2 extinguishers, but these proved unreliable in combating fuel fires. Later aircraft were given rubber sheeting on the underside the wings to give some degree of self sealing protection from flak and ground fire, but provided no protection from enemy aircraft. Ironically, structurally the aircraft proved very durable thanks to its forward fuselage and wings built as a single unit. It was fairly common for aircraft to come home on one engine or in extreme states of damage, just so long as there were no fuel tank fires.

Most of the defensive guns were not particularly effective at defending the aircraft. None of the gun positions were powered, and the forward 7.7mm machine gun had a very limited angle of traverse, in addition to proving difficult to move against the air stream. The rear gunner position was the exception, and featured a 20mm machine gun. It was called a machine gun as this was a naval aircraft, and the IJN considered the 20mm a small cartridge compared to some of the others in their inventory. This weapon could seriously damage a trailing fighter, but was somewhat restricted by its use of a drum magazine, the reloading of which was quite cumbersome.

The aircraft was often called ‘Hamaki’ by its crews, over its cylindrical fuselage, though it carried a darker double meaning when the aircraft’s flammability began to become well known. Subsequent names like ‘one shot lighter’ or ‘flying lighter’ accumulated as its service continued through 1942. The official American callsign for the aircraft was “Betty”.

The aircraft was employed in many roles, as a level bomber, torpedo bomber, maritime patrol plane, photo reconnaissance aircraft, and transport. The typical combat deployment was the Kokutai, or Air Group. The airgroup itself was the Hikotai, led by its Hikotaisho, and supported by its Hikokai, which represented all of the ground based personnel and equipment, which included transport aircraft. An air group’s command staff was a distinct element, not considered part of its Hikokai. Each Hikotai comprised up to 27 planes, with an airgroup capable of fielding multiple, and not needing to be of the same model, such that some units operated both bombers and fighters. In March 1944, the Hikotai were given much broader autonomy and were capable of deploying to bases distant from their original ground based Kokutai staff and ground crew, and attaching themselves to ground based services in areas they were redeployed to.

The largest combat formation was composed of 3, nine plane Chutai, which were themselves composed of 3, three plane Shotai. In combat, these units could be broken down into whatever size formation was needed. During torpedo attacks, the shotai would be divided into their own sections and could be used to attack a target from multiple directions, preventing them from evading. At a larger level, Chutai would conduct attacks separately, waiting to see the results of proceeding attacks, before choosing and committing a target based on the damage they’d taken.

Construction

Bulkhead diagram (G4M1 Manual)

The G4M1 Model 11, was a multipurpose twin engine bomber, and was an all metal, mid wing design. Its semi-monocoque fuselage was built as two halves, joined at the 24th bulkhead for ease of construction. The forward section was built as a unified wing-fuselage section, both to increase its structural strength, and reduce weight. The rear section was simpler, and its construction was given to other firms. Structurally, the aircraft made use of ‘extra super duralumin’, produced originally by Sumitomo metals before the war. It was an exceptionally strong material in aircraft design, and an area where Japanese aviation had forged ahead of the rest of the world. Once joined, the fuselage consisted of 38 bulkheads. At the nose was a glazed section for navigation, behind which there was a flat panel in the floor for aiming the bombsight. Several windows were installed along the nose for navigation and reconnaissance purposes. The cockpit was long, containing five crew positions, and doubled as an observation platform. The cockpit was equipped with radio navigation equipment and a level autopilot. The arrangement of instruments was somewhat unorthodox, with the pilot and copilot having non-identical sets of instruments on their respective sides. Notably, the copilot’s side lacks several navigational instruments, with the intent that he likely use the central panel which does have them, in the case of emergency. The fuselage carried a centerline fuel tank, along with a trio of tanks, which were situated in the fuselage and inner wing panel.

The aircraft’s navigator takes watch alongside the radioman. (aviacaoemfloripa)

The captain of the aircraft sat behind the pilot and copilot, and also doubled as the top gunner. The navigator sat at the rear, left side of the cockpit, with the radio operator sitting opposite him. Both of them also acted as the waist gunners in combat, with the navigator also being the bombardier. The cockpit and nose also doubled as watch stations for maritime patrol missions. The rear gunner was the only position without a secondary duty. It also was the only one with armor, with two small 5mm steel plates installed to protect the 20mm ammunition, but they were rarely kept aboard the plane.

The wings were built into the forward fuselage and were composed of an inner panel, outer panel, the engine mount, removable inner leading edges, and the flaps and ailerons. The wings were built incorporating an integral fuel tank between the spars, running from the fuselage to the end of the inner panel, with the surfaces of the wings representing the other walls of the container. These stores, combined with those in the fuselage, gave the aircraft a 4780 liter fuel capacity. External sections of 30mm rubber sheeting, installed from the 663rd plane onwards, provided a modicum of self sealing ability from punctures from below the aircraft. This added 300kg to the aircraft, reducing its speed by 5kts and reducing its range by 170 nm. The only other protective measures were flushing the compartments fore and aft of the wing tank with CO2, and adding CO2 fire extinguishers. The wings also contained a pair of two 150 liter oil tanks. The flaps and landing gear were electrically operated.

The tail section comprised a three section horizontal stabilizer featuring a center section embedded in the fuselage, connected to two outer panels. The vertical stabilizer featured a smaller, innerpanel, and a considerably larger outer panel. All of the control surfaces were equipped with trim tabs.

The Kasei 11 and 15 were fitted with metal Sumitomo, 3.4 meter, constant speed propellers. They began receiving prop spinners between the spring and summer of 1942. (arawasi-wildwings)

The aircraft was initially fitted with the Mitsubishi Kasei 11, a 42 liter, 14 cylinder radial engine which was rated at 1460hp at 2350 rpm, and had a full throttle height of 4.6km. It had a length of 1705mm and a height of 1340mm. It was replaced in March of 1942 with the Kasei 15, which incorporated a larger supercharger which improved its performance at higher altitudes. Apart from the supercharger, it was visually indistinguishable from the previous model. It produced 1420 hp at 2350 rpm, and had a full throttle height of 6km. Both used direct fuel injection and were equipped with a single stage, two speed supercharger, with the Kasei 15’s being far larger. Initially, there were only two exhaust stacks, but later models included one exhaust stack per cylinder.

Armament

The G4M1 had a bomb bay which could accommodate 800 kg of munitions. The bomb bay did not have retractable doors, but rather a removable fairing that was carried on the aircraft for reconnaissance, transportation, and ferry flights. The bomb load could consist of a single 500kg bomb, four of 250 kg bombs, twelve 60 kg bombs, and a variety of other devices, such as parachute flares, and target marking smoke. They were configured to use the Navy’s bombs, and with few exceptions were unable to make use of the weapons for Imperial Army aircraft. The suspension methods between the two forces differed, and their fuses were not interchangeable without the use of an adapter.

Ground crew maneuver a Type 91 aerial torpedo into place (rodswarbirds).

As with other Japanese torpedo attack aircraft, the G4M1 carried the Type 91 torpedo. This weapon was produced in a number of marks going back to 1931, though wartime stockpiles and production were the Models I, II, and III, possessing a common diameter. These had a diameter of 45 cm, and were powered by an eight cylinder, wet-heater type, radial steam engine. The Mod. It could carry a 150 kg warhead out to a range of 2 kilometers at a speed of 42 knots. The Mod. II, a 205 kg charge out to the same distance, with the Mod. III carrying a 240 kg warhead. The Mod.III also possessed an interchangeable warhead, allowing it to be converted to a Mod. IV, 300 kg, a V-Head 305 kg warhead, a Kite head at 355 kg, or the Mod.VII at 420 kg.

The Type 92 machine gun in its deployed position. (ww2db)

The bomber was equipped with three 7.7 mm Type 92 machine guns, and a single 20mm Type 99 machine gun. The Type 92’s were modernized variants of the British Lewis gun, being a gas blowback machine gun with a cyclic rate of 600 rounds per minute, and loaded from 97 cartridge pan magazines. The 20mm machine gun was an Oerlikon FFL adapted for an aircraft mount. It was an advanced primer blowback weapon with a cyclic rate of 490 rounds per minute. It could be loaded from 45, 60, or 100 round drum magazines. The 100 round magazines were a late war addition. The machine gun enclosures were two part blisters where the rearward half could be pulled inside the aircraft. The rear section was a conical frame that articulated to move with the position of the 20mm gun. By late 1942, it was commonly modified in the field by removing the rear half of the enclosure to give better visibility and field of fire. Later, it was redesigned to incorporate a rear cone with a framing that was less restrictive.

A view from the rear gunner’s position. A very common field modification involved removing the outer frame of the enclosure to improve visibility and allow for a greater traverse of the weapon, as has been done here. (aviaocampo)

Production

The G4M1 model 11 was produced at Mitsubishi Airframe Works No. 3 at Nagoya, with production beginning in 1940, with the completion of a single aircraft. Production picked up the following year at a low rate, peaking at 28 aircraft per month in December with 182 made during the year. Monthly production increased the following year, with around 30 planes being produced per month, with 39 being produced in December. 1943 production sat at roughly between 45 and 60 planes being produced per month, being produced alongside its replacement, the G4M2. Production of the G4M1 terminated in January of 1944, with a total of 1170 aircraft built, excluding the two prototypes and the abortive G6M1 project.

No.3 works fabricated the airframes and skinning for all of the aircraft built there, though other items including electrical components, instruments, wheel assemblies, rubber parts, pumps, and calves were supplied from other manufacturers. Conscripted labor began to be used early in the production of the G4M1, with conscript workers appearing in October 1941. The factory operated in two 11 hour shifts, with one hour and ten minutes in breaks for lunch and smoking. In addition to the G4M1, the plant was concurrently producing the A6M fighter ‘Zeke’ or Type Zero, the J2M ‘Jack’, and the F1 ‘Pete’ recon seaplane. Production of the G4M1 model 11 was terminated in January of 1944. It was superseded by the G4M2 Model 22 which replaced it on the production line.

There exists no documented variants of this aircraft, regardless of the model of engine or other modification, the aircraft was always referred to as G4M1 Model 11.

Mitsubishi G4M1 Model 11Specification

Engine Mitsubishi MK4E Kasei 15 (early models used the Kasei 11)
Engine Output 2x1420hp ( 2x1460hp)
Empty Weight 7000kg
Operating Weights 8810-13300kg
Maximum Range 2315 nm
Maximum Speed 252 knots at 4200m (without rubber wing sheeting)
Armament (payload limited by space not weight) 4x 7.7mm Machine Gun, 1x 20mm Machine Gun, 800kg payload
Crew Pilot, Copilot, Navigator/bombardier, Radio operator, Commander, Rear Gunner
Dimensions
Length 19.97m
Wingspan 24.88m
Wing Area 78.12m^2

Conclusion

The G4M1’s career spanned from triumph to disaster. (SDASM)

The G4M1 was perhaps the perfect material representation of the philosophy and martial attitudes of those who led Japan to war. It was an aircraft built entirely to suit the most aggressive plans possible, with little consideration given to its use outside of its, admittedly, broad focus, or a changing wartime environment. It was an excellent aircraft in prosecuting a war that had been meticulously planned, and was to end very quickly. Yet, this wasn’t the war Japan was to fight, instead finding themselves facing a flexible, and determined adversary with superior material and technical resources. In this shift, the compromises that made the G4M1 a deadly, long range weapon, became serious liabilities that threatened the usefulness of the aircraft. While the virtue of self-sacrifice was paramount to the Japanese military, it was to prove self destructive when the lives of experienced airmen far exceeded that of the aircraft they flew.

Illustration

The Kanoya Air Group was among the first units to be supplied with the G4M1, and flew them to devastating effect against American forces in the Philippines and Force Z. Kanoya Kokutai, January 1942.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Misawa Air Group was formed after the Japanese entry to WWII, its first combat station was Rabaul. The white square around the Hinomaru emblem denotes this plane as being part of an operational training unit. Misawa Kokutai, June 1943.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bataan 2 joined a G6M1 transport in delivering the Japanese surrender delegation to Manilla.

Credits

Written By Henry H.

Edited By Henry H.

Illustrated by Oussama Mohamed “Godzilla”

Sources:

Primary

G4M1 Model 11 Manual

Japanese Aircraft Performance and Characteristics TAIC Manual No. 1. Technical Air Intelligence Center. 1944.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) Corporation Report No. 1 (Airframes and Engines). United States Strategic Bombing Survey Aircraft Division. 1947.

The Japanese Aircraft Industry. United States Strategic Bombing Survey Aircraft Division. 1947.

USS Chicago (CA29) Loss in Action 29-30 January 1943 Guadalcanal Island. Buships War Damage Report No. 36.

TM 9-1986-4/TO 39B-1A-11. Japanese Explosive Ordnance (Bombs, Bomb Fuzes, Land Mines, Grenades, Firing Devices and Sabotage Devices. United States Government Printing Office.

Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics. Military Analysis Division. 1947.

Secondary:

The Cactus Air Force Air War Over Guadalcanal. Eric Hammel & Thomas McKelvey Cleaver. 2022.

Neptune’s Inferno The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. James D. Hornfischer. 2011.

Fire and Fortitude The US Army in the Pacific War 1941-1943. John C. McManus. 2019.

Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko ‘Betty’. Osamu Tagaya. 2001.

Profile Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ & Ohka Bomb. Rene J. Francillon Ph.D. 1971.

American Nightfighter Aces of World War 2. Andrew Thomas and Warren Thompson. 2008.

Conquering the Night Army Air Forces Night Fighters at War. Stephen L. McFarland. 1998.

Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War. Rene J. Francillon Ph.D. 1970.

Sunburst. Mark R. Peattie. 2001.

Kaigun. Mark R. Peattie and David C. Evans. 1997.

McCawley II (AP-10). Naval History and Heritage Command.

Birmingham II (CL-62). Naval History and Heritage Command.

Denver II (CL-58). Naval History and Heritage Command.

McKean I (Destroyer No. 90). Naval History and Heritage Command.

Intrepid IV (CV-11). Naval History and Heritage Command.

USS San Francisco (CA38) Gunfire Damage Battle of Guadalcanal 13 November 1942. War Damage Report No. 26. 1942.

Lt(jg) Haruki Iki Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), Kanoya Kokutai (Kanoya Air Group). Pacific Wrecks.https://pacificwrecks.com/people/veterans/iki/index.html

 

Re.2000 (J20) In Swedish Service

sweden flag Sweden (1941)
Fighter – 60 Aircraft

To protect their airspace as the Second World war ravaged Europe, Sweden wanted to acquire more modern fighters. Initially, they purchased American fighters, but the few they could order  were insufficient and would be soon out of date. Luckily for Sweden,  Italy was in short supply of vital metal ore, so it was that the Swedish Air Force managed to acquire 60 Re.2000 fighters. These were immediately put to service and proved to be the best fighters that Sweden had in its inventory during the war.

J20 (Re.2000) in Swedish service. Source: www.destinationsjourney.com

History

As the war in Europe broke out in 1939, Sweden tried to use its geopolitical and geographic position to remain neutral. Despite its neutral position, it still needed to acquire weapons and other pieces of military equipment to protect its border in case of any potential attack. Just as the war in Europe started,  Sweden’s military officials purchased 120 P-35 Seversky fighters from the US to strengthen its air force. The first contingent of 60 aircraft reached Sweden in early 1940. The second group never reached Sweden, as the US Government canceled this agreement.

Despite ordering 120 P-35 Seversky fighters only half that number ever reached Sweden. Source: comandosupremo.com

The Swedish Armed Forces, not wanting to be left defenseless against an enemy air force, instead approached the Italians. Luckily for them, the Italians had developed and produced the Re.2000 which was essentially an improved copy of the US P-35. The Swedish government requested the purchase of 60 aircraft of this type. The official agreement was signed on the 28th of November 1940. As payment, Sweden agreed to give the Italians vital ore resources such as chrome and nickel.

Through Italy, Sweden managed to acquire 60 Re.2000 fighter aircraft in 1941. Source:www.destinationsjourney.com

Re.2000 Brief Development History 

In 1938, the development of the Re.2000 by Reggiane began at the request of the Italian Aviation Ministry. The Italian Air Force at that time wanted to introduce more modern, low-wing fighters. By then, several different fighter designs were in various states of development. Reggiane formed a team of engineers with the aim of creating such a fighter, led by the Technical Director Antonio Alessio, and Engineer Roberto Longhi. Due to a lack of time to design an aircraft from the ground up, a solution was made to utilize some elements of the design of the US Seversky P-35. The main reason why the Re.2000 was influenced by this US design was Roberto Longhi. He had spent some time working in the aviation industry in America before returning to Italy in 1936. While the two planes look very similar, there were some differences, like the cockpit, and landing gear. Due to the lack of interest of the Italian Air Force Officials, fewer than 170 aircraft of this type would be produced. Most were exported, and only small quantities of this fighter were ever operated by the Italian Air Force.

 

Italian Re.2000 fighter. Source: www.warbirdphotographs

In Swedish service 

The first Re.2000 reached Sweden in 1941. It was disassembled and then transported by rail through Germany and finally to Sweden. Once there, it was transported to the Swedish Air Force central workshop at Malment to be reassembled, after which the first trial and evaluation flights were carried out in September 1941. Once all 60 arrived, these were allocated to the F 10 Kung. Skanska Flyglottiljen (Eng. Fighter wing) unit. Their primary base of operation was the airfields at Bulltofta and Rinkaby. In Swedish Service, the Re.2000s were renamed to J20. The ‘J’ stands for Jacktplan, meaning a fighter. These received serial numbers from 2301 to 2360. The last two digits of these numbers were painted (in white color) on the aircraft tails and engine.

In general, the overall flight performance of the J20 was deemed sufficient. Its greatest downside was its poor mechanical reliability, and the difficulty in maintaining its engine. The Italians never tested the Re.2000’s performance in a cold climate, as it was intended for service in the Mediterranean. Because of this, the Swedish maintenance crews had to find out the hard way that the aircraft was simply not suited for the cold climate in the North. Trouble starting the engine in cold weather would prove a common, and frustrating exercise.

The J20 mainly saw service in the role of the interceptor. Their job was to intercept any aircraft that came near Sweden’s airspace. These were in the majority of cases, damaged Allied aircraft that were returning from bombing raids in  Germany. On rare occasions, some German aircraft would lose their way and be intercepted by the J20. The interception operations were not intended to engage incoming aircraft but to simply escort them to the Bulltofta airfield, where the plane and its crew would be interred.

During the war, some 16 J20s were lost in various accidents but only one was shot down in combat. During a routine patrol on the 3rd of April 1945, a J20 piloted by Erik Nordlund spotted a German Do 24 aircraft that was flying near Nahobukten. As the J20 approached the German plane it was hit by 2 cm cannon rounds. While the pilot disengaged and tried to fly back, the engine exploded in midair, destroying the aircraft and killing the pilot. The J20s that survived the war remained in the inventory of the Sweden Air Force up to 1955 before being finally removed from service.

Besides their national marking, the Swedish added two large two-digit designations to the J20. These large numbers were painted in white color. Source: www.destinationsjourney.com

Surviving aircrafts

Most were either lost or scrapped, and today, only one J20 is preserved. It is currently exhibited at the Swedish Air Force Museum at Linkoping.

The preserved Swedish J20 fighter (serial number 2340). Source: plasticfantastique.com

Technical characteristics

The Re.2000 was designed as a low-wing, mixed-construction, single-seat fighter plane. The fuselage consisted of a round frame covered with a metal sheet held in place using flush-riveting. The Re.2000 wings had a semi-elliptical design, with five spars covered with stressed skin. The central part of the wing held two integral fuel tanks. The tail section had a metal construction with the controls covered with fabric.

The landing gear system was unusual. When it retracted, it rotated 90° (a copy from the Curtiss model) before it entered the wheel bays. For better landing handling, the landing gear was provided with hydraulic shock absorbers and pneumatic brakes. The smaller rear wheel was also retractable and could be steered.

The Re.2000 engine was the Piaggio P.XI R.C.40 14-cylinder air-cooled radial engine, providing 985 hp, equipped with a three-blade variable pitch propeller made by Piaggio.

The cockpit canopy opened to the rear and the pilot had a good overall view of the surroundings. For pilot protection, a 8 mm (0.3 in) thick armor plate was placed behind the seat.

The Re.2000 possessed weak offensive capabilities, as it was armed with only two Breda-Safat 12.7 mm (0.5 in) heavy machine guns. The machine guns were installed in the forward front fuselage and fired through the propeller arc. For each machine gun, 300 ammunition rounds were provided. The Re.2000 also had two small bomb bays placed in each central wing section. Each bomb bay had a payload of twenty-two 2 kg (4.4 lb) anti-personnel or incendiary bombs.

Conclusion

The J20 was the best fighter in service within the Swedish Air Force. It was noted that during its service it possessed good overall flight characteristics. There were several issues with its maintenance, but this was mainly attributed to the cold Scandinavian Climate.  In conclusion, while not the best fighter of the Second World War, for the country as Sweden it was more than enough to protect its airspace.

Re.2000 Specifications  

Wingspans 11 m  / 36 ft
Length 8 m  / 26 ft 5 in
Height 3.15 m  / 10 ft 4 in
Wing Area 20.4 m² /  220 ft²
Engine One Piaggio P.XI RC.40 985 hp
Empty Weight 2,460 kg   / 5,424  lbs
Maximum Takeoff Weight 3,240 kg   / 7,140  lbs
Climb Rate to 6 km 6 minutes 10 seconds
Maximum Speed 515 km/h  / 320 mph
Cruising speed 450 km/h / 280 mph
Range 840 km / 520 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 11,500 m /  34,450 ft
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • Two 0.5 in (12.7 mm) heavy machine guns
  • 44 kg bombs
Swedish J 20 (Re.2000) with 42 marking number

Credits:

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by Henry H.
  • Illustration by Pavel

Source:

  • G. Punka (2001) Reggiane Fighters in Action, Squadron/signal publication
  • D. Nešić  (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Italija. Beograd.
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
  • M. D. Terlizzi. (2002). Reggiane Re 2000: Falco, Heja, J.20. IBN
  • G. Cattaneo () The Reggiane Re.2000, Profile Publication

 

Junkers Ju 88S

Nazi Germany (1943)

Medium Bomber, Pathfinder: 362 Built

The fastest variant of the Ju 88, the S featured a massive increase in engine power and numerous aerodynamic improvements. (beeldbank)

The Junkers Ju 88 was among the most versatile and longest serving aircraft of the Second World War, and can be counted among the very few that weren’t completely obsolete at the end of hostilities. A modern design in the days preceding the war, it was intended to become the primary medium bomber in Luftwaffe service. In the following years, it to was to be replaced by the more modern Ju 288. However, production shortfalls made phasing out the dated Heinkel 111 unfeasible, and the Ju 288 would never see service, for a multitude of technical reasons. It thus fell on Junkers to keep the Ju 88 updated through the end of the war, producing a number of bombers, fighters, night fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft to service in whatever roles were needed. Among the last of these variants was the Ju 88S, which sought to produce the fastest bomber variant of the aircraft possible.

The Secret Airforce

The rearmament of the German air forces began as a covert program, with the government  hiding its efforts in both accumulating a pool of experienced airmen, and producing capable combat airplanes. The foundations of a new air force were laid during the Weimar period, where all of the existing civil airlines were merged into the state owned Deutsche Lufthansa enterprise under the directorship of Erhard Milch. Milch was a former Junkers employee, and future Inspector General of the Luftwaffe during the Second World War. In running Lufthansa, he created a pool of experienced pilots, aircrew, and maintainers under a single state enterprise, one which could provide the necessary expertise for providing the human resources necessary for any new military organization.

The task of arming this air force had to be achieved more covertly, and was pursued through two means. The first was simply to continue the production of civilian aircraft in order to maintain technical competence and an industrial base for building aircraft, and secondly, to design military equipment in secret abroad. The largest of these efforts was in the Soviet Union where several firms, the first being Junkers, built facilities supplied with shadow funding from the Weimar government. The Junkers plant at Fili, near Moscow, would sell military aircraft to the nascent USSR while gaining invaluable design and production expertise for facilities back in Germany.

Designed ostensibly as an airliner, the He 111 was the primary medium bomber of the Luftwaffe during the early stages of WWII. (wikimedia)

In the years to follow, German aircraft firms would go on to produce a number of dual-use civilian aircraft. Even before the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, this secret rearmament program was producing designs like the Junkers K-37 high speed mail plane, which was developed into a bomber in Japan as the Mitsubishi K-1 and 2. The designs of new military aircraft accelerated under the Nazi regime, who unlike their predecessors, were not simply interested in keeping pace in military aviation, but were now looking for weapons to defeat the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union.

The new Luftwaffe was to have a very strong striking arm, and thus needed a bomber fleet. To meet this need, the government requested designs for high speed airliners and mail delivery aircraft that could double as light and medium bombers. By the end of 1935, this contest produced the Heinkel He 111, the Dornier Do 17, and the Junkers Ju 86. They were all capable, and very modern for their day, but with the expectation of conflict by around 1940 it was clear a second generation of aircraft would be needed to phase out these models once they began to show their age. The resources for this effort were in a competition between a large, four engine Uralbomber to strike at targets deep within the Soviet Union, and a smaller twin-engined Schnellbomber, a shorter ranged, more flexible medium bomber. The death of the Uralbomber’s strongest supporter, General Wever, and the more practical concerns of being able to support a fleet of heavy bombers, ensured the Schnellbomber’s ascendancy. Beyond this, the range of medium bombers was judged sufficient for war against France and Britain, who were seen as the primary opponents to the regime in the short term, and thus Germany would have the time to develop a heavy bomber later on for war against the Soviet Union.

This Schnellbomber was to be a fast medium bomber capable of engaging distant targets without need for an escort or heavy defensive armament. The requirements were listed as needing a top speed of 500 km/h, a 1000 kg bomb load, a range of 2500 km, and of course it needed to have a modest production impact, taking no more than 30,000 man hours to build. Junkers, and Willi Messerschmitt at the Bayerisch Flugzeugwerke, were the only major competitors, and though Messerschmitt’s Bf 162 was the simpler of the two, the design was not altogether finished at the time of its submission, and thus the Junkers Ju 88 was the clear front runner.

The Ju 88 went through lengthy prototyping, this being the fifth, and far from the last. (prints online)

The Junkers Ju 88 was a modern, but not revolutionary design, it represented the most up to date concepts in airplane design, did but not incorporate any cutting edge technology. It was originally developed as a high speed level-bomber, but after the death of General Weaver, Ernst Udet was made the general Flugzeugmeister, the general inspector for the Luftwaffe. This change would result in severe complications to its, and other aircraft’s, development. A fervent advocate of the newly refined techniques of dive bombing, he made it a requirement that new bombers be made able to perform these attacks, which would require a substantial number of modifications to the design. Udet was a famed Great War aviator, but had very little in the way of engineering knowledge, and this decision slowed the development of the Ju 88, and largely doomed the later heavy bomber projects.

This requirement saw the program shift from the aircraft being a Schnellbomber to the multipurpose ‘Wunderbomber’, which required significant structural strengthening and the installation of dive breaks with an automatic recovery system. This added drag, weight, and delays in prototyping, but in the end, the design changes were worked into the aircraft satisfactorily. Production however was not forthcoming, as the German aviation industry would struggle to shift a massive proportion of capacity to building the new plane at an overly optimistic, and unreachable, rate of 300 per month. The plans for the plane were delivered in 1934, and the first prototype flew in 1936, but serial production only began in 1939. It wasn’t until 1940 that the Ju 88A-1 medium bomber was being produced at about ⅔’s of the desired 300 planes per month. It was the massive number of design changes resulting from the typical industrial corrections, the mission changes from the Luftwaffe, and simply basic design tweaks, that caused delay after delay.

Teething issues notwithstanding, the Luftwaffe had its most advanced bomber in the form of the Ju 88A. While it wasn’t the supposedly untouchable high speed bomber it was originally supposed to be, it was a multipurpose aircraft capable of carrying out a much wider number of missions. While it was slower than the original concept, it traded that speed for being able to engage large, mobile targets such as trains, columns of vehicles on roads, ships, and static point targets too small to be hit with level bombing.

The Early Years

Following its slow production during 1939, the Ju 88A was not employed widely until 1940, during the invasion of Norway. Its pilots were immediately appreciative of the plane’s superior handling and speed over the older bombers in service, and its dive attack capabilities were soon put to use. Equipped with the new aircraft, elements of Kampfgeschwader 30 engaged a number of Allied ships during Operation Weserubung, badly damaging the cruiser HMS Suffolk, the French cruiser Emile, and sinking the destroyer HMS Gurkha.

While it was the fastest Luftwaffe bomber by a large margin, its crews were quick to learn that no matter its top speed, a bomber was always in danger without escorts. (albumwar)

It was during the invasion of Belgium and France that some of the design’s shortcomings became apparent, chief of which was its poor defensive armament and the limited fields of fire from the forward and top-rear machine gun positions. Not yet employed in significant numbers, the Ju 88 units on this front participated mostly in attacks against the French air force in suppressing their bases and attacking aircraft production. Beyond this they attacked port facilities and shipping to complicate the transportation of forces between Britain and the continent.

The attacks on the UK, culminating in the weeks that have come to be known as the Battle of Britain, would further demonstrate the destructive capabilities of the Ju 88, but also its vulnerability to fighters. In the end, bomber losses were high among all Luftwaffe units involved, with Ju 88 units specifically having trouble maintaining serviceability rates with their new aircraft. In short, both the RAF and Luftwaffe were pulverized and great damage was rained across much of Southern England, but in the end the defenders prevailed, and the Luftwaffe was forced to retreat and regroup.

As the campaign against England progressed, the Ju 88A was entering wider service and gradually replacing the obsolete Do 17. (rods warbirds)

Returning that fall, the Luftwaffe began the Blitz, nightly attacks against British cities conducted in the hope of breaking the resolve of the civilian populace. For the Germans, these raids would be less costly, but unlike earlier attacks on British production and shipping, there was little they could point to as a success beyond the acreage of burned out homes. The performance of the Ju 88 over the He 111 and Do 17 on these missions was largely a non-issue given the inaccuracy of nightly air defenses, and the small, but growing, RAF night fighter force. The true battle was being fought over the airwaves with the Luftwaffe using radio navigation aids to guide bombers to their targets, and the British sending out their own signals to disrupt them.

Adaptation

As with all military aircraft, design improvements were constantly being worked in via small changes, or different design variants. While there are few aircraft with as many variant designs as the Ju 88, these started simple. Initially there was a basic heavy fighter conversion of the Ju 88A-1, the Ju 88C-1 and 2. The glass ‘beetle’s eye’ nose glaze was replaced with a metal nose with fittings for 7.92mm machine guns, and 15 mm and 20 mm autocannons. These were built by modifying completed bombers, and in the earliest models, these fighters still had bombing gear and dive brakes. Beyond these easy converts, it was clear the basic bomber design itself could be significantly improved. The first major revision was in installing a set of long span wings and replacing the 1200hp Junker Jumo 111B’s for newer, more powerful models. While the more powerful Jumo 111J would not be produced in the numbers needed until 1941, implementing a new, longer span wing proved easy enough thanks to the modular construction of the aircraft. The revised design was the Ju 88A-5, which would go on to see service during the Blitz and the campaigns to follow.

The Ju 88A-4 offered a thorough improvement in performance, and a better defensive armament. (bundesarchiv)

The first thorough improvement to the design was the Ju 88A-4, which incorporated the long span wings, a redesigned rear canopy equipped with a second gun to improve firing arcs, better radio equipment, and the new Jumo 211J engines which each produced 200 PS more than the older Jumo 211B. This new design would prove to be the foundation for many more variants of the aircraft, all made to pursue different missions.

By the end of the Blitz, the Luftwaffe was having to contend with the nightly bombing of Germany by the RAF’s Bomber Command, and the Mediterranean theater, which featured action at very long ranges against maritime and ground targets alike. To suit these disparate needs, several new variant designs of the Ju 88A-4 were created. Mass produced heavy fighters were built to service long range day and night fighter squadrons, torpedo computers and shackles were added for anti-shipping units, and streamlined recon planes were built. Once the Jumo 211J was available in large numbers in 1942, Ju 88A-4 production would surge after pre-built airframes were finally receiving their new engines, and thus the number of Ju 88’s variants was expanded upon as well.

Mid War Service

By the end of 1942, the war had grown to four major fronts and the Ju 88 was used extensively on all of them. Over the Bay of Biscay Ju 88C-6 long range fighters flew cover for U-Boats, over Western Europe they served as night fighters, and across the Mediterranean and Eastern Fronts there were a great number of bomber, torpedo bomber, and photo reconnaissance units. However, near the end of 1942, the Ju 88A-4 derived models were starting to grow more vulnerable as the Luftwaffe’s fighter forces saw continued attrition. The Allied fighter forces were also growing considerably in strength, especially those of the UK and US who were building a considerable technological edge over their German opponents. With the Ju 288 having failed to materialize, Junkers would have to return to the drawing board with their old design.

This later Ju 88T recon aircraft features a number of aerodynamic improvements over the older models. With the aircraft’s lower ‘gondola’ section having been removed and having had the older ‘beetle’s eye’ nose replaced for a low drag glazing. This nose glazing first appeared on reconnaissance Ju 88s near the end of 1942.(asisbiz)

With the wings already having been modified, further performance improvements were to come through streamlining and new engines. In 1942, a proposed major redesign of the aircraft with a new, streamlined canopy was proposed and prototyped, but it was clear that the production delays in adopting this new Ju 88B would be unacceptable. The new design would be included in the later Ju 188, but no major fuselage changes would be made on the Ju 88 for the rest of the war. Instead, a streamlined nose glazing would be considered, as would a new rear streamlined canopy with a defensive 13mm Mg 131 gun mount.

The only new major change in equipment was the introduction of the BMW 801 engine, which was now available in greater numbers, no longer reserved for Fw 190 fighter production. The Jumo 111J, even in its improved form, was growing increasingly obsolete as it had reached its operational limits. A successor design, the Jumo 213 with an improved pressurized cooling system, and designed to operate at much higher RPMs, was in development, but Germany’s reliance on second rate ‘economy alloys’, and resources being spread thin across several competing engine designs had caused long, painful delays. Once Germany’s access to molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, and nickel were restricted by the Allied blockade, engine development ran into significant barriers. Thus, modified versions of older designs presented some of the few ways forward.

The BMW 801 promised a power increase of over 300 PS per engine, and beyond that it featured a highly advanced engine control system that meant the pilot only needed to adjust the throttle, and the system would adjust the RPM, boost, and mixture as needed. It’s only major drawback was its relatively dated single stage supercharger. Regardless, it represented the way forward for the Ju 88, and several new designs were drafted using this engine. The first of these were heavy fighters, which were much improved thanks to this massive increase in horsepower. The Ju 88R series would be the first mass produced variants to use this engine, but it still used an otherwise unmodified bomber airframe. There was much to be improved in regards to aerodynamics, especially in the case of the lower underslung ‘gondola’ which carried a pair of autocannons and a position for a ventral gunner on the Ju 88R. Further developments would see the removal of this feature, and net a massive reduction in drag, which would lead to the development of the final series of production Ju 88s.

The Ju 88S was delivered in a factory standard green/off white pattern, once they reached squadrons they were immediately repainted for night use. (hugojunkers)

These new models would be the Ju 88G, a night fighter, the Ju 88T, a reconnaissance aircraft, and the Ju 88S, a high speed level bomber and pathfinding aircraft. Apart from a few pieces of specialized equipment, and the larger vertical stabilizer on the Ju 88G, these aircraft shared the same supply chain, and the technical differences between them were so minor that they shared basic manuals. This would prove vital, as during this period, Inspector General Erhard Milch was attempting to rationalize all aircraft production into as few airframes as possible in order to increase overall production, and to ease the requirements of servicing aircraft. As part of this scheme, the Ju 88 would prove essential, with its single airframe fulfilling many of the most essential roles in the Luftwaffe.

The new Ju 88S, would resemble the recon plane almost entirely save for its lack of camera mounts. It was fitted with the low drag nose cone first installed aboard the earlier recon models, BMW 801D engines, and the dive brakes were removed. Compared to the Ju 88A-4, the top speed in a clean configuration was increased from 470 km/h to 588 km/h, at 6 km. At its maximum cruise speed of 460km/h, the plane nearly reached the maximum speed of the previous model. Performance could be improved further at high altitudes using the GM-1 nitrous boost system. The system was simple, it used the nitrous as an oxygen carrier to increase the oxygen content of the air entering the manifold at altitudes where the supercharger’s effectiveness fell off, and recovered engine performance otherwise lost to the thinner air. Using this system saw these planes reach a top speed of 610 km/h at 8km. Of course, carrying an external bomb load would seriously affect these speeds, but this boost in performance was remarkable. While the Ju 88S had sacrificed its dive bombing capability, it more than made up for it in sheer speed, which put it in the same league as the otherwise incomparable DeHavilland Mosquito Bomber.

The first of these planes was the prototype Ju 88V-56, which was followed by 24 production aircraft delivered up until June of 1943. These were not new airframes, however, but rebuilt Ju 88A-4’s, converted at Junkers Flugzeugwerk Magdeburg. Few major changes to this design were made until later, though the engines were soon changed to BMW 801G-2s, which was geared specifically for use in bombers.

Schnellbomber Once More

The first unit to receive these aircraft was Gruppe I of Kampfgeschwader 66, this being a specialized pathfinding unit whose task was to lead bombers to their targets at night. They received the first of the aircraft of May of 1943, and were employed in small raids and reconnaissance operations over Southern England from their base in Chartres, France. One of the first losses came on the 30th, when one plane was shot down by a Mosquito night fighter, who pursued and intercepted them at 30,000ft. The crew bailed out, and the plane went down over England, its wreckage carefully picked over once the empty canisters of the GM-1 system were identified.

High contrast blue-gray and black patterns were preferred for night use as the upper sections would not stand out against clouds, and the countershading obscured the plane against the night sky. (rods warbirds)

The unit trained for raids conducted with conventional beam navigation systems, but also the newer EGON method. This system operated using one or more Freya radars which tracked the path of an aircraft by its Identify Friend-or-Foe transponder signal and guided it along its course toward the target via radio transmission. Such a system would require a well trained crew as the Freya’s lack of a height finding capability meant that careful attention would be needed to maintain the plane’s altitude while receiving directions from the ground controller. This system would be less vulnerable to jamming than the radio beam direction types that the British were already familiar with, but it still relied on the typical Luftwaffe communications systems, which they were also familiar with.

It wasn’t until 1944 that they were used for their intended purpose, during the revenge motivated Operation Steinbock, or ‘Baby Blitz’ as it came to be known. The previous year had seen an intensification of the Allied Bombing of Germany, especially with the highly destructive raids against the city of Hamburg, and the disastrous Bomber Command offensive against Berlin in the Winter. In the span of those six grueling months, Bomber Command went from its highest capability for destruction, to its worst blunder of the war so far. Despite the apparent futility of the assault on their own capital, Hitler wished to exact a cost on the British people, and Reichsmarshal Goering felt it was an opportunity to show the lethality of his air force. The Luftwaffe had seen some improvements, and the addition of the massive, if troubled He 177 heavy bombers, gave the force a destructive new weapon. In contrast to the highest echelons of leadership, Colonel Dietrich Peltz, who was to direct the operation, wished to use this concentration of bombers against Allied shipping, which he believed could damage their oceanic supply lines before an anticipated cross-channel invasion. He failed to convince either of his superiors, and thus proceeded with Operation Steinbock.

KG 66 was effectively the leading edge of the force which peaked at 524 planes, supplying a total 42 bombers, 23 being Ju 88S-1s. The general level of night flying proficiency among the raiders was poor, and thus the pathfinders were essential in leading the raiding force to their targets. The attack was to mirror the tactics of RAF’s Bomber Command, with light, specialized pathfinders plotting a route for heavy bombers carrying the heaviest types of bombs available, intermixed with smaller incendiaries, and fragmentation bombs on timers set to explode well after the raid ended. The assault began on the night of January 21/22, and it immediately became apparent that all of the existing guidance systems in use were compromised, even EGON to an extent. In spite of this, EGON was the primary system in use on these raids, and was capable of high accuracy on nights without interference. Early in the campaign, on a night of poor visibility, the pathfinders failed to illuminate London, and only some 30 of 500 tons of bombs fell on the city that night. The RAF and the city’s Flak batteries would claim 20 planes, with 15 being lost to accidents.

As fast as the Ju 88S was, it was vulnerable to interception by the newest models of DeHavilland Mosquito nightfighters, which represented the deadliest nightfighters in use over Europe. (asisbiz)

However, the Luftwaffe was committed to the offensive, and launched another attack at the end of the month, and they returned to the city 7 more times in February, when the pathfinders had shown serious improvement. In March, they shifted their attention somewhat to Hull, and Bristol, but London remained their primary target, attacked five more times in March before the last major raid on the city in mid April. The Germans had little to show for their attacks, as while they had done a great deal of damage to the city, the worst since the Blitz, they found the Londoners as immovable as they had been near the start of the war. For their efforts, the Luftwaffe had largely expended their bomber forces, with Luftflotte 3’s Fliegerkorps IX now being left with 130 serviceable bombers. Reserves were drawn upon for replacements, and forces were redeployed from the Mediterranean, but there was nothing that could hope to challenge the 7000 planes of the Allied Air Forces across the channel. What might have been a potent strike force against the invasion was blunted in a shortsighted disaster that not only failed to take into account the lessons from Blitz, but what they themselves faced from Allies only weeks ago.

The Last Effort

I./KG 66 did not escape Steinbock untouched, losing about half of their aircraft, with only their Ju 88S and Ju 188 bombers remaining. However, as a specialized unit, and one of the only users of the Ju 88S, they were soon supplied with fresh aircraft and set to a new mission. Steinbock had largely destroyed the Luftwaffe’s bomber forces, and thus there was little use for a pathfinder force tasked with directing large formations of bombers. The Luftwaffe’s fortunes had also declined since the futile offensive, as the American 8th and 15th air forces were employing long range escorts which now contested the airspace over all of Western Europe. When the Allies returned to France, they did so under the protective canopy of their fighter forces. To strike at the American and British armies now deployed to France, one of the few options available was to attack at night. With the bomber force having been depleted, it would thus fall to what remained, with assistance from night fighter squadrons, to carry out attacks against the Allied beachhead, supply lines, and frontline positions.

In this, I./KG 66 was perhaps the best equipped squadron for the task, having superior navigational training, and better aircraft than the typical raiders. Their operations were infrequent through the Autumn of 1944, while they rebased several times to keep ahead of the advancing Allied armies. Beyond this, there was a lull in night operations across the Western Front from roughly September to December. Their situation had deteriorated significantly, with chronic fuel shortages now being universal, and the Western Allies having succeeded in blinding German early warning systems by deploying ground based jammers to the continent.

A Ju 88S-1 in service with I. KG 66. (Cujo1970)

It was during the last month of 1944 that Germany’s remaining resources in the west were to be placed on an all-or-nothing offensive to stall the advance of the Allied armies. Operation Wacht Am Rhein would involve throwing what remained of the Heer’s offensive capabilities at the Allies at a moment where they had outpaced their supply lines. One of the major factors for the operation was the need for poor weather, to eliminate the Allied advantage in the air. For both sides of the coming battle, the only air units that could take part were those capable of instrument flying. For the Germans, this eliminated the use of all but the scarce remaining bombers, and their night fighters, which had become a second line night attack force since the Normandy landings. Against them were handful of American P-61 night fighters, with most of the RAF’s Mosquito squadrons having been transferred to the UK to refit to the new Mk XXX.

KG 66 was to take a vital and early lead in the air operations during the offensive, where it would again act as a pathfinder force. They now also operated the Ju 88S-3 from their base in Dedelsdorf, Germany, this being a new subtype that used the more reliable Jumo 213A engines. Operations began on the night of December 17/18, with the Luftwaffe mounting some 243 night attack sorties. KG 66’s role was to aid in the navigation of night fighters, and to illuminate targets along the roads between Sittard, Maastricht, and Liege. Given the Allied supply situation, and the chaotic road traffic experienced across the front, these strafing and cluster bomb attacks would inflict considerable losses and sow confusion along the roads. Losses among the night fighters themselves were steep, as despite the minor presence of allied night fighters, the use of proximity, radar-fused shells among Allied flak units proved lethal.

The night attack force would fly out the next night, with only limited success, but no losses. These attacks would continue throughout the offensive against rear line supply convoys, trains, and troop concentrations. They had some notable success, but at a very high cost to the night fighter force at a time when experienced aircrews could not be replaced. KG 66 would fare somewhat better given their less direct role in the assault, and would have an active strength of 29 Ju 88S-3s by January 10th, 1945. By this time, the S-3 was also found in the inventories of a number of standard bomber units. Outside of KG 66, the largest numbers of the aircraft were found in the first and second Gruppe of LG 1, a training unit now serving in combat, having been issued the aircraft the previous July.

As many Luftwaffe airfields were under threat from allied fighters through 1944, a reliance on secondary, concealed airfields was inevitable. (asisbiz)

For the next few weeks, what remained of the German bomber and night fighter forces of the Western front would be used as night harassment forces. Morale plummeted as there was little hope of anything being achieved in these costly actions, and the best of the RAF’s night fighter forces were again on the continent. During these night raids, crews felt a constant anxiety over the presence of the dreaded Mosquito, which possessed both incredible speed and an endurance that allowed it to pursue targets on long chases. When these planes were found to be operating in a certain region, night attack sorties for the night were called off. Such notices came at a great relief to the dwindling number of bomber and night fighter crews who were called upon to support the army as it retreated ever deeper into Germany itself. In the final weeks of the war, KG 66 was merged with KG 200 and participated in night harassment sorties until the capitulation of the German armed forces.

Handling and Use Characteristics

The Ju 88S retained the good flying characteristics the series was known for. It featured well harmonized, responsive controls that remained light at higher speeds, and possessed excellent take off and landing characteristics. The use of the highly automated BMW 801 and Jumo 213 engines also removed a substantial amount of workload for the pilot, who only needed to adjust the throttle to bring the aircraft to its various power settings. Combined with the level, azimuth only autopilot, the Ju 88 was an aircraft many Luftwaffe crews felt confident in flying hands off for extended periods of time. This would prove essential considering the mostly nocturnal use of the plane, where pilots flew by instruments and needed to pay close attention to the various navigational signals guiding them to their targets. Overall, the Ju 88 has been described as a viceless aircraft with very forgiving handling.

It would also prove to be incredibly fast, with a clean configuration allowing the Ju 88S-1 to reach 588 km/h at 6 km. Using various boost systems allowed the aircraft to reach higher speeds. GM-1 nitrous boosting allowed the S-1 to reach 610 km/h at 8 km, with the S-3 being able to reach 615 km/h. At lower altitudes, the S-3 could make use of methanol-water injection to allow the engine to produce considerably more power. While no data is extant on performance of the aircraft with this system, crew testimonies claim the heavier Ju 88G-6 night fighters were capable of exceeding 600 km/h at lower altitudes using MW50.

The Ju 88 gained a reputation for being easy to fly, both among Luftwaffe aircrews and foreign evaluators. (asisbiz)

Famed Royal Navy pilot Capt. Erik ‘Winkle’ Brown would also be among the few allied pilots to have had the opportunity to fly many models of the Ju 88, from bombers to night fighters. Capt. Brown felt the aircraft possessed largely the same excellent handling characteristics from the Ju 88A-5 medium bomber to the Ju 88G-6 nightfighter. He praised it for its easy ground handling, thanks to its excellent brakes, it’s good handling during climbs, and light controls at cruising speed.

Capt. Brown would spend more time with the G-6, a variant very similar in construction to the Ju 88S-3, and was able to put one through more demanding tests. Having previously flown several versions of the Ju 88, Brown was particularly impressed by the high speeds he reached in a Ju 88G-6 (Werk-nr 621965). The aircraft remained in line with his general, glowing remarks over the Ju 88. “It was a pilot’s airplane, first and last, it demanded a reasonable degree of skill in handling and it responded splendidly when such skill was applied. There was a number of very good German aircraft but, with the exception of the Fw 190, none aroused my profound admiration as did the Junkers ‘eighty-eight’.”

Perhaps the simplest, but greatest, advantage the aircraft had was in the close proximity of the crewmembers, which allowed them easy communication in the event of intercom failure or emergency. It also allowed the pilot to be seated beside the gunner and flight engineer, an ideal arrangement providing both easy communication and good situational awareness. This arrangement also provided good protection from rearward attacks, with the armored gunner’s position and the bulkhead armor between the crew and any attacker. Should all else fail, the bail out procedure was as simple as it could have been. The entire rear of the canopy detached, allowing for all of the crew to bail out from the shared compartment.

The general design of the aircraft was modular, with the wings, stabilizers, and engine units being attached to the aircraft by very robust, but easily removable connectors. Thus, the maintenance, replacement, or adjustment of any one of these components was made far easier. This lent to an overall ease of maintainability for the ground crews who could perform dreaded tasks like engine replacements rapidly, and without much exertion. The unified engine units could simply be disconnected and pulled away from the mount.

While it inherited the benefits of the original design, it also had its flaws. The most obvious of which was the poor visibility due to the bars of the reinforced cockpit frame, which reduced visibility, and the troublesome landing gear which had a tendency to buckle if the aircraft was brought down too hard. The landing gear was a hydraulically actuated set that rotated 90 degrees so that the wheels would lie flat within their nacelles. This greatly reduced drag, as the shallower landing gear bays contributed far less to the frontal area of the plane, but they could be broken in hard landings or harsh ground maneuvers while carrying a heavy payload. These types of accidents were typically handled by the local repair staff, but greater levels of damage often called for an aircraft to be disassembled and sent to repair depots, or factories, for restoration.

The most common accidents with the plane were landing accidents involving flipping the plane over onto its nose. Due to the forward placement of the engines, it wasn’t uncommon for the plane to flip over forward while landing, when less experienced pilots were too heavy on the brakes. These typically resulted in little more than damaged propellers and smashed nose cones, and thus didn’t remove an aircraft from service for very long. In more dramatic cases the plane could be flipped onto its back and injuring the crew.

Production

As one of the more minor variants of the Ju 88, the S was manufactured across several facilities, with both new built, and modified production models. The Ju 88S-1 was entirely an Umbau series, a modified production aircraft built from new Ju 88A-4 airframes. These were produced at the Junkers plant in Magdeburg, with the first deliveries arriving in the Spring. At Magdeburg, a total of 57 planes were manufactured in 1943, with 14 more being built the following year, with production being terminated in May.

The Ju 88S-3 incorporated the newer Junkers Jumo 213A engines, its performance was not significantly altered, but the engine was more reliable and in greater supply. It was the only variant to be mass produced as newly built, rather than modified, aircraft. (rods warbirds)

The Ju 88S-3 was built as both new airframes, and modified production aircraft. All of the new production aircraft were built at the Henschel Aircraft Factory in 1944, beginning in June. Here, they replaced the production of the Ju 88A-4, with a total of 264 rolling off the line in 1944, and 12 more the following year. The Henschel plant built another 15 from Ju 88A-4s. The Ju 88S-3 was by far the more prolific of the two and wasn’t just regarded as a specialized aircraft, with deliveries being made to standard bomber squadrons. Apart from these bombers, Deutsche Lufthansa at Berlin-Staaken converted 3 Ju 88S-3’s to high speed couriers and transports.

The production of the Ju 88S itself continued at a fairly high pace for a specialized design well into 1944, when bomber production was drastically cut in favor of fighters. There was also a declining interest in piston engine bombers, as the German aviation industry began to produce a growing number of jet aircraft. The Arado 234 was seen as an obvious successor, being the only reconnaissance plane that was truly non interceptable.

The build conditions of these aircraft declined precipitously between 1943 and 1944 as the German war effort ran short on key materials, and an ever growing number of factory workers were drafted. This hit a critical level in 1943, where the mass use of forced labor became the standard across most wartime German industries. In aviation, it had become an accepted practice the previous year, with concentration camp inmates being made to work at a number of plants. As the German labor pool continued to be drained, an even larger proportion of forced laborers were used, now drawing large numbers from the concentration camp system, and forcefully deported workers from Eastern Europe. This change saw a vast drop in working conditions and a large increase in sabotage; production quantities surged while quality backslid considerably. This process was overseen by Erhard Milch, inspector general for the air force, and armaments minister Albert Speer. They expanded upon the use of forced labor drastically in early 1944, following the American Air Forces targeting of German fighter production. This enabled them to build more aircraft than ever before, but saw a sharp increase in rates of sabotage and an overall decline in quality.

Much of this production strategy also relied on corner cutting and the implementation of extremely long work hours, with a 72 hour work week eventually becoming the standard. In terms of materials, they cut back the production of spare parts, began to accept well-used parts in new production aircraft, and recycled refurbished equipment from written-off planes. The production of all but a small, crucial number of fighter, night fighter, and reconnaissance models were cut drastically or eliminated. Overall, this strategy allowed them to drastically boost fighter production in the short term, but the rate could not be maintained and declined in the fall of 1944, only a few weeks after its peak.

Construction

Fuselage

The Ju 88A-4 was the most widely produced bomber variant and formed the basis of the Ju 88S’s design. This was also true in a literal sense, with many of the new models being built from existing A-4s. It was conventional all metal aircraft in its construction, and, while it pushed few technical boundaries, it was state of the art and versatile. It was primarily made of aluminum alloys, with cast parts used for load bearing elements. Some use of Elektron magnesium alloy was made to further reduce weight, but later in the war this had been replaced by steel, which was primarily used in the landing gear fittings. The fuselage cross section was rectangular with rounded corners and clad in large sheet aluminum stampings. It used a semi-monocoque structure made up of formers and bulkheads joined by connectors that ran front to aft, with the outer aluminum skin riveted to both elements, which allowed it to bear some of the structural load. Its structural load factor was 4.5 with a 1.1 multiplier for the first wrinkle, 1.3 for yield, and 1.8 for failure. In service, it proved very sturdy, with Junkers engineers claiming after the war that there had been no reported major structural failures over the service life of the airframe.

Modularity was a key feature of the Ju 88, allowing for simple modifications to the design, and ease of field maintenance.(Ju 88S flugzeug handbuch)

By the time of the Ju 88S, the construction process had been improved to the point where the fuselage was built from sub-assemblies that would become the upper and bottom halves of the fuselage. These would then be joined together after wiring and internal components were fitted. Wing construction followed a similar process, making heavy use of sub assemblies, followed by equipment installation, skinning, and painting.

Wings

The Ju 88’s wings were the heaviest part of the aircraft, comprising much of its total structural weight at over 1200 kg. A pair of massive main spars ran from the root to the wing tip, a rear spar ran across the entire span of the wing to support the flaps and aileron. One forward spar ran from the engine nacelles to the fuselage to transfer thrust from the engines and support loads from the landing gear. These spars were joined by relatively few airfoil shaped ribs and stiffened with corrugated aluminum. The wings were joined to the fuselage by means of four large ball-screw connectors, which made for easy assembly and alignment.

 

Wing connecting system (Ju 88A-4 Bedieungsvorscrift 1941)

The vertical stabilizer was fixed to the fuselage by means of the same ball-screw connectors as the wings. Installing it was simple, with the rudderless stabilizer being fitted to the fuselage, and the rudder fin being affixed afterwards. The horizontal stabilizers did not use the same fitting system. Instead, they were each inserted into the fuselage by two spars which were then bolted together.

As previously stated, the landing gear could prove troublesome due compromises in its design. During early prototyping, the landing gear was redesigned to use a single strut that would rotate so that it would lie flat beneath the wing when retracted. While this did remove frontal area that would have seriously impacted the aircraft’s high speed performance, it came at the cost of added complexity, and made for a far less robust landing gear arrangement. Differing from earlier series, the Ju 88S’s landing gear frames made use of welded cast steel instead of light weight alloys.

The wings were also equipped with an excellent de-icing system which took in air, ran it through a heat exchanger around the exhaust ejector stacks, drove it through channels in the wings, and then out over the ailerons. As the BMW 801 had no exhaust stacks compatible with this system, they made use of a petrol-fired heater to supply air to the de-icing system on the Ju 88S-1.

 

The highly effective de-icing system made Ju 88s a comparatively safe aircraft to fly under the worst winter conditions. (NACA)

 

Engines

In addition to its high power and automation, the BMW 801 was well protected, with armor plate ahead of the integral oil cooler. (smithsonian)

Apart from the initial use of BMW 801D’s, the Ju 88S used two engines in service, the BMW 801G-2 and the Junkers Jumo 213A-1. The BMW 801G-2 was a 14 cylinder, 41.8 liter radial engine which produced a maximum of 1715 PS at 2700 rpm. It had a bore and stroke of 156 mm by 156 mm, weighed 1210 kg, had a compression ratio of 7.22:1, and ran on C3 95 octane aviation gasoline. It was equipped with a single stage, two speed supercharger that gave the engine a full throttle height of 6 km. Despite its lackluster high altitude performance, the engine had a massive advantage in its high level of automation. Designed with an mechanical-hydraulic computer, called the Kommandogerät, the pilot needed only to adjust the throttle to bring the engines to a higher or lower power setting. RPM, mixture, and boost were all managed by this system, and massively reduced the pilot’s workload. The BMW 801G-2 would be installed aboard the Ju 88S-1 before later being replaced with the Jumo 213A-1 on the S-3.

The Jumo 213A was a 35 liter, inverted V-12 that was derived from the earlier Jumo 211. The new engine was designed to work at significantly higher RPMs and featured a new pressurized cooling system, which kept the internal pressure stable regardless of altitude. The engine ran on B4 gasoline, which was approximately 89 to 91 octane by the stage of the war this aircraft was used. The primary issue with the older Jumo 211 was its open cooling system which left it open to the effects of external air pressure. At higher altitudes, the lower boiling point of water severely its performance. The new engine possessed a smaller block, a more powerful supercharger, and an automated control device, like that on the BMW 801, called the Bediengerat. The A, being a low altitude model of the engine, had a single stage, two speed supercharger.  This gave the engine a full throttle height of around 6 km, roughly the same as the BMW 801. The engine had a bore and stroke of 150mm by 165mm, a weight of 940 kg, a compression ratio of 6.5:1, and it produced 1775 PS at 3250 RPM. A large annular radiator provided cooling for the engine’s pressurized cooling system, and oil.

The Jumo 213A was the preferred engine for Ju 88 crews, owing to its higher reliability. Note, this engine is displayed upside down. (aerofossile2012)

Both engines were installed in ‘Kraftei’ units which placed the engine and its associated cooling systems within a single, unified arrangement. These allowed for a great ease of maintenance, as the entire engine could be easily removed and replaced. These engines were fitted with VDM and VS-111 propellers on the BMW 801G and Jumo 213A respectively. Both engines employed direct fuel injection.

Fuel System

Fuel capacity varied dramatically depending on the mission loadout, as the rear fuselage tank would be removed in order to carry the GM-1 or MW 50 bottles. Fuel tankage consisted of multiple wing tanks contributing 1680 liters, a forward fuselage fuel tank of 1220 liters, a rear fuselage tank of 680 liters, and up to two external fuel tanks of 900 liters. At the lowest fuel capacity of 1680 liters, the Ju 88S-1 could fly a maximum of 1130 km at a cruise speed of 420 km/h, or 750 km at a maximum cruise speed of 460 km/h. At a maximum fuel capacity of 3580 liters, this was increased to 2415 km at low cruise, and 1590 km at high cruise.

The maximum fuel tankage of the Ju 88, 7 & 8 are oil, 9 is the emergency raft and beacon kit. (Ju 88A-4 Bedieungsvorscrift 1941)

Endurance with the Jumo 213A-1 powered Ju 88S-3 was somewhat lower, with a reduced fuel capacity of 1680 liters giving the aircraft a range of 1000 km at cruising speed of 410 km/h, and a range of 900 km at a maximum cruise speed of 450 km/h. The maximum operational fuel load was reduced to 2900 liters, which permitted a range of 2050 km at low cruise, and 1570 km at high.

Engine Boost Systems

The Ju 88S-1 could carry the GM1 high altitude boost system, and its successor, the S-3 could carry this system and the low altitude MW 50 low altitude boost system. The GM1 system was a nitrous boost system which provided high oxygen content to the engine at altitudes where the super charger failed to provide a boost with enough oxygen content to run the engine at its higher power settings. The mixture was delivered into the supercharger intake by means of compressed air. Activating the system was done by flipping the activation switch in the cockpit, which was accompanied by gauges showing the pressure remaining in the system. The activation time was approximately five minutes.

The high altitude boost systems allowed the Ju 88S to evade all but the fastest night fighters in Allied service. (candvt)

The chilled liquid nitrous was stored in insulated bottles, in either a three bottle arrangement, where each held approximately 90 liters, or a single large container containing approximately 284 liters. The flow of nitrous was either 3.26 kg per engine, per minute, or when set to the emergency setting, 5.98 kg per engine per minute. The emergency setting was typically ignored, as it was seen to cause engine trouble. In the three bottle version, the boost could be sustained for a non-consecutive 45 minutes, or 27 at the emergency setting. The chilled nitrous also aided in reducing knock via charge cooling. It should be understood that this system does not boost the maximum power output of the engine, but is rather a method of recovering power lost due to the thinner air at high altitudes. The activation height for the BMW 801 was 7 km, below which it offered no benefit.

MW 50 was a low altitude boost system to increase the maximum power output of the engine. This is done by reducing knock and allowing the engine to run at manifold pressures far higher than normal. This is achieved by increasing the overall octane rating of the fuel by adding methanol, rated at approximately 115, and water, which allows for a denser airflow at the manifold via charge cooling. This allowed the Jumo 213A to run at 2100 PS, roughly a 325 PS increase. Use of the system was rare on the Ju 88S.

It was not without its drawbacks. Firstly, the mixture was highly corrosive, and even with its anti-corrosion additive, it markedly shortened the lifespan of the engine. Second, was that it was restricted to use at lower altitudes. Unlike GM1 which delivered using pressurized air bottles, MW 50 was supplied into the supercharger via a pump. After rising above the supercharger’s maximum effective height, pressure in the system would fall until it offered no benefit to performance.

Crew Accommodations

The crew arrangement on all Ju 88 models would set the entire crew within the canopy and in close contact with one another. The bombardier sat to the pilot’s right, a flight engineer/gunner at the pilot’s back, and a ventral gunner sat beside the flight engineer or in a prone position inside the “gondola”, where his weapon was located. Aboard the Ju 88S, the ventral gunner’s position had been omitted with the removal of the gondola, however the positions of the other crew members remained largely unchanged. While these close quarters arrangements were somewhat claustrophobic, they ensured easy communication between the pilot and the rest of the crew at all times. It also made for a much simpler bail out procedure, as half the canopy would detach and allow for a quick escape for all aboard. In the Ju 88S, the crew entered the aircraft through a hatch below the cockpit.

Armament

The aircraft came equipped with a pair of ETC 500 underwing racks which could support a payload of up to 1800kg per shackle. These two pylon positions were plumbed to allow them to mount a pair of 900 liter external fuel tanks. It was possible to mount a second pair of ETC 500 racks could be added beside the standard two, though this does not seem to have been carried out in the field. The Ju 88S retained the internal bomb stowage, and could be used to carry small diameter bombs or extra fuel. Apart from flares and small incendiaries that could be accommodated by this bomb bay, most of the weapons used were larger diameter bombs mounted to the external shackles, being either conventional high explosive or anti-personnel cluster bombs.

The internal bay could only accommodate small diameter bombs, and was often used to carry either extra fuel, or GM 1 cannisters. (Ju 88A-4 Bedieungsvorscrift 1941)

The single 13 mm MG 131 was placed at the rear of the canopy within an armored glass mount and supplied with 500 rounds of armor piercing and high explosive shells in equal proportion.

Avionics

The Ju 88S was typically equipped with the following devices: FuB1 2 (Blind approach receiver), Fug 10P (radio set), FuG 25 (IFF), FuG 101 (Radio altimeter), and in rare cases the FuG 136 (pathfinder command receiver).

The FuB1 2 was a blind landing system that guided the aircraft onto a runway by way of two radio beacons placed at 300 m and 3000 m away from one end of the airstrip. It was a tunable device so that airfields could possess separate frequencies between 30 and 33.3 mHz. The aircraft itself carried the Eb1 2 beacon receiver, the Eb1 3F beam receiver, the FBG 2 remote tuner, the AFN 2 approach indicator, the U8 power supply unit, and either a mast or flush antenna.

The FuG 10 was designed to be easy to maintain with its universal frame and swappable modules. (pa0pzd)

FuG 10P was a radio developed by Telefunken and was coupled with the Pielgeräte 6 radio direction finder. The device consisted of numerous transmitters and receivers capable of operating at various ranges. Each component was fitted in a modular box which was connected to a wall rack to allow for the quick replacement of damaged components. One pair, E10 L and EZ 6, operated at between 150-1200kHz, and another, S10 K and E10 K, between 3-6mHz. Other components included the U10/S and U10/E power supply units, and the fixed antenna loading unit AAC 2. Numerous versions existed and made use of various other components.

FuG 25 “Erstling” was an IFF system manufactured by GEMA that would respond with coded impulses to the ground-based Wurzburg, Freya, and Gemse radar systems up to a range of 100 km. The receiver operated on a frequency of 125 mHz and the transmitter at 160 mHz. The entire unit was contained within the SE 25A unit, with the BG 25A control box in the radio operator’s station. This unit was used to facilitate the use of the EGON navigation system wherein a pair of Freya, or Wasserman, radar stations would ping the IFF. Finding its direction, gauging the signal strength, and triangulating its angle between the radar stations allowed the ground controllers to accurately set the position of the aircraft against a plotting table. Navigational commands were issued over wireless telegraph or a specialized device, the FuG 136 Nachtfee.

FuG 101 was a radio altimeter designed by Siemens/LGW with a maximum range of 150-170 m and operated on a frequency of 375 mHz at 1.5 kW. Accuracy was within 2 m and the entire system weighed 16 kg. It consisted of the S 101A transmitter, E 101A receiver, U 101 power supply unit, and the pilot’s panel indicator.

FuG 136 Nachtfee

On the right is the read out for the aircraft based receiver, the notch at twelve o’clock would represent one of over a dozen commands. Note the display is from the ground unit. (candvt)

This communication device consisted of a CRT indicator aboard the plane which received commands from a ground based control console, using the EGON navigation system. These commands were represented by a 12 position, clock-like display, where each position represented a different navigational command. These were sent to an aircraft’s onboard FuG 25 IFF system via transmission pulses from the ground based radar. In addition to the 12 commands, based on the position of the pulse, an additional 4 commands could be given with a double pulse. For example, a transmission of position 1 followed by position 2 would be an entirely different command than simply just one on position 1. The device required constant monitoring by a specialized crew member.

 

Conclusion

Out to pasture. (wiki)

The Ju 88S would prove a tremendous improvement to Junker’s ever versatile bomber, achieving extremely high speeds and proving a difficult target to intercept. In terms of its sheer performance, Junkers was successful both in keeping their bomber from falling obsolescence, developing an airframe which was very successful both as a medium bomber and night fighter. However, nothing could prevent the eventual undoing of the Luftwaffe, from both the British and American Air Forces, and the terrible, short sighted decision making that dominated the upper echelons of power in the Third Reich.

Variants

Ju 88S-1: Bomber-Pathfinder equipped with BMW 801G-2 engines. 71 Built.

Ju 88S-2: Bomber-Pathfinder equipped with BMW 801T turbocharged engines. Experimental, none built.

Ju 88S-3:Bomber-Pathfinder equipped with Junkers Jumo 213A-1 engines. 291 Built.

Ju 88S-3 Highspeed Courier: Deutsche Lufthansa fast transport and mail carrier. 3 converted.

Ju 88S-4: Bomber-Pathfinder equipped with Junkers Jumo 213A-1 engines and vertical stabilizer from Ju 188. None built.

Specifications

Ju 88S-1 (Ju 88S-3) Specification
Engine BMW 801 G-2 (Jumo 213 A-1)
Engine Output 2×1715 PS (2x 1775 PS [MW50: 2100PS])
Empty Weight 8350 kg (8420 kg)
Loaded Weight 13650 kg (14040 kg)
Maximum Range (no weapons, max fuel) 2415 km (2050 km)
Maximum Endurance 5hr 45min (5hr 20min)
Maximum Speed [at altitude] 588 km/h at 60 km (580 km/h)
Maximum Speed with w/ GM1 at 8km 610 km/h at 6km (615 km/h at ~5.5 km)
Armament 1xMG 131
Crew 1 Pilot, 1 Radar Operator, 1 Flight Engineer/Gunner
Dimensions
Length 14.36 m
Wingspan 20.08 m
Wing Area 54.5 m2

Combat range varied dramatically depending on the fuel, weapon, and boost system arrangement. A Ju 88S-1 carrying pair of 250 kg bombs, and equipped with GM-1, had a combat radius of 330km. Without GM 1, its combat range was otherwise comparable to the Ju 88A-4.

Illustration

 

This polka-dot pattern was used by the pathfinder unit KG 66 from the spring of 1943 until the end of the war.
This paint scheme was used by LG 1 during the last offensive on the Western Front and the following retreat into Germany.

Credits

Written and Edited by Henry H.

Illustration by Arte Bellico

Sources

Primary:

A.D.I. (K) Report No. 357/1945. Radio and Radar Equipment in the Luftwaffe II. 1945.

Ju 88S-1 Flugzeug Handbuch. Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke A.G., Dessau. 1944.

Ju 88S-1 Flugzeug Handbuch Teil 12 G Rüstsätze (Stand Marz 1944). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. 1944.

Ju 88S-1 Flugzeug Handbuch Teil 12 D Sondereinbauten Heft 4: Sonderstoffanlage (Stand Marz 1944). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. 1944.

Ju 88A-4 Bedienungsvorschrift-FL Bedienung und Wartung des Flugzeuges. Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. Juli 19, 1941.

Ju 88G-1 Schusswaffenlage Bedienungsvorschrift-Wa (Stand Oktober 1943). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. November 1943.

Ju 88 G-1,R-2, S-1,T-1 Bedienungsvorschrift-Fl (Stand November 1943). Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, Berlin. December 1, 1943.

Ju 88 G-2, G-6, S-3, T-3 Bedienungsvorschrift-Fl (Stand September 1944). 1944.

Rodert, L. A., & Jackson, R. (1942). A DESCRIPTION OF THE Ju 88 AIRPLANE ANTI-ICING EQUIPMENT (Tech.). Moffett Field, CA: NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS. 1942.

Secondary:

Brown, Eric Melrose. Wings of the Luftwaffe. Hikoki, 2010.

Medcalf, William A. Junkers Ju 88 Volume One From Schnellbomber to Multi-Mission War Plane. Manchester, UK: Chevron Publishing Limited , 2013.

Medcalf, William A. Junkers Ju 88 Volume Two The Bomber at War Day and Night Operational and service history. Manchester, UK: Chevron Publishing Limited , 2014.

Green, William. The warplanes of the Third Reich (1st ed.). London: Doubleday. 1972.

Bergs, Christopher & Kast, Bernhard. STUKA The Doctrine of the German Dive-Bomber. Lulu Press. 2022.

Boitens, Theo. Nachtjagd Combat Archive 24 July – 15 October 1944 Part 4. Red Kite . 2021.

Boitens, Theo. Nachtjagd Combat Archive 16 October – 31 December Part 5 1944. Red Kite . 2021.

Boitens, Theo. Nachtjagd Combat Archive, 1 January – 3 May 1945. Red Kite . 2022.

Bauer, Arthur .O. Nachtfee-EGON. 2012. https://www.cdvandt.org/

Bauer, Arthur .O. Nachtfee. 2012. https://www.cdvandt.org/

Stipa-Caproni

italian flag Italy (1932)
Experimental Aircraft – One Prototype Built

In the history of aviation, there have been many projects that on paper promised outstanding flight capabilities, or offered other technical advantages. The time before the Second World War saw aviation advance at a breakneck pace, and is well known for such experiments. The so-called Stipa-Caproni was one such project, being an intriguing, and somewhat bizarre, experimental aircraft designed by Italian aeronautical engineer Luigi Stipa, and built by Caproni during the interwar period. It was characterized by its tubular fuselage, hence earning it the nickname Flying Barrel.

The unique design Stripa-Caproni experimental aircraft. Source: Wiki

History

In 1927 a young Italian aircraft engineer Luigi Stipa began working on an unusual tube-shaped aircraft. Like many other aviation enthusiasts, Stipa was very interested in how aircraft could achieve better performance through exploring unorthodox construction methods. Thanks to his studies in thermodynamics, he was aware of the so-called Venturi effect, named after Italian physicist Giovanni Battista Venturi. In essence, this effect describes the reduction of fluid pressure and increasing velocity when it’s moving through a cylinder of decreased diameter. In theory, using this principle, a special type of aircraft could be created that could achieve significantly higher speeds than the conventional models of the time. Stipa theorized that for this purpose, such an aircraft would have to have a tube-shaped fuselage with the engine being positioned near the front. After finding it theoretically possible, he moved forward to test if the Venturi effect could be implemented in his airplane concept. For this purpose, he began a series of different tests inside a wing tunnel, carried out at the Aerodynamic Laboratory in Rome, from 1928 to 1931. The main focus of this testing period was to find the adequate shape, and leading edges, of the tube-shaped fuselage. This also included finding the right position of the engine, its position inside that tube, and the ideal propeller rotation speed. Following a series of wind tunnel tests, Stipa concluded that it was possible to build a full-scale prototype by using a single tube-shaped fuselage.

Luigi Stipa in his younger years. Source: Wiki

At the end of his research, he concluded that such a project was viable and set the task of building a working prototype. To gain interest in his project, he wrote about his work in the Rivista Aeronautica journal in 1931, and even built a small working replica. The next logical step was to write to the Italian Minister of Aviation, in the hope of getting approval for the realization of his project. Luckily for Stipa, his work came to the attention of General Luigi Crocco, the Air Ministry’s director. Stipa’s work was well received and the project received a green light. To test the concept, a working prototype had to be constructed.  It is important to note, that both Stipa and the Italian Air Ministry were aware that this project was merely to test his theories, and would not entail any further development of the prototype. In addition, both were aware that Stipa’s proposed principle was only practical on larger aircraft types.

For this purpose, the prototype was to be powered by a small 120-hp engine. The reason behind this decision lay in the fact that this aircraft was primarily built for evaluation and academic purposes. The Italian Air Ministry was not quite willing to invest huge monetary resources in it, beyond those necessary for the construction of the working prototype.

To help build the test aircraft, the Caproni aircraft manufacturer from Milan Taliedo was chosen. It was designated as Stipa-Caproni (sometimes referred to as Caproni-Stipa) referring to its designer and constructor. The prototype was built quickly and was ready for testing in October 1932.

It is perhaps a little surprising that such an unusual design would receive the necessary support for its realization. However, the exploration of new and unorthodox ideas in aviation was very popular in pre-war Europe. During the 1930s, Italy led the way in this aspect, perhaps even more than other countries, testing many unorthodox designs. What’s more, the Italian Fascist regime even encouraged different and unusual projects like this one, although many of them did not produce any meaningful results.

The Stipa-Caproni prototype was used for testing during 1932 and 1933. Source: en.topwar.ru

Technical specification

The Stipa-Caproni was a two-seater, mixed-construction aircraft, designed to have the simplest and thus cheapest fuselage. Its fuselage consisted of a tube which internally consisted of two large wooden round-shaped rings at the nose, followed by a series of similar but smaller rings. All of them were then connected with horizontal ribs which in turn were covered in fabric. The outer wooden rings served as the foundation, on which the wing and the cockpit would be connected. The fuselage design was, in effect, a large tube shaped airfoil.

A close-up view of the Stipa-Caproni internal fuselage construction. The two larger wooden rings serve as a base to which wings and the cockpit would be attached. Source: www.thevintagenews.com

The wings were mounted centrally on each side of the fuselage. These had a simple wooden construction, and were covered in fabric. They were also connected to the fuselage through metal bracing wires, which as a consequence increased the aircraft’s drag.

To the rear, a fairly large tail assembly was placed. During the design work of this aircraft, Stipa intentionally placed the rear control surfaces as close to the slipstream as possible. He hoped that this arrangement would greatly improve the aircraft’s handling and maneuverability.

On top of the fuselage, an elevated two-seat cockpit was placed. These were top-open with a small windshield placed in front of each position. There were also a pair of small doors that opened on the left side to give access to the seats.

The 120-hp de Havilland Gypsy III engine was placed inside this fuselage. It was centrally positioned and suspended using several steel bars that held it strongly in place. This was necessary to do so, as a weaker mounting could potentially endanger the aircraft during flight. The engine propeller was the almost the same diameter as the tube-shaped fuselage.

Given its overall design, and the position of the propellers inside the fuselage, the landing wheels were small and quite close to the ground. It consisted of three fixed road wheels. Two larger on the front and one smaller on the rear. Initially, wheel fairings were used but at some point, and for unclear reasons, these were removed.

A front view of the unusual engine installation. The engine itself was held in place by several metal bars. Source: Wiki
It was provided with a small and fixed three-wheel landing gear. Source: en.topwar.ru

Testing and Final Fate

With this project approved, a prototype was constructed and air tested in October 1932 at the experimental field at Monte Celio near Rome. Despite its odd design, the prototype was able to take to the sky without any major problems. Furthermore, it made several successful flights around Taliedo and Guidnia. It was even presented to the Italian Air Force for future test flights. During this period the aircraft was jokingly nicknamed Flying Barrel or Aereo Botte (Eng. Wooden wine barrel aircraft) or Aereo Barile (Eng. Fuel-Barrel aircraft).

The weight of the aircraft during these flights was 800 kg (1,874 lb), while the calculated wing loading was 44,73 kg/m² (9,16 lb sq.ft.). The maximum speed achieved was 133 km/h (83 mph), and it needed 40 minutes to climb at a height of 3, 000 m. It needed an 800 m long airfield to be able to take to the sky.

The Stipa-Caproni during one of many test flights. Source: www.historynet.com

Despite Stipa’s hopes that the position and shape of the tail control surfaces would improve its mobility, several problems were noted by the test pilots. Firstly the elevator worked very well, which ironically proved to be a major problem. Even with a slight movement of the command control stick by the pilots, the aircraft could prove very sensitive to elevator inputs. On the other hand, the rudder controls were quite stiff,  as a consequence the pilot had to use considerable force in order to use it effectively.  Analyzing this problem showed that the rudder’s large surface area was to blame for its stiff control. But besides the two problems, the aircraft was reported to be easy to fly when being used in a gliding flight. These defects  were of a more or less technical nature, which were not necessarily irremediable through further development of the overall design.

The design of the rear tail assembly proved somewhat problematic. Specifically, the elevator control was overly sensitive while the rudder was quite the opposite. Source: en.topwar.ru

The final results of evaluation flights showed that the Stipa-Caproni does not have any particularly great advantages compared to other more standard aircraft designs.  In addition, Stipa-Caproni’s overall aircraft shape offered limited space within the fuselage for passengers or payload.

As Stipa predicted from the start, his principles would not offer any major advantage over a standard smaller-dimension aircraft. The real application of the Stipa-Caproni design was only feasible on larger aircraft. Stipa hoped that his further research would enable him to construct large aircraft powered by two to three tube-shaped engine mounts. Unfortunately for him, after a series of test flights during 1932 and 1933 the interest in his work died out. It was briefly used in various Italian aviation propaganda publications before being scrapped in 1939.

Despite being in general an unimpressive design, the French showed interest in it. Particularly the company ANF Lex Maureaux, which went so far as to acquire a license for the design in 1935. According to initial plans, a two-engine variant was to be built for testing and evaluation. The project did not go beyond basic work was later canceled.

Lastly, an interesting fact is that many people considered Stipa-Caproni to design some sort of proto-jet engine. Whether this was the case or not, Stipa felt his work was overlooked, and according to some sources, he remained bitter throughout his life until he died in the early 1990s.

Stipa hoped that with more resources he would be able to test his principle on a much larger scale, but ultimately nothing came of it. Source: L. Stipa, Stipa Monoplane with Venturi Fuselage

Replica

In 1996, aviation enthusiast Guido Zuccoli began working on a smaller replica of this aircraft.  However, the death of Zuccoli in a landing accident caused a delay in the replica’s final delivery. It was finally completed in 2001 when numerous small flights were achieved. The aircraft, powered by a 72 hp Simonini racing engine, managed to achieve a flight distance of 600 m (1,968 ft). After that, the aircraft replica was stored as an exhibit at the Zuccoli Collection at Toowoomba, in Australia.

A smaller-scale replica was built and flight-tested in 2001. Source: www.uasvison.com

Conclusion

The Stipa-Caproni represented an intended for the purpose of testing his new concepts in practice. While surely an interesting and unusual concept, Stipa-Caproni’s overall design was not that practical in reality, offering little improvement over a standard aircraft design of similar dimensions.

 

Stipa-Caproni  Specifications

Wingspans 14.3 m / 46 ft 10 in
Length 6.04 m / 19 ft 10  in
Height 3.2 m / 10  ft 7  in
Wing Area 19 m² / 204 ft²
Engine One 120 hp (89.5 kW) De Havilland Gipsy III
Empty Weight 595  kg / lbs
Maximum Take-off Weight 850 kg / 1,874 lbs
Maximum Speed 133 km/h / 83 mph
Landing Speed 68 km/h / 42 mph
Climbing speed to 3,000 m 40 min
Maximum Service Ceiling 3,700 m / ft
Crew 1 to 2 pilots
Armament
  • None

Illustration

 

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by Henry H. & Ed J.
  • Illustration by Godzilla

Source:

 

 

 

A7He1 (He 112) in Japanese Service

Empire of Japan (1937)
Fighter Aircraft – Number Operated 30

During the war with China, the Japanese Air Forces encountered enemy fighters that were much better than what they currently had in their inventory. As their modern fighters were either under development or only available in limited numbers, they tried to acquire new fighters from aboard.  The options for acquiring such fighters were rather limited, and the Japanese turned to the Germans for a solution. This came in the form of 30 He 112 known in Japanese service as the A7He1.

The He 112 in Japanese service. Source: D. Bernard Heinkel He 112 in Action

A brief He 112 history

Before the Second World War, the Luftwaffe was in need of a new and modern fighter that was to replace the older biplane fighters in service, such as the Arado Ar 68 and Heinkel He 51.  For this reason, in May 1934 the RLM issued a competition for a new and modern fighter plane. While four companies responded to this request, only the designs from Heinkel and Messerschmitt were deemed sufficient. The Heinkel He 112 was a good design that offered generally acceptable flight characteristics and possessed a good basis for further improvements. The Bf 109 on the other hand had slightly better overall flight performance and was much simpler and cheaper to build. Given the fact that the Germans were attempting to accelerate the production of the new fighter, this was seen as a huge advantage over the He 112. Ultimately it would not be accepted for service, and only 100 or so aircraft would be built. These would be mainly sold abroad, with those remaining in Germany used for various testing and evaluation purposes.

He 112 the unsuccessful competitor of the Bf 109. Source: www.luftwaffephotos.com

While the He 112 project was canceled by the RLM, to compensate for the huge investment in resources and time into it, Heinkel was permitted to export this aircraft. A number of countries such as Austria, Japan, Romania, and Finland showed interest, but only a few actually managed to procure this aircraft, and even then, only in limited numbers.

Attempts to make a deal with Japan 

In 1937 a war between Japan and China broke out. While Japan had a better-equipped and more organized army, it faced stiff resistance. The Chinese were supported by the Soviet Union which supplied them with weapons and equipment, including aircraft. These caused huge concern within the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their newest fighters were either present only in small numbers or were still under development. As a temporary solution, IJN officials decided to approach Germany for assistance in the hope of acquiring new fighters.

For this reason, a military delegation was dispatched to Germany in the Autumn of 1937. Despite its later known fame, the German Air Force at that time was still in its early stage of rebuilding and realistically did not have much to offer, being in need of modern fighters themselves.  This would come in the form of the Messerschmitt Me 109. Its competing Heinkel He 112 lost the competition but was allowed to be sold abroad if anyone was interested. It was probably for this reason that the Japanese delegation visited the Heinkel factory at Marienehe. There they had the choice to observe the He 112 V9 aircraft. They were generally satisfied with what they saw and placed an initial order for 30 He 112Bs. If these proved to be as good as they hoped they would be, another, larger order for 100 more aircraft was to be given. As a confirmation of this agreement, the Japanese delegation returned with one He 112 aircraft that was to be used for familiarization and evaluation.

One of the 30 He 112 sold to Japan in 1938, Source: D. Bernard Heinkel He 112 in Action

Naming Scheme

As this aircraft was expected to enter service, it was designated as A7He1 by the IJN. The capital ‘A’ stands as a designation for a fighter. The number ‘7’ represents that this aircraft was to supersede the type 6 designation fighter. He stands for the Heinkel, and lastly the ‘1’ stands for the first variant of this type.  The Allied intelligence services discovered its existence within the IJP and awarded it the code name Jerry. 

Testing In Japan

Four aircraft arrived in 1937, and the last one arrived at the end of 1938. As the first aircraft began to arrive, the IJN began testing the A7He1’s performance in contrast to other fighters that they had in inventory, namely the Mitsubishi A5M2. While the A7He1 proved to be some 65 km/h faster, in other regards such as climbing speed and general maneuverability it proved equal or even worse than the Japanese fighter.  The Japanese were not satisfied with the A7He1 engine which was deemed too complex. These factors ultimately led the commission which examined it to propose that it should not be adopted, nor that any further orders should be given. After the arrival of the last A7He1, the order for an additional 100 aircraft was canceled.

Ultimate Fate 

As the A7He1 was not adopted for service, the IJN had to decide what to do with the 30 aircraft. They still represent a financial investment that could not be simply discarded. Some of these were allocated to various research institutes for future studies and evaluation, the remainder were given to training schools. None were ever used operationally in combat either in China or in the Pacific.

Quite surprisingly given their age and the rather limited numbers that were acquired, a few He1 survived the war and were captured by the Allies. One example was found in Atsugi airfield near Honshu in early October 1945. Unfortunately, the fate of these captured aircraft is not known but they were likely scrapped at some point after the war.

Despite the limited number of acquired aircraft, some of them survived the war and were later captured by the Allies. Source: www.destinationsjourney.com
Another aircraft (on the left) is being photographed by the Allied soldiers. It is possible that it was the same aircraft as in the previous photograph just taken later when it was being scraped. Source: www.destinationsjourney.com

Technical Characteristics

The He 112 was an all-metal single-engine fighter. The monocoque fuselage consisted of a metal base covered by riveted stress metal sheets. The wing was slightly gulled, with the wingtips bending upward, and had the same construction as the fuselage with a combination of metal construction covered in stressed metal sheets.

During its development life, a great number of engines were tested on the He 112. For the main production version, the He 112 B-2, the 700 hp Jumo 210G liquid-cooled engine was used, and some were equipped with the  680 hp Jumo 210E engine. The He 112 had a fuel capacity of 101 liters in two wing-mounted tanks, with a third 115-liter tank placed under the pilot’s seat.

The landing gear was more or less standard in design. They consisted of two larger landing wheels that retracted into the wings and one semi-retractable tail wheel. The He 112 landing gear was wide enough to provide good ground handling and stability during take-off or landing.

The cockpit received a number of modifications. Initially, it was open with a simple windshield placed in front of the pilot. Later models had a sliding canopy that was either partially or fully glazed.

While the armament was changed during the He 112’s production, the last series was equipped with two 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns and two 2 cm Oerlikon MG FF cannons. The ammunition load for each machine gun was 500 rounds, with 60 rounds each for the cannons. If needed, two bomb racks could be placed under the wings.

Conclusion

While the He 112 was often portrayed as a modern fighter, from the Japanese point of view it proved to be disappointing in any case. While expecting a potentially effective fighter that was better with everything they had, the He 112 proved to be quite the opposite. After the 30 aircraft arrived no further orders were given. This only serves to prove that the old saying the grass is always greener on the other side is correct once in a while.

He 112B-2 Specifications

Wingspans 29  ft 10  in / 9.1 m
Length 30  ft 2 in / 9.22 m
Height 12 ft 7 in  / 3.82  m
Wing Area 180  ft² / 17 m²
Engine One 700 hp Jumo 210G liquid-cooled engine
Empty Weight 3,570  lbs / 1,620 kg
Maximum Take-off Weight 4,960 lbs / 2,250 kg
Climb Rate to 6 km In 10 minutes
Maximum Speed 317 mph / 510 km/h
Cruising speed 300 mph / 484 km/h
Range 715 miles / 1,150 km
Maximum Service Ceiling 31,170 ft / 9,500 m
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • Two 20 mm (1.8 in) cannons and two machine guns  7.92 mm (0.31 in) machine guns and 60 kg bombs

 

He 112 v5 as it was tested by Japan

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by  Henry H.
  • Illustrations by Godzilla

Source:

  • Duško N. (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemаčaka. Beograd
  • J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1990) German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
  • D. Bernard (1996) Heinkel He 112 in Action, Signal Publication
  • R.S. Hirsch, U, Feist and H. J. Nowarra (1967) Heinkel 100, 112, Aero Publisher
  • C. Chants (2007) Aircraft of World War II, Grange Books.
  • https://airpages.ru/eng/lw/he112_combat_use.shtml

 

MS 406 in Croatian Service

Independent State of Croatia flag Independent State of Croatia (1943-1945)
Fighter –  36 to 46 Operated

During the Second World War, the German puppet state the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska NDH (Eng. Independent State of Croatia), tried to develop its own Air Force. Unfortunately for them, its German and Italian allies simply did not have the industrial resources, nor spare planes to allow them to build a significant air force. Still, the NDH’s persistence in asking for such equipment paid off in 1944 when they received over 30 captured French MS 406 fighters.

The Morane-Saulnier MS 406 in NDH service. Source: T. Likso and Danko Č. The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War

History

After Italy’s unsuccessful invasion of Greece, Benito Mussolini was forced to ask his German ally for help. Adolf Hitler agreed to assist, fearing that a possible Allied attack through the Balkans would reach Romania and its vital oil fields. In the path of the German advance towards Greece stood Yugoslavia, whose government initially agreed to join the Axis side. This agreement was short-lived, as the Yugoslav government was overthrown by an anti-Axis pro-Allied military coup at the end of March 1941. Hitler immediately gave an order for the preparation of the invasion of Yugoslavia. The war that began on 6th April 1941, sometimes called the April War, was a short one and ended with a Yugoslav defeat, and the division of its territory between the Axis powers.

With the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Croatia, with German aid, was finally able to declare independence, albeit becoming a fascist puppet state. It was officially formed on the 10th of April 1941. The new state received a significant territorial expansion by annexing most of western Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, parts of Serbia, and Montenegro.

While the conquest of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia proved to be an easy task for the Axis, holding these territories proved to be much more difficult. This was mainly due to two resistance movements that were actively engaged in sabotage, destroying railways and bridges, and attacking isolated occupation units’ positions and strong points. Despite attempts to suppress these attacks, the resistance movements, especially the Communist Partisans, grew rapidly, forcing the Germans and their Allies to introduce ever-larger occupation forces. The NDH forces were especially targeted as they committed mass murders and deportations to concentration camps. Thanks to the German help, they managed to form a small Air Force that in its inventory consisted of all kinds of obsolete, and in rarer cases, new equipment. By 1943, it was in the process of reorganization and the NDH officials during this time often asked their German overlords for more modern aircraft. Sometimes they even portrayed their own Air Force as weaker than it was.

The NDH Air Force was particularly poorly equipped with fighter aircraft. Luckily for them, the Germans at that time occupied what remained of Vichy France, capturing all kinds of military equipment. This also included the MS 406 fighters which was agreed to be sent to NDH by the end of 1943.

A Brief MS 406  History

At the start of the Second World War, the Morane-Saulnier MS 406 was one of the more modern French fighters built using metal components whose development began in mid-1930s. The first prototype under the designation MS 405 made its maiden test flight on the 8th of August 1935. Following successful testing and good performance, the French Ministry of Aviation issued a request for the first 50 aircraft in February 1938. Given the rising tension in Europe at that time the order was eventually increased to an additional 825 aircraft to be built. By the time, the French surrendered to the Germans over 1,000 aircraft of this type were built.

French Morane-Saulnier MS 406 fighter. Source: Wiki

The MS 406 was a good design that was nearly equal to the German Bf 109 models near the start of the war. During the War with the Germans in 1940, the MS 406 managed to achieve some success against the Germans but ultimately proved incapable of stopping the enemy. Some 300 aircraft of this type would be lost during this brief war, either due to the action of enemy fighters, ground anti-aircraft fire, or accidents. The MS 406 also achieved some success on the foreign market with 12 being sold to China, 30 to Finland, and the Swiss obtained a license for production. Poland also expressed interest in acquiring 150 aircraft of this type but nothing came of this as a result of the German invasion that began in September 1939.

In NDH service

The precise number of available MS 406 or the date when they arrived is not clear.  According to A. Pelletier ( French Fighters Of World War II in Action) the NDH received 46 MS 406 in early 1943. Author V. V. Mikić ( Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945) on the other hand mentioned a lower number of 38 which began to arrive at the end of 1943 and early 1944. These aircraft received registration numbers from 2301 to 2338.  According to T. Likso and D. Čanak (The Croatian Air Force In Second World War) between 36 to 38 were sent to the NDH during 1944.

In late 1943, these aircraft, together with Italian-supplied Fiat G.50s, were to be used to equip the 11th Group consisting of three squadrons (21st, 22nd, and 23rd). The MS 406s were expected to arrive at the start of 1944. The first operational units were to be formed by mid-February. To help train the pilots, one Seiman 200 and ex-Yugoslav P.V.T aircraft were to be supplied. The training operations were carried out at Lučko airfield, starting from October 1943.

Once in Croatia, the MS 406 was used together with the Fiat G.50 fighter aircraft. Source: Wiki

The situation in the air and the ground significantly worsened for NDH at the start of 1944. It was especially hard-pressed as the Allies began bombing operations in occupied Yugoslavia. Thanks to their advances in Italy, they managed to set up many air bases from which these attacks could be launched. They bombed many military installations including ammunition depots, fuel production facilities, and NDH airfields.

An NDH MS 406 w heavily damaged during one of many Allied bombing attacks. The aircraft while damaged beyond repair was not written off, as it was used to cannibalize any usable spare parts. Source: T. Likso and D. Čanak The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War

On the 5th or 6th of April 1944, the Lazužani airfield where the NDH 5th Air  Base was located was bombed by the Allied 2nd SAAF Squadron. They managed to completely destroy 11 and damage 20 more aircraft. One MS 406 was destroyed when an Allied bomb landed next to it. The pilot Cvitan Galić did not survive the explosion. The loss in material was such that the 23rd Lovačko Jato was disbanded. Another MS 406 was lost during a second Allied bombing run on Borongaj and Lučko air bases that occurred on the 12th of April 1944.

In March 1944 Hrvatska Zrakoplovna Legija HZL (Eng. Croatian Air Force Legion) arrived at the NDH capital Zagreb. This unit was formed way back in 1941 and was in direct control by the Germans. Its pilots participated under German controls on the Eastern Front and were quite experienced. The Germans demanded that at least two MS 406s be given to this unit to be used as training aircraft. The NDH officials could do little not to comply.

By 15th September 1944, there were 19 available MS 406 aircraft. Of this number only 7 were fully operational. On September 18th, or on the night of the 21st the sources are not clear, the Partisan forces managed to capture an NDH airfield near Banja Luka. Some 30 ,or 11 depending on the source, aircraft stationed there were captured. The NDH personnel either joined the Partisans or fled leaving behind valuable equipment and supplies. The Partisans managed to capture 3 MS 406 fighters, two were under repair. These were used against their former owners, but one was damaged in an accident and was written off.

In late 1944, the few surviving MS 406 were used in desperate attempts to stop the victorious Partisans forces that were liberating Yugoslavia from the Axis occupiers. By this point, the NDH Air Force could do little to stop them given the chronic lack of fuel. Unfortunately, the precise information about the fate of many NDH aircraft in the last few months of the war was not recorded well. While the Partisans managed to capture a few MS 406 their use was limited at best, and unfortunately, none of them is known to have survived the war.

An MS 406duirng the winter of 1944. Source: T. Likso and D. Čanak The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War

Camo and markings

The MS 406 appears to have been left in German late time war type camouflage. This usually consisted of  Dunkelgrun (Eng. Dark green) and Grau  (Eng. Grey) on the upper aircraft surfaces, and  Hellblau (Eng. Sky Blue) on the lower surfaces. A standard Croatian white and red checkerboard coat of arms was painted on the wings and the fuselage sides. Starting from 24th February 1945 the NDH Air Force introduced the use of a black trefoil that was painted on the aircraft fuselage sides.

Near the end of the war, the NDH Air Force introduced the use of a black trefoil that was painted on the aircraft fuselage sides. Source: https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/morane-saulnier-ms-406.50613/page-2

Technical Specification

The MS 406 was designed as a low-wing mix-construction fighter.  Its designers went for a conventional construction aircraft design. The fuselage frame was made using aluminum tubes connected and covered with Plymax. This is a  composite material that consists of layers of aluminum and plywood. The wings were constructed using a combination of spars and steel tubes also covered in this material. It was powered by one 860 hp Hispano-Suiza liquid-cooled engine. Most produced aircraft used a three-bladed two-pitch propeller, while some received variable-pitch propellers. The armament consisted of one 20 mm (0.78 in) Hispano-Suiza S9 cannon and two 7.5 mm (0.29 in) MAC 1934 machine guns. The cannon fired through the propeller shaft.  The total ammunition load for the cannon was 60 and for the two machine guns 600 rounds.

Conclusion

The MS 406 was one of the few more modern fighter aircraft that was available in any significant number. But despite that, it was already obsolete and could realistically do little against Allied bombers and fighters. It was mostly used to fight the advancing Partisan formations. Few remaining aircraft were used in this role up to the end of the war.

MS 406  Specifications

Wingspans 10.6 m / 34  ft 10  in
Length 8.13 m / 26 ft 9  in
Height 2.71 m / 8  ft 10  in
Wing Area 17.1 m² / 184 ft²
Engine One 860 hp Hispano-Suiza 12Y-31 liquid-cooled engine
Empty Weight 1,900 kg / 4,190  lbs
Maximum Take-off Weight 2,426 kg / 5,790  lbs
Climb Rate per minute 850 m / 2,790 ft
Maximum Speed 485 km/h / 302 mph
Range 1,000 km / 620 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 9,400 m / 30,840 ft
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • One 20 mm (0.78 in) cannon and two 7.5 mm (0.29 in) machine guns

Illustration

 

Credits

  • Article written by Marko P.
  • Edited by  Henry H.
  • Illustration by Godzilla

Source:

  • A. Pelletier (2002) French Fighters Of World War II in Action, Squadron/Signal Publication
  • Duško N. (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Francuska. Beograd
  • V. V. Mikić, (2000) Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941-1945, Vojno  istorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije.
  • T. Likso and Danko Č. (1998) The Croatian Air Force In The Second World War, Nacionalna Sveučilišna Zagreb
  • J. R. Smith and A. L. Kay (1990) German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam
  • D. Monday (2006) The Hamlyn Concise Guide To Axis Aircraft OF World War II, Bounty Books
  • T.L. Morosanu and D. A. Melinte Romanian (2010) Fighter Colours 1941-1945 MMP Books
  • D. Bernard (1996) Heinkel He 112 in Action, Signal Publication
  • R.S. Hirsch, U, Feist and H. J. Nowarra (1967) Heinkel 100, 112, Aero Publisher
  • C. Chants (2007) Aircraft of World War II, Grange Books.

 

 

 

 

ANT-1

 USSR (1921)
Experimental Single-seat light aircraft – 1 Prototype Built

While the Russian Civil War was raging on, there were early attempts to rebuild its shattered aviation industry.  Aviation engineers and enthusiasts attempted, despite the chaos around them, to build small experimental aircraft to test their ideas and concepts. One such young individual was Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev. His ANT-1 was a specialized design to test the concept of using metal alloys in aircraft construction.

The ANT-1 experimental aircraft. Source: www.globalsecurity.org/military

History

Tupolev began his career as an aircraft engineer in 1909, when he was admitted to the Moscow Higher Technical School. There he met Professor Nikolai Yagorovich who greatly influenced Tupolev’s interest in aviation. In the following years, he spent time developing and testing various glider designs. When the First World War broke out Tupolev managed to get a job at the Russian Dux Automotive factory in Moscow, which produced a variety of goods, including aircraft. There he gained valuable experience of aircraft manufacturing.

Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev was one of the greatest Russian/Soviet aviation engineers and designers. Source: Wiki

In 1917, the October Revolution plunged the disintegrating Russian Empire into total chaos. The few aircraft manufacturing centers were either abandoned or destroyed. All work on the design and construction of new aircraft was essentially stopped. The Dux was one exception and continued to work at a limited capacity. It was renamed to Gosudarstvennyi aviatsionnyi zavod (Eng. State aircraft factory) or simply GAZ No.1. Given that he was one of few aviation engineers left, with most skilled either being killed or fled the country, Tupolev remained working for the GAZ No.1. He spent a few years working on various projects such as designs improving weapon mounts for older aircraft that were still in service.

In 1921, Tupolev was elected as the deputy of the Aviatsii i Gidrodinamiki AGO (Eng. Aviation and Hydrodynamics Department). This department was tasked with developing various aircraft designs but also including torpedo boats. In 1921 he and his team from AGO began working on a new aircraft design that was to test new concepts. Two new innovative features were that it should be a monoplane, and be built using mainly metal alloy. Its primary purpose was not to gain any production orders, but instead to serve as a test bed for new ideas and concepts. The aircraft was named ANT-1, where ANT stands for the initials of  Andrei Nikolayevich Tupovlev.  This designation should not be confused with a snowmobile developed by  Tupolev, which shared its name.

During this period, Soviet aviation officials and the German Junkers company spent years negotiating the possibility of producing a Duralumin alloy that could be used for aviation construction. Junkers proved the validity of this concept on the J.I saw service during the First World War. The German company wanted to avoid sanctions on arms and aviation development imposed by the Allies, while the Soviets wanted the technology for themselves, not wanting to depend on the Germans entirely. The Soviet Union in 1922, managed to produce their own copy of Duralumin known as Kol’schugaluminiyem alloy. The name was related to a small village Kol’chugino where this factory was located. Limited production of this alloy began in 1923.

Due to problems with the production of the new alloy, Tupolev was forced to postpone the development of his new aircraft until 1922. At that time the alloy was not yet available, so Tupovlev decided to go on with a mix-construction design, but mostly using wood. The benefit of using wood was that it was an easily available material, with almost unlimited supply in Russia. It was cheap and there were plenty of skilled woodworkers. However, there were also numerous flaws in using wooden materials. The greatest issue was a generally short service life in harsh climates as in Russia, in addition, standardization of spare parts is almost impossible to do.

Tupolev himself preferred the new metal technology believing that it would offer many benefits to the aircraft industry,  giving new aircraft a lighter and stronger overall construction. Tupolev eventually decided to go for a mixed-construction solution. His decision was based on a few factors, such as the general lack of this new material, and he wanted to be on the safe side as using metal in aircraft construction was still a new and not yet fully proven concept. In addition, he wanted to be sure about the Aluminum alloy material’s quality before proceeding to design a fully metal aircraft.

Once the choice for the construction material was solved the next step was to decide whether it was to be a single or two-seat configuration. The wing design was also greatly considered. After some time spent in calculations and small wind testing, the choice was made to proceed with a single engine and low-wing monoplane.

For the engine, three different types were proposed including 14hp and 18 hp Harley-Davidson and a 20 hp Blackburn Tomtit. Despite Tupovlev’s attempts, he failed to acquire any one of these three. It was not until early 1923 that he managed to get his hands on an old 35hp Anzani engine which was over 10 years old by that point. Despite its poor mechanical state, Tupovlev knowing that nothing else was available decided to try salvage it.

Testing and the Final Fate

The construction of this aircraft took over a year to complete. Given the general chaos at that time, this should not be surprising. It was finally completed in October 1923, and the first test flight was carried out on the 21st of October of the same year. Despite using the older engine, the flight proved successful. It was piloted by Yevgeni Pogosski.

The completed ANT-1 test aircraft. Source: www.globalsecurity.org

Following this, the ANT-1 was used mainly for various testing and evaluation. It would see service in this manner for the next two years. In 1925 the aging engine finally gave up, and this made the aircraft unflyable. Tupovlev tried to find a factory that could potentially refurbish it. He ultimately failed, as the engine was simply beyond repair by that point.

The aircraft was for some time stored at Factory No.156.  The fate of this aircraft is not clear in the sources, however, there are few theories about what happened to it. After Tupovlev’s imprisonment by Josef Stalin, his plans and documentation were confiscated. The aircraft was believed to be also confiscated and scrapped in the late 1930s. Another possibility is that it was moved to another storage facility where it was eventually lost during the Axis Invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

Specification

The ANT-1 was designed as a cantilever low-wing monoplane aircraft of mixed construction. The fuselage consisted of four spruce longerons. The lower two were connected to the wing spars and  were held in place with four bolts. The parts of the fuselage starting with the pilot cockpit to the engine were covered in the metal alloy. This alloy was also used to provide additional strength of some internal wooden components of the aircraft fuselage. The pilot Pilot cockpit was provided with a small windscreen. Inboard equipment was spartan consisting only of an rpm counter, oil pressure indicator, and ignition switch.

The cantilever wings were made of single pieces. At the end of the two tips  (on each side of the wings) large wooden spars were installed. Some parts of the wing were built using metal parts such as the wing ribs,  The rest of the wing was mainly covered in fabric. The tail unit was made of wood, its surfaces were covered with a metal-fabric cover.

The fixed landing gear consisted of two large wheels. These were connected to a metal frame which itself was connected to the aircraft fuselage. Small rubber bungees acted as primitive shock absorbers.

Given that nothing else was available, the ANT-1 was powered by an old, refurbished 35-hp strong Bristol Anzani engine.

A good view of the ANT-1 internal wing and fuselage construction. Source: www.globalsecurity.org
The cantilever wings received on each side one large wooden spar. Source: Wiki
The pilot cockpit received only a few basic instruments and a small windshield. Source:www.globalsecurity.org

Conclusion

The ANT-1 despite its simplicity, and being built a single, cobbled-together prototype, could be considered a great success for Tupolev. Through this experimental aircraft, Tupovlev gained valuable experience in designing an aircraft by using metal alloy. This success emboldened Tupovlev to go even further and design and build the Soviet first all-metal construction aircraft known as ANT-2. The ANT-1 was Tupovlev’s first stepping stone in a long and successful career as an aircraft designer in the following decades.

ANT-1 Specifications

Wingspans 7.2 m / 23ft 7 in
Length 5.4 m / 17 ft 8 in
Height 1.7 m / 5 ft 7 in
Wing Area 10 m²  / 108 ft²
Engine One 35 hp Bristol Anzani engine
Empty Weight 230 kg / 5,070 lb
Maximum Takeoff Weight 360 kg / 7,940 lb
Maximum Speed 125 km/h / 78 mp/h
Range 400 km / 250 miles
Maximum Service Ceiling 600 m /  1,970 ft
Maximum Theoretical Service Ceiling 4,000 m / 13,120 ft
Crew 1 pilot
Armament
  • None

 

Gallery

 

 

Credits

  • Article written by Marko P.
  • Edited by  Henry H.
  • Illustration by Godzilla

Sources:

  • Duško N. (2008)  Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-SSSR. Beograd.
  • Y. Gordon and V. Rigmant (2005) OKB Tupolev, Midland
  • P. Duffy and A. Kandalov (1996) Tupolev The Man and His Aircraft, SAE International
  • B. Gunston () Tupolev Aircraft Since 1922, Naval Institute press