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Hwasŏng Missile Series and Missile Carriers

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – (1960s – Present)

Hwasŏng-15 being launched during a test. Source: KCNA via The Diplomat https://i.imgur.com/eEJVew1.jpeg

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the world’s lesser-known nations, but one that is periodically mentioned in Western media for diplomatic incidents with neighboring nations after testing ballistic missiles. This article attempts to shed light on Korea’s most famous, and numerous family of ballistic missiles, the Hwasŏng, in English literally “Star of Fire”, which in the Korean language (Hangŭl) indicates the planet Mars.

Creation of the DPRK Missile Program

Going back in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the first rockets it had available were various artillery rocket systems from the Soviet Union, such as the BM-8, BM-13 and BM-31 ‘Katyusha’ Multiple Rocket Launchers. These systems first arrived between 1948 and 1950 in Korea and were used against UN forces during the Korean War with great results.

In the following years, several ‘Katyushas’ remained in service with the KPA, and in the early 1960s they were joined by the modern 122 mm, BM-21 ‘Grad’, and Chinese produced MLRs such as the 107 mm Type 63. Both systems were studied and reverse engineered in late 1960s, with the creation of the 122 mm BM-11 MRLs and 107 mm Type 75.

North Korean-produced 122 mm BM-11 on ZiL-151 trucks. These are the most common Korean copies of the BM-21 ‘Grad’ MLRS distinguishable for the presence of 30 tubes instead of 40 divided in two blocks of 15 tubes. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/4fBuab4.jpg

Between 1968 and 1970, North Korea purchased several S-2 ‘Sopka’ coastal defense missiles from the Soviet Union, enough to equip 5 batteries. With the help of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea created the first maintenance and assembly facilities for the S-2 missiles, and newly purchased HY-1 Chinese anti-ship missiles. The deliveries of these anti-ship missiles were made both from Chinese military stocks, and kits that were assembled in Korea at the Mangyongdae Facility, to allow Korean scientists to become familiar with the systems.

North Korean S-2 ‘Sopka’ coastal defense missiles during a parade in early 1970s. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/EEwPx7t.png

Later in the 1960s, the Soviet Union supplied the DPRK with heavy artillery rockets, defined by NATO as Free Rockets Over Grounds (FROGs). More precisely these were 3R9 Luna and 3R10 Luna-2 rockets in 2K6 complexes (FROG-3 and FROG-5), and 9M21 Luna-M rockets in 9K52 complexes (FROG-7). An important note is that the USSR refused to help Korea create its own missile program for political issues, and only aided Korea in building facilities to assemble anti-ship and S-75 missiles. On the other hand, China delivered many types of reverse engineered Soviet Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), anti-ship missiles, and associated technologies to DPRK. Chinese assistance would probably have been greater, but the PRC did not possess the same systems, and level of knowledge, as the Soviet Union.

In 1972, the DPRK created its first missile plant for the production of Chinese anti-ship missiles but, for their assembly, they still needed some hi-tech components from China. These SAMs, and coastal defense anti-ship missiles, provided the Korean engineers with material to familiarize themselves with modern missile technologies, such as rocket guidance and propulsion. By 1973, North Korea had enough missiles to equip its navy with 10 Komar-class, and 8 Osa-class missile boats armed with P-15 and HY-1 missiles.

A North Korean S-75 ‘Dvina’ SAM battery (or its Chinese copy, the HQ-2). The Koreans later reached the goal of producing this system indigenously, calling it Pongae-1. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/Ir2eVLP.png

 

Some sources claim that the DPRK received 24 Luna, Luna-2 and Luna-M and an equal number of 2P16 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) but this number has never been confirmed with certainty, in fact, another source says that the DPRK received between 27 and 63 missiles, and 9 TELs, from the Soviet Union. Some also state that the DPRK acquired between 24 and 56 9M21 Luna-Ms between 1975 and 1976, together with 6 or 8 TELs from Egypt, but these deliveries have never been confirmed.

North Korean 3R9 Luna loaded on 2P16 chassis. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/Ewcyn7h.jpg

 

 

Nomenclature
Missiles NATO TEL Complex
3R9 Luna FROG-3 2P16 2K6
3R10 Luna-2 FROG-5 2K6
9M21 Luna-M FROG-7 9K52

The first copies of these missiles appeared in the following years, being renamed Hwasŏng.

The code Hwasŏng-1 being uncertain to which missile it refers to, but all sources seems to agree that it is the Korean designation of the indigenous production of the 2K6 Luna, while Hwasŏng-3 is the Korean designation of the indigenous production of the 9K52 Luna-M missiles.

A Soviet-produced 9P113 TEL equipped with 9M21 Luna-M in Korean service in a frame of a propaganda video. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/Df5XEFd.jpeg

The two missiles had a range of 45 and 65 km (28 and 40 miles), and carried a High-Explosive warhead of about 400 kg (881 lb). The Soviet models could be equipped with small nuclear warheads, but the Koreans, at that time, did not have miniaturized nuclear weapons, as the first tests on a nuclear reactor were only carried out in 1958. It is, however, very likely that the DPRK developed chemical warheads for such missiles.

Data on the missiles designated Hwasŏng-2 and Hwasŏng-4 are unknown, but they never reached mass production.

Some sources speculate that the designation Hwasŏng-2 was given to the Korean copy of the S-75 surface-to-air missile, a hypothesis rejected thanks to Korea itself, that calls the S-75 copy Pongae-1. The Hwasŏng-4 may have been given by the Koreans to the joint project of a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), between DPRK and People’s Republic of China, referred by the Chinese sources to Dōngfēng-61 (DF-61). This project was born at the end of the 1970s at the behest of Kim Il-sung himself, who in April 1975, traveled to Beijing where Oh Jin-u, North Korean defense minister, asked the People’s Republic of China to purchase their SRBM missiles.

The DF-61 program, born in late 1976 to develop a missile with a range of 600 km (372 miles) and possess a warhead of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb), had a very short life due to the fact that in 1978 its main Chinese supporter, Chen Xilian was limited in his powers and eventually purged for political reasons in 1980. The failure of the DF-61, however, was not a defeat for the DPRK technicians, as thanks to the exchange of knowledge with the Chinese, had greatly increased their knowledge of missile design. In these years, the DPRK gradually diminished their imports of anti-ship missile technology from China, in favor of indigenously produced equipment.

The Hwasŏng-5 – The First Korean SRBM

Due to the deterioration of relations with Moscow, and the unsuccessful joint project with China, the DPRK, as soon as the DF-61 project was closed, decided to turn to another country. A nation that possessed Soviet-made missiles and that, at the same time, was in debt to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: the Arab Republic of Egypt.

International relations between Korea and Egypt have always been very close from the mid 1950s. In early 1973, after political issues, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat expatriated all the Soviet advisors, pilots and instructors from its country. It was a bad idea, considering that the Arab nation was preparing to launch an attack on Israel, and its military was dependent on Soviet equipment. In March 1973, a delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea led by Kang Ryang-uk, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, visited Egypt, and the Egyptians asked for Korean technical assistance with their missile program.

In June 1973, 20 MiG-21 pilots and 19 ground crew members from the Korean People’s Air Force were sent to Egypt to train the Egyptian pilots. When the Yom Kippur War broke out on 6th October 1973, the DPRK’s pilots (joined by others that arrived later) supported Egyptian troops against the Israeli Defense Force.

This was only the last of a series of diplomatic and military trades between the Arab country and the small Asian country; and it was a good excuse to ask a favor to Egypt, with Kim Il-sung requesting Soviet-produced SRBMs from Egypt. Some sources claim that the missiles were received in 1976 while other claims they were received by Korea in 1981. Despite the discordant sources, Egyptian president Sadat agreed to sell to the DPRK SCUD-B missiles received from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s for use against Israel. It seems that the agreement was not signed until 1981.

A Soviet SRBM R-17E Elbrus during training in the Soviet Union. The Transporter Erector Launcher is a MAZ-543P. Source: topwar.ru https://i.imgur.com/ENUceGk.jpg

The Short-Range Ballistic Missiles received from Egypt were the R-17E ‘Elbrus’ (also known as 8K14E, or with the NATO name SS-1C SCUD-B). These were purchased together with a Soviet-made TEL, a MAZ-543P. A missile production factory, Factory 125 in P’yŏngyang, the Research and Development Institute in Sanum-dong, and the Musudan-ri Launch Facility were also set up in the DPRK at that time with the help of Soviet Union, which by the early 1980s changed had changed their policy about helping Korea in its missile program.

It should be noted, however, that a Korean defector claimed that in 1972, 20 SCUD-Bs were provided by the Soviet Union in exchange for the secret material found aboard the USS Pueblo in 1968, which was provided by the DPRK to the USSR. This claim however has never been confirmed, and in fact, in the 1970s and early 1980s, no SCUD-B tests were reported, and it is very likely that his information was a misidentification or totally false.

The R-17E had a slow process of reverse engineering which led DPRK engineers to develop a slightly modified domestic version, which was christened Hwasŏng-5, the first SRBM produced by DPRK. To finance the reverse engineering program, funds were allocated from Islamic Republic of Iran. Prime Minister Mir-Hosein Musavi and Defense Minister Colonel Mohammad Salimi in October 1983, signed an agreement with North Korea to finance the Korean program in exchange for receiving missiles when the program concluded.

The warheads of Hwasŏng-5 or -6 presented to Kim Jong-il. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/TWd63kC.jpeg

In 1984, the first Korean copies of the R-17E were produced and the first test launch took place in April of the same year with some others occurring for the rest of the year, with at least two failures. It seems that all the R-17E in Korean arsenals were dismantled and studied to copy their components, even if some statements hypothesize that some missiles tested in 1984 were R-17Es, and were launched to confuse the analysts on the real results of the missile program. Incredibly, the first official appearance of the Hwasŏng-5 was on 7th April 2007 and a year after one camouflaged Hwasŏng-5 was shown to a Myanmar delegation.

Camouflaged Hwasŏng-5 exposed in a DPRK’s underground missile facility to a Myanmar delegation in 2008. Source: The Armed Forces of North Korea https://i.imgur.com/YAalhbw.jpg

The first version, however, saw a very limited pilot production and was replaced by a new version of the Hwasŏng-5 in 1985, when the full scale production also started.

This version had a length of about 12 meters (39 feet), a diameter of about 0.8 meters (2.6 feet) and a range of 330-340 km or 205-211 miles (compared to 300 km -186 miles – of the R-17E) and a 1,000 kg warhead that could be standard High Explosive, Cluster, Chemical and probably even Biological. The Hwasŏng-5 was produced until 1989 when it was replaced by the Hwasŏng-6. The number of Hwasŏng-5s produced is unknown.

A Hwasŏng-5 night launch. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/q6V1Cxt.jpeg

The Hwasŏng-6 was developed on the basis of the Hwasŏng-5 starting in 1987, when Korean engineers began working on the missile guidance system to reduce the Circular Error Probable (CEP), the maximum distance the missile could miss the target.

According to North Korean sources, the CEP of the Hwasŏng-6 was decreased from several hundred meters of the Hwasŏng-5 to 50 meters (164 feet). The increased accuracy of the missile allowed the warhead to be decreased to 750 kg (1,653 lb), and increased to size of the rocket’s fuel tanks which brought the estimated total range to 500-700 km (310-434 miles).

Another image of night launch of a Hwasŏng-5. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/LUWdpnp.jpeg

The first test of the Hwasŏng-6 took place in 1988, immediately after which the assembly lines were modified, and mass production began in 1989. According to some Western estimates, in 1999, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was estimated to have produced 600 to 1,000 Hwasŏng-6, of which 300 to 500 had been exported, and 300 to 500 were in service with the Korean People’s Army Strategic Rocket Force, and 25 were used in tests.

The Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 enabled the DPRK to work on its missile program by providing a good deal of knowledge, and laying the foundation for the Korean People’s Army to become independent of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in the development of Ballistic Missiles.

1990s Development: New Leader, New Threats

The new decade brought a number of changes to the DPRK: first, though not the most important, the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed a few years later by the death of Kim Il-sung. On 8th July 1994 North Korea’s Great Leader Kim Il-sung died suddenly from a heart attack leaving his first-born son Kim Jong-il, the leader of the nation which, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, had been almost completely isolated. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the cessation of the supply of wheat and other edibles to Korea drastically decreasing the food supply in the country, which was also due to several crop damage recorded in the late 80s and early 90s. The famine occurred between 1994 to 1998 and is known in Korea as the Arduous March which caused an estimated number of 240,000 to 3,5 millions of deaths from starvation or hunger-related illnesses. Kim Jong-il instead of investing funds in agricultural growth to get out of famine, launched the Songun policy, a sort of “Military-First” policy aimed at improving North Korean military capabilities at the expense of the population.

The “Dear” Leader Kim Jong-il with its bodyguards at the P’yŏngyang International Airport await the Chinese president Yang Shangkun in April 1992. Source: cbsnews.com https://i.imgur.com/egAbEEW.jpg

This increased Western fears of Kim Jong-il, who was seen as an unscrupulous dictator and thus capable of starting a war against South Korea. South Korean and US analysts were already predicting that he was a much more dangerous character than his father because of a number of bombings against South Korea that had occurred in previous years, under his initiative. These included the Rangoon Bombing of 9th October 1983, an attempt to kill the South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan, and the Korean Air Flight 858 Bombing on 29th November 1987 to intimidate travelers to the South Korean Olympic Games.

The new decade did not bring only bad news to Korea, however. The destabilization of the Soviet Union in 1989 allowed Korea to bring some Soviet scientists closer to its cause on the pretext of lack of work, if the Cold War ended. In April 1991 Korean agents contacted Soviet solid-state physicist Anatoliy Rubtsov in Beijing during a meeting. They offered to Rubtsov to recruit Soviet physicists and scientists for them in the Soviet Union, in exchange for compensation from the North Korean embassy in Moscow. The proposal was attractive, and it was clear that the Soviet Union would not last long, and so Rubtsov accepted.

Dr. Rubtsov began recruiting Soviet strategic weapons specialists at the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau in Miass in February 1992. His offers to work in Korea were quite interesting, with monthly salaries ranging from $1,500 to $4,000 to work on North Korean missile and nuclear programs; however, the program included assistance to other unknown nations, likely Iran and Syria.

The total number of Russian scientists that were recruited by Dr. Rubtsov is unknown, some analysts quote the number to be about 60 scientists, but according to Russian and Western sources, at least 64 were blocked in Russian airports before their departure to Korea.

In January 1994, a Japanese newspaper claimed,quoting Russian reports, that the Russian missile specialists in DPRK were 17, including Dr. Rubtsov, plus another 9 nuclear scientists. Along with these scientists, there may have been many others since upon arrival in Korea, some not only received Korean citizenship but also changed their names.

In the late 1980s, the DPRK began development of a new missile that was essentially a scaled-up version of the earlier Hwasŏng-5 and 6: the Hwasŏng-7, also known by its unofficial Western nickname of Nodong-1 ,or Rodong-1 depends which type of translation is used.

The Hwasŏng-7 was first uncovered by the West in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri Test Launch Facility, when it was still under development and later tested 1992.

The first version of the Hwasŏng-7, with single conical nose and interesting camouflage loaded on its TEL, ready to be tested. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/tPhC2Qa.jpg

With a length of about 18 meters (59 feet), a diameter of 1.35 meters (4.1 feet), and a speed of mach 10 (12.348 km/h – 7,672 miles per hour). This new missile is a step forward compared to previous DPRK designs. There are two versions of the Hwasŏng-7: a version with a standard conical nose with a 1,000 kg warhead, and a range estimated at around 1,000 km (621 miles), and a version with a double conical nose that decreases the warhead to about 700 kg (1543 lb), but increases its range to an estimated maximum of 1,500 km (932 miles).

A big step forward for the DPRK, was that it could now threaten Japan with a missile capable of carrying a small atomic warhead.

The second version of the Hwasŏng-7, with double conical nose during a parade in Kim Il-sung Square in P’yŏngyang. Source: gladiusds.com https://i.imgur.com/bP2Q4Ah.jpg

Due to the restricted airspace of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, not many Hwasŏng-7 tests have ever been reported. However, we can take as an example the Islamic Republic of Iran which has purchased the Hwasŏng-7, and has produced several indigenous variants called Shahab-3 which, although possessing some differences with the original missiles. These have a range of 1,280 km (795 miles) for the 1,000 kg warhead version and 1,930 km (1,199 miles) with the lighter warhead. According to some estimates, the KPA-SF have about 300 Hwasŏng-7 but have fewer than 50 TELs to transport and launch them.

The Iranian copy of the Hwasŏng-7, the Shahab-3 during testing in Iran. Source: wikipedia.org https://i.imgur.com/1jBQ26b.jpg

Kim Jong-il did not slow down the missile development started by his father, and under his leadership was presented a new missile designed Hwasŏng-8 appears to be a modified Hwasŏng-6 variant with a 500 kg (1,102 lb) warhead and a length increased to 12.4 meters (40.6 feet) allowing the missile to reach a maximum range of 700 km (1,543 miles).

The Hwasŏng-8 missile before 2010. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/kxCK5aE.jpg

Despite the characteristics suitable to hit targets in South Korea, it seems that this missile has never been used by the KPA but only by Syria that tested it in September 2000. For unknown reasons, the Hwasŏng-8 reappeared in 2021, but it seems that the name was simply given to another missile based on the first stage of the Hwasŏng-14. The new Hwasŏng-8 is claimed to be the first North Korean Hypersonic Medium-Range Ballistic Missile with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), becoming a dangerous threat for South Korea because of its speed and ability to change trajectory, which results in greater difficulty of being intercepted by anti-ballistic missile.

New Hwasŏng-8 test launch occurred on 14th September 2021. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/sqMJEwu.jpg

The Hwasŏng-9 (US Department of Defence – DoD designation KN-04) first appeared in 1994, but remained relatively unknown in the west West until 2016. This is the last missile in the Hwasŏng series to have ties to the Soviet R-17E.

The diameter has increased to just over a meter while the length is about 12.8 meters (42 feet).

Four Hwasŏng-9 simultaneously launched by their TELs on March 6, 2017. Source: militarywatchmagazine.com

The structure appears to be made of an aluminum alloy, combining the Korean copy of the Isayev RD-21 engine with a 500 kg warhead that can be launched against a target about 1,000 km away, making it a Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). Unfortunately, estimates of how many Hwasŏng-9 missiles the Korean People’s Army – Air and Anti-Air Force (KPA-AF) has in service are unknown, some estimates refer to as few as 15 while others exaggerate that number to as many as 100.

 

Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un watching four successfully launched Hwasŏng-9 from a high quarter some kilometers away. Source: KCNA via twitter.com @KPA_bot

In 1999 the Korean People’s Army’s Ground Force Artillery Commands subordinate to the KPA-AF were reorganized into the new Korean People’s Army – Strategic Rocket Force (KPA-SRF).

The beginning of the new century – The Beginning of a New Missile Era for DPRK

First appearing in 2010, the first Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) to enter service was the Hwasŏng-10, which has received several unofficial nicknames including: Nodong-2, Taepodong-X, BM-25 and Musudan. In appearance the missile is really similar to the Soviet-designed R-27 ‘Zyb’ Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).

Soviet R-27 ‘Zyb’ exhibited at the Peresvet museum, Moscow Oblast. Source: Stanislav Kozlovskij https://i.imgur.com/X6EgXvq.jpg

Despite its late appearance, it is certain that its development began in the mid-1990s, and is thanks to the knowledge brought to the country by the Russian scientists led by Dr. Rubtsov, now member of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Science Academy.The first presentation to Kim Jong-il took place in 2004, but was kept secret. Also the absence of missile tests for such a long time made many believe that this missile was a fake created to confuse Western secret agencies. The missile can be equipped with a conventional warhead of about 1,000 kg or with a nuclear warhead with an estimated power between 80 and 200 kilotons.

A Hwasŏng-10 being launched by its TELs with protections to cover the wheels from the heat generated by the launch. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/vyjHEsT.jpg

Obviously, the missile received some modifications to better suit Korean requirements.

The TEL designated to carry this missile could carry 20 tons of cargo, while the R-27 weighed only 14 tons, and so it was decided to enlarge the missile, bringing it from 8.8 meters (28.8 feet), to about 11 meters (36 feet) in length, thus increasing the previous range of about 600 km (372 miles) to 2,400 km (1,491 miles). Another big difference seems to be the fuel supply of this missile, which appears to be a hypergolic mixture of Unsymmetrical DiMethylHydrazine (UDMH) as fuel and Nitrogen TetrOxide (NTO) as oxidizer.

As for the UDMH, it was a step forward since previous Korean missiles used a Soviet version of the Tonka German-designed rocket propellant, a mixture of Nitric Acid and Kerosene also known as TM-185. As for the Oxidizer, it is unknown which was used, the original R-27 used AK-27P Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) and was very similar to the one used on the R-17 Elbrus missiles. This would have led the DPRK to not have to modify its chemical plants to produce this oxidizer, but later this hypothesis was denied.

The DPRK used a new oxidizer on the upgraded version of the Soviet R-27U missile, namely N2O4 which gave the new version a range of 3,000 km (1,864 miles).

It is true that N2O4 is more refined and powerful, and would increase the range of the missile, but it is also more difficult to handle because it is more volatile and toxic than the already extremely dangerous AK-27P IRFNA and in fact is rarely used as oxidizer for ground ballistic missiles. NTO also has a narrow range of temperatures for the liquid form, forcing the user to periodically make environmental controls.

Despite these issues, Western analysts and technicians have stated that NTO is the best match for the flight path of the Hwasŏng-10 in the June 2016 ballistic test. Despite the switch to such an oxidizer, the missile has a range of “only” 3,000 km and is unable, for example, to reach new strategic targets such as the Island of Guam, and so while it is a big step in DPRK missile development, it does not amplify its offensive capabilities.

The Hwasŏng-10 during a parade. Interestingly the missiles are slightly elevated on their launch platforms. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/8wMOiut.jpg

According to Korean sources, a version of the missile was tested with solid fuel in 2016; it would be a Korean version of the Julang-1 SLBM. The use of solid fuel would increase the missile’s range to 3,500 km (2,174 miles). The Hwasŏng-10 was spotted rarely in parades and only a few test launch were made, this suggests that the Koreans had found serious problems during its testing and preferred to abandon the project when newer missiles were completed.

In the first decade of the new millennium, the DPRK continued to improve its missile program, such that after the Hwasŏng-10, the next ballistic missiles are powered by solid fuel. This has led to a substantial modification of chemical plants and fuel production, in fact, producing liquid fuels is cheaper, easier and less dangerous. This modification will certainly cost a lot to the DPRK, but it has brought a series of unprecedented innovations.

First of all, the solid fuels are more energy dense than liquid fuels guaranteeing to missile of the same size and weight to possess superior range than it were to it be using liquid fuel. They also do not need a lengthy fueling process before the launch, which makes the TEL and the missile very vulnerable to enemy attacks. Liquid fuels are more volatile and could cause catastrophic explosions in the event of an accident To avoid this, the missiles were fueled immediately before launch from specialized tanker trucks. In the case of short-range ballistic missiles, this operation can take a short time, less than an hour, but with medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, this operation can take much longer. This period of time when the TEL and the missile are stationary in the launch zone can be easily detected by enemy spy satellites, and South Korea or the United States may then decide to launch preemptive strikes to prevent its launch.

With solid-fueled missiles, the fueling phase is eliminated, dramatically decreasing the time to battery and launch the missile. At the same time, the missile does not need specialized vehicles in its vicinity, this reduces the logistics and total cost for Korea, and the risk of being intercepted by spy satellites.

The earliest example of a North Korean solid-fuel missile is the Hwasŏng-11 tactical ballistic missile ,US DoD designation KN-02, a copy of the Soviet 9K79M ‘Tochka’. Its unofficial western nickname is ‘Toksa’ (Eng: Viper). First appearing in 2004, and with still debated origins, some sources speculate that the Hwasŏng-11 may be reverse engineered from Soviet missiles purchased in the 1990s from Syria, while other sources do not exclude the possibility that the missiles were purchased from Russia itself, perhaps even with the signing of a contract for Russian development support in the late 1990s or early 2000s.

The debate becomes even more complex when considering that the South Korean Media reports the first test of the Hwasŏng-11, which was unsuccessfully tested in 2004, was based on a Soviet 9K79-1 ‘Tochka-U’ model missile that Syria did not yet possess at that time.

This claim by the South Korean media cannot be confirmed and most importantly, the missile externally is much more similar to the 9K79M rather than the 9K79-1.

The Hwasŏng-11 on parade in late 2000s. The missiles were slightly erected on their launch platforms to be visible to the folks, normally they were stored inside with truck tops closed. Source: militarywatchmagazine.com https://i.imgur.com/tzHsxYv.png

As Israeli military sources stated in 1989, Syria and the DPRK cooperated in developing Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs). Thanks to this agreement, Korean engineers were able to study other solid-fuel missiles, such as the 4K44 ‘Redut’, P-20 ‘Rubezh-A’, and also the Tupolev Tu-143 ‘Reys’ Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft with solid-fuel engines, whichSyria delivered in exchange for Korean help. In 1994, the missiles were exported to Korea which began reverse engineering them.

The Hwasŏng-11 is a small missile compared to the others of the Hwasŏng series. With 6.4 meters (21 feet) long and 0.65 meters (2.1 feet) in diameter, it has a shorter range than previous missiles, reaching about 220 km (136 miles) but it has a CEP reduced to less than 100 meters (328 feet). With a payload capacity of 485 kg (1,069 lb), quite exceptional for a 2 tons missile, its warhead can be a single HE, HE submunition, thermonuclear, chemical, and probably biological. This missile is considered by the KPA-SRF as an emergency missile, capable of being launched in a short time, and thanks to its dimensions, it is easily concealable. It must be launched as close as possible from the Demilitarized Zone without being spotted, due to its short range.

Despite its reduced dimensions, this missile is considered to be a great threat from Democratic Republic of Korea missile experts. Analysts have hypothesized, that given the nuclear weapons progress of the DPRK, it could be armed with a reduced nuclear warhead of 100 kilotons, therefore being able to hit Seoul from P’yŏngyang. The big problem is that such missiles, and their TELs, are very difficult to keep under observation due to their small size and can therefore, in case of conflict, be even more dangerous than the Hwasŏng behemoths that are easier to identify and keep an eye on. The reduced dimensions also translate in cheaper production and maintenance costs,even for the TELs, meaning that North Korea could increase its arsenal of Hwasŏng-11s and launch them in salvos against South Korea as first strike weapons to saturate anti-missile defenses before the arrival of more powerful ballistic missiles.

Its maximum speed is estimated to be around mach 5 (6.174 km/h – 3,836 miles per hour), being able to reach Seoul from P’yŏngyang in only one minute and forty seconds.

Its speed is not its biggest advantage, in fact, the missile has a trajectory similar to MRLs and is difficult to intercept and counter by South Korean missile countermeasures.

Despite some speculations, the first successful test took place in 2005 and mass production likely started the following year. According to some ROKA estimates, the KPA-SRF has 100 Hwasŏng-11 missiles in active service and 30 TELs to launch them. Also according to South Korean estimates, TEL commissioning operations are around 16 minutes with 2 minutes to launch the missile and another 20 minutes to reload the TEL increasing the threat along the southern half of the peninsula.

2010s – New Leader, New Program

In the decade that saw the death of the second member of the Kim dynasty, there were developments unexpected by a nation like Korea. Kim Jong-il died from a heart attack on 17th December 2011 leaving the country in the hands of his third son, Kim Jong-un.

The money gained by illicit activities of the DPRK, such as counterfeiting foreign currency, drug trade, and other traffic allowed the new leader, Kim Jong-un to invest billions in the development of new ICBMs.

North Korea new leader Kim Jong-un inspect a Hwasŏng-12 missile on its TEL shortly before the missile test in May 2014. Source: brookings.edu https://i.imgur.com/yzjEdQ0.jpg

North Korea new leader Kim Jong-un inspect a Hwasŏng-12 missile on its TEL shortly before the missile test in May 2014. Source: brookings.edu https://i.imgur.com/yzjEdQ0.jpg

Soviet UR-100K InterContinental Ballistic Missile. Source: b14643.de https://i.imgur.com/euFdOl1.jpg

Going in numerical order, the Hwasŏng-12 (US DoD designation KN-17) was first spotted on 2014, some sources suspect it is a Korean copy of the Soviet two-stage liquid fuel Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile UR-100.

The new Korean missile lies somewhere between an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile and an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and has a diameter of about 1.5 meters (4.92 feet), and a height of 16 meters (52.5 feet). The propulsion of the first stage is about 100 tons of thrust, provided by 4 auxiliary engines, and an engine of 85 tons of thrust. This being the Paekdusan-1B (or Baekdusan-1B depending which type of translation is used), the Korean name of which seems to be an engine derived from the Glushko RD-250, used on some Soviet ICBMs. Initially, it was not clear how the Koreans had the opportunity to study such an engine, at first it was assumed that they had the support of Russian or Ukrainian engineers after the fall of the Soviet Union, and maybe even some samples of the engine. It is more plausible that Korea came into possession of the official blueprints, stolen from the Yuzhonoye Design Office in Ukraine. In fact, in May 2012 two North Korean citizens were arrested in Ukraine on charges of stealing confidential documents from that office. Due to the possibility of this missile hitting Guam island, many western sources nicknamed it “The Guam Killer”.

Launching the Hwasŏng-12 near P’yŏngyang on 29th August 2017. Source: thediplomat.com https://i.imgur.com/585X6H3.jpg

It seems however that the Korean variant is equipped with only one nozzle instead of the two of the original model, suggesting that the Korean variant actually incorporates features of the RD-250 engine, and the copy of the Soviet 4D10 engine, used on the Hwasŏng-10.

It has an estimated range of 3,700 km (2,299 miles) with a 650 kg (1,433 lbs) warhead, 4,500 km (2,796 miles) with a 500 kg (1,102 lbs) warhead, up to a maximum of 6,000 km (3,728 miles) with a lower weight warhead (to be classified as an ICBM it must reach 5,500 km – 3,417 miles thus double identification). Korean sources have presented a nuclear warhead for such a missile that, according to western analysts, could have a power of 1 megaton.

Also a great introduction is the Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) used to change the trajectory of the warhead in flight when detached from the last stage of the missile. This, driven by a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), dramatically decreases CEP, and also makes the warhead more difficult for adversary radar detectors to intercept.

According to some estimates, the warhead has a speed, during descent, from 15 to 24 Mach (18,375 km/h – 11,509 mph to 29,400 km/h – 18,414 mph).The missile entered service and quickly replaced the Hwasŏng-10 which was plagued by 4D10s engine reliability issues.

Little is known about this missile’s service history apart from that, on 1st January 2023 the Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the Thaesong Machine Factory (also known as the Jamjin missile factory), located on the western edge of P’yŏngyang. In the images published by the Korean Propaganda Ministry, there are at least 26 Hwasŏng-12 awaiting for final assembly. This meant that the missile is in service and is currently in production.

Images released by DPRK’s Propaganda Ministry on 1st January 2023 showing the North Korean leader accompanied (in second photo) by his daughter Kim Ju-ae inspecting the production lines of Hwasŏng-12 missiles. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/buu8Wvh.jpg

https://i.imgur.com/17GLxwE.jpg Images released by DPRK’s Propaganda Ministry on 1st January 2023 showing the North Korean leader accompanied (in second photo) by his daughter Kim Ju-ae inspecting the production lines of Hwasŏng-12 missiles. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/buu8Wvh.jpg

In 2011, the People’s Republic of China supplied the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with 8, some sources mention 6, WS51200, super heavy duty trucks. Almost immediately, the UN accused China of militarily supporting the DPRK by violating international embargoes, but China argued that these vehicles were for timber harvesting.

In spite of this defense, the West looked with suspicion at this transaction, expecting something very big in the coming years in the Korean missile program.

The long-awaited moment for analysts came in April 2012, when at the Kim Il-sung 100th Birth Anniversary parade, the mockup of the Hwasŏng-13 (US DoD designation KN-08) three-stage liquid-fuel ICBM was first spotted in 2008.

The Hwasŏng-13 or NK-08 on parade in Kim Il-sung Square in April 2012. The TEL is a WS51200 super heavy duty truck converted by DPRK’s factories into a missile transporter. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/xM0inrm.jpeg

The Hwasŏng-13 or NK-08 on parade in Kim Il-sung Square in April 2012. The TEL is a WS51200 super heavy duty truck converted by DPRK’s factories into a missile transporter. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/xM0inrm.jpeg

In 2012, it was labeled as part of the disinformation campaign to misdirect Western analysts.

It was later discovered that in fact, the design of this massive three stage missile was slowed down by the problem of the engines being nothing more than two 4D10 engines produced under license and coupled together. In addition to the suspicion of Chinese trucks, the West expected a missile of this size after an engine test occurred at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in September 2016.

This system gave many problems as it did on the Hwasŏng-10. It seems that the Koreans have decided to set aside the twin 4D10s in favor of the derivative of the RD-250 engine that generates less power, and decreases the range, but gives less problems in terms of reliability. This missile in the Korean terminology has not changed its name, but has become for the US DoD designation KN-08 Mod. 2 or KN-14. According to estimates, the first model of Hwasŏng-13 with twin engine 4D10s would have a maximum range of 11,500 km (7,145 miles) while the second two stage model has a range of 10,000 km (6,213 miles), placing it under the category of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. These are the first Korean ICBMs, and the first Korean missiles capable of threatening the east coast of North America, thus being able to reach far inland cities, like Chicago and Toronto. According to analysts,the range was not wide enough to hit Washington DC with a nuclear warhead presented in March 2016, estimated at 500-700 kg (1,102 – 1,543 lbs) although specifications were never provided by the Koreans.

Kim Jong-un in front of some Hwasŏng-13 warheads in a Korean bunker. On the wall is the motto ‘Advocating and observing the line of Songun with weapons productivity’. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/jCIhJ43.jpeg

According to the estimates of Western analysts on the first model, the first stage of the missile (which is the same as the Hwasŏng-12) would have dimensions of 17 meters (55.7 feet), the second about 2 meters (6.56 feet) while the third would have a total size of 1.25 meters (4.10 feet) for a total height of about 20 meters (65.6 feet) while the second model with the RD-250 engine, with only two stages would be shorter reaching a total height of about 16 meters (52.5 feet).

Two-stages Hwasŏng-13s (KN-14) on parade on their new WS51200. Source: prokorea.ru https://i.imgur.com/LZyUnJS.jpg

The Hwasŏng-14 (US DoD designation KN-20) first shown in 2017, has a diameter of 1.7 meters (5.5 feet) and a length of about 19 meters (62.3 feet).With its two stages, it is capable of reaching a range of 10,000 km thus able to hit the east coast of the United States. This missile was developed mostly as a testbed to develop more powerful ICBMs that will later be seen in service with the KPA-SRF. Despite its purpose, it can be armed with a 750 kg nuclear warhead with a power of 1.44 megatons, the same warhead that was tested on 3rd September 2017 during the sixth Korean nuclear test.

The Hwasŏng-14 during the erection on its TE. Source: tg24.sky.it https://i.imgur.com/pXKDLjF.jpg

The two-stage Hwasŏng-15 (US DoD designation KN-22) was, up until 2020, the largest ICBM in the world, with a diameter of more than 2 meters (6.56 feet), and an overall length of about 24 meters (78 feet). It surpasses the Russian RS-24 and the Chinese DF-41 and is capable of carrying a warhead of 1,000 kg therefore, able to carry a warhead of 1.44 megatons as the Hwasŏng-14, or more likely Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV)and several decoys at a range of 13,000 km (8,077 miles), and at a maximum apogee of 4,500 km (2,796 miles).

Other hypotheses are that the missile can be equipped with Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that are nuclear (or biological) submunitions and guided by GNSS on to multiple targets. This would allow, for example, to hit more cities on the east coast of the United States, or the capitals of nations in Europe, capable of threatening the most prominent world powers.

The Hwasŏng-15 showed off to the Great Leader. Source: bbc.com https://i.imgur.com/kc6bmEJ.jpg

The first stage of the Hwasŏng-15 has a two-chambered main engine developed by the RD-250 powered by a turbopump to increase thrust at takeoff that missile experts and analysts say increases thrust by 170 percent over the Hwasŏng-14.

The second stage, it is assumed, will be powered by two smaller engines developed in DPRK. Some estimations speculate that the DPRK is in possession of about 40 Hwasŏng-15s thus capable of seriously endangering the many European nations and the United States.

2020s -The Best was not Enough for Kim Jong-un

For Kim Jong-un, the Hwasŏng-15 was not enough, and on 10th October 2020 for the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea parade, he presented to the world the Hwasŏng-17 (US DoD designation KN-27). Until 24th March 2022, this missile was known in Western nations with the name of Hwasŏng-16. This is because the real name was not revealed by the Koreans until the first launch test took place on that date. Previously, analysts, news outlets, and other enthusiasts fans had named it Hwasŏng-16 continuing the chronological numeration.

This two-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM with a length of 24 to 26 meters (78 to 85 feet) and a diameter of just under 3 meters (9.84 feet) is capable of launching a 2,000 to 3,500 kilogram warhead (2.2 ton to 3.3 ton) at a range, according to some experts, of 13,000 kilometers (8,077 miles).

The Hwasŏng-17 during elevation in the P’yŏngyang International Airport. 24th March 2022. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/Y2gKXum.jpg

Its warhead is supposed to be a series of MRVs or MIRVs, with decoys, representing a threat to nations with anti-ballistic missile programs,such as the United States. Some analysts surmised that such ICBM will retain the same range as the previous Hwasŏng-15, which is enough to hit almost any target on the globe. Its increased size allows it to carry warheads of greater weight, making it significantly more destructive than the previous missile.

Supposedly, the warhead could be: a single one-megaton one or several submunitions of several tens,or hundreds, of kilotons each. To give an idea of the destructive power of such devices, the US atomic bombs that hit Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a power between 15 and 30 kilotons each.In both cases the missile was probably equipped with some decoys to deceive the tracking systems for Anti-Ballistic Missiles.

Because of the missile’s huge diameter, it has also been speculated that the missile’s first stage (approximately 17.5 m – 57.4 feet in length) could accommodate four RD-250 engines, for a power output never before developed for a Korean ICBM. Quoting US and South Korean sources, the Hwasŏng-17 is powered by a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine.

While the Hwasŏng-17 seemed to be the apotheosis of North Korean missile power, during the parade for the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army on 8th February 2023, the new Hwasŏng-18 was presented to the crowds. The new three stage solid-fuel ICBM has an estimated length of 25 meters (82 feet) and an estimated payload of 1,5 tonnes, and an increased range of 15,000 km (9,320 miles).

The official presentation of the Hwasŏng-18 on 8th February 2023. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/zqWDeIS.jpg

The official presentation of the Hwasŏng-18 on 8th February 2023. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/zqWDeIS.jpg

The Hwasŏng-18 during launch test on 13th April 2023. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/jURIzuB.jpg

Last but Probably not Latest

On 2nd April 2024 the North Korean technicians tested a new missile of the Hwasŏng-16Na (‘Na’ meaning B in Hangŭl). The Hwasŏng-16Na is the second North Korean hypersonic missile with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle after the Hwasŏng-8 in 2021. The current information available on the weapon, as of publication, describes the Hwasŏng-16Na as a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a length estimated in 20-21 m and a diameter between 2.1 to 2.3 m. Probably to save up money and development, the two-stages of the Hwasŏng-16Na are the same ones of the Hwasŏng-18.

The Hwasŏng-16Na during test flight of 2nd April 2024. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/3j7umdM.jpeg

Obviously the presence of the ‘B’ in the name makes it plausible that there is another version of this missile but it is not yet confirmed or shown to mass media.

Brief Nomenclature
Name US DoD Designation Other Designations
Hwasŏng-1 FROG-3
Hwasŏng-3 FROG-5
Hwasŏng-4 DF-61
Hwasŏng-5 SS-1C SCUD-B
Hwasŏng-6 SS-1C SCUD-C
Hwasŏng-7 SS-1C SCUD-D Nodong-1

(Rodong-1)

Hwasŏng-9 KN-04 SCUD-ER

SCUD-D
Nodong-1M

(Rodong-1M)

Hwasŏng-10 Nodong-2
(Rodong-2)
Taepodong-X
Musudan
BM-25
Hwasŏng-11 KN-02 Toksa
Hwasŏng-12 KN-17 “The Guam Killer”
Hwasŏng-13 KN-08

KN-08 Mod. 2
KN-14

Hwasŏng-14 KN-20
Hwasŏng-15 KN-22
Hwasŏng-16Na
Hwasŏng-17 KN-28
Hwasŏng-18

DPRK’s TEL, MEL and TEs

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has had problems, since the beginning of the development of its missile program, in developing and producing Transporter Erector Launchers, the vehicles for transporting, lifting and launching missiles. The first available were 2P16 TELs on the PT-76 amphibious light tank chassis received from the Soviet Union, along with the 3R9 Luna, 3R10 Luna-2 and 9M21 Luna-M missiles.

A 2P16 TEL with an Hwasŏng-1 SRBM in a exercise filmed by the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee (KCBC). Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/skX337k.png

It does not appear, from sources, that Korea produced the TEL 2P16 under license, although they were producing the PT-76B amphibious tank under license ,according to Korean sources, since 1967 at the Sinhung Tank Plant.

A 9P113 TEL with a Hwasŏng-3 missile parading through Kim Il-sung Square in P’yŏngyang for the 80th Anniversary of the Kim Il-sung Birthday on 15th April 1992. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/mUN0AIR.jpg

Instead, it appears that the Koreans switched to wheeled vehicles such as the TEL 9P113, derived from the Soviet ZIL-135LM heavy duty truck with which they transported the Hwasŏng-1 and Hwasŏng-3, and FROG rockets supplied by the Soviet Union during the 1970s. In that period the DPRK also developed a TEL on a indigenous truck, the Sungri Number 2, a Korean copy of the Soviet KrAZ-255.

North Korean Sungri Number 2 launchers loaded with 2K6 Luna or Hwasŏng-1. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/3SFm367.jpg

As the KrAZ-255, the Sungri 2 was an heavy duty 10-ton 6×6 off-road truck with a 1,486 cm3 engine delivering 240 hp, enough to transport the missiles of the early Hwasŏng series.

This was the first missile carrier developed in North Korea and was for some decades, the only one.

In the following years, with the arrival of the new R-17E Elbrus from Egypt, also came an example of 9P117M1 TEL on the chassis of the Soviet heavy duty truck MAZ-543P. The Korean technicians of the Second Academy of Defense Sciences together with the Korean Workers’ Party Munitions Industry Department through its subordinate Second Economic Committee ( the developer of every other Korean carrier missile to date) tried in every way to copy it, but with poor results until 1984, when the Hwasŏng-5 entered service. Mass production at the Sungri General Automotive Factory, where Korean missile carriers are still produced today, was however very slow to start. To speed up adoption, North Korea bought some Japanese Nissan UD 8×8 or HINO 8×8 trucks from China or Soviet MAZ which were then modified by the Koreans into TELs.

In other cases, vehicles will be produced in Korea but with foreign sourced parts such as Isuzu engines. To fulfill a 1985 Iranian order for a hundred missiles and 12 TELs, both 9P117M1 and modified Nissan UDs were supplied until 1987.

Nissan UD 8×8 TEL with a Hwasŏng-5 missile in Iranian service. Source: The Armored Forces of North Korea https://i.imgur.com/6hVrnWE.jpg

The original MAZ-543P, on which the 9P117 and 9P117M1 TELs were based, according to western sources, were shipped in kits and assembled in Korea.The MAZ-543 was developed by the Belarusian Minsk Prime Mover Plant, weighed 23 tons, and was 11.65 meters (38.2 feet) long, with a fully loaded top speed of about 60 km/h (37 mph) thanks to its 520 hp D12 diesel engine.

North Korean MAZ-543P TELs with Hwasŏng-5 missiles in Kim Il-sung Square in P’yŏngyang. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/qt18trT.jpg

Being based on the R-17 SCUD, also the Hwasŏng-9 was transported and launched by a slightly modified MAZ-543P.

A MAZ-543P TEL ready to launch a Hwasŏng-9 during live training. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/1d26isO.jpg

With the presentation of the Hwasŏng-7, a considerably larger weapon than the previous Hwasŏng-5 and -6 missiles, a new version of the 9P117 was introduced. It was modified in Korea and has no official name.

Such a TEL has a fifth axle of rear wheels, lengthening the size of the MAZ-543P by about two meters, from the original 11.65 meters to about 14 meters (46 feet). It does not seem that the last axle is connected to the transmission, transforming the vehicle into an 8×10, and probably decreasing the top speed. It is also noticeable the modification of the erection mechanism, that due to the lengthening of the chassis, has been moved back. These types of modifications allowed North Korean automotive technicians to gain experience in developing and producing heavy trucks, which proved extremely useful in the next decades.

The 10×8 version of the MAZ-543P TEL loaded with second variant of the Hwasŏng-7. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/nwpbOrn.jpg

For the Hwasŏng-10, the TEL used is a Korean variant of the MAZ-547W 12×12 with a launching cab in the center of the chassis, and a modified cockpit with a new top position on the right side of the vehicle. Such modifications, together with the fact that transportation from Belarus, where they are produced, would be impossible without being spotted by Western analysts and satellites, suggests that the DPRK has received them dismantled. The Korean workers had then assembled and modified them independently.

The Hwasŏng-10’s TEL on parade in Kim Il-sung on modified MAZ-547W. Source: edition.cnn.com https://i.imgur.com/G4W9VK9.jpg

After initial testing of the Hwasŏng-10, the Koreans realized that on takeoff, the force and heat generated by the missile damaged the TELs, so steel covers were added to the wheels to prevent extensive damage. These modifications were carried over to only a few TELs while most likely keeping some unchanged for parades, in fact, such vehicles without covers have a more massive and characteristic appearance than the true TELs.

Kim Jong-un salute the crew a Hwasŏng-10 on its MAZ-547W with protection sheets on the wheels after a successful launch. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/lY5ZL3c.jpg

For the Hwasŏng-11, the MAZ-6303 series trucks were used. According to some sources, the vehicles were the MAZ-630308-224 6×6 or MAZ-630308-243 6×4 model produced in Belarus and derived as civilian models later modified in TELs by the North Korean. This showed once again that the DPRK had problems in producing even small TELs in the mid-2000s.

Hwasŏng-11 tactical ballistic missile transported by MAZ-630308s during a parade in P’yŏngyang. Source: missiledefenseadvocacy.org https://i.imgur.com/YY1koH4.jpg

These trucks have however a great advantage, thanks to the smaller dimensions of the Hwasong-11. The missile is kept inside the launcher bay, which opens at the top to erect the launcher rail and the missile along with it. This makes storage and transport safer, and makes the vehicle much more difficult to distinguish from standard transport trucks using spy satellites.

While most of the characteristics of the vehicle remain similar or identical to those of the Belarusian model, the TEL of the Hwasong-11 has a weight of about 14 tons, a 330 hp engine, and a top speed of about 80 km/h (49.7 mph) when fully loaded.

Also used for the Hwasŏng-12, were the same versions of MAZ-547W used for the Hwasŏng-10. This suggest that the Belarusian MAZ trucks were largely sent to the DPRK in the early 2010s to guarantee an adequate number of TELs for the Hwasŏng-12 that is still produced today. It’s also possible that the Koreans slowly started to produce their own copy of this heavy duty truck, probably with the help of Belarusian or Russian technicians.

The Hwasŏng-12 on parade. Its TEL had covers on the wheels to protect them from the heat generated during launch as on the Hwasŏng-10. Source: military-today.com https://i.imgur.com/u9QLxcA.jpg

New WS51200s heavy duty trucks were used for the Hwasŏng-13 and -14. These trucks were supplied by the Chinese and had, in order to circumvent international embargoes on the sale of weapons and military material, the fictitious purpose of transporting wood and were delivered with a red coloration typical of civilian vehicles produced by Wanshan Special Vehicle.

Wanshan WS51200 in its standard red livery. Source: Wanshan Sale Brochure https://i.imgur.com/RJHI9HY.jpg

Subsequently, the KPA has modified these vehicles for the transport of missiles with a hydraulic ramp that rises at 90°. The power developed by the missile’s engines during take-off would destroy or damage a common TEL so the Koreans had to develop an alternative solution, developing it into a Transporter Erector (TE), a vehicle that transports and lifts the missile but is not able to launch it. This would mean that the missile would have to be launched only in certain positions easily detectable by western satellites. This is why the majority of North Korean missiles, from Hwasŏng-13 onwards, have a launching pad that allows the crews a margin of maneuver on where to launch the missile, and are able to launch the missiles on unprepared terrain, and not from fixed launching positions.

The pads used to elevate the missiles and block them in elevated positions. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/WiXbjaS.jpg

The pad is erected together with the missile by the TE erection system, which then moves away. Once the commissioning operations are completed, the missile is then launched.

Another positive side of TEs is that in case of an enemy attack on the launch site, the missile carrier is not involved in the launch, improving its chance to remain unharmed, and to be used in other launches.

The WS51200 is a heavy duty truck produced by Wanshan Special Vehicle of Wanshan in China based on trucks developed by MAZ and MZKT such as the MAZ-7912 and MZKT-79221. This 20-meter-long 8-axle truck weighs 42 tons and is capable of carrying up to a maximum of about 45-50 tons of cargo.

It is equipped with Cummins Diesel KTTA19-C700, a 6-cylinder in-line engine with an output of 700 hp at 2,100 rpm 19,000 cm³. It is equipped with a direct injection pump, with a weight of 2,073 kg (4,570 lbs), and a fuel tank that can hold approximately 800 liters. At full load, its consumption is estimated at 300 liters per 100 kilometers, more or less like a MZKT-79221. Although some sources claim that this vehicle, thanks to the Cummins engine, has a range of 1,000 kilometers without specifying whether full load or not.

The power of the engine allows this juggernaut to travel at a maximum speed of 60 km/h when unloaded. Of the eight axles, the first three are steerable, the last three are counter steerable, and all six are traction, allowing the vehicle a reduced turning radius.

One of Kim Jong-il’s last public appearances before his death on 17th December 2011. Clearly visible behind him is a WS51200 still in civilian livery equipped with the Hwasong-13 missile mockup. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/ukvcWpc.jpg

For the massive Hwasŏng-15, at least four WS51200s have been modified in Korea by removing the hydraulic missile lift system, the instrument panel, and cockpit and replacing them with new models. More importantly, a ninth wheel axle was added between the sixth and seventh front wheel axles, making it the largest ICBMs transport vehicle in the world, as well as the only TE ever made with 9 axles. Although the traction was changed from 16×12 to 18×12 it seems that the original engine remained unchanged, thus decreasing the TE’s top speed.

The modified WS51200 TE for the Hwasŏng-15. Source: bulgarianmilitary.com https://i.imgur.com/GZ15PEh.jpg

It can be assumed that perhaps more WS51200s were supplied from China, or that Korea started to produce them under license. Analysts, after seeing the modification to the Chinese heavy duty truck, assumed that in the future Korea would also eventually display independently produced heavy duty TEs, and so it happened in 2020.

An 11-axle Transporter Erector appeared for the Hwasŏng-17, a unique vehicle capable of carrying the missile with estimated weight between 80 and 150 tons. It is as of publication, the largest TEL in the world.

The 11-axles TEL of the behemoth Hwasŏng-17 during the parade on 10th October 2020. Source: frontierindia.com https://i.imgur.com/ufR6BUF.jpg

Given the remarkable strides made by the Korean industry, it is likely that this new heavy duty truck will be manufactured in Korea. This is confirmed in more recent years by the appearance of the new TEL for the Hwasŏng-18, a 9 axle truck that seems to be assembled in North Korea. The Hwasŏng-16Na TEL had similar characteristics to the Hwasŏng-18’s one but is shorter, with just 7 axles instead of 9. It also had a curious shaped cover for the Hypersonic glide vehicle fixed on the TEL’s cab. Both models seem derived from Chinese trucks but produced in North Korea. As satellite images suggest, at the Kusong Tank Production plants in the past years , new facilities were created to assemble these heavy trucks.

Kim Jong-un and his daughter reaching the observation point before the Hwasŏng-18 launch test. In the background, the new North Korean-produced TEL with a protective tube. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/vGiVYoL.jpg
Kim Jong-un reaching a safe area from which supervise the Hwasŏng-16Na launch test on 2nd April 2024. As clearly visible, the launching area is the same of the previous Hwasŏng-18 test. Note the curious shaped cover for the HGV warhead. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/Vdq7Thg.jpeg

The number of TELs available to North Korea has roughly doubled in recent years, but that’s not the end of the story. The DPRK is currently decommissioning its “Soviet” TEL models, their heavy duty trucks with eight or more axles. These are heavy, and hard to produce and maintain in service. The Kim’s nation now has its attention on the MEL (Mobile Erector Launcher) models, a prime mover that pulls a trailer or a semitrailer on which the missile is mounted. These models, much more similar to the Chinese Dōngfēng carrier series than to the Soviet/Russian ones, entered service only in recent years.

 

Two examples of MELs in service with the Korean People’s Army. The first ones showing off an unknown type of missiles known as ICBM-1 and the second is loaded with a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile. In the last case, the vehicle is used only to show the missile in a parade. Sources: pinterest.com and Alamy.com https://i.imgur.com/qvEaWeT.jpg & https://i.imgur.com/JiIwQ3s.jpg

In the last period, a TEL very similar to the Chinese DF-31, has been seen with a 6×4 prime mover and a 3-axle semi-trailer. It has been speculated that the prime mover used by the Korean People’s Army Strategic Rocket Force is a licensed copy, or a Korean modification of the Chinese HOWO T7H civilian prime mover. If the Korean version has similar characteristics to the Chinese one, the engine will be a copy of the MAN MC11 6-cylinder in-line diesel engine, 440 hp, 10,518 cm³ with a manual gearbox with 16 gears and a fuel tank capacity of 600 liters. Tire size 315/80R22.5, a net weight of 9,500 kg (20,944 lbs) and a maximum load of 55,000 kg (60.62 tons).A South Korean source says that this vehicle is a TIR version of the 6×6 Taebaeksan-96 licensed copy of the 6×6 KamAZ-55111 truck. This TIR is said to be a joint civilian truck project developed between Russia and Korea, and after producing a few examples with Russia, Korea exported them back home and converted them into MELs without informing the Russians.

These MELs are easier to produce, easier to maintain, are easier to conceal, and are cheaper, necessary for an industry like Korea that, until the late 2010s, had difficulty producing heavy duty missile carriers on its own. Some were used in multiple parades to show Kim Jong-un and the Korean population Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and therefore not launchable from TELs or MELs, such as the Pukguksong. Others were equipped with canisters of about 2 meters in diameter, and therefore are unable to carry the latest ICBMs of the Hwasŏng series, while others have been seen carrying Hwasŏng-14, and not being able to launch them. It is assumed that they are not used by the KPA only as parade vehicles, but can also act as “ammunition carriers” following the TEs,reloading them after the first launch.

Another example of missile carriers used by the DPRK are tracked TELs on tank chassis which, although it seems anachronistic, the DPRK has less difficulty in producing instead of standard wheeled TELs. The advantages of the TELs on tank chassis are, first of all, the ease of production compared to the production of TELs of Belarusian or Chinese origin, and allow for the possibility to cross rougher terrain that wheeled vehicles cannot overcome, thus increasing the number of launch sites and making it more difficult for spy satellites to identify all the favorable positions.

Tracked TELs for Pukguksong-2 or KN-15, it is not of the Hwasŏng missiles family. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/K6v4VHt.jpeg

The disadvantages with respect to wheeled TELs are that the increased vibrations of a tracked chassis, that could damage the sensitive electronics of Korean missiles, and the creation of a new tracked vehicle production line that could slow down the already slow Ch’ŏnma and Songun-915 production lines.

These TELs are a good idea if they are converted from old disused tank hulls, as the Soviet Union did in the 1960s by converting the now obsolete IS-2 Mod. 1944 into renamed 2P19 TELs that mounted R-17 Elbrus missiles, and became the 8U218 missile complex.

 

The experienced crews of these TELs and TEs are considered invaluable by the KPA and prior to each test launch they are removed to a safe distance along with their vehicles to avoid losing them in accidents. Training such crews requires time and obviously a very high cost and it is not easy for Korea to replace them or their carriers in case of an accident, even now that Korea has reached a certain autonomy in the production of missile carriers.

Export

Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is often referred to as the “Hermit Kingdom” by the Western media, Korea has more exports than can be expected, in 1985 it signed a contract with Iran for the purchase of an unspecified number of Hwasŏng-5 ranging (according to western sources) from a minimum of 90 to a maximum of 100, and 12 TELs for a total of 500 million USD. Part of the deal was also to help Iran develop its own production line for the autonomous production of SRBMs. The first missiles arrived in Iran in 1985, beginning a reverse engineering program that led the Iranians to produce their first copy of the Hwasŏng-5, the Shahab-1 in 1987. By the same year, all missiles and TELs ordered by Iran had been delivered.

Iranian Shahab-1 on its particularly camouflaged TEL near a camouflaged civilian SUV. Source: oryxblog.com https://i.imgur.com/oT4IBVD.jpeg

Two years later, in 1989, the United Arab Emirates purchased a number of Hwasŏng-5 and some MLRS but due to “unsatisfactory quality” according to some sources or, due to US pressure according to other sources, decommissioned them very quickly.

A Hwasŏng-5 on a MAN KAT-1 TEL in service with the United Arab Emirates army. Source: oryxspioenkop.com https://i.imgur.com/4aGq0bh.jpg

In 2008, Myanmar and the DPRK signed a contract for a missile technology transfer so that Myanmar could also develop its own missile program. According to some analysts, and the People’s Republic of China, the DPRK delivered the Hwasŏng-5 to Myanmar to familiarize themselves with the operation of the missiles. The North Korean-Myanmar relationship was confirmed by the weapon’s arrival in Myanmar’s harbors, with the merchant ships being loaded not only with missiles, but also small arms and artillery rockets.

The Hwasŏng-6 was exported to Iran in the latter half of the 1980s, before being studied and then produced under license under the name of Shahab-2 from 1990 onwards.

In January 1993, General Mohsen Rezaee Commander of Iranian Revolution Guard Corps went to P’yŏngyang to sign a 2.7 billion dollars contract purchasing 300 Korean SRBMs for Iranian oil.

The Shahab-2 SRBM on a one-axle trailer used only to transport it. Source: missilethreat.csis.org https://i.imgur.com/qM6Jc81.png

A few Hwasŏng-6 were sent to Syria to be studied and produced under license with the support of the People’s Republic of China. In 1996, some Syrian technicians went to Korea for 2 weeks to study missile development techniques directly from Korean technicians.

Some missiles have been supplied to Yemen since the 1990s. In 2002, the North Korean merchant ship ‘So San’ was boarded in the Arabian Sea, after being detained by Spanish and US warships. In the cargo bay, covered by bags of concrete, there were 15 Hwasŏng-5 or 6 SRBMs. However the US did not have the authority to seize the cargo and the ship docked in Yemen. This was not the only North Korean merchant ship who arrived in Yemen, and in the years to follow, some unconfirmed sources claimed a total number of 45 North Korean Hwasŏngs arrived in Yemen.

The So San merchant ship was seized by Spanish and US forces in 2002. Source: pinterest.com https://i.imgur.com/OzqNfbt.jpeg

 

In 2009, some Hwasŏng-6 were supplied to Myanmar for the development of its own variant but nothing is known about this deal. According to SIPRI, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam purchased a total of 25 Hwasŏng-6 in 1997. An unsurprising development as Vietnam has a limited missile arsenal, and is unable to produce them. Unfortunately, no other news about their service is available. To date, the only Vietnamese unit using ballistic missiles is the 490th Missile Brigade, which had in service not only the Hwasŏng-6, but also the Soviet R-17 Elbrus variants known in west as SCUD-B and SCUD-C, fielding an unknown number of examples. For what is currently known, Vietnam is only equipped with conventional high-explosive warheads, and as Army Recognition and Defence Leaders reports, in 2023, Vietnam started upgrading its SCUD fleet with “foreign partners” to reduce the missile’s original CEP.

Members of the 490th Missile Brigade with a Soviet SCUD or Hwasŏng-6 during a SCUD missile positioning training. Source: twitter.com @AnnQuann https://i.imgur.com/nGStA1F.jpg

In 1999, according to US intelligence, Pakistan signed a contract with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the development of a MRBM.Beginning in 1993, some North Korean scientists and engineers arrived in Pakistan and began working with the Pakistani Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) to aid in the development of a new MRBM. The work proceeded expeditiously, though against strong international pressure for the Pakistanis to give up Korean aid.

The Pakistani Ghauri-I missile with the crew lined up. Source: defencetalk.com https://i.imgur.com/GYn3EKh.jpeg

In April 1998, the first launch of the missile was made 120 km from Islamabad. The Ghauri reached 350 km of apogee but during the re-entry, the conical nose of the missile melted due to the heat and the test failed. The new Pakistani administration, under international pressure, exploited the failure of the test, kicking North Korean missile engineers out of the country and ordering the KRL to continue development.

By 2003, the tests were completed and the missile, with the name Ghauri-I, officially entered service with the Pakistan Army. The Ghauri-I had a maximum range of 1,500 km, a payload of 750 kg of conventional explosive or nuclear warhead and a total weight of 15.8 tonnes. It is estimated that Pakistan has 30 Ghauri-I missiles in service and the tests of the newer all-Pakistani variant occurred in 2004, 2010, 2012 and 2015. The Circular Error Probable (CEP) is estimated at 190 meters. Now, the Ghauri-I is substituted in first strike units from its upgraded versions: the Ghauri-II and Ghauri-III.

The Ghauri-I on a semi-trailer used to present it to the public in a parade in Islamabad in the early 2000s. Source: X.com https://i.imgur.com/3YVgh57.jpeg

In the 1990s, Iran also began to develop its own version of the missile nicknamed Shahab-3, which was tested from 1998, and entered service in 2003. There are four different versions of this missile, the first one is not very different from the original Korean version, while the last one has a range of 2,000 km (1,242 miles) and a warhead composed of 5 submunitions of 280 kg each (617 lbs).

The Shahab-3 missile towed by an Iranian developed MEL. Source: fdd.org https://i.imgur.com/AOsJCzQ.jpeg

Egypt and Libya have also had or have in service a number of Hwasŏng-7. Of the Egyptian missiles not much is known, while the Libyan ones were dismantled in 2003 when dictator Mu’ammar Gaddafi agreed to the disarmament of most of the weapons of mass destruction in his country. Some analysts were skeptical of the complete destruction of this arsenal but, there is no evidence of Hwasŏng-7 launches during the Libyan Civil War or subsequent fighting between Libyan militias, therefore, we can assume that Libyan Hwasŏng were all destroyed by 2004.

Not a single Hwasŏng-9 has been exported beyond the Korean borders, while the last missile known to have been exported is the Hwasŏng-10.Some sources and rumors have claimed that the Hwasŏng-10 has been sold to Iran. It is correct to say that such a missile has been proposed for export, in fact in the report of a Myanmar delegation that visited several military facilities and factories in the DPRK in 2008, made a reference to a SCUD-F with a range of 3,000 kilometers. This more or less confirms the maximum range of the Hwasŏng-10, and also that such a missile has been proposed for export.

In 2010, it seems that Iran has purchased 19 Hwasŏng-10 missiles according to a leaked classified report from the US State Department, even if the number has never been confirmed, and at first it was thought that this information was false since Iran did not show anything similar until 2017. In January, an MRBM with similar characteristics to the Korean missile nicknamed by the Iranians Khorramshahr, from the name of an Iranian city, was tested. According to some analysts this missile is the direct descendant of the Hwasong-10.

The Iranian Khorramshahr Medium Range Ballistic Missile showed in an Iranian parade in Theran loaded on a MEL with IVECO prime mover. Source: wikipedia.com https://i.imgur.com/r7fkaa8.jpeg

In the 2000s, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq bought parts of Korean missiles in order to integrate them into their missile development. A 9 million USD contract was purchased for parts such as guidance and control systems, inertial navigation systems, on-board computers, gyroscopes, and accelerometers that were probably used on the Al-Fat’h and Al-Samud missiles. The parts were taken by ship to Syria and from there were delivered to the Iraqis. It does not appear that any Korean parts were found in any of the Iraqi missile facilities by the US in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, so either they never arrived in Iraq or the Iraqis had already integrated them.

Al-Samud SRBM of the Iraqi Army. Source: b14643.de https://i.imgur.com/hF8nkc7.jpeg

Brief Korean Hwasŏng Tests

The first documented North Korean missile test occurred in 1984 when the Hwasŏng-5 was successfully tested while a few years later the Hwasŏng-6 was tested.

In 1990 the Hwasŏng-7 was tested for the first time, resulting in a successful launch test. On 29th-30th May 1993, another missile test of the Hwasŏng-7 was conducted and launched from the Hwadae missile base near Wonsan in the Sea of Japan to demonstrate it to the Iranian delegation that had come to Korea.

In 1994 Kim Il-sung, father of the nation, died. Under his government, in 9 years a total of 15 missile tests were made, of which only the one in 1993 created international problems.

Since 1994 and under Kim Jong-il, there have been 16 missile tests, in 2005 some SRBMs of the Hwasŏng series were launched in the Sea of Japan causing alarm among Western analysts.

Between the 2nd and 4th of July 2009, a total of 9 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles and two Hwasŏng-7 were launched into the Sea of Japan in violation of a UN Security Council resolution. The incident created minimal international tension with the Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China condemning such provocative testing.

With the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, there has been an increase in terms of Korean missile tests, in fact, from 1984 to 2011 31 missile tests were carried out against 119 tests carried out by Kim Jong-un, third of the Kim dynasty from 2011 until 2022. (in this number are counted also tests of missiles not belonging to the Hwasŏng series)

Between 18th and 20th May 2013, a couple of weeks after the issuance of the sentence to the US student Kenneth Bae arrested months earlier, Korea began another provocation by launching a total of six Hwasŏng-11 in the Sea of Japan.

On 27th February 2014, five Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were launched from Kittaeryong Missile Base in protest of joint exercises between the US Army and the Republic Of Korea Army. On 3rd March of the same year, two SRBMs were launched from Wonsan Kalma International Airport likely to test the ability to launch missiles from airstrips.

On 26th March 2014, in conjunction with an International meeting in Netherlands to discuss the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear threat, as a show of force the DPRK launched 2 Hwasŏng-7s. These missiles flew about 500 km (310 miles) into the Sea of Japan.

From 26th-29th June 2014, North Korea launched three SRBMs into the Sea of Japan landing them near the sea border with South Korea. Between 2nd and 13th July of the same year, South Korea and Japan accused the DPRK of launching six SRBMs in three separate dual launches and then crashing them into the Sea. The missiles were launched from Kaesong and Hwangju.

On 14th August 2014 a Hwasŏng-11 was launched from Wonsan while Pope Francis was visiting South Korea. In September, another Hwasŏng-11 was launched from Wonsan.

On 8th February 2015, five Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were launched into the Sea of Japan; they flew less than 200 km (124 miles) before crashing into the sea.

On March 2, SRBMs were launched into the sea as a protest to a large joint military exercise between Republic Of Korea Army and US Army. On the 5th of April, SRBMs were launched from the West Coast into the Yellow Sea; the missiles flew about 100 km (62 miles).

In 2016, several missile tests were reported, the first one was on February 7, when both South Korea and Japan detected a missile of unknown model, probably a Hwasŏng-9 from the Dongchang-ri launch site, neither South Korea nor Japan released more details.

On March 10 the DPRK launched two Short-Range Ballistic Missiles which flew about 350 km (217 miles) and crashed into the sea. On 18th March 2016 two Hwasŏng-7 were launched traveling about 600 km (372 miles) before crashing.

On 15th April 2016 the Hwasŏng-10 was tested for the first time but the test was a failure.

On 18th April and 31st May there were tests of 3 more Hwasŏng-10 without success.

On 22nd June 2016 there was the first successful missile test of the Hwasŏng-10, the missile reached an altitude of over 700 km (434 miles) and then fell into the sea.

On 18th July 2016, two SRBMs (probably Hwasŏng-6) and one Hwasŏng-7 were launched into the Sea of Japan.

On 2nd August 2016, 2 Hwasŏng-7 were launched of which one flew 1,000 km (621 miles) and ended up in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Japan. In September, a few SRBMs were launched to coincide with the end of the G20 that year.

In October 2 more Hwasŏng-10 tests failed.

In March 2017, four Hwasŏng-6 modified to have increased range, were tested by launching them towards Japan crashing 250 km (155 miles) off the Japanese coast.

On 22th March Hwasŏng-10 was tested again, the test failed.

On 5th April 2017 a Hwasŏng-12 was tested which, launched from Simpo Base flew about 50 km (31 miles) before crashing into the ocean.

On 16th April another Hwasŏng-12 was tested from Simpo Base, the launch failed on takeoff.

On 29th April, another Hwasŏng-12 missile exploded during a test.

On 15th May 2017, another Hwasŏng-12 was tested, this time successfully, the missile flew nearly 500 km (310 miles) crashing into the Sea of Japan.

On 29th May, an SRBM was launched.

On 4th June the Hwasŏng-14, the first North Korean ICBM tested, was successfully tested, another test on 28th 2017 June was again a success, flying the missile for 45 minutes.

In August other tests were done, the first one on 25th August where three SRBMs were launched and the second one on the 28th when a missile, probably Hwasŏng-12 flew 2,000 km (1,242 miles) over Japan at 400 km (248 miles) altitude. Always in 2017 a missile Hwasong-15 flew for 53 minutes at an altitude of about 4,475 km (2,780 miles) and with a range of 950 km (590 miles).

In 2018, there was a pause in missile launches given the rapprochement of international relations between South Korea, DPRK, and the United States with the Summit between the US President Donald J. Trump and Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore on 12th June 2018.

Kim Jong-un and Donald J. Trump shaking hands during the 12th June 2018 Singapore summit. Source: Shealah Craighead https://i.imgur.com/Lo4M42x.jpeg

Due to the failure of the second summit between the two on 28th February 2019 in Hanoi, Vietnam, missile testing resumed.

On 4th May 2019 some Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were tested, ending up in the Sea of Japan.

In the following months more missiles were tested, dozens of KN-23 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles, and a Pukguksong-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile in October.

In 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic testing was less sparse within testing of a few SRBMs in March.

On 21st March 2021 another test of two missiles, probably Hwasŏng-11 was successfully completed.

On 24th March 2022, when nearly all the western media outlets were focused on the Russo-Ukrainian war, tests of the new Hwasŏng-17 were carried out at the presence of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un.In this test, the Hwasŏng-17 was launched by its TE from the P’yŏngyang International Airport, where it flew for 67.5 minutes at a distance of 1,090 km (677 miles) and at a maximum altitude of 6,248.5 km (3,882 miles) and accurately hit a target in the sea, near Aomori, Japan, as reported by North Korean Central National Television. This information was confirmed by Japan and South Korea’s analysts, which note that this is the longest North Korean launch ever, even more than North Korea’s last ICBM test in 2017.

The Hwasŏng-17 during erection on the 24th March 2022 on one of the P’yŏngyang International Airport’s auxiliary airstrips. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/knABqw6.jpeg

The Hwasŏng-17 during erection on the 24th March 2022 on one of the P’yŏngyang International Airport’s auxiliary airstrips. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/knABqw6.jpeg

On 26th November 2023, after a complex period for the Democratic People Republic of Korea, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un participated to view an Hwasŏng-17 launch. On this occasion, he also presented to the North Korean population and to the world his young daughter, Kim Ju-ae.

The North Korean Central National Television claimed that in the test, the Hwasŏng-17 had flown for 999,2 km (620 miles) with an apogee of over 6,000 km and for a flight time of 68 minutes.

On 2nd April 2024 the Hwasŏng-16Na was first flight tested. According to North Korean sources it flew for 1,000 km in 10 minutes (6,000 km/h) whileaccording to South Korean sources the maximum distance was 600 km. Japanese reported an altitude of 650 km beingreached, and confirmed a maximum apogee reached of 101 km. After reaching the maximum apogee, the glide vehicle flew to a height of 72.3 km, the first to land in the Japanese Sea (this was also confirmed by Japanese sources).

The Hwasŏng-16Na being erected on 2nd April 2024. In the foreground Kim Jong-un and General Jang Chang-ha, head of the Missile General Bureau. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/EhSG14q.jpeg

The total number of tests in this list are only tests of Hwasŏng series missiles.

From 1984 to 2021, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted 151 missile tests including Hwasŏng series missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, space launches, and other land-based missiles not part of the Hwasŏng series.In 37 years, 15 tests were completed under Kim Il-sung’s government, 16 under Kim Jong-il and a total of 120 under Kim Jong-un’s government for an 80% of missile tests in the last 10 years.

North Korean Hwasŏng-3 loaded on a Soviet-produced 9P113 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-5 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-6 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-7 (second version) loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher modified in North Korea to fit the new missile.

North Korean Hwasŏng-11 loaded on a Belarusian-produced MAZ-630308 Transporter Erector Launcher.

Illustrations

North Korean Hwasŏng-3 loaded on a Soviet-produced 9P113 Transporter Erector Launcher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

North Korean Hwasŏng-5 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

North Korean Hwasŏng-6 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

North Korean Hwasŏng-7 (second version) loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher modified in North Korea to fit the new missile.

North Korean Hwasŏng-11 loaded on a Belarusian-produced MAZ-630308 Transporter Erector Launcher.

Credits

Written by Arturo Giusti

Edited by Henry H.

Illustrated by Carpaticus

Sources:

The Armed Forces of North Korea, On The Path Of Songun – Stijn Mitzer & Joost Oliemans

Reuters; various

autoopt.ru; Product Catalog

sinotruk.com; Product Catalog

missilethreat.csis.org

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 30 September 2004, Volume 2 – Central Intelligence Agency

Korean People’s Army Journal Volume 1 Number 2 – Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

 

8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37

Nazi flag Nazi Germany (1933)
Anti-Aircraft Gun – 19,650 Built

8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No. Dreaded Threat The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role

With the growing use of aircraft during the First World War, many nations developed their own anti-aircraft weapons. Initially, these were mostly crude adaptations of existing weapons systems. During the interwar period, the development of dedicated anti-aircraft guns was initiated by many armies. Germany, while still under a ban on developing new weapons, would create the 8.8 cm Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun. The gun, while originally designed for the anti-aircraft role, was shown to possess excellent anti-tank firepower. This gun would see action for the first time during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and would continue serving with the Germans up to the end of World War II.

This article covers the use of the 8.8 cm Flak gun in the original anti-aircraft role. To learn more about the use of this gun in its more famous anti-tank role visit the Tank Encyclopedia website.

 

World War One Origins

Prior to the Great War, aircraft first saw service in military operations during the Italian occupation of Libya in 1911. These were used in limited numbers, mostly for reconnaissance, but also for conducting primitive bombing raids. During the First World War,  the mass adoption of aircraft in various roles occurred. One way to counter enemy aircraft was to employ one’s own fighter cover. Despite this, ground forces were often left exposed to enemy bombing raids or reconnaissance aircraft that could be used to identify weak spots in the defense.

To fend off airborne threats, most armies initially reused various artillery pieces, sometimes older, or even captured guns, and modified them as improvised anti-aircraft weapons. This involved employing ordinary artillery guns placed on improvised mounts that enabled them to have sufficient elevation to fire at the sky. These early attempts were crude in nature and offered little chance of actually bringing down an enemy aircraft. But, occasionally, it did happen. One of the first recorded and confirmed aircraft kills using a modified artillery piece happened in September of 1915, near the Serbian city of Vršac. Serbian artilleryman Raka Ljutovac managed to score a direct hit on a German aircraft using a captured and modified 75 mm Krupp M.1904 gun.

A captured Krupp gun was modified to be used for anti-aircraft defense by the Serbian Army during the First World War. Other warring nations also employed similar designs during the war. [telegraf.rs]
On the Western Front, the use of these improvised and crude contraptions generally proved ineffective. Dedicated anti-aircraft guns were needed. This was especially the case for the Germans who lacked fighter aircraft due to insufficient resources and limited production capacity. The Germans soon began developing such weapons. They noticed that the modified artillery pieces were of too small a caliber (anything smaller than 77 mm caliber was deemed insufficient) and needed much-improved velocity and range. Another necessary change was to completely reorganize the command structure, by unifying the defense and offensive air force elements, into a single organizational unit. This was implemented in late 1916. This meant that the anti-aircraft guns were to be separated from ordinary artillery units. The effect of this was that the new anti-aircraft units received more dedicated training and could be solely focused on engaging enemy aircraft.

The same year, trucks armed with 8 to 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns began to appear on the front. While these had relatively good mobility on solid ground, the conditions of the Western Front were generally unsuited for such vehicles, due to difficult terrain. With the development of better anti-aircraft gun designs, their increased weight basically prevented them from being mounted on mobile truck chassis. Instead, for mobility, these were placed on specially designed four-wheeled trailers and usually towed by a K.D.I artillery tractor.

Both Krupp and Ehrhardt (later changing their name to Rheinmetall) would develop their own 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns, which would see extensive action in the later stages of the war. While neither design would have any major impact (besides the same caliber) on the development of the later 8.8 cm Flak, these were the first stepping stones that would ultimately lead to the creation of the famous gun years later.

The Krupp 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun. [Wiki]
As the newer German anti-aircraft guns became too heavy to be used in more mobile configurations by mounting them on trucks, they had to be towed instead. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World War

Work after the War

Following the German defeat in the First World War, they were forbidden from developing many technologies, including artillery and anti-aircraft guns. To avoid this, companies like Krupp simply began cooperating with other arms manufacturers in Europe. During the 1920s, Krupp partnered with the Swedish Bofors armament manufacturer. Krupp even owned around a third of Bofors’ shares.

The Reichswehr (English: German Ground Army) only had limited anti-aircraft capabilities which relied exclusively on 7.92 mm caliber machine guns. The need for a proper and specialized anti-aircraft gun arose in the late 1920s. In September 1928, Krupp was informed that the Army wanted a new anti-aircraft gun. It had to be able to fire a 10 kg round at a muzzle velocity of 850 m/s. The gun itself would be placed on a mount with a full 360° traverse and an elevation of -3° to 85°. The mount and the gun were then placed on a cross-shaped base with four outriggers. The trailer had side outriggers that were raised during movement. The whole gun when placed on a four-wheeled bogie was to be towed at a maximum speed of 30 km/h. The total weight of the gun had to be around 9 tonnes. These requirements would be slightly changed a few years later to include new requests such as a rate of fire between 15 to 20 rounds per minute, use of high-explosive rounds with a delay fuse of up to 30 seconds, and a muzzle velocity between 800 to 900 m/s. The desired caliber of this gun was also discussed. The use of a caliber in the range of 7.5 cm was deemed to be insufficient and a waste of resources for a heavy gun. But despite this, a 7.5 cm Flak L/60 was developed, but it would not be adopted for service. The 8.8 cm caliber, which was used in the previous war, was more desirable. This caliber was set as a bare minimum, but usage of a larger caliber was allowed under the condition that the whole gun weight would not be more than 9 tonnes. The towing trailer had to reach a speed of 40 km/h (on a good road) when towed by a half-track or, in case of emergency, by larger trucks. The speed of redeployment for these guns was deemed highly important. German Army Officials were quite aware that the development of such guns could take years to complete. Due to the urgent need for such weapons, they were even ready to adopt temporary solutions.

Krupp’s first 8.8 cm Flak 18 prototype. [8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37 Vol.1]
Krupp engineers that were stationed at the Sweden Bofors company were working on a new anti-aircraft gun for some time. In 1931, Krupp engineers went back to Germany, where, under secrecy, they began designing the gun. By the end of September 1932, Krupp delivered two guns and 10 trailers. After a series of firing and driving trials, the guns proved to be more than satisfactory and, with some minor modifications, were adopted for service in 1933 under the name 8.8 cm Flugabwehrkanone 18 (anti-aircraft gun) or, more simply, Flak 18. The use of the number 18 was meant to mislead France and Great Britain that this was actually an old design, which it was in fact not. This was quite commonly used on other German-developed artillery pieces that were introduced to service during the 1930s. The same 8.8 cm gun was officially adopted when the Nazis came to power.  In 1934, Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles, and openly announced the rearmament of the German Armed forces.

Production

While Krupp designed the 8.8 cm FlaK 18, aside from building some 200 trailers for it, was not directly involved in the production of the actual gun. The 8.8 cm Flak 18 was quite an orthodox anti-aircraft design, but what made it different was that it could be mass-produced relatively easily, which the Germans did. Most of its components did not require any special tooling and companies that had basic production capabilities could produce these.

Some 2,313 were available by the end of 1938. In 1939, the number of guns produced was only 487, increasing to 1,131 new ones in 1940. From this point, due to the need for anti-aircraft guns, production constantly increased over the coming years. Some 1,861 examples were built in 1941, 2,822 in 1942, 4,302 in 1943, and 5,714 in 1944. Surprisingly, despite the chaotic state of the German industry, some 1,018 guns were produced during the first three months of 1945. In total,  19,650 8.8 cm Flak guns were built.

Of course, like many other German production numbers, there are some differences between sources. The previously mentioned numbers are according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Dreaded Threat: The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role). Author A. Radić (Arsenal 51) mentions that, by the end of 1944, 16,227 such guns were built. A. Lüdeke (Waffentechnik Im Zweiten Weltkrieg) gives a number of 20,754 pieces being built.

Year Number produced
1932 2 prototypes
1938 2,313 (total produced at that point)
1939 487
1940 1,131
1941 1.861
1942 2.822
1943 4,302
1944 5,714
1945 1,018
Total 19,650

 

Design

The gun 

The 8.8 cm Flak 18 used a single tube barrel that was covered in a metal jacket. The barrel itself was some 4.664 meters (L/56) long. The gun recuperator was placed above the barrel, while the recoil cylinders were placed under the barrel. During firing, the longest recoil stroke was 1,050 mm, while the shortest was 700 mm.

The 8.8 cm gun had a horizontal sliding breechblock which was semi-automatic. It meant that, after each shot, the breach opened on its own and ejected the shell casing, enabling the crew to immediately load another round. This was achieved by adding a spring coil, which was tensioned after firing. This provided a good rate of fire of up to 15 rounds per minute when engaging ground targets and up to 20 rounds per minute for aerial targets. If needed, the semi-automatic system could be disengaged and the whole loading and extracting of rounds done manually. While some guns were provided with a rammer to help during loading the gun, it was sometimes removed by the crew.

This particular gun is equipped with a loading rammer with a new round which is ready to be loaded into the chamber. [Pinterest]
For the anti-tank role, the 8.8 cm Flak was provided with a Zielfernrohr 20 direct telescopic sight. It had 4x magnification and a 17.5° field of view. This meant a 308 m wide view at 1 km. With a muzzle velocity of 840 m/s, the maximum firing range against ground targets was 15.2 km. The maximum altitude range was 10.9 km, but the maximum effective range was around 8 km.

The dimensions of this gun during towing were a length of 7.7 m, width of 2.3 m, and height of 2.4 meters. When stationary, the height was 2.1 m, while the length was 5.8 meters. Weight in firing position, it weighed 5,150 kg, while the total weight of the gun with the carriage was 7,450 kg. Due to some differences in numbers between sources, the previously mentioned 8.8 cm Flak performance is based on T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts Dreaded Threat The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role).

When stationary, the gun had a height of 2.1 meters, which offered a relatively large target for enemy gunners. Good camouflage and well-selected positions were vital for its crew’s survival. [defensemedianetwork.com]

The Gun Controls

The gun elevation and traverse were controlled by using two handwheels located on the right side. The traverse handwheel had an option to be rotated at low or high speed, depending on the need. The lower speed was used for more precise aiming at the targets. The speed gear was changed by a simple lever located at the handwheel. To make a full circle, the traverse operator, at a high-speed setting. needed to turn the handwheel 100 times. while on the lower gear, it was 200 times. With one full circle of the handwheel, the gun was rotated by 3.6° at high speed and 1.8° at low speed.

Next to it was the handwheel for elevation. The handwheel was connected by a series of gears to the elevation pinion. This then moved the elevation rack which, in turn, lowered and raised the gun barrel. Like the traverse handwheel, it also had options for lower and higher rotation speed, which could be selected by using a lever. During transport, in order to prevent potential damage to the gun elevating mechanism, a locking system was equipped. In order to change position from 0° to 85°, at high speed, 42.5 turns of the handwheel were needed. One turn of the wheel at high speed changed the elevation by 2°. At lower speed, 85 times turns of the handwheel were needed. Each turn gave a change of 1°.

The two control handwheels. The front handwheel is for traverse while the rear one is for elevation. Source: W. Muller (1998) The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World Wars, Schiffer Military

Sometimes, in the sources, it is mentioned that the traverse was actually 720°. This is not a mistake. When the gun was used in a static mount, it would be connected with wires to a fire control system. In order to avoid damaging these wires, the guns were allowed to only make two full rotations in either direction. The traverse operator had a small indicator that informed him when two full rotations were made.

The 8.8 cm Flak at its maximum elevation. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No. Dreaded Threat The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role

The 8.8 cm fuze setter is located on the left side of the gun. Two rounds could be placed for their time fuse settings. These were usually done manually but the gun controls could also be connected to an external control system.

The 8.8 cm fuze setter. [Pinterest]

The Kommandogerat 36

The fire control system Kommandogerat 36 (Stereoscopic Director 36) was an important device when using the 8.8 cm guns in an anti-aircraft role. This piece of equipment actually is a combination of a stereoscopic rangefinder and a director. It uses a 4-meter-long, stereoscopic rangefinder. It has a magnification of 12 to 14x with a reading case ranging from 500 to 50,000 meters. When the unit was being transported, the stereoscopic rangefinder would be disengaged and placed in a long wooden box. If for some reason the Stereoscopic Director 36 was not available or not working, a smaller auxiliary Stereoscopic Director 35 could be used instead.

The 8.8 cm guns were usually used in a square formation consisting of four guns.  Inside this squire was a command post, which would usually have additional range-finding equipment and instruments. These four gun’s positions were also connected to the battery unit command.

The Stereoscopic Director 36 was a vital piece of equipment that provides the necessary acquisitions of targets. [waralbum.ru]
Common 8.8 cm anti-aircraft employment was a square formation with four guns. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World War

Mount

The mount which held the gun barrel itself consisted of a cradle and trunnions. The cradle had a rectangular shape. On its sides, two trunnions were welded. In order to provide stability for the gun barrel, two spring-shaped equilibrations were connected to the cradle using a simple clevis fastener.

Carriage

Given its size, the gun used a large cross-shaped platform. It consisted of the central part, where the base for the mount was located, along with four outriggers. The front and the rear outriggers were fixed to the central base. The gun barrel travel lock was placed on the front outrigger. The side outriggers could be lowered during firing. These were held in place by pins and small chains which were connected to the gun mount. To provide better stability during firing the gun, the crew could dig in the steel pegs located on each of the side outriggers. This cross-shaped platform, besides holding the mount for the main gun, also served to provide storage for various equipment, like the electrical wiring. Lastly, on the bottom of each outrigger, there were four round-shaped leveling jacks. This helped prevent the gun from digging in into the ground, distributing the weight evenly, and to help keep the gun level on uneven ground.

A close-up view of the dismantled 8.8 cm Flak cross-shaped platform. The two folding side outriggers are missing. The central octagonal base would later be replaced with a much simpler square-shaped one. Source: German 88-mm AntiAircraft Gun Materiel, US War Department Technical Manual
The side outriggers could be lowered during firing. In order to provide better stability during firing the gun, the crew could dig in the steel pegs located on each of the side outriggers. At the bottom of each outrigger were round-shaped leveling jacks. Their purpose was to prevent the gun from digging into the ground and to keep the gun level on uneven ground. Source: German 88-mm AntiAircraft Gun Materiel, US War Department Technical Manual
The side outriggers are fully raised during transport. [o5m6.de]
To prevent damaging the gun during transport, a large travel lock was installed on the front outrigger. Source: German 88-mm AntiAircraft Gun Materiel, US War Department Technical Manual

Bogies

The entire gun assembly was moved using a two-wheeled dolly, designated as Sonderanhanger 201. The front part consisted of a dolly with single wheels, while the rear dolly consisted of a pair of wheels per side on a single axle. Another difference between these two was that the front dolly had 7, and the rear had 11 transverse leaf springs. The wheel diameter was the same for the two, at 910 mm. These were also provided with air brakes. While these units were supposed to be removed during firing, the crew would often not remove them, as it was easier to move the gun quickly if needed. This was only possible when engaging targets at low gun elevations. Aerial targets could not be engaged this way, as the recoil would break the axles. The front and rear outriggers would be raised from the ground by using a winch with chains located on the dollies. When raised to a sufficient height, the outriggers would be held in place by dolly’s hooks. These were connected with a round pin, located inside of each of the outriggers.

The two trailer units were connected to the front and rear outriggers by using simple hooks, which would quite easily be disengaged. Source: German 88-mm AntiAircraft Gun Materiel, US War Department Technical Manual
The front view of the Sonderanhanger 201 dolly could be easily identified by the use of only two wheels. The chain’s winch would be used to raise the outriggers. Source: German 88-mm AntiAircraft Gun Materiel, US War Department Technical Manual

Firing with both trailer units still connected to the gun as possible, but it raised the height of the gun and prevented it from engaging air targets. [o5m6.de]
Later, a new improved Sonderanhanger 202 model was introduced (used on the Flak 36 version). On this redesigned version, the two towing units were redesigned to be similar to each other. This was done to ease production but also so the gun could be towed in either direction when needed. While, initially, the dolly was equipped with one set of two wheels and the trailer with two pairs, the new model adopted a doubled-wheeled dolly instead.

Protection

Initially, the 8.8 cm Flak guns were not provided with an armored shield for crew protection. Given its long-range and its intended role as an anti-aircraft gun, this was deemed unnecessary in its early development. Following the successful campaign in the West against France and its Allies in 1940, the Commanding General of the I. Flakkorp requested that all 8.8 cm Flak guns that would be used at on the frontline receive a protective shield. During 1941, most 8.8 cm Flaks that were used on the frontline were supplied with a 1.75 meter high and 1.95 meters wide frontal armored shield. Two smaller armored panels (7.5 cm wide at top and 56 cm at bottom) were placed on the sides. The frontal plate was 10 mm thick, while the two side plates were 6 mm thick. The recuperator cylinders were also protected with an armored cover. The total weight of the 8.8 cm Flak armored plates was 474 kg. On the right side of the large gun shield, there was a hatch that would be closed during the engagement of ground targets. In this case, the gunner would use telescopic sight through the visor port. During engagement of air targets, this hatch was open.

Most guns were initially not provided with a shield. Given its original purpose, this is not surprising. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts. Dreaded Threat The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role
Most guns that were issued for field use would be provided with a large 10 mm thick front armored shield. The wire cover on the top was used for camouflage. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts Dreaded Threat The 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/47 in the Anti-Tank role
On the left side of the gun shield, there was a hatch that would be used for the gunner to find his aerial targets. [worldwarphotos.info]

Ammunition

The 88 mm FlaK could use a series of different rounds. The 8.8 cm Sprgr. Patr. was a 9.4 kg heavy high-explosive round with a 30-second time fuze. It could be used against both anti-aircraft and ground targets. When used in the anti-aircraft role, the time fuze was added. The 8.8 Sprgr. Az. was a high-explosive round that had a contact fuze. In 1944 the Germans introduced a slightly improved model that tested the idea of using control fragmentation, which was unsuccessful. The 8.8 Sch. Sprgr. Patr. and br. Sch. Gr. Patr. were shrapnel rounds.

The 8.8 cm Pzgr Patr was a 9.5 kg standard anti-tank round. With a velocity of 810 m/s, it could penetrate 95 mm of 30° angled armor at 1 km. At 2 km at the same angle, it could pierce 72 mm of armor. The 8.8 cm Pzgr. Patr. 40 was a tungsten-cored anti-tank round. The 8.8 cm H1 Gr. Patr. 39 Flak was a 7.2 kg heavy hollow charge anti-tank round. At a 1 kg range, it was able to penetrate 165 mm of armor. The 8.8 cm ammunition was usually stored in wooden or metal containers.

The 8.8 cm Flak used large one-piece ammunition. It was stored in either wooden or metal containers. [defensemedianetwork.com]

Crew

The 88 mm Flak had a crew of 11 men. These included a commander, two gun operators, two fuze setter operators, a loader, four ammunition assistants, and the driver of the towing vehicle. Guns that were used on a static mount usually had a smaller crew. The two gun operators were positioned to the right of the gun. Each of them was responsible for operating a hand wheel, one for elevation and one for the traverse. The front operator was responsible for traverse and the one behind him for elevation. The front traverse operator was also responsible for using the weapon gun sight for targeting the enemy. On the left side of the gun were the two fuse operators. The loader with the ammunition assistants was placed behind the gun. A well-experienced crew needed 2 to 2 and a half minutes to prepare the gun for firing. The time to put the gun into the traveling position was 3.5 minutes. The 8.8 cm gun was usually towed by an Sd.Kfz. 7 half-track or a heavy-duty six-wheel truck.

The 8.8 cm guns that were used for supporting ground units had a fairly large crew. [Pinterest]
The Sd.Kfz. 7 half-tracks were the primary towing vehicles for this gun. [defensemedianetwork.com]
Six-wheeled heavy-duty trucks would sometimes be used due to the lack of half-tracks. They did not offer the same driving performance. [worldwarphotos.info]

Flak 36 and 37

While the Flak 18 was deemed a good design, there was room for improvement. The gun itself did not need much improvement. The gun platform, on the other hand, was slightly modified to provide better stability during firing and to make it easier to produce. The base of the gun mount was changed from an octagonal to a more simple square shape. The previously mentioned  Sonderanhanger 202 was used on this model.

Due to the high rate of fire, anti-aircraft guns frequently had to receive new barrels, as these were quickly worn out. To facilitate quick replacement, the Germans introduced a new three-part barrel. It consists of a chamber portion, a center portion, and the muzzle section. While it made the replacement of worn-out parts easier, it also allowed these components to be built with different metals. Besides this, the overall performance of the Flak 18 and Flak 36 was the same. The Flak 36 was officially adopted on the 8th of February 1939.

As the Germans introduced the new Flak 41, due to production delays, some of the guns were merged with the mount of a Flak 36. A very limited production run was made of the 8.8 cm Flak 36/42, which entered service in 1942.

In 1942, the improved 88 mm Flak 37 entered mass production according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle. On the other hand J. Ledwoch (8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37 Vol.1 Wydawnictwo Militaria 155) state that the Flak 37 was introduced to service way back in 1937. Visually, it was the same as the previous Flak 36 model. The difference was that this model was intended to have better anti-aircraft performance, having specially designed directional dials. The original gunner dials were replaced with the “follow-the-pointer” system. It consists of two sets of dials that are placed on the right side of the gun. These received information about the enemy targets from a remote central fire direction post connected electrically. This way, the gun operator only had to make slight adjustments, such as elevation, and fire the gun.

The necessary information about the enemy targets was provided by a Funkmessgerate ( Predictor) which was essentially a mechanical analog computer. Once the enemy aircraft were spotted, their estimated speed and direction were inserted into this computer which would then calculate the precise position and elevation. This information would be sent to any linked anti-aircraft batteries by a wire connection. One set of the dials would then show the crew the necessary changes that need to be done to the elevation and direction of the enemy approach. The crew then had to manually position the gun elevation and direction until the second dials indicators matched the first one. The funkmessgerate computer also provided correct fuse time settings. In principle, this system eased the aiming task of the crew and at the same time improved accuracy. When used in this manner the Flak 37 could not be used for an anti-tank role.

The last change to this series was the reintroduction of a two-piece barrel design. Besides these improvements, the overall performance was the same as with the previous models. From March 1943 only the Flak 37 would be produced, completely replacing the older models.

The 8.8 cm Flak 37 introduced the use of specially designed directional dials, which help the crew better adjust the gun. Source: Norris 8.8 cm FlaK 16/36/37/ 41 and PaK 43 1936-45

Organization 

German air defense was solely the responsibility of the Luftwaffe, with the majority of 8.8 cm guns being allocated to them. The German Army and Navy also possessed some anti-aircraft units, but these were used in quite limited numbers. The largest units were the Flak Korps (Anti-aircraft corps). It consisted of two to four Flak Divisionen (Anti-aircraft divisions). These divisions, depending on the need, were either used as mobile forces or for static defense. These were further divided into Bigaden (brigades ) which consisted of two or more Regimenter (Regiments). Regiments in turn were divided into four to six Abteilunge (Battalion). Battalion strength was eight 8.8 cm guns with 18 smaller 2 cm guns. To complicate things a bit more, each Battalion could be divided into four groups: Leichte (Light, equipped with calibers such as 2 cm or 3.7 cm), Gemischte (mixed light and heavy), Schwere (Heavy equip with a caliber greater than 88 mm) and Scheinwerfer  (Searchlight).

Mobile War

Initially, operations and crew training was carried out by the Reichswehr. They were organized into the so-called Fahrabteilung (Training Battalion) to hide their intended role. By 1935, the German Army underwent a huge reorganization, one aspect of which was changing its name to the Wehrmacht. In regard to the anti-aircraft protection, it was now solely the responsibility of the Luftwaffe. For this reason, almost all available 8.8 cm guns were reallocated to Luftwaffe control. Only around eight Flak Battalions which were armed with 2 cm anti-aircraft guns were left under direct Army control.

In Spain

When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Francisco Franco, leader of the Nationalists, sent a plea to Adolf Hitler for German military equipment aid. To make matters worse for Franco, nearly all his loyal forces were stationed in Africa. As the Republicans controlled the Spanish navy, Franco could not move his troops back to Spain safely. So he was forced to seek foreign aid. Hitler was keen on helping Franco, seeing Spain as a potential ally, and agreed to provide assistance. At the end of July 1936, 6 He 51 and 20 Ju 57 aircraft were transported to Spain under secrecy. These would serve as the basis for the air force of the German Condor Legion which operated in Spain during this war. The German ground forces operating in Spain were supplied with a number of 8.8 cm guns.

These arrived in early November 1936 and were used to form the F/88 anti-aircraft battalion. This unit consisted of four heavy and two light batteries. Starting from March 1937 these were allocated to protect various defense points at Burgos and Vittoria. In March 1938, the 8.8 cm guns from the 6th battery dueled with an enemy 76.2 cm anti-aircraft gun which were manned by French volunteers from the International Brigades. While the 8.8 cm guns were mainly employed against ground targets they still had a chance to fire at air targets. For example, while defending the La Cenia airfield, the 8.8 cm guns from the 6th battery prevented the Republican bombing attack by damaging at least two SB-2 bombers on the 10th of June 1938. Three days later one SB-2 was shot down by an 8.8 cm gun. In early August another SB-2 was shot down by the same unit. The performance of the 8.8 cm gun during the war in Spain was deemed satisfying. It was excellent in ground operations, possessing good range and firepower.

An 8.8 cm Flak gun in Spain.[weaponsandwarfare.com]

During the Second World War

Prior to the war, the 8.8 m guns could be often seen on many military parades, exercises, and ceremonies. The first ‘combat’ use of the 8.8 cm Flak in German use was during the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938. The entire operation was carried out peacefully and the 8.8 cm gun did not have to fire in anger.

Prior to the war, the 8.8 cm guns war could have been often seen on military parades, exercises, and ceremonies. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World Wars

The Polish campaign saw little use of the 8.8 cm guns. The main reason for this was that the Polish Air Force was mostly destroyed in the first few days of combat. They were mainly used against ground targets. In one example, the 8.8 cm guns from the 22nd Flak Regiment tried to prevent a Polish counter-attack at Ilza. The battery would be overrun while the crew tried to defend themselves, losing three guns in the process. The 8.8 cm Flak gun also saw service during the battles for Warsaw and Kutno.

The 8.8 cm followed the Germans in their occupation of Denmark and Norway. One of the key objectives in Norway was the capture of a number of airfields. Once captured, the Germans rushed in Flak guns including the 8.8 cm, to defend these as they were crucial for the rather short-ranged German bombers. On the 12th of April 1940, the British Air Force launched two (83 strong in total) bombing raids at the German ships which were anchored at the Stavanger harbor. Thanks to the Flak and fighter support, six Hampden and three Wellington bombers were shot down.

Following the conclusion of the Polish campaign, the Germans began increasing the numbers of the motorized Flak units. Some 32 Flak Batteries were available which the Germans used to form the 1st and 2nd Flak Corps. 1st Corps would be allocated to the Panzergruppe Kleist, while the second was allocated to the 4th and 6th Army. The Luftwaffe, as in Poland (September 1939), quickly gained air superiority over the Allied Air Forces. Despite this, there was still opportunity for the 8.8 cm guns to fire at air targets.  During the period from the 10th to 26th May 1940, the following successes were made against enemy aircraft by flak units that were part of the XIX Armee Corps: the 83rd Flak Battalion brought down some 54, 92nd Flak Battalion 44, 71th Flak Battalion 24, the 91st Flak Battalion 8, 36th Flak Regiment 26, 18th Flak Regiment 27, and 38th Flak Regiment 23 aircraft. During the notorious German crossing near Sedan, a combined Allied air force tried to dislodge them. The strong Flak presence together with air fighter cover, lead to the Allies losing 90 aircraft in the process.

Following the Western Campaign, the 8.8 cm guns would see extensive service through the war. Ironically they would be more often employed against enemy armor than in the original role. Given the extensive Allied bombing raids, more and more 8.8 cm would be allocated to domestic anti-aircraft defense. One major use of 8.8 cm Flak was during the German evacuation of Sicily, by providing necessary air cover for the retreating Axis soldiers and materiel to the Italian mainland.

In the occupied Balkans, the 8.8 cm Flak was a rare sight until late 1943 and early 1944. The ever-increasing Allied bombing raids forced the Germans to reinforce their positions with a number of anti-aircraft guns, including the 8.8 cm Flak. Some 40 8.8 cm Flak guns were used to protect German-held Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. Most would be lost after a successful liberation operation conducted by the Red Army supported by Yugoslav Partisans. The 8.8 cm Flak guns were also used in static emplacements defending the Adriatic coast at several key locations from 1943 on. One of the last such batteries to surrender to the Yugoslav Partisans was the one stationed in Pula, which had twelve 8.8 cm guns. It continued to resist the Partisans until the 8th of May, 1945.

Some of the 8.8 cm guns were destroyed or abandoned. Source: A. Radić Arsenal 51

Defense of the Fatherland

While the 8.8 cm Flaks would see service supporting the advancing German forces, the majority of them would actually be used as static anti-aircraft emplacements. For example, during the production period of October 1943 to November 1944, around 61% of the 8.8 cm Flak guns produced were intended for static defense. Additionally, of 1,644 batteries that were equipped with this gun, only 225 were fully motorized, with an additional 31 batteries that were only partially motorized (start of September 1944).

When the war broke out with Poland, the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft units had at their disposal some 657 anti-aircraft guns of various calibers. The majority were the 8.8 cm with smaller quantities of the larger 10.5 cm and even some captured Czezh 8.35 anti-aircraft guns. An additional 12 Flak Companies equipped with the 8.8 cm guns were given to the navy for the protection of a number of important harbors. The remaining guns were used to protect vital cities like Berlin and Hamburg. The important Ruhr industry center was also heavily defended.

The majority of the 8.8 cm Flak guns built would be used in static defense without the cross-shaped platform. These would mostly be destroyed by their crews to prevent their capture when the Allies made their advances into Germany. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World Wars

One of the first enemy aircraft shot down over German skies were British Wellington bombers. This occurred on the 4th of September 1939 when one or two enemy bombers were brought down by heavy Flak fire. These intended to bomb vital German naval ports. In early October 1939, in Strasbourg, a French Potez 637 was shot down by the 84th Flak Regiments 8.8 cm guns. One Amiot 143 and a Whitley aircraft were shot down in Germany in mid-October. During December 1939 British launched two bombing raids intended to inflict damage on German ports. Both raids failed with the British losing some 17 out of 36 Wellington bombers.

After Germany’s victory over the Western Allies in June, the Germans began forming the first Flak defense line in occupied territories and coastlines. These  were not only equipped with German guns but also with those captured from enemy forces.

A 8.8 cm by the Atlantic coast in 1941. This crew had already achieved two kills, judging by the kill marks on the barrel. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World Wars

Due to the poor results of their daylight bombing raids, the British began to employ night raids. These initially were quite unsuccessful with minimal damage to Germany’s infrastructure and industry. The Flak defense of Germany was also quite unprepared for night raids, unable to spot enemy bombers at night. The situation changed only in 1940 with the introduction of ground-operated radar. Thanks to this, the first few months of 1941 saw German Flak units bring down 115 enemy aircraft.

In 1942 the British military top made a decision to begin the mass bombing of German cities. The aim was to “de-house” (or kill) workers, damage infrastructure to make urban industrial areas unusable, and try and cause a moral collapse as was the case in 1918. Implementation of this tactic was initially slow due to an insufficient number of bombers. In addition, vital targets in occupied Europe were also to be bombed. In May 1942, the British launched a force that consisted of over 1,000 aircraft causing huge damage to Germany, killing 486 and injuring over 55,000 people.

In 1943 several huge events happened. The German defeats in East and North Africa led to huge material and manpower losses, while the Allies were preparing to launch massive bombing raids mainly intended to cripple Germany’s production capabilities. In response, the Germans began increasing their number of Flak units. At the start of 1943, there were some 659 heavy Flak batteries, which were increased to  1,089 by June the same year. Due to a lack of manpower, the Germans began mobilizing their civilians regardless of their age or sex. For example, in 1943 there were some 116,000 young women who were employed in various roles, even operating the guns. Near the end of the war, it was common to see all-female crews operating Flak batteries. In addition in 1944 some 38,000 young boys were also employed in this manner. Ironically, while all German military branches lacked equipment, the anti-aircraft branch had spare equipment and guns, but lacked the manpower to operate them. To resolve this, foreign Volunteers and even Soviet prisoners of war were pressed into service. The downside was the general lack of training, which greatly affected their performance.

In the first few months of 1944, the Allied 8th and 15th Air Forces lost some 315 bombers with 10,573 damaged, all attributed to the heavy Flak. In 1944 (date unspecified in the source) during an attack on the heavily defended Leuna synthetic oil refinery, some 59 Allied bombers were brought down by the heavy Flak guns. By 1944 the number of heavy anti-aircraft guns that were intended for the defense of Germany reached 7,941. By April 1945 the Flak guns managed to shoot down 1,345 British bombers. The American 8th lost 1,798, while the 15th Air Force lost 1,046 bombers due to German Flak defence by the end of the war.

The last action of the 8.8 cm Flak guns was during the defense of the German capital of Berlin. Due to most being placed in fixed positions, they could not be evacuated and most would be destroyed by their own crews to prevent capture. Despite the losses suffered during the war, in February 1945, there were still some 8,769 8.8 cm Flak guns available for service.

The Flak provided necessary and crucial defense of vital industrial centers. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World Wars

Effectiveness of the 8.8 cm Guns in Anti-aircraft Role

Regarding the effectiveness of the 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns with the necessary number of rounds needed to bring down enemy aircraft. Author E.B. Westermann (Flak German Anti-Aircraft Defenses 1914-1945) gives us a good example and comparison between three main German anti-aircraft guns. The largest 12.8 cm Flak on average fired some 3,000 rounds to take down an enemy aircraft. The 10.5 cm gun needed 6,000 and the 8.8 cm 15,000 rounds (some sources mentioned 16,000). This seems at first glance like a huge waste of available resources, but is it right to conclude that?

According to an Allied war document dated from early 1945, they mentioned a few interesting facts about German flak defense. According to them, in 1943 some 33% of bombers destroyed by Germany were accredited to heavy Flak gunfire. In addition, 66% of damage sustained by their aircraft was also caused by the heavy Flak fire. In the summer of 1944, this number increased. The majority (some 66%) shot down enemy bombers were accredited to the heavy Flaks. And of 13,000 damaged bombers some 98% were estimated to be caused by the Flaks. Here it is important to note that by this time, Luftwaffe fighters lacked the ability to attack bomber formations en mass. Therefore this increase of aircraft shot down by the Flaks may be explained by this.

In addition, we must also take into account two other functions that these guns had which are often overlooked. They did not necessarily need to bring down enemy bombers. It was enough to force the enemy fly at higher altitudes to avoid losses. This in turn led to a huge loss of accuracy for the bombers. Secondly, the enemy bombers were often forced to break formation when sustaining heavy Flak fire, which left them exposed to German fighters. The shrapnel from the Flak rounds could not always directly bring down a bomber, but it could cause sufficient damage (fuel leaks for example) that the aircraft, later on, had to make an emergency landing, even in enemy territory. The damaged aircraft that made it back to their bases could spend considerable time awaiting repairs. Lastly, the Flak fire could incapacitate, wound or even kill bomber crews. Thus there was a huge psychological effect on enemy bomber crews. B-17 gunner Sgt W. J. Howard from the 100th Bomb Group recalled his experience with the German Flak. “All the missions scared me to death. Whether you had fighters or not you still had to fly through the flak. Flak was what really got you thinking, but I found a way to suck it up and go on.”

Hitler was quite impressed with the 8.8 cm performance. On the 28th of August 1942, he stated:  “The best flak gun is the 8.8 cm. The 10.5 has the disadvantage that it consumes too much ammunition, and the barrel does not hold up very long. The Reich Marshall Göring continually wants to build the 12.8 into the flak program. This double-barreled 12.8 cm has a fantastic appearance. If one examines the 8.8 from a technician’s perspective, it is to be sure the most beautiful weapon yet fashioned, with the exception of the 12.8 cm”.

Despite the best German efforts, the Flak’s effectiveness greatly degraded by late 1944. The reason for this was the shortage of properly trained crews. At the start of the war, the Germans paid great attention to crew training, which lasted several months. As the Flak guns were needed on the front, less experienced and trained personnel had to be used instead. In the later stages of the war, these crews received only a few weeks of training, which was insufficient for the job they had to perform. Lastly, Allied bombing raids eventually took their toll on German industry, greatly reducing the production of ammunition, which was one of the main reasons why the anti-aircraft defense of Germany ultimately failed. Of course, a proper analysis and conclusion could not be easily made and would require more extensive research, a wholly different topic on its own.

Self-Propelled Versions

When used as anti-aircraft weapons, the 8.8 cm guns were in most cases used as static defense points. Despite this, the Germans made several attempts to increase their mobility by placing the 8.8 cm guns on various chassis. One of the first attempts was by mounting the 8.8 cm gun on a VOMAG 6×6 truck chassis. The small number built was given to the 42nd Flak Regiment which operated them up to the end of the war.

The VOMAG truck was armed with 8.8 cm guns. Source: W. Muller The 8.8 cm FLAK In The First and Second World War

The truck chassis offered great mobility on good roads, but their off-road handling was highly problematic. So Germans used half-tracks and full-track chassis.  Smaller numbers of Sd. Kfz 9 armed with the 8.8 cm gun were built. Attempts to build a full-track vehicle were made but never went beyond a prototype stage. The 8.8 cm Flak auf Sonderfahrgestell was a project where an 8.8cm gun was mounted on a fully tracked chassis with a folding wall, but only one vehicle would be built.  There are some photographs of Panzer IV modified with this gun, and while not much is known about them they appear to be a field conversion, rather than dedicated design vehicles. There were even proposals to mount an 8.8 cm gun on a Panther tank chassis, but nothing would come from it in the end.

Some 12 Sd. Kfz. 9 were modified by receiving an 8.8 cm gun. [worldwarphotos.info]
The 8.8 cm Flak auf Sonderfahrgestell Pz.Sfl.IVc prototype.[uofa.ru]
The strange-looking Panzer IV armed with this gun. [armedconflicts.com]
Mounting the 8.8 cm gun on railroad cars was a common sight in Germany at early stages of the war. There was various design that may differ greatly from each other. [defensemedianetwork.com]

Usage after the war

With the defeat of Germany during the Second World War, the 8.8 cm Flak guns found usage in a number of other armies. Some of these were Spain, Portugal, Albania, and Yugoslavia. By the end of the 1950s, the Yugoslavian People’s Army had slightly less than 170 8.8 cm guns in its inventory. These were, besides their original anti-aircraft role, used to arm navy ships and were later placed around the Adriatic coast. A number of these guns would be captured and used by various warring parties during the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s. Interestingly, the Serbian forces removed the 8.8 cm barrel on two guns and replaced them with two pairs of 262 mm Orkan rocket launcher tubes. The last four operational examples were finally removed from service from the Serbian and Montenegrin Army in 2004.

The 8.8 cm Flak in the Yugoslavian People’s Army service, during military training near the capital in 1955. Source: A. Radić Arsenal 51
Two 8.8 cm Flak guns were reused by replacing the gun with two 262mm rocket launchers. While not a success, these two remained in use up to 1998. [srpskioklop.paluba.info]

Conclusion

The 8.8 cm Flak was an extraordinary weapon that provided the German Army with much-needed firepower during the early stages of the war. The design as a whole was nothing special, but it had a great benefit in that it could be built relatively cheaply and in great numbers. That was probably its greatest success, being available in huge numbers compared to similar weapons of other nations.

Its performance in the anti-aircraft role was deemed satisfying, but still stronger models would be employed to supplement its firepower. The 8.8 cm anti-air gun’s effectiveness was greatly degraded toward the end of the war, which was caused not by the gun design itself but other external forces. These being mainly the lack of properly trained crews and shortages of ammunition.

8.8 cm Flak 18 Specifications:
Crew: 11 (Commander, two gun operators, two fuze setter operators, loader, four ammunition assistants, and the driver)
Weight in firing position: 5150 kg
Total weight:  7450 kg.
Dimensions in towing position: Length 7.7  m, Width 2.2 m, Height 2.4 m,
Dimensions in deployed position: Length 5.8  m, Height 214 m,
Primary Armament:  8.8 cm L/56 gun
Elevation: -3° to +85°  

 

Gallery

The Flak 88 mm gun in towing postion

 

Flak 88 in firing position

Credits

  • Written by Marko P.
  • Edited by by Ed Jackson & Henry H.
  • Illustrations by David B.

Sources

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