Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – (1960s – Present)

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the world’s lesser-known nations, but one that is periodically mentioned in Western media for diplomatic incidents with neighboring nations after testing ballistic missiles. This article attempts to shed light on Korea’s most famous, and numerous family of ballistic missiles, the Hwasŏng, in English literally “Star of Fire”, which in the Korean language (Hangŭl) indicates the planet Mars.

Creation of the DPRK Missile Program

Going back in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the first rockets it had available were various artillery rocket systems from the Soviet Union, such as the BM-8, BM-13 and BM-31 ‘Katyusha’ Multiple Rocket Launchers. These systems first arrived between 1948 and 1950 in Korea and were used against UN forces during the Korean War with great results.

In the following years, several ‘Katyushas’ remained in service with the KPA, and in the early 1960s they were joined by the modern 122 mm, BM-21 ‘Grad’, and Chinese produced MLRs such as the 107 mm Type 63. Both systems were studied and reverse engineered in late 1960s, with the creation of the 122 mm BM-11 MRLs and 107 mm Type 75.

North Korean-produced 122 mm BM-11 on ZiL-151 trucks. These are the most common Korean copies of the BM-21 ‘Grad’ MLRS distinguishable for the presence of 30 tubes instead of 40 divided in two blocks of 15 tubes. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/4fBuab4.jpg

Between 1968 and 1970, North Korea purchased several S-2 ‘Sopka’ coastal defense missiles from the Soviet Union, enough to equip 5 batteries. With the help of the People’s Republic of China, North Korea created the first maintenance and assembly facilities for the S-2 missiles, and newly purchased HY-1 Chinese anti-ship missiles. The deliveries of these anti-ship missiles were made both from Chinese military stocks, and kits that were assembled in Korea at the Mangyongdae Facility, to allow Korean scientists to become familiar with the systems.

North Korean S-2 ‘Sopka’ coastal defense missiles during a parade in early 1970s. Source: KCBC https://i.imgur.com/EEwPx7t.png

Later in the 1960s, the Soviet Union supplied the DPRK with heavy artillery rockets, defined by NATO as Free Rockets Over Grounds (FROGs). More precisely these were 3R9 Luna and 3R10 Luna-2 rockets in 2K6 complexes (FROG-3 and FROG-5), and 9M21 Luna-M rockets in 9K52 complexes (FROG-7). An important note is that the USSR refused to help Korea create its own missile program for political issues, and only aided Korea in building facilities to assemble anti-ship and S-75 missiles. On the other hand, China delivered many types of reverse engineered Soviet Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), anti-ship missiles, and associated technologies to DPRK. Chinese assistance would probably have been greater, but the PRC did not possess the same systems, and level of knowledge, as the Soviet Union.

In 1972, the DPRK created its first missile plant for the production of Chinese anti-ship missiles but, for their assembly, they still needed some hi-tech components from China. These SAMs, and coastal defense anti-ship missiles, provided the Korean engineers with material to familiarize themselves with modern missile technologies, such as rocket guidance and propulsion. By 1973, North Korea had enough missiles to equip its navy with 10 Komar-class, and 8 Osa-class missile boats armed with P-15 and HY-1 missiles.

Some sources claim that the DPRK received 24 Luna, Luna-2 and Luna-M and an equal number of 2P16 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) but this number has never been confirmed with certainty, in fact, another source says that the DPRK received between 27 and 63 missiles, and 9 TELs, from the Soviet Union. Some also state that the DPRK acquired between 24 and 56 9M21 Luna-Ms between 1975 and 1976, together with 6 or 8 TELs from Egypt, but these deliveries have never been confirmed.

The first copies of these missiles appeared in the following years, being renamed Hwasŏng.

The code Hwasŏng-1 being uncertain to which missile it refers to, but all sources seems to agree that it is the Korean designation of the indigenous production of the 2K6 Luna, while Hwasŏng-3 is the Korean designation of the indigenous production of the 9K52 Luna-M missiles.

The two missiles had a range of 45 and 65 km (28 and 40 miles), and carried a High-Explosive warhead of about 400 kg (881 lb). The Soviet models could be equipped with small nuclear warheads, but the Koreans, at that time, did not have miniaturized nuclear weapons, as the first tests on a nuclear reactor were only carried out in 1958. It is, however, very likely that the DPRK developed chemical warheads for such missiles.

Data on the missiles designated Hwasŏng-2 and Hwasŏng-4 are unknown, but they never reached mass production.

Some sources speculate that the designation Hwasŏng-2 was given to the Korean copy of the S-75 surface-to-air missile, a hypothesis rejected thanks to Korea itself, that calls the S-75 copy Pongae-1. The Hwasŏng-4 may have been given by the Koreans to the joint project of a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), between DPRK and People’s Republic of China, referred by the Chinese sources to Dōngfēng-61 (DF-61). This project was born at the end of the 1970s at the behest of Kim Il-sung himself, who in April 1975, traveled to Beijing where Oh Jin-u, North Korean defense minister, asked the People’s Republic of China to purchase their SRBM missiles.

The DF-61 program, born in late 1976 to develop a missile with a range of 600 km (372 miles) and possess a warhead of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb), had a very short life due to the fact that in 1978 its main Chinese supporter, Chen Xilian was limited in his powers and eventually purged for political reasons in 1980. The failure of the DF-61, however, was not a defeat for the DPRK technicians, as thanks to the exchange of knowledge with the Chinese, had greatly increased their knowledge of missile design. In these years, the DPRK gradually diminished their imports of anti-ship missile technology from China, in favor of indigenously produced equipment.

The Hwasŏng-5 – The First Korean SRBM

Due to the deterioration of relations with Moscow, and the unsuccessful joint project with China, the DPRK, as soon as the DF-61 project was closed, decided to turn to another country. A nation that possessed Soviet-made missiles and that, at the same time, was in debt to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: the Arab Republic of Egypt.

International relations between Korea and Egypt have always been very close from the mid 1950s. In early 1973, after political issues, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat expatriated all the Soviet advisors, pilots and instructors from its country. It was a bad idea, considering that the Arab nation was preparing to launch an attack on Israel, and its military was dependent on Soviet equipment. In March 1973, a delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea led by Kang Ryang-uk, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, visited Egypt, and the Egyptians asked for Korean technical assistance with their missile program.

In June 1973, 20 MiG-21 pilots and 19 ground crew members from the Korean People’s Air Force were sent to Egypt to train the Egyptian pilots. When the Yom Kippur War broke out on 6th October 1973, the DPRK’s pilots (joined by others that arrived later) supported Egyptian troops against the Israeli Defense Force.

This was only the last of a series of diplomatic and military trades between the Arab country and the small Asian country; and it was a good excuse to ask a favor to Egypt, with Kim Il-sung requesting Soviet-produced SRBMs from Egypt. Some sources claim that the missiles were received in 1976 while other claims they were received by Korea in 1981. Despite the discordant sources, Egyptian president Sadat agreed to sell to the DPRK SCUD-B missiles received from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s for use against Israel. It seems that the agreement was not signed until 1981.

The Short-Range Ballistic Missiles received from Egypt were the R-17E ‘Elbrus’ (also known as 8K14E, or with the NATO name SS-1C SCUD-B). These were purchased together with a Soviet-made TEL, a MAZ-543P. A missile production factory, Factory 125 in P’yŏngyang, the Research and Development Institute in Sanum-dong, and the Musudan-ri Launch Facility were also set up in the DPRK at that time with the help of Soviet Union, which by the early 1980s changed had changed their policy about helping Korea in its missile program.

It should be noted, however, that a Korean defector claimed that in 1972, 20 SCUD-Bs were provided by the Soviet Union in exchange for the secret material found aboard the USS Pueblo in 1968, which was provided by the DPRK to the USSR. This claim however has never been confirmed, and in fact, in the 1970s and early 1980s, no SCUD-B tests were reported, and it is very likely that his information was a misidentification or totally false.

The R-17E had a slow process of reverse engineering which led DPRK engineers to develop a slightly modified domestic version, which was christened Hwasŏng-5, the first SRBM produced by DPRK. To finance the reverse engineering program, funds were allocated from Islamic Republic of Iran. Prime Minister Mir-Hosein Musavi and Defense Minister Colonel Mohammad Salimi in October 1983, signed an agreement with North Korea to finance the Korean program in exchange for receiving missiles when the program concluded.

In 1984, the first Korean copies of the R-17E were produced and the first test launch took place in April of the same year with some others occurring for the rest of the year, with at least two failures. It seems that all the R-17E in Korean arsenals were dismantled and studied to copy their components, even if some statements hypothesize that some missiles tested in 1984 were R-17Es, and were launched to confuse the analysts on the real results of the missile program. Incredibly, the first official appearance of the Hwasŏng-5 was on 7th April 2007 and a year after one camouflaged Hwasŏng-5 was shown to a Myanmar delegation.

The first version, however, saw a very limited pilot production and was replaced by a new version of the Hwasŏng-5 in 1985, when the full scale production also started.

This version had a length of about 12 meters (39 feet), a diameter of about 0.8 meters (2.6 feet) and a range of 330-340 km or 205-211 miles (compared to 300 km -186 miles – of the R-17E) and a 1,000 kg warhead that could be standard High Explosive, Cluster, Chemical and probably even Biological. The Hwasŏng-5 was produced until 1989 when it was replaced by the Hwasŏng-6. The number of Hwasŏng-5s produced is unknown.

The Hwasŏng-6 was developed on the basis of the Hwasŏng-5 starting in 1987, when Korean engineers began working on the missile guidance system to reduce the Circular Error Probable (CEP), the maximum distance the missile could miss the target.

According to North Korean sources, the CEP of the Hwasŏng-6 was decreased from several hundred meters of the Hwasŏng-5 to 50 meters (164 feet). The increased accuracy of the missile allowed the warhead to be decreased to 750 kg (1,653 lb), and increased to size of the rocket’s fuel tanks which brought the estimated total range to 500-700 km (310-434 miles).

The first test of the Hwasŏng-6 took place in 1988, immediately after which the assembly lines were modified, and mass production began in 1989. According to some Western estimates, in 1999, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was estimated to have produced 600 to 1,000 Hwasŏng-6, of which 300 to 500 had been exported, and 300 to 500 were in service with the Korean People’s Army Strategic Rocket Force, and 25 were used in tests.

The Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 enabled the DPRK to work on its missile program by providing a good deal of knowledge, and laying the foundation for the Korean People’s Army to become independent of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in the development of Ballistic Missiles.

1990s Development: New Leader, New Threats

The new decade brought a number of changes to the DPRK: first, though not the most important, the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed a few years later by the death of Kim Il-sung. On 8th July 1994 North Korea’s Great Leader Kim Il-sung died suddenly from a heart attack leaving his first-born son Kim Jong-il, the leader of the nation which, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, had been almost completely isolated. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the cessation of the supply of wheat and other edibles to Korea drastically decreasing the food supply in the country, which was also due to several crop damage recorded in the late 80s and early 90s. The famine occurred between 1994 to 1998 and is known in Korea as the Arduous March which caused an estimated number of 240,000 to 3,5 millions of deaths from starvation or hunger-related illnesses. Kim Jong-il instead of investing funds in agricultural growth to get out of famine, launched the Songun policy, a sort of “Military-First” policy aimed at improving North Korean military capabilities at the expense of the population.

This increased Western fears of Kim Jong-il, who was seen as an unscrupulous dictator and thus capable of starting a war against South Korea. South Korean and US analysts were already predicting that he was a much more dangerous character than his father because of a number of bombings against South Korea that had occurred in previous years, under his initiative. These included the Rangoon Bombing of 9th October 1983, an attempt to kill the South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan, and the Korean Air Flight 858 Bombing on 29th November 1987 to intimidate travelers to the South Korean Olympic Games.

The new decade did not bring only bad news to Korea, however. The destabilization of the Soviet Union in 1989 allowed Korea to bring some Soviet scientists closer to its cause on the pretext of lack of work, if the Cold War ended. In April 1991 Korean agents contacted Soviet solid-state physicist Anatoliy Rubtsov in Beijing during a meeting. They offered to Rubtsov to recruit Soviet physicists and scientists for them in the Soviet Union, in exchange for compensation from the North Korean embassy in Moscow. The proposal was attractive, and it was clear that the Soviet Union would not last long, and so Rubtsov accepted.

Dr. Rubtsov began recruiting Soviet strategic weapons specialists at the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau in Miass in February 1992. His offers to work in Korea were quite interesting, with monthly salaries ranging from $1,500 to $4,000 to work on North Korean missile and nuclear programs; however, the program included assistance to other unknown nations, likely Iran and Syria.

The total number of Russian scientists that were recruited by Dr. Rubtsov is unknown, some analysts quote the number to be about 60 scientists, but according to Russian and Western sources, at least 64 were blocked in Russian airports before their departure to Korea.

In January 1994, a Japanese newspaper claimed,quoting Russian reports, that the Russian missile specialists in DPRK were 17, including Dr. Rubtsov, plus another 9 nuclear scientists. Along with these scientists, there may have been many others since upon arrival in Korea, some not only received Korean citizenship but also changed their names.

In the late 1980s, the DPRK began development of a new missile that was essentially a scaled-up version of the earlier Hwasŏng-5 and 6: the Hwasŏng-7, also known by its unofficial Western nickname of Nodong-1 ,or Rodong-1 depends which type of translation is used.

The Hwasŏng-7 was first uncovered by the West in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri Test Launch Facility, when it was still under development and later tested 1992.

With a length of about 18 meters (59 feet), a diameter of 1.35 meters (4.1 feet), and a speed of mach 10 (12.348 km/h – 7,672 miles per hour). This new missile is a step forward compared to previous DPRK designs. There are two versions of the Hwasŏng-7: a version with a standard conical nose with a 1,000 kg warhead, and a range estimated at around 1,000 km (621 miles), and a version with a double conical nose that decreases the warhead to about 700 kg (1543 lb), but increases its range to an estimated maximum of 1,500 km (932 miles).

A big step forward for the DPRK, was that it could now threaten Japan with a missile capable of carrying a small atomic warhead.

Due to the restricted airspace of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, not many Hwasŏng-7 tests have ever been reported. However, we can take as an example the Islamic Republic of Iran which has purchased the Hwasŏng-7, and has produced several indigenous variants called Shahab-3 which, although possessing some differences with the original missiles. These have a range of 1,280 km (795 miles) for the 1,000 kg warhead version and 1,930 km (1,199 miles) with the lighter warhead. According to some estimates, the KPA-SF have about 300 Hwasŏng-7 but have fewer than 50 TELs to transport and launch them.

Kim Jong-il did not slow down the missile development started by his father, and under his leadership was presented a new missile designed Hwasŏng-8 appears to be a modified Hwasŏng-6 variant with a 500 kg (1,102 lb) warhead and a length increased to 12.4 meters (40.6 feet) allowing the missile to reach a maximum range of 700 km (1,543 miles).

Despite the characteristics suitable to hit targets in South Korea, it seems that this missile has never been used by the KPA but only by Syria that tested it in September 2000. For unknown reasons, the Hwasŏng-8 reappeared in 2021, but it seems that the name was simply given to another missile based on the first stage of the Hwasŏng-14. The new Hwasŏng-8 is claimed to be the first North Korean Hypersonic Medium-Range Ballistic Missile with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), becoming a dangerous threat for South Korea because of its speed and ability to change trajectory, which results in greater difficulty of being intercepted by anti-ballistic missile.

The Hwasŏng-9 (US Department of Defence – DoD designation KN-04) first appeared in 1994, but remained relatively unknown in the west West until 2016. This is the last missile in the Hwasŏng series to have ties to the Soviet R-17E.

The diameter has increased to just over a meter while the length is about 12.8 meters (42 feet).

The structure appears to be made of an aluminum alloy, combining the Korean copy of the Isayev RD-21 engine with a 500 kg warhead that can be launched against a target about 1,000 km away, making it a Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). Unfortunately, estimates of how many Hwasŏng-9 missiles the Korean People’s Army – Air and Anti-Air Force (KPA-AF) has in service are unknown, some estimates refer to as few as 15 while others exaggerate that number to as many as 100.

In 1999 the Korean People’s Army’s Ground Force Artillery Commands subordinate to the KPA-AF were reorganized into the new Korean People’s Army – Strategic Rocket Force (KPA-SRF).

The beginning of the new century – The Beginning of a New Missile Era for DPRK

First appearing in 2010, the first Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) to enter service was the Hwasŏng-10, which has received several unofficial nicknames including: Nodong-2, Taepodong-X, BM-25 and Musudan. In appearance the missile is really similar to the Soviet-designed R-27 ‘Zyb’ Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).

Despite its late appearance, it is certain that its development began in the mid-1990s, and is thanks to the knowledge brought to the country by the Russian scientists led by Dr. Rubtsov, now member of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Science Academy.The first presentation to Kim Jong-il took place in 2004, but was kept secret. Also the absence of missile tests for such a long time made many believe that this missile was a fake created to confuse Western secret agencies. The missile can be equipped with a conventional warhead of about 1,000 kg or with a nuclear warhead with an estimated power between 80 and 200 kilotons.

Obviously, the missile received some modifications to better suit Korean requirements.

The TEL designated to carry this missile could carry 20 tons of cargo, while the R-27 weighed only 14 tons, and so it was decided to enlarge the missile, bringing it from 8.8 meters (28.8 feet), to about 11 meters (36 feet) in length, thus increasing the previous range of about 600 km (372 miles) to 2,400 km (1,491 miles). Another big difference seems to be the fuel supply of this missile, which appears to be a hypergolic mixture of Unsymmetrical DiMethylHydrazine (UDMH) as fuel and Nitrogen TetrOxide (NTO) as oxidizer.

As for the UDMH, it was a step forward since previous Korean missiles used a Soviet version of the Tonka German-designed rocket propellant, a mixture of Nitric Acid and Kerosene also known as TM-185. As for the Oxidizer, it is unknown which was used, the original R-27 used AK-27P Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) and was very similar to the one used on the R-17 Elbrus missiles. This would have led the DPRK to not have to modify its chemical plants to produce this oxidizer, but later this hypothesis was denied.

The DPRK used a new oxidizer on the upgraded version of the Soviet R-27U missile, namely N2O4 which gave the new version a range of 3,000 km (1,864 miles).

It is true that N2O4 is more refined and powerful, and would increase the range of the missile, but it is also more difficult to handle because it is more volatile and toxic than the already extremely dangerous AK-27P IRFNA and in fact is rarely used as oxidizer for ground ballistic missiles. NTO also has a narrow range of temperatures for the liquid form, forcing the user to periodically make environmental controls.

Despite these issues, Western analysts and technicians have stated that NTO is the best match for the flight path of the Hwasŏng-10 in the June 2016 ballistic test. Despite the switch to such an oxidizer, the missile has a range of “only” 3,000 km and is unable, for example, to reach new strategic targets such as the Island of Guam, and so while it is a big step in DPRK missile development, it does not amplify its offensive capabilities.

According to Korean sources, a version of the missile was tested with solid fuel in 2016; it would be a Korean version of the Julang-1 SLBM. The use of solid fuel would increase the missile’s range to 3,500 km (2,174 miles). The Hwasŏng-10 was spotted rarely in parades and only a few test launch were made, this suggests that the Koreans had found serious problems during its testing and preferred to abandon the project when newer missiles were completed.

In the first decade of the new millennium, the DPRK continued to improve its missile program, such that after the Hwasŏng-10, the next ballistic missiles are powered by solid fuel. This has led to a substantial modification of chemical plants and fuel production, in fact, producing liquid fuels is cheaper, easier and less dangerous. This modification will certainly cost a lot to the DPRK, but it has brought a series of unprecedented innovations.

First of all, the solid fuels are more energy dense than liquid fuels guaranteeing to missile of the same size and weight to possess superior range than it were to it be using liquid fuel. They also do not need a lengthy fueling process before the launch, which makes the TEL and the missile very vulnerable to enemy attacks. Liquid fuels are more volatile and could cause catastrophic explosions in the event of an accident To avoid this, the missiles were fueled immediately before launch from specialized tanker trucks. In the case of short-range ballistic missiles, this operation can take a short time, less than an hour, but with medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, this operation can take much longer. This period of time when the TEL and the missile are stationary in the launch zone can be easily detected by enemy spy satellites, and South Korea or the United States may then decide to launch preemptive strikes to prevent its launch.

With solid-fueled missiles, the fueling phase is eliminated, dramatically decreasing the time to battery and launch the missile. At the same time, the missile does not need specialized vehicles in its vicinity, this reduces the logistics and total cost for Korea, and the risk of being intercepted by spy satellites.

The earliest example of a North Korean solid-fuel missile is the Hwasŏng-11 tactical ballistic missile ,US DoD designation KN-02, a copy of the Soviet 9K79M ‘Tochka’. Its unofficial western nickname is ‘Toksa’ (Eng: Viper). First appearing in 2004, and with still debated origins, some sources speculate that the Hwasŏng-11 may be reverse engineered from Soviet missiles purchased in the 1990s from Syria, while other sources do not exclude the possibility that the missiles were purchased from Russia itself, perhaps even with the signing of a contract for Russian development support in the late 1990s or early 2000s.

The debate becomes even more complex when considering that the South Korean Media reports the first test of the Hwasŏng-11, which was unsuccessfully tested in 2004, was based on a Soviet 9K79-1 ‘Tochka-U’ model missile that Syria did not yet possess at that time.

This claim by the South Korean media cannot be confirmed and most importantly, the missile externally is much more similar to the 9K79M rather than the 9K79-1.

As Israeli military sources stated in 1989, Syria and the DPRK cooperated in developing Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs). Thanks to this agreement, Korean engineers were able to study other solid-fuel missiles, such as the 4K44 ‘Redut’, P-20 ‘Rubezh-A’, and also the Tupolev Tu-143 ‘Reys’ Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft with solid-fuel engines, whichSyria delivered in exchange for Korean help. In 1994, the missiles were exported to Korea which began reverse engineering them.

The Hwasŏng-11 is a small missile compared to the others of the Hwasŏng series. With 6.4 meters (21 feet) long and 0.65 meters (2.1 feet) in diameter, it has a shorter range than previous missiles, reaching about 220 km (136 miles) but it has a CEP reduced to less than 100 meters (328 feet). With a payload capacity of 485 kg (1,069 lb), quite exceptional for a 2 tons missile, its warhead can be a single HE, HE submunition, thermonuclear, chemical, and probably biological. This missile is considered by the KPA-SRF as an emergency missile, capable of being launched in a short time, and thanks to its dimensions, it is easily concealable. It must be launched as close as possible from the Demilitarized Zone without being spotted, due to its short range.

Despite its reduced dimensions, this missile is considered to be a great threat from Democratic Republic of Korea missile experts. Analysts have hypothesized, that given the nuclear weapons progress of the DPRK, it could be armed with a reduced nuclear warhead of 100 kilotons, therefore being able to hit Seoul from P’yŏngyang. The big problem is that such missiles, and their TELs, are very difficult to keep under observation due to their small size and can therefore, in case of conflict, be even more dangerous than the Hwasŏng behemoths that are easier to identify and keep an eye on. The reduced dimensions also translate in cheaper production and maintenance costs,even for the TELs, meaning that North Korea could increase its arsenal of Hwasŏng-11s and launch them in salvos against South Korea as first strike weapons to saturate anti-missile defenses before the arrival of more powerful ballistic missiles.

Its maximum speed is estimated to be around mach 5 (6.174 km/h – 3,836 miles per hour), being able to reach Seoul from P’yŏngyang in only one minute and forty seconds.

Its speed is not its biggest advantage, in fact, the missile has a trajectory similar to MRLs and is difficult to intercept and counter by South Korean missile countermeasures.

Despite some speculations, the first successful test took place in 2005 and mass production likely started the following year. According to some ROKA estimates, the KPA-SRF has 100 Hwasŏng-11 missiles in active service and 30 TELs to launch them. Also according to South Korean estimates, TEL commissioning operations are around 16 minutes with 2 minutes to launch the missile and another 20 minutes to reload the TEL increasing the threat along the southern half of the peninsula.

2010s – New Leader, New Program

In the decade that saw the death of the second member of the Kim dynasty, there were developments unexpected by a nation like Korea. Kim Jong-il died from a heart attack on 17th December 2011 leaving the country in the hands of his third son, Kim Jong-un.

The money gained by illicit activities of the DPRK, such as counterfeiting foreign currency, drug trade, and other traffic allowed the new leader, Kim Jong-un to invest billions in the development of new ICBMs.

North Korea new leader Kim Jong-un inspect a Hwasŏng-12 missile on its TEL shortly before the missile test in May 2014. Source: brookings.edu https://i.imgur.com/yzjEdQ0.jpg

Going in numerical order, the Hwasŏng-12 (US DoD designation KN-17) was first spotted on 2014, some sources suspect it is a Korean copy of the Soviet two-stage liquid fuel Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile UR-100.

The new Korean missile lies somewhere between an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile and an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and has a diameter of about 1.5 meters (4.92 feet), and a height of 16 meters (52.5 feet). The propulsion of the first stage is about 100 tons of thrust, provided by 4 auxiliary engines, and an engine of 85 tons of thrust. This being the Paekdusan-1B (or Baekdusan-1B depending which type of translation is used), the Korean name of which seems to be an engine derived from the Glushko RD-250, used on some Soviet ICBMs. Initially, it was not clear how the Koreans had the opportunity to study such an engine, at first it was assumed that they had the support of Russian or Ukrainian engineers after the fall of the Soviet Union, and maybe even some samples of the engine. It is more plausible that Korea came into possession of the official blueprints, stolen from the Yuzhonoye Design Office in Ukraine. In fact, in May 2012 two North Korean citizens were arrested in Ukraine on charges of stealing confidential documents from that office. Due to the possibility of this missile hitting Guam island, many western sources nicknamed it “The Guam Killer”.

It seems however that the Korean variant is equipped with only one nozzle instead of the two of the original model, suggesting that the Korean variant actually incorporates features of the RD-250 engine, and the copy of the Soviet 4D10 engine, used on the Hwasŏng-10.

It has an estimated range of 3,700 km (2,299 miles) with a 650 kg (1,433 lbs) warhead, 4,500 km (2,796 miles) with a 500 kg (1,102 lbs) warhead, up to a maximum of 6,000 km (3,728 miles) with a lower weight warhead (to be classified as an ICBM it must reach 5,500 km – 3,417 miles thus double identification). Korean sources have presented a nuclear warhead for such a missile that, according to western analysts, could have a power of 1 megaton.

Also a great introduction is the Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) used to change the trajectory of the warhead in flight when detached from the last stage of the missile. This, driven by a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), dramatically decreases CEP, and also makes the warhead more difficult for adversary radar detectors to intercept.

According to some estimates, the warhead has a speed, during descent, from 15 to 24 Mach (18,375 km/h – 11,509 mph to 29,400 km/h – 18,414 mph).The missile entered service and quickly replaced the Hwasŏng-10 which was plagued by 4D10s engine reliability issues.

Little is known about this missile’s service history apart from that, on 1st January 2023 the Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the Thaesong Machine Factory (also known as the Jamjin missile factory), located on the western edge of P’yŏngyang. In the images published by the Korean Propaganda Ministry, there are at least 26 Hwasŏng-12 awaiting for final assembly. This meant that the missile is in service and is currently in production.

https://i.imgur.com/17GLxwE.jpg Images released by DPRK’s Propaganda Ministry on 1st January 2023 showing the North Korean leader accompanied (in second photo) by his daughter Kim Ju-ae inspecting the production lines of Hwasŏng-12 missiles. Source: KCTV https://i.imgur.com/buu8Wvh.jpg

In 2011, the People’s Republic of China supplied the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with 8, some sources mention 6, WS51200, super heavy duty trucks. Almost immediately, the UN accused China of militarily supporting the DPRK by violating international embargoes, but China argued that these vehicles were for timber harvesting.

In spite of this defense, the West looked with suspicion at this transaction, expecting something very big in the coming years in the Korean missile program.

The long-awaited moment for analysts came in April 2012, when at the Kim Il-sung 100th Birth Anniversary parade, the mockup of the Hwasŏng-13 (US DoD designation KN-08) three-stage liquid-fuel ICBM was first spotted in 2008.

The Hwasŏng-13 or NK-08 on parade in Kim Il-sung Square in April 2012. The TEL is a WS51200 super heavy duty truck converted by DPRK’s factories into a missile transporter. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/xM0inrm.jpeg

In 2012, it was labeled as part of the disinformation campaign to misdirect Western analysts.

It was later discovered that in fact, the design of this massive three stage missile was slowed down by the problem of the engines being nothing more than two 4D10 engines produced under license and coupled together. In addition to the suspicion of Chinese trucks, the West expected a missile of this size after an engine test occurred at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in September 2016.

This system gave many problems as it did on the Hwasŏng-10. It seems that the Koreans have decided to set aside the twin 4D10s in favor of the derivative of the RD-250 engine that generates less power, and decreases the range, but gives less problems in terms of reliability. This missile in the Korean terminology has not changed its name, but has become for the US DoD designation KN-08 Mod. 2 or KN-14. According to estimates, the first model of Hwasŏng-13 with twin engine 4D10s would have a maximum range of 11,500 km (7,145 miles) while the second two stage model has a range of 10,000 km (6,213 miles), placing it under the category of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. These are the first Korean ICBMs, and the first Korean missiles capable of threatening the east coast of North America, thus being able to reach far inland cities, like Chicago and Toronto. According to analysts,the range was not wide enough to hit Washington DC with a nuclear warhead presented in March 2016, estimated at 500-700 kg (1,102 – 1,543 lbs) although specifications were never provided by the Koreans.

According to the estimates of Western analysts on the first model, the first stage of the missile (which is the same as the Hwasŏng-12) would have dimensions of 17 meters (55.7 feet), the second about 2 meters (6.56 feet) while the third would have a total size of 1.25 meters (4.10 feet) for a total height of about 20 meters (65.6 feet) while the second model with the RD-250 engine, with only two stages would be shorter reaching a total height of about 16 meters (52.5 feet).

The Hwasŏng-14 (US DoD designation KN-20) first shown in 2017, has a diameter of 1.7 meters (5.5 feet) and a length of about 19 meters (62.3 feet).With its two stages, it is capable of reaching a range of 10,000 km thus able to hit the east coast of the United States. This missile was developed mostly as a testbed to develop more powerful ICBMs that will later be seen in service with the KPA-SRF. Despite its purpose, it can be armed with a 750 kg nuclear warhead with a power of 1.44 megatons, the same warhead that was tested on 3rd September 2017 during the sixth Korean nuclear test.

The two-stage Hwasŏng-15 (US DoD designation KN-22) was, up until 2020, the largest ICBM in the world, with a diameter of more than 2 meters (6.56 feet), and an overall length of about 24 meters (78 feet). It surpasses the Russian RS-24 and the Chinese DF-41 and is capable of carrying a warhead of 1,000 kg therefore, able to carry a warhead of 1.44 megatons as the Hwasŏng-14, or more likely Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV)and several decoys at a range of 13,000 km (8,077 miles), and at a maximum apogee of 4,500 km (2,796 miles).

Other hypotheses are that the missile can be equipped with Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that are nuclear (or biological) submunitions and guided by GNSS on to multiple targets. This would allow, for example, to hit more cities on the east coast of the United States, or the capitals of nations in Europe, capable of threatening the most prominent world powers.

The first stage of the Hwasŏng-15 has a two-chambered main engine developed by the RD-250 powered by a turbopump to increase thrust at takeoff that missile experts and analysts say increases thrust by 170 percent over the Hwasŏng-14.

The second stage, it is assumed, will be powered by two smaller engines developed in DPRK. Some estimations speculate that the DPRK is in possession of about 40 Hwasŏng-15s thus capable of seriously endangering the many European nations and the United States.

2020s -The Best was not Enough for Kim Jong-un

For Kim Jong-un, the Hwasŏng-15 was not enough, and on 10th October 2020 for the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea parade, he presented to the world the Hwasŏng-17 (US DoD designation KN-27). Until 24th March 2022, this missile was known in Western nations with the name of Hwasŏng-16. This is because the real name was not revealed by the Koreans until the first launch test took place on that date. Previously, analysts, news outlets, and other enthusiasts fans had named it Hwasŏng-16 continuing the chronological numeration.

This two-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM with a length of 24 to 26 meters (78 to 85 feet) and a diameter of just under 3 meters (9.84 feet) is capable of launching a 2,000 to 3,500 kilogram warhead (2.2 ton to 3.3 ton) at a range, according to some experts, of 13,000 kilometers (8,077 miles).

Its warhead is supposed to be a series of MRVs or MIRVs, with decoys, representing a threat to nations with anti-ballistic missile programs,such as the United States. Some analysts surmised that such ICBM will retain the same range as the previous Hwasŏng-15, which is enough to hit almost any target on the globe. Its increased size allows it to carry warheads of greater weight, making it significantly more destructive than the previous missile.

Supposedly, the warhead could be: a single one-megaton one or several submunitions of several tens,or hundreds, of kilotons each. To give an idea of the destructive power of such devices, the US atomic bombs that hit Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a power between 15 and 30 kilotons each.In both cases the missile was probably equipped with some decoys to deceive the tracking systems for Anti-Ballistic Missiles.

Because of the missile’s huge diameter, it has also been speculated that the missile’s first stage (approximately 17.5 m – 57.4 feet in length) could accommodate four RD-250 engines, for a power output never before developed for a Korean ICBM. Quoting US and South Korean sources, the Hwasŏng-17 is powered by a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine.

While the Hwasŏng-17 seemed to be the apotheosis of North Korean missile power, during the parade for the 75th Anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army on 8th February 2023, the new Hwasŏng-18 was presented to the crowds. The new three stage solid-fuel ICBM has an estimated length of 25 meters (82 feet) and an estimated payload of 1,5 tonnes, and an increased range of 15,000 km (9,320 miles).

The official presentation of the Hwasŏng-18 on 8th February 2023. Source: twitter.com @KPA_bot https://i.imgur.com/zqWDeIS.jpg

Last but Probably not Latest

On 2nd April 2024 the North Korean technicians tested a new missile of the Hwasŏng-16Na (‘Na’ meaning B in Hangŭl). The Hwasŏng-16Na is the second North Korean hypersonic missile with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle after the Hwasŏng-8 in 2021. The current information available on the weapon, as of publication, describes the Hwasŏng-16Na as a two-stage solid-fuel missile with a length estimated in 20-21 m and a diameter between 2.1 to 2.3 m. Probably to save up money and development, the two-stages of the Hwasŏng-16Na are the same ones of the Hwasŏng-18.

Obviously the presence of the ‘B’ in the name makes it plausible that there is another version of this missile but it is not yet confirmed or shown to mass media.

DPRK’s TEL, MEL and TEs

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has had problems, since the beginning of the development of its missile program, in developing and producing Transporter Erector Launchers, the vehicles for transporting, lifting and launching missiles. The first available were 2P16 TELs on the PT-76 amphibious light tank chassis received from the Soviet Union, along with the 3R9 Luna, 3R10 Luna-2 and 9M21 Luna-M missiles.

It does not appear, from sources, that Korea produced the TEL 2P16 under license, although they were producing the PT-76B amphibious tank under license ,according to Korean sources, since 1967 at the Sinhung Tank Plant.

Instead, it appears that the Koreans switched to wheeled vehicles such as the TEL 9P113, derived from the Soviet ZIL-135LM heavy duty truck with which they transported the Hwasŏng-1 and Hwasŏng-3, and FROG rockets supplied by the Soviet Union during the 1970s. In that period the DPRK also developed a TEL on a indigenous truck, the Sungri Number 2, a Korean copy of the Soviet KrAZ-255.

As the KrAZ-255, the Sungri 2 was an heavy duty 10-ton 6×6 off-road truck with a 1,486 cm³ engine delivering 240 hp, enough to transport the missiles of the early Hwasŏng series.

This was the first missile carrier developed in North Korea and was for some decades, the only one.

In the following years, with the arrival of the new R-17E Elbrus from Egypt, also came an example of 9P117M1 TEL on the chassis of the Soviet heavy duty truck MAZ-543P. The Korean technicians of the Second Academy of Defense Sciences together with the Korean Workers’ Party Munitions Industry Department through its subordinate Second Economic Committee ( the developer of every other Korean carrier missile to date) tried in every way to copy it, but with poor results until 1984, when the Hwasŏng-5 entered service. Mass production at the Sungri General Automotive Factory, where Korean missile carriers are still produced today, was however very slow to start. To speed up adoption, North Korea bought some Japanese Nissan UD 8×8 or HINO 8×8 trucks from China or Soviet MAZ which were then modified by the Koreans into TELs.

In other cases, vehicles will be produced in Korea but with foreign sourced parts such as Isuzu engines. To fulfill a 1985 Iranian order for a hundred missiles and 12 TELs, both 9P117M1 and modified Nissan UDs were supplied until 1987.

The original MAZ-543P, on which the 9P117 and 9P117M1 TELs were based, according to western sources, were shipped in kits and assembled in Korea.The MAZ-543 was developed by the Belarusian Minsk Prime Mover Plant, weighed 23 tons, and was 11.65 meters (38.2 feet) long, with a fully loaded top speed of about 60 km/h (37 mph) thanks to its 520 hp D12 diesel engine.

Being based on the R-17 SCUD, also the Hwasŏng-9 was transported and launched by a slightly modified MAZ-543P.

With the presentation of the Hwasŏng-7, a considerably larger weapon than the previous Hwasŏng-5 and -6 missiles, a new version of the 9P117 was introduced. It was modified in Korea and has no official name.

Such a TEL has a fifth axle of rear wheels, lengthening the size of the MAZ-543P by about two meters, from the original 11.65 meters to about 14 meters (46 feet). It does not seem that the last axle is connected to the transmission, transforming the vehicle into an 8×10, and probably decreasing the top speed. It is also noticeable the modification of the erection mechanism, that due to the lengthening of the chassis, has been moved back. These types of modifications allowed North Korean automotive technicians to gain experience in developing and producing heavy trucks, which proved extremely useful in the next decades.

For the Hwasŏng-10, the TEL used is a Korean variant of the MAZ-547W 12×12 with a launching cab in the center of the chassis, and a modified cockpit with a new top position on the right side of the vehicle. Such modifications, together with the fact that transportation from Belarus, where they are produced, would be impossible without being spotted by Western analysts and satellites, suggests that the DPRK has received them dismantled. The Korean workers had then assembled and modified them independently.

After initial testing of the Hwasŏng-10, the Koreans realized that on takeoff, the force and heat generated by the missile damaged the TELs, so steel covers were added to the wheels to prevent extensive damage. These modifications were carried over to only a few TELs while most likely keeping some unchanged for parades, in fact, such vehicles without covers have a more massive and characteristic appearance than the true TELs.

For the Hwasŏng-11, the MAZ-6303 series trucks were used. According to some sources, the vehicles were the MAZ-630308-224 6×6 or MAZ-630308-243 6×4 model produced in Belarus and derived as civilian models later modified in TELs by the North Korean. This showed once again that the DPRK had problems in producing even small TELs in the mid-2000s.

These trucks have however a great advantage, thanks to the smaller dimensions of the Hwasong-11. The missile is kept inside the launcher bay, which opens at the top to erect the launcher rail and the missile along with it. This makes storage and transport safer, and makes the vehicle much more difficult to distinguish from standard transport trucks using spy satellites.

While most of the characteristics of the vehicle remain similar or identical to those of the Belarusian model, the TEL of the Hwasong-11 has a weight of about 14 tons, a 330 hp engine, and a top speed of about 80 km/h (49.7 mph) when fully loaded.

Also used for the Hwasŏng-12, were the same versions of MAZ-547W used for the Hwasŏng-10. This suggest that the Belarusian MAZ trucks were largely sent to the DPRK in the early 2010s to guarantee an adequate number of TELs for the Hwasŏng-12 that is still produced today. It’s also possible that the Koreans slowly started to produce their own copy of this heavy duty truck, probably with the help of Belarusian or Russian technicians.

New WS51200s heavy duty trucks were used for the Hwasŏng-13 and -14. These trucks were supplied by the Chinese and had, in order to circumvent international embargoes on the sale of weapons and military material, the fictitious purpose of transporting wood and were delivered with a red coloration typical of civilian vehicles produced by Wanshan Special Vehicle.

Subsequently, the KPA has modified these vehicles for the transport of missiles with a hydraulic ramp that rises at 90°. The power developed by the missile’s engines during take-off would destroy or damage a common TEL so the Koreans had to develop an alternative solution, developing it into a Transporter Erector (TE), a vehicle that transports and lifts the missile but is not able to launch it. This would mean that the missile would have to be launched only in certain positions easily detectable by western satellites. This is why the majority of North Korean missiles, from Hwasŏng-13 onwards, have a launching pad that allows the crews a margin of maneuver on where to launch the missile, and are able to launch the missiles on unprepared terrain, and not from fixed launching positions.

The pad is erected together with the missile by the TE erection system, which then moves away. Once the commissioning operations are completed, the missile is then launched.

Another positive side of TEs is that in case of an enemy attack on the launch site, the missile carrier is not involved in the launch, improving its chance to remain unharmed, and to be used in other launches.

The WS51200 is a heavy duty truck produced by Wanshan Special Vehicle of Wanshan in China based on trucks developed by MAZ and MZKT such as the MAZ-7912 and MZKT-79221. This 20-meter-long 8-axle truck weighs 42 tons and is capable of carrying up to a maximum of about 45-50 tons of cargo.

It is equipped with Cummins Diesel KTTA19-C700, a 6-cylinder in-line engine with an output of 700 hp at 2,100 rpm 19,000 cm³. It is equipped with a direct injection pump, with a weight of 2,073 kg (4,570 lbs), and a fuel tank that can hold approximately 800 liters. At full load, its consumption is estimated at 300 liters per 100 kilometers, more or less like a MZKT-79221. Although some sources claim that this vehicle, thanks to the Cummins engine, has a range of 1,000 kilometers without specifying whether full load or not.

The power of the engine allows this juggernaut to travel at a maximum speed of 60 km/h when unloaded. Of the eight axles, the first three are steerable, the last three are counter steerable, and all six are traction, allowing the vehicle a reduced turning radius.

For the massive Hwasŏng-15, at least four WS51200s have been modified in Korea by removing the hydraulic missile lift system, the instrument panel, and cockpit and replacing them with new models. More importantly, a ninth wheel axle was added between the sixth and seventh front wheel axles, making it the largest ICBMs transport vehicle in the world, as well as the only TE ever made with 9 axles. Although the traction was changed from 16×12 to 18×12 it seems that the original engine remained unchanged, thus decreasing the TE’s top speed.

It can be assumed that perhaps more WS51200s were supplied from China, or that Korea started to produce them under license. Analysts, after seeing the modification to the Chinese heavy duty truck, assumed that in the future Korea would also eventually display independently produced heavy duty TEs, and so it happened in 2020.

An 11-axle Transporter Erector appeared for the Hwasŏng-17, a unique vehicle capable of carrying the missile with estimated weight between 80 and 150 tons. It is as of publication, the largest TEL in the world.

Given the remarkable strides made by the Korean industry, it is likely that this new heavy duty truck will be manufactured in Korea. This is confirmed in more recent years by the appearance of the new TEL for the Hwasŏng-18, a 9 axle truck that seems to be assembled in North Korea. The Hwasŏng-16Na TEL had similar characteristics to the Hwasŏng-18’s one but is shorter, with just 7 axles instead of 9. It also had a curious shaped cover for the Hypersonic glide vehicle fixed on the TEL’s cab. Both models seem derived from Chinese trucks but produced in North Korea. As satellite images suggest, at the Kusong Tank Production plants in the past years , new facilities were created to assemble these heavy trucks.

The number of TELs available to North Korea has roughly doubled in recent years, but that’s not the end of the story. The DPRK is currently decommissioning its “Soviet” TEL models, their heavy duty trucks with eight or more axles. These are heavy, and hard to produce and maintain in service. The Kim’s nation now has its attention on the MEL (Mobile Erector Launcher) models, a prime mover that pulls a trailer or a semitrailer on which the missile is mounted. These models, much more similar to the Chinese Dōngfēng carrier series than to the Soviet/Russian ones, entered service only in recent years.

In the last period, a TEL very similar to the Chinese DF-31, has been seen with a 6×4 prime mover and a 3-axle semi-trailer. It has been speculated that the prime mover used by the Korean People’s Army Strategic Rocket Force is a licensed copy, or a Korean modification of the Chinese HOWO T7H civilian prime mover. If the Korean version has similar characteristics to the Chinese one, the engine will be a copy of the MAN MC11 6-cylinder in-line diesel engine, 440 hp, 10,518 cm³ with a manual gearbox with 16 gears and a fuel tank capacity of 600 liters. Tire size 315/80R22.5, a net weight of 9,500 kg (20,944 lbs) and a maximum load of 55,000 kg (60.62 tons).A South Korean source says that this vehicle is a TIR version of the 6×6 Taebaeksan-96 licensed copy of the 6×6 KamAZ-55111 truck. This TIR is said to be a joint civilian truck project developed between Russia and Korea, and after producing a few examples with Russia, Korea exported them back home and converted them into MELs without informing the Russians.

These MELs are easier to produce, easier to maintain, are easier to conceal, and are cheaper, necessary for an industry like Korea that, until the late 2010s, had difficulty producing heavy duty missile carriers on its own. Some were used in multiple parades to show Kim Jong-un and the Korean population Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and therefore not launchable from TELs or MELs, such as the Pukguksong. Others were equipped with canisters of about 2 meters in diameter, and therefore are unable to carry the latest ICBMs of the Hwasŏng series, while others have been seen carrying Hwasŏng-14, and not being able to launch them. It is assumed that they are not used by the KPA only as parade vehicles, but can also act as “ammunition carriers” following the TEs,reloading them after the first launch.

Another example of missile carriers used by the DPRK are tracked TELs on tank chassis which, although it seems anachronistic, the DPRK has less difficulty in producing instead of standard wheeled TELs. The advantages of the TELs on tank chassis are, first of all, the ease of production compared to the production of TELs of Belarusian or Chinese origin, and allow for the possibility to cross rougher terrain that wheeled vehicles cannot overcome, thus increasing the number of launch sites and making it more difficult for spy satellites to identify all the favorable positions.

The disadvantages with respect to wheeled TELs are that the increased vibrations of a tracked chassis, that could damage the sensitive electronics of Korean missiles, and the creation of a new tracked vehicle production line that could slow down the already slow Ch’ŏnma and Songun-915 production lines.

These TELs are a good idea if they are converted from old disused tank hulls, as the Soviet Union did in the 1960s by converting the now obsolete IS-2 Mod. 1944 into renamed 2P19 TELs that mounted R-17 Elbrus missiles, and became the 8U218 missile complex.

The experienced crews of these TELs and TEs are considered invaluable by the KPA and prior to each test launch they are removed to a safe distance along with their vehicles to avoid losing them in accidents. Training such crews requires time and obviously a very high cost and it is not easy for Korea to replace them or their carriers in case of an accident, even now that Korea has reached a certain autonomy in the production of missile carriers.

Export

Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is often referred to as the “Hermit Kingdom” by the Western media, Korea has more exports than can be expected, in 1985 it signed a contract with Iran for the purchase of an unspecified number of Hwasŏng-5 ranging (according to western sources) from a minimum of 90 to a maximum of 100, and 12 TELs for a total of 500 million USD. Part of the deal was also to help Iran develop its own production line for the autonomous production of SRBMs. The first missiles arrived in Iran in 1985, beginning a reverse engineering program that led the Iranians to produce their first copy of the Hwasŏng-5, the Shahab-1 in 1987. By the same year, all missiles and TELs ordered by Iran had been delivered.

Two years later, in 1989, the United Arab Emirates purchased a number of Hwasŏng-5 and some MLRS but due to “unsatisfactory quality” according to some sources or, due to US pressure according to other sources, decommissioned them very quickly.

In 2008, Myanmar and the DPRK signed a contract for a missile technology transfer so that Myanmar could also develop its own missile program. According to some analysts, and the People’s Republic of China, the DPRK delivered the Hwasŏng-5 to Myanmar to familiarize themselves with the operation of the missiles. The North Korean-Myanmar relationship was confirmed by the weapon’s arrival in Myanmar’s harbors, with the merchant ships being loaded not only with missiles, but also small arms and artillery rockets.

The Hwasŏng-6 was exported to Iran in the latter half of the 1980s, before being studied and then produced under license under the name of Shahab-2 from 1990 onwards.

In January 1993, General Mohsen Rezaee Commander of Iranian Revolution Guard Corps went to P’yŏngyang to sign a 2.7 billion dollars contract purchasing 300 Korean SRBMs for Iranian oil.

A few Hwasŏng-6 were sent to Syria to be studied and produced under license with the support of the People’s Republic of China. In 1996, some Syrian technicians went to Korea for 2 weeks to study missile development techniques directly from Korean technicians.

Some missiles have been supplied to Yemen since the 1990s. In 2002, the North Korean merchant ship ‘So San’ was boarded in the Arabian Sea, after being detained by Spanish and US warships. In the cargo bay, covered by bags of concrete, there were 15 Hwasŏng-5 or 6 SRBMs. However the US did not have the authority to seize the cargo and the ship docked in Yemen. This was not the only North Korean merchant ship who arrived in Yemen, and in the years to follow, some unconfirmed sources claimed a total number of 45 North Korean Hwasŏngs arrived in Yemen.

In 2009, some Hwasŏng-6 were supplied to Myanmar for the development of its own variant but nothing is known about this deal. According to SIPRI, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam purchased a total of 25 Hwasŏng-6 in 1997. An unsurprising development as Vietnam has a limited missile arsenal, and is unable to produce them. Unfortunately, no other news about their service is available. To date, the only Vietnamese unit using ballistic missiles is the 490th Missile Brigade, which had in service not only the Hwasŏng-6, but also the Soviet R-17 Elbrus variants known in west as SCUD-B and SCUD-C, fielding an unknown number of examples. For what is currently known, Vietnam is only equipped with conventional high-explosive warheads, and as Army Recognition and Defence Leaders reports, in 2023, Vietnam started upgrading its SCUD fleet with “foreign partners” to reduce the missile’s original CEP.

In 1999, according to US intelligence, Pakistan signed a contract with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the development of a MRBM.Beginning in 1993, some North Korean scientists and engineers arrived in Pakistan and began working with the Pakistani Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) to aid in the development of a new MRBM. The work proceeded expeditiously, though against strong international pressure for the Pakistanis to give up Korean aid.

In April 1998, the first launch of the missile was made 120 km from Islamabad. The Ghauri reached 350 km of apogee but during the re-entry, the conical nose of the missile melted due to the heat and the test failed. The new Pakistani administration, under international pressure, exploited the failure of the test, kicking North Korean missile engineers out of the country and ordering the KRL to continue development.

By 2003, the tests were completed and the missile, with the name Ghauri-I, officially entered service with the Pakistan Army. The Ghauri-I had a maximum range of 1,500 km, a payload of 750 kg of conventional explosive or nuclear warhead and a total weight of 15.8 tonnes. It is estimated that Pakistan has 30 Ghauri-I missiles in service and the tests of the newer all-Pakistani variant occurred in 2004, 2010, 2012 and 2015. The Circular Error Probable (CEP) is estimated at 190 meters. Now, the Ghauri-I is substituted in first strike units from its upgraded versions: the Ghauri-II and Ghauri-III.

In the 1990s, Iran also began to develop its own version of the missile nicknamed Shahab-3, which was tested from 1998, and entered service in 2003. There are four different versions of this missile, the first one is not very different from the original Korean version, while the last one has a range of 2,000 km (1,242 miles) and a warhead composed of 5 submunitions of 280 kg each (617 lbs).

Egypt and Libya have also had or have in service a number of Hwasŏng-7. Of the Egyptian missiles not much is known, while the Libyan ones were dismantled in 2003 when dictator Mu’ammar Gaddafi agreed to the disarmament of most of the weapons of mass destruction in his country. Some analysts were skeptical of the complete destruction of this arsenal but, there is no evidence of Hwasŏng-7 launches during the Libyan Civil War or subsequent fighting between Libyan militias, therefore, we can assume that Libyan Hwasŏng were all destroyed by 2004.

Not a single Hwasŏng-9 has been exported beyond the Korean borders, while the last missile known to have been exported is the Hwasŏng-10.Some sources and rumors have claimed that the Hwasŏng-10 has been sold to Iran. It is correct to say that such a missile has been proposed for export, in fact in the report of a Myanmar delegation that visited several military facilities and factories in the DPRK in 2008, made a reference to a SCUD-F with a range of 3,000 kilometers. This more or less confirms the maximum range of the Hwasŏng-10, and also that such a missile has been proposed for export.

In 2010, it seems that Iran has purchased 19 Hwasŏng-10 missiles according to a leaked classified report from the US State Department, even if the number has never been confirmed, and at first it was thought that this information was false since Iran did not show anything similar until 2017. In January, an MRBM with similar characteristics to the Korean missile nicknamed by the Iranians Khorramshahr, from the name of an Iranian city, was tested. According to some analysts this missile is the direct descendant of the Hwasong-10.

In the 2000s, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq bought parts of Korean missiles in order to integrate them into their missile development. A 9 million USD contract was purchased for parts such as guidance and control systems, inertial navigation systems, on-board computers, gyroscopes, and accelerometers that were probably used on the Al-Fat’h and Al-Samud missiles. The parts were taken by ship to Syria and from there were delivered to the Iraqis. It does not appear that any Korean parts were found in any of the Iraqi missile facilities by the US in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, so either they never arrived in Iraq or the Iraqis had already integrated them.

Brief Korean Hwasŏng Tests

The first documented North Korean missile test occurred in 1984 when the Hwasŏng-5 was successfully tested while a few years later the Hwasŏng-6 was tested.

In 1990 the Hwasŏng-7 was tested for the first time, resulting in a successful launch test. On 29th-30th May 1993, another missile test of the Hwasŏng-7 was conducted and launched from the Hwadae missile base near Wonsan in the Sea of Japan to demonstrate it to the Iranian delegation that had come to Korea.

In 1994 Kim Il-sung, father of the nation, died. Under his government, in 9 years a total of 15 missile tests were made, of which only the one in 1993 created international problems.

Since 1994 and under Kim Jong-il, there have been 16 missile tests, in 2005 some SRBMs of the Hwasŏng series were launched in the Sea of Japan causing alarm among Western analysts.

Between the 2nd and 4th of July 2009, a total of 9 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles and two Hwasŏng-7 were launched into the Sea of Japan in violation of a UN Security Council resolution. The incident created minimal international tension with the Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, Russia and China condemning such provocative testing.

With the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, there has been an increase in terms of Korean missile tests, in fact, from 1984 to 2011 31 missile tests were carried out against 119 tests carried out by Kim Jong-un, third of the Kim dynasty from 2011 until 2022. (in this number are counted also tests of missiles not belonging to the Hwasŏng series)

Between 18th and 20th May 2013, a couple of weeks after the issuance of the sentence to the US student Kenneth Bae arrested months earlier, Korea began another provocation by launching a total of six Hwasŏng-11 in the Sea of Japan.

On 27th February 2014, five Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were launched from Kittaeryong Missile Base in protest of joint exercises between the US Army and the Republic Of Korea Army. On 3rd March of the same year, two SRBMs were launched from Wonsan Kalma International Airport likely to test the ability to launch missiles from airstrips.

On 26th March 2014, in conjunction with an International meeting in Netherlands to discuss the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear threat, as a show of force the DPRK launched 2 Hwasŏng-7s. These missiles flew about 500 km (310 miles) into the Sea of Japan.

From 26th-29th June 2014, North Korea launched three SRBMs into the Sea of Japan landing them near the sea border with South Korea. Between 2nd and 13th July of the same year, South Korea and Japan accused the DPRK of launching six SRBMs in three separate dual launches and then crashing them into the Sea. The missiles were launched from Kaesong and Hwangju.

On 14th August 2014 a Hwasŏng-11 was launched from Wonsan while Pope Francis was visiting South Korea. In September, another Hwasŏng-11 was launched from Wonsan.

On 8th February 2015, five Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were launched into the Sea of Japan; they flew less than 200 km (124 miles) before crashing into the sea.

On March 2, SRBMs were launched into the sea as a protest to a large joint military exercise between Republic Of Korea Army and US Army. On the 5th of April, SRBMs were launched from the West Coast into the Yellow Sea; the missiles flew about 100 km (62 miles).

In 2016, several missile tests were reported, the first one was on February 7, when both South Korea and Japan detected a missile of unknown model, probably a Hwasŏng-9 from the Dongchang-ri launch site, neither South Korea nor Japan released more details.

On March 10 the DPRK launched two Short-Range Ballistic Missiles which flew about 350 km (217 miles) and crashed into the sea. On 18th March 2016 two Hwasŏng-7 were launched traveling about 600 km (372 miles) before crashing.

On 15th April 2016 the Hwasŏng-10 was tested for the first time but the test was a failure.

On 18th April and 31st May there were tests of 3 more Hwasŏng-10 without success.

On 22nd June 2016 there was the first successful missile test of the Hwasŏng-10, the missile reached an altitude of over 700 km (434 miles) and then fell into the sea.

On 18th July 2016, two SRBMs (probably Hwasŏng-6) and one Hwasŏng-7 were launched into the Sea of Japan.

On 2nd August 2016, 2 Hwasŏng-7 were launched of which one flew 1,000 km (621 miles) and ended up in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Japan. In September, a few SRBMs were launched to coincide with the end of the G20 that year.

In October 2 more Hwasŏng-10 tests failed.

In March 2017, four Hwasŏng-6 modified to have increased range, were tested by launching them towards Japan crashing 250 km (155 miles) off the Japanese coast.

On 22th March Hwasŏng-10 was tested again, the test failed.

On 5th April 2017 a Hwasŏng-12 was tested which, launched from Simpo Base flew about 50 km (31 miles) before crashing into the ocean.

On 16th April another Hwasŏng-12 was tested from Simpo Base, the launch failed on takeoff.

On 29th April, another Hwasŏng-12 missile exploded during a test.

On 15th May 2017, another Hwasŏng-12 was tested, this time successfully, the missile flew nearly 500 km (310 miles) crashing into the Sea of Japan.

On 29th May, an SRBM was launched.

On 4th June the Hwasŏng-14, the first North Korean ICBM tested, was successfully tested, another test on 28th 2017 June was again a success, flying the missile for 45 minutes.

In August other tests were done, the first one on 25th August where three SRBMs were launched and the second one on the 28th when a missile, probably Hwasŏng-12 flew 2,000 km (1,242 miles) over Japan at 400 km (248 miles) altitude. Always in 2017 a missile Hwasong-15 flew for 53 minutes at an altitude of about 4,475 km (2,780 miles) and with a range of 950 km (590 miles).

In 2018, there was a pause in missile launches given the rapprochement of international relations between South Korea, DPRK, and the United States with the Summit between the US President Donald J. Trump and Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore on 12th June 2018.

Due to the failure of the second summit between the two on 28th February 2019 in Hanoi, Vietnam, missile testing resumed.

On 4th May 2019 some Short-Range Ballistic Missiles were tested, ending up in the Sea of Japan.

In the following months more missiles were tested, dozens of KN-23 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles, and a Pukguksong-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile in October.

In 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic testing was less sparse within testing of a few SRBMs in March.

On 21st March 2021 another test of two missiles, probably Hwasŏng-11 was successfully completed.

On 24th March 2022, when nearly all the western media outlets were focused on the Russo-Ukrainian war, tests of the new Hwasŏng-17 were carried out at the presence of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un.In this test, the Hwasŏng-17 was launched by its TE from the P’yŏngyang International Airport, where it flew for 67.5 minutes at a distance of 1,090 km (677 miles) and at a maximum altitude of 6,248.5 km (3,882 miles) and accurately hit a target in the sea, near Aomori, Japan, as reported by North Korean Central National Television. This information was confirmed by Japan and South Korea’s analysts, which note that this is the longest North Korean launch ever, even more than North Korea’s last ICBM test in 2017.

The Hwasŏng-17 during erection on the 24th March 2022 on one of the P’yŏngyang International Airport’s auxiliary airstrips. Source: KCNA https://i.imgur.com/knABqw6.jpeg

On 26th November 2023, after a complex period for the Democratic People Republic of Korea, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un participated to view an Hwasŏng-17 launch. On this occasion, he also presented to the North Korean population and to the world his young daughter, Kim Ju-ae.

The North Korean Central National Television claimed that in the test, the Hwasŏng-17 had flown for 999,2 km (620 miles) with an apogee of over 6,000 km and for a flight time of 68 minutes.

On 2nd April 2024 the Hwasŏng-16Na was first flight tested. According to North Korean sources it flew for 1,000 km in 10 minutes (6,000 km/h) whileaccording to South Korean sources the maximum distance was 600 km. Japanese reported an altitude of 650 km beingreached, and confirmed a maximum apogee reached of 101 km. After reaching the maximum apogee, the glide vehicle flew to a height of 72.3 km, the first to land in the Japanese Sea (this was also confirmed by Japanese sources).

The total number of tests in this list are only tests of Hwasŏng series missiles.

From 1984 to 2021, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted 151 missile tests including Hwasŏng series missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, space launches, and other land-based missiles not part of the Hwasŏng series.In 37 years, 15 tests were completed under Kim Il-sung’s government, 16 under Kim Jong-il and a total of 120 under Kim Jong-un’s government for an 80% of missile tests in the last 10 years.

North Korean Hwasŏng-3 loaded on a Soviet-produced 9P113 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-5 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-6 loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher.

North Korean Hwasŏng-7 (second version) loaded on a Belarusian-produced 9P117M1 Transporter Erector Launcher modified in North Korea to fit the new missile.

North Korean Hwasŏng-11 loaded on a Belarusian-produced MAZ-630308 Transporter Erector Launcher.

Illustrations

Credits

Written by Arturo Giusti

Edited by Henry H.

Illustrated by Carpaticus

Sources:

The Armed Forces of North Korea, On The Path Of Songun – Stijn Mitzer & Joost Oliemans

Reuters; various

autoopt.ru; Product Catalog

sinotruk.com; Product Catalog

missilethreat.csis.org

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 30 September 2004, Volume 2 – Central Intelligence Agency

Korean People’s Army Journal Volume 1 Number 2 – Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.