After three years of extreme tension between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel in October 1973, Egyptian president Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat signed an agreement with the Arab Republic of Syria to launch a combined attack on the State of Israel. The war began on the 6th October 1973 and lasted for 19 days. Not many know that 20 pilots of the Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Force (KPAAF) were involved in Egyptian air force operations.

Egyptian-Korean Relations

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had always maintained a good relationship with the Arab Republic of Egypt, beginning in the early 1950s.The Asian country always supported the position of the former Egyptian president ,Nasser, to nationalize the Suez Canal, and financially helped the country during the Suez Crisis of 1956. The conflict saw the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launch an attack in the Sinai peninsula, supported by British and French forces that simultaneously landed in Port Said, Egypt. On 3rd November 1956, the DPRK issued a statement of solidarity with Egypt and sent the symbolic figure of 60,000 DPRK’s Wons (about 5,000 USD) to support the Egyptian Army. Between 1957 and 1963 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Arab Republic of Egypt signed some cultural and commercial agreements and opened in the capital cities of both countries.

During the 1960s, Egypt maintained an unclear relationship with North Korea, abstaining from some votes in favor of the DPRK during United Nations meetings until 1962, when Israel, and the Republic of Korea chose not to pursue diplomatic and trade relations.

After the Six Days War, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sent Egypt 5,000 tons of cereals as aid. In response, Egyptian delegations supported the North Korean regime at the United Nations meetings and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meetings.

The Non-Aligned Movement was created after a meeting in Belgrade, in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 1st September 1961. Among its founders was Egyptian president Nasser, Yugoslavian leader Tito, Indian Prime Minister, Ghanaian President and Indonesian President. This movement was created because, after the Korean War, some nations did not want to take sides against Cold War opponents and be drawn into potential conflicts. In 1975 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea joined the movement with Egyptian support.

Egyptian MiG-21

The Arab Republic of Egypt received its first MiG-21s from the Soviets in 1963. By the end of that year, the Egyptian Air Force had in its service a total of 60 MiG-21F-13s. These were followed, until the end of the decade, by 40 or 50 MiG-21PFs.

The MiG-21F-13 was an upgraded version of the MiG-21 platform with upgraded on-board radar, new optics, a single 30 mm cannon and the possibility to load 2 Vympel K-13 short-range infrared homing Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs). In the designation, the ‘F’ refers to ‘Forsirovannyy’ (English: Uprated) and ‘13’ refers to the K-13 missiles.
The MiG-21PF was a heavily updated version of the MiG-21 bringing it to the “Second Generation” of fighters. The upgrades included new turbojet engine and rails for RS-2US Adams instead of K-13 missiles.

The first deployment of the Egyptian MiGs was during the Six Days War where the majority of them were destroyed at their airfields by Israeli preemptive air attacks. The few brave Egyptian pilots that had the possibility to take off in these hours were quickly overwhelmed by better-trained Israeli pilots. The Israeli attack was divided in 4 different waves; in the first one, Israeli pilots claimed to have shot down 8 Egyptian planes, 7 of which were MiG-21s while Egypt had claimed 5 planes shot down by MiG-21PFs.In the second wave, Israeli pilots claimed 4 MiG-21s shot down. At the end of the attacks, Egypt had lost about 100 MiG-21s out of 110 owned by its Air Force.

The few surviving MiG-21s were used in the last days of war to try and slow down the Israeli ground forces in the Sinai peninsula. They were however, only armed with unguided 57 mm rockets. These few MiGs were manned by the surviving pilots of the different squadrons whose aircraft had been lost the previous days. Some of them were deployed for air defense in an air base near Cairo, while the rest were deployed at Inshas air base, north of Cairo, and took part in the attacks against Israeli ground force Israeli forces.

After the Six Days War, Egypt quickly restored its MiG-21 inventory, buying some second-hand MiG from the Soviet Union, and others from Algeria.

About a month after the war, on 15th July 1967, Egyptian MiGs shot down an Israeli Mirage III CJ over Sinai skies at the cost of two MiGs. By the end of 1968, the Egyptian Air Force had in service 115 MiG-21s that were extensively used against Israeli Air Force Mirages, with results still debated today. The Egyptian pilots were not as well trained as the Israeli pilots, and this often led to heavy losses when flying against the IAF.

1969 was a year full of changes for the Egyptian Air Force, in the early months of the year, the radar equipped MiG-21PFMs were equipped with GP-9 gun pods, delivered by the Soviet Union. The gun pods were a great advantage for the MiGs giving them more possibilities of success in dog-fights where the distances between the planes were less than 1,000 meters, where their R-3S missiles (AA-2 Atoll) were less useful.

In late 1969, the MiG-21Ms, with four missile rails and a new internal 23 mm GSh-23L automatic cannon arrived from the Soviet Union. On the 11th of September 1969, Egyptian MiG-21 pilots shot down 3 Israeli Mirages III, two of those manned by Israeli veterans. This battle was widely publicized in Egypt, but the Egyptian government did not mention that to shoot down the three Israeli planes, Egypt lost 5 MiGs and 3 other planes. Between February and March 1970, a total of 80 MiG-21MFs with improved radars and new engines arrived in Egypt.

According to a Soviet report, from July to December 1969, during the War of Attrition fought between the Six Days War and the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian Air Force lost 72 war planes, 53 of them shot down by Israeli forces. The majority of them were MiG-21s. Due to the poor results of the Egyptian Air Force in the War of Attrition, Egyptian President Nasser was forced to ask the Soviet Union for more help. In March 1970, the first Soviet pilots, and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) battery technicians, arrived in Egypt.

On the 13th of April 1970, there was the first Soviet-Israeli air battle in which two MiG-21MFs manned by Soviet pilots, attacked two Israeli F-4 Phantom II. It is not clear if the Israeli planes were shot down or not. In a similar situation, 5 days later, a Soviet MiG-21MF damaged an Israeli RF-4E recon plane. From March to August of 1970, Egypt, thanks to Soviet forces deployed in the country, shot down 8 Israeli planes with S-125 (NATO code SA-3 Goa) Surface-to-Air Missiles, and 13 other planes were shot down by MiG-21s. Egypt would only lose 5 MiG-21s.

In October 1973, the Egyptian Air Force had at its disposal 770 combat aircraft of which about 150 of these were in storage. In total they could rely on 620 aircraft and over 100 helicopters. The planes were: 220 MiG-21s, 200 MiG-17 Fighter bombers, 120 Su-7 Fighter bombers, 18 Tupolev Tu-16 Bombers, 40-50 Il-14 and An-12 Cargo planes, 10 Il-28 Bombers and 100-140 MiL Mi-1; Mi-4; Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. These were integrated with a squadron of MiG-21F-13 from Algeria, another squadron of MiG-21PFs from Algeria that was mainly deployed to defend Cairo region skies, and some Pakistani Instructors that flew some Egyptian MiGs during the war.

The Soviet MiG-21 was less modern than the American F-4 air superiority fighter, although it was more maneuverable than the early models of the Phantom and was much simpler to keep running. During the air combat in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the difference was often made by the pilot’s experience, giving an advantage to the Israeli pilots who, in some cases, had more experience than the US pilots deployed in Vietnam. The Egyptian pilots had, for the most part, deficient training and lacked experience.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was also familiar with the MiG 21, and received its first MiG-21F-13’s in late 1962, receiving more until 1965 for a total of 14 fighters. In the following years, many MiG-21PFMs arrived in the Asian country. This was a big step forward for the Korean Air Force as the MiG-21s introduced the possibility for the Korean pilots to use Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) such as the R-3S (AA-2 Atoll) infrared homing missiles. The later MiG-21PFM would give them the ability to to use both the R-3S and the RS-2U, also known as Kaliningrad K-5M (NATO Code AA-1 Alkali), beam-riding guided missile.

Korean Squadron in Egypt

After the deterioration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the new Egyptian president Sadat chased the Soviet advisors out of the country and stopped buying their military equipment, and this decision led to a very serious problem.

Not only were Soviet advisors deployed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, but also instructors, the technicians of Surface-to-Air Missiles batteries, and even some combat pilots.

Roughly 30% of the 400 Egyptian combat planes were manned by Soviet pilots and even the 20% of the SAM batteries were manned by Soviets that were leaving the country.

Few Egyptian pilots were well trained, and many had to finish their training very hastily due to the expatriation of Soviet trainers. The last Soviet soldiers deployed in Egypt left the country in July 1973.

The loss of Soviet expertise would force the Egyptians to look elsewhere for training and technical advisors. Between 1st to 7th March 1973 a delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea led by Kang Ryang-uk, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, visited Egypt. It was during this visit that Egyptian Military’s Chief of Staff, Saad Al Shazly, asked the Korean politician to help Egypt by sending a single squadron of pilots to give to the Egyptian pilots reliable combat training.

After solving the bureaucratic problems, starting from 6th to 13th April 1973, General Al Shazly went to the DPRK, and during his trip he met Korean leader Kim Il-sung. They finalized the plan and signed an agreement, and a few months later the Korean pilots arrived in the country. For the Korean pilots, it was not difficult to fly the Egyptian aircraft because they were also flying the same variants of the MiG-21 in Korea. Even for the Korean SAM battery technicians, it was not a problem to use the Egyptian SAM batteries because, in Korea, they operated S-75 and the HQ-2, their Chinese copy, which proved similar enough to the systems in Egyptian service.

A total of 20 pilots, 8 ground crew guides, 5 translators, 3 administrative staffers, 1 political commissar, 1 military doctor, and 1 military chief left Korea, reaching Moscow dressed as foreign students, and arrived in Egypt in late June. They started their deployment in Bir Alida air base in southern Egypt in July 1973, the same month that Soviet forces abandoned the country.

These events are mentioned in an article written by analyst Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. about the DPRK’s deployment in other nations in the KPA Journal magazine. The analyst mentions the arrival of 30 pilots while other less reliable sources like newspaper articles sometimes claim 10 pilots arrived in Egypt. However, the commander of this small Korean squadron was Major General Cho Myong-rok (also transliterated as Jo Myong Rok). The numbers were also confirmed by Captain Lee Chol-su, a North Korean defector pilot who crossed the Korean Demilitarized Zone in a MiG-19 in May 1996. During some interviews, Capt. Chol-su confirmed the source of the 20 pilots.

Although it may seem strange today, North Korea had well trained pilots before the fall of the Soviet Union, when their economy could support sizable training programs. Many were trained by North Korean veterans that participated in the Korean War, Soviet advisors, or even at facilities in the Soviet Union together with Soviet rookies. An unknown number of the pilots under Cho Myong-rok were veterans, who had already seen combat in Vietnam, where they flew Vietnamese planes against the United States Air Force. Some of them had more than 2,000 flight hours on the MiG-21. The news of the Korean pilots in Egypt did not remain secret for long.

On 15th August 1973, the Israeli Military Command reported that Israeli Intelligence discovered that between 10 and 20 Korean pilots were flying Egyptian fighter planes. This Israeli claim was confirmed on the same day by the US State Department that also stated that probably they were more than 20.

12 days after the war broke out, on 18th October 1973, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced officially that they would send a contingent of pilots to support the Arab Coalition air forces. The KPA Journal states that a North Korean defector, during an interrogation, said that 500 North Korean pilots were sent to Egypt and Syria to pilot their planes after the DPRK’s announcement. This seems like an exaggerated number, as before the war, Egypt had only 620 planes and a maximum of 140 helicopters, while Syria had 200 MIG-21s, 80 MIG-17s, 80 SU-7s and 36 MiL Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. If this statement is true, the DPRK alone had sent enough pilots to fly about 30% of the Arab Coalition planes and helicopters. The number probably also included ground crews, translators, chiefs, officers, and other assorted personnel.

The Korean pilots left Egypt shortly after the war probably between late 1973 to early 1974 leaving the Arab country with a small contingent of veteran pilots for training. There is little information about Korean People’s Army Air Force pilots during the Yom Kippur war, even if some unconfirmed reports mention the deployment of Korean pilots that flew Egyptian and Syrian planes. South Korean newspaper, Kyong Hyang Shimbun, states that the Israeli Ministry of Defence declared that Korean pilots flew 8 MiG-21s during the war and shot down several Israeli F-4 Phantoms, however, this information is not confirmed.

Engagement of 6th December 1973

On 6th December 1973, two Israeli F-4E ‘Kurnass’ from the 69th Squadron, one crewed by Yiftach Shadmi and Meir Gur, while the second was piloted by Shpitzer and Ofer together, flew a mission at the Egyptian border. They were supported by another two ‘Kurnass’ of the 119 Squadron.

These four planes, took off from Ramat David Air Base and were sent on the West sector to patrol the Egyptian border. The pilots were allowed to trespass into Egypt, and after a couple of low level crosses, they entered Egyptian territory at high altitude, and then flew back over the Suez Canal and continued patrolling their side of the border.

Israeli pilots kills
Pilot’s name	Kills
Meir Gur	3
Yiftach Shadmi	3

They were sent in the area because the Israeli command wanted to patrol the southern area of Egypt, where they thought the Egyptians were preparing something.

Pilot Meir Gur reported that at some point, they received orders to search for targets in Egyptian territory. He and his wingman were flying at 20,000 – 25,000 feet while the two ‘Kurnass’ of 119 Squadron were apparently above them.The on-board radars were not working very well, and that day saw heavy overcast and fog. Gur noticed a pair of ‘blips’ on its radar display, and they closed the distance to investigate.

When the Israeli pilots found the ‘Blips’ they dropped their external fuel tanks and continued to search at high speed, but they could still see the bright spots on the radar, and the distance didn’t change. This meant that the two ‘Blips’ were flying at a similar speed to them. Meir’s radar performed a high to low search but it was very difficult to aim with the interference of the ground clutter.

Thanks to a GCI (Ground Control Intercept) station, the Israeli F-4Es of the 69th Squadron were able to track the enemy targets that were now in the range of their AIM-7 Air-to-Air missiles. However the Israeli pilots preferred to wait to engage the targets because of the bad weather, they did not know if the ‘blips’ were warplanes. Another problem was the fog that prevented the wingmen from being seen, so the Israeli pilots decided not to launch the missiles.

A few moments later, two Egyptian MiG-21s appeared in the Israeli pilot’s field of view and the two ‘Kurnass’ of the 69 Squadron immediately engaged.

One of the two MiGs escaped the skirmish while the other one remained for a 1 vs 2 air battle. From the Israeli pilots’ testimonies, the MiG-21 pilot, revealed to be a Korean some years later, was extraordinarily good with excellent reaction times and great knowledge in the maneuverability of his plane.

The Korean People’s Army Air Force pilot was probably a Vietnam War veteran, or otherwise a very well trained pilot. He tried many times to force the Israeli pilots to fight a low speed duel, where he had the advantage, but the Israeli pilots insisted on maintaining high speed.

The 119 Squadron pilots, above the 69th Squadron planes, asked by radio for their fellows to step aside, but the 69th Squadron’s F-4Es did not step aside, forcing the Korean pilot to maintain high speed, putting him at a disadvantage against the faster Israeli F-4s.

After a long chase, the MiG-21 was in range of Air-to-Air missiles and Yiftach Shadmi and Meir Gur’s F-4 launched two AIM-9Ds Air-to-Air missiles. Immediately after, Shpitzer and Ofer’s F-4 that was behind the other 69 Squadron plane, about 200 meters on a side, launched an AIM-9D too. This was a dangerous maneuver, the two Israeli planes risked shooting down each other with the missiles and, at the same time, Shpitzer and Ofer’s F-4 ‘Kurnass’ were at risk of ending up in the jet wake of the F-4 of Shadmi and Gur.

The first AIM-9D went close to the target and exploded but the MiG-21 emerged intact from the explosion and continued its flight. The second and third AIM-9Ds exploded near the target too but, for unknown reasons even in this case, the MiG-21 emerged from the fireballs intact. The Israeli pilots, now desperately low on fuel, were forced to disengage and return to base. Meir Gur was the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) of one of the two F-4Es, and looking back he saw the MiG was intact, but trailing white smoke. From Meir’s testimony, it is known that the Korean pilot turned his plane west and descended to a low altitude. Meir continued to keep an eye on it to check if it crashed on the ground but no explosions were seen.

While the Israeli planes were near the Suez Canal, Gur saw something that seized his attention. Meir is said to have seen the characteristic smoke trail of a Surface-to-Air Missile launched by the Egyptians. A few tenths of seconds later a giant explosion was visible at about 20,000 feet. Copilot Gur checked on his radar, but all the four ‘Kurnass’ were leaving the Egyptian airspace. By mistake, the Egyptian Anti-Aircraft missile batteries shot down one of their own MiGs manned by the Korean pilot.

When the planes landed safely home the credit was split between the two 69 Squadron plane crews. Meir Gur reported what he saw to the command, and some time later Israeli Intelligence confirmed his story: Egyptian Air Defense forces shut down their own MiG.

Unfortunately nothing is known about the nameless Korean pilot, if he survived ejecting , or if he died by friendly fire. Only in 2019 did the Israeli Air Force and Intelligence service make public the events of that day, informing the world and the Israeli pilots involved in the affair that the MiG pilot was from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Aftermath & Conclusion

After the Yom Kippur War, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea maintained a small training squadron in Egypt and also some other training units for the SAM batteries and other tasks.

Sadat agreed, the DPRK’s request to receive some R-17 Elbrus (NATO Code SS-1C Scud-B) tactical ballistic missiles and a MaZ TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) to start its own missile program.

In 1990s the Arab Republic of Egypt bought from Korea an unknown number of Scud-C missiles, they seem to be Hwasŏng-7 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). In 2008 Egyptian telecommunication company Orascom had the permission to create a 3G phone network called Koryolink in Korea.

At the same time Egypt permitted Korea, until the mid 2010s, to use Port Said as safe harbor to unload military equipment that would be sent all over the African continent.To give an example, the United Nations had declared that in 2016 a Korean merchant ship loaded with 30,000 RPGs arrived in Port Said. They were probably later delivered to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 2017 after the US slashed roughly $300 million due the Egyptian help in Korean illegal trades and due some failure to respect human rights. Afterwards, Egyptian Defense Minister Sedki Sobhi, during a visit to the Republic of Korea, said that Egypt had cut all military relationships with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Illustrations

Gallery

Credits

Written by Arturo G.

Edited by Henry H.

Illustrated by Godzilla

Sources

Air Operations During The 1973 Arab-Israeli War And The Implications – Global Security

https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/north-korea-fight-israel-mig21s-syria-egypt

https://apnews.com/article/da0e376a33020c988eaa2ab19e2e3041

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-unknown-story-of-the-israeli-f-4s-that-dogfighted-with-north-korean-mig-21s-during-the-yom-kippur-war/

Fact: North Korean Jet Fighters Fought Against Israel in the Yom Kippur War – The Aviation Geek Club – Dario Leone

Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 Alexander Mladenov – Osprey Publishing Air Vanguard 14

https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-egypt-north-korea-connection/

Arab MiG-19 MiG-21 Units in Combat – David Nicolle and Mark Styling – Osprey Combat Aircraft 44

North Korea’s Armed Forces: On the Path of Songun – Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans